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ABSTRACT  
Governing To!day denotes a domain of research, and what the thesis undertakes is a 
theoretical discussion of some questions of method vis!à!vis researching this 
domain. There are two aspects to the title that enfold one another. Firstly, 
“governing to!day” signposts that it is to!day that is to be governed, that it is 
ourselves in our actuality that form the target of government, hence it is this 
government of ourselves in our present that we are to enquire into. Secondly, 
“governing to!day” highlights the fact that it is thus the state of contemporary arts of 
government, government at this moment in time, in the present!day, in this time 
that is our own, and so forth, that forms the object of enquiry. Accordingly, 
“governing to!day” denotes both a government of the present and government in 
the present. In working through said questions of method, the thesis sketches out 
an approach that takes as its reference point and means of critique the “will not to 
be governed like that”. Consequently, the approach thus outlined is firmly situated 
within that rather loosely affiliated body of work that goes under the title studies in 
governmentality. Studies in governmentality have their point of departure in the 
research and writing of the French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault. It is 
primarily within the writings of Foucault that the thesis seeks to find a 
workaround to the problem thrown forth by the aforementioned questions of 
method.  
The central problematic that the thesis addresses concerns the non!historical 
nature not only of much contemporary studies in governmentality but also in the 
application of Foucault’s analytics of power more generally. The problem, as the 
thesis conceives this, is that the “tools” employed by Foucault in his various 
researches were essentially tools for doing historical research and, by way of these 
methods, for posing philosophical question to the present. The central question the 
thesis addresses, then, is how applicable are these “tools” to questioning the 
present not from the perspective of its history but from the perspective of its 
contemporality, and thus of our actuality. In putting to one side the now overused 
“tool!box” approach, the thesis puts forward what it calls a work!shop approach. 
This work!shop approach approaches the writings of Foucault and others not as a 
box of ready!made tools to be taken up and used, but as equipment from which we 
can fashion our own tools with regards to the problem at hand. In working 
through some questions of method—vis!à!vis, the provent present, its 
problematizations, their programmes, and the exercising of relations of power they 
articulate—, the thesis proposes an approach that it calls an architectural analytics 
of the architectonics of control.  
What is being proposed is an architectural analytics for doing field!work in 
the architectonics of control. Such field!work enquiries into the determination of 
the matter that constitutes the object and target of government; into 
conceptualizations of the form of subjectivity that matter is to be worked into; into 
the elaboration of the agent that is to transform the matter thus constituted into the 
form thus conceived; and into the thematization of the overall end, goal, or strategy 
of control: the for!the!sake!of!which the matter is to be shaped into the form by way of 
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the agent. The aim of such field!work in the present is to render visible the 
environmentality of governmentality in its, and thus our, contemporality.  
This approach is then presented as being one possible way of questioning 
concerning contemporary governmental technologies, and to question them not 
from the perspective of their history (archaeology and genealogy) but from the 
perspective of their, and thus our, actuality, and thus as being one possible way in, 
by, and through which to pose questions to governing to!day. 
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ABSTRAKT  PÅ  DANSK  
STYRING I DAG: PÅ VEJ MOD EN ANALYTIK AF DET NUTIDIGE 
 
 
”Styring i dag” betegner et domæne af forskning, og denne afhandling indeholder 
en teoretisk diskussion af spørgsmål om metode vis!à!vis en undersøgelse af dette 
domæne. Titlen har to aspekter, der omfatter hinanden: For det første, ”styring i 
dag” indikerer, at det er i dag, der skal styres, og at det er os selv i vores aktualitet 
som er målet for styringen, således er det styringen af os selv i vores nutid som vi 
er ved at undersøge. For det andet, fremhæver ”styring i dag”, at det tilstanden af 
nutidens regeringskunst, der danner genstand for undersøgelsen. Derfor betegner 
styring i dag både styring af nutiden og styring i nutiden. Ved at arbejde sig 
igennem disse spørgsmål om metode skitserer afhandlingen en tilgang, der tager 
”viljen til ikke at blive styret på denne måde” som sit referencepunkt og middel til 
kritik. Som konsekvens heraf, er den skitserede tilgange solidt situeret indenfor 
den løst knyttede samling af arbejder, der går under titlen studier i 
guvernementalitet. Studier i guvernementalitet har deres udgangspunkt i forskning 
og skrifter af den franske filosof og historiker, Michel Foucault. Det er primært 
indenfor Foucaults værker, at afhandlingen søger at arbejde sig igennem de 
problemer, som førnævnte metodespørgsmål rejser.  
Den centrale problematik, som afhandlingen analyserer, vedrører den ikke!
historiske natur af mange af de nutidige studier i guvernementalitet, men også i 
applikationen af Foucaults magtanalytik mere generelt. Det problematiske i at 
anlægge en sådan ikke!historisk tilgang er, som det er udlagt afhandlingen, at 
Foucaults metoder, som han benyttede i hans egne studier, var ”værktøjer” til at 
bedrive historisk forskning for derigennem at kunne stille filosofiske spørgsmål til 
nutiden. Det centrale spørgsmål afhandlingen stiller, er derfor hvor anvendelige 
disse ”værktøjer” er til at stille spørgsmål til nutiden fra et nutidigt perspektiv, og 
derfor fra vores aktualitet, snarere end fra et historisk perspektiv. Afhandlingen 
sætter derfor det nu overbrugte ”værktøjskasseperspektiv” til en side og 
argumenterer for, hvad der her kaldes, en work!shop tilgang. En sådan work!shop 
tilgang anskuer Foucaults og andres arbejder ikke som en kasse af færdigt 
tilvirkede værktøjer, som kan tages op og bruges, men som udstyr fra hvilke vi kan 
udforme vores egne værktøjer, som vi kan bruge til at arbejde med de 
forhåndenværende problemer. Ved arbejde sig igennem spørgsmål om metode—
vis!à!vis, nutiden som herkomst, dets problematiseringer, deres programmer, og 
udøvelsen af de magtrelationer de italesætter—, foreslår afhandlingen en tilgang, 
som den benævner en arkitektonisk analytik af kontrollens arkitektonikker.  
Det, der foreslås her, er en analytik til brug for at udføre felt!arbejde i 
kontrollens arkitektonikker. Et sådan felt!arbejde undersøger det stof, der udgør 
objektet og målet for regeringen; undersøger begrebsdannelse af formen for 
subjektivitet som stof skal omformes til; undersøger udarbejdelsen af den agent 
(virkende), der skal omdanne det konstituerede stof i den udtænkte form; og 
undersøger tematisering af det samlede formål, mål eller strategi for kontrol; af!
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hensyn!til!hvilken stoffet bliver formet i netop denne form gennem agenten (den 
virkende). Formålet med sådanne felt!arbejder er at synliggøre 
guvernementalitetens miljøbetingethed i sin, og dermed vores nutidighed.  
Denne tilgang er præsenteret som en mulig måde at forholde sig til vores 
nutidige styringsmæssige teknologier, og til at anfægte dem ikke ud fra deres 
historiske perspektiv (arkæologi og genealogi), men ud fra deres, og dermed vores 
egen, nutid. Dermed er afhandlingens tilgang blot en mulig måde at stille 
spørgsmål til styring i dag. 
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PART  ONE: INTRODUCTION  
We do not undertake analyses of works because we want to 
copy them or because we suspect them. We investigate the 
methods by which another has created his work, in order to set 
ourselves in motion. 
(Klee, The Thinking Eye) 
 
The most valuable insights are the last to be discovered; but the 
most valuable insights are methods  
(Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ) 
The thesis takes up as a central motif of studies in governmentality the critical 
attitude embodied in the question of “How not to be governed?” (Foucault 1996b: 
384). This critical question does not concern “How not to be governed at all?”, but 
rather revolves around a series of question posed in relation to that other 
question: “How to govern?” This series poses such questions as ‘“How not to be 
governed like that, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such 
objectives and by the means of such methods, not like that, not for that, not by 
them?”’ (ibid.). In other words, the will to govern has, since the sixteenth century, 
been constantly meet by the reactivation of a counter!will of not wanting to be 
governed by them, in that way, with those techniques, towards that end, and at 
that cost. What I want to do in the thesis is not to present a genealogy of the 
historical unfolding of this game of “How to govern?” and “How not to be 
governed thusly?” but, rather, to propose some tools for critiquing the former, as 
it is practiced to!day, from the perspective of the latter. That is to say, in using the 
critical work done by Foucault and others, I want to propose some tools for 
undertaking a critique of the micro!practices of government from the standpoint 
of not wanting to be governed like that. To question the will to govern and 
reflections upon how to govern from the counter!point of not wanting to be 
governed in that way is neither to question it from the side of resistance nor to 
put forward alternative forms of government; rather, it is to undertake an 
analytics of the will to govern by analysing their governmental practices, 
technologies, and rationalities. That is to say, it is to render visible not only what 
government wants but also how it wants to achieve this so as to open up a space 
for possible critique; critique that takes the form of not wanting to be governed 
like that. 
Studies in governmentality have as their target, then, discourses that 
concern themselves with the question of “How to govern?”; to this end, they are 
predominantly concerned with descriptions of what “is”, and prescriptions and 
codifications concerning techniques or arts of governing and knowledge about 
“man” evidenced in technological discourses—the theoreticians schemas: the, 
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programmatics, diagrammatics, architectonics, and so on, concerned with the 
“how?” of governing. That is to say, they interrogate government not 
“governance” (see the discussion on page 142 below). In doing so, they not only 
look at the product or end result, as it were, of such schematizations—their 
thematic content and their effects; more importantly they look primarily at how 
things were made governable or, more specifically, of how they were rendered 
seeable and sayable and thus thinkable and actionable; in short, how what is to 
be governed was made in the very process of being made thinkable as governable. 
To be rendered governable here does not only mean to be made susceptible to 
investigation, reflection, evaluation, calculation, and so forth; it concerns not so 
much a question of what is governable as it does what there is to govern and how 
this was made governable. That is to say, it does not deal with the question of 
thought in relation to pre!discursive, ready!made objects, but looks at how 
objects are made at the same time and through the very same processes as being 
made thinkable and being thought about: “how were objects made as seeable and 
sayable and thinkable and practicable (i.e. actionable) as governable?” That is to 
say, they look at what Rose and Miller (1992, 2010) call the “problematics of 
government”.  
Such an analysis or analytics interrogates the mutual and simultaneous 
coming!into!being of problematizations (matters of concern) and their objects 
(matters of fact) on the one hand, and of problems and rejoinders on the other; 
rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes. It is these programmes that 
codify and prescribe ways of doing things; that is to say, what is to be known and 
what is to be done (Foucault 2001d: 225, 230). It is these codifying and 
prescriptive discourses, these programmes, that Foucault calls technologies. 
Technologies, understood as “the articulation of certain techniques and certain 
kinds of discourse about the subject”, constitute the domain of analysis of studies 
in governmentality. Technologies are prescriptions!codifications, techniques!
discourses, or what Foucault once termed power!knowledge; on this view, 
governmental technologies or technologies of government equates to 
governmental power!knowledge or the power!knowledge of government. 
Governmentality, then, refers, simultaneously, to relations of power and to the 
techniques and knowledges that allow for those relations to be exercised; 
techniques which often not only work upon but also through and by means of 
techniques of self. Governmentality refers to the conducting of conducts, to ‘a 
strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and 
reversibility’ (Foucault 2005: 252); governmental technologies, or power!
knowledges, refer to the setting!out or laying!out of probable conduct (Foucault 
2001d: 341). 
In taking up this concept of governmentality, then, we will take it in its 
broadest possible conceptualization; a conceptualization that consists of a three!
fold matrix: Firstly, it points to relations of power conceptualized as strategic 
games between liberties: those over whom power is to be exercised are free to act 
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and are thus thought of as being susceptible to having their actions acted upon. 
Secondly, it refers to the techniques, the tactics, and so forth, which enable those 
strategic relations to be operationalized and exercised: techniques that do not act 
directly and immediately upon either minds or bodies but aim to act upon 
actions by setting!out environments of probability. Thirdly, it relates to the 
formation not only of an object of knowledge and target of governmental 
intervention but also of the forms of subjectivity that are to be brought into 
existence. Subjectivity is conceived here not only as a relation of governed to 
governor but also as a relation of self to self (see, e.g. Burchell 1996; Cruikshank 
1996; Rose 1996b), and so the techniques deployed to allow for the exercising of a 
relation of power by contemporary governmentalities are questioned according 
to the different and differential ways in which they colonize such relations; that is 
to say, not only in the ways in which government works upon the other but also 
the ways in which it works upon the other by getting this other to work upon 
themselves (i.e. through techniques of self). As Foucault put this in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, ‘if we take the question of power…[and situate]…it in 
the more general question of governmentality…[, understood as]…a strategic 
field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, 
then…reflection [up]on this notion of governmentality can[not] avoid passing 
through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the 
relationship of self to self…[On this view,]…the analysis of 
governmentality…must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the 
relationship of self to self’ (Foucault 2005: 252). 
One question to be addressed here, which has been signposted by Walters 
(2012), is the way in which much contemporary studies in governmentality deal 
with ‘contemporary history’ (ibid.: 49; see also Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 
2011a, who state that ‘[r]ather than being genealogically!historically oriented, 
most of this [Anglo!Saxon] work used Foucault’s instruments to analyze 
processes of contemporary social transformation’, 9ff.). As Walters observes, 
studies in governmentality have largely ‘normalized’ (Walters 2012: 50) what was 
something of an aberration or anomaly in Foucault’s own genealogies of power. 
That is to say, whereas the larger percentage of Foucault’s genealogies of 
government have been historical analyses of its verticality (provenance and 
emergence) and horizontality (epistemic and technical matrices) since the 
sixteenth century, contemporary studies in governmentality, in placing emphasis 
upon Foucault’s analyses of “neo!liberal” arts of government that emerged post 
Second World War, ‘have diverged from the kind of historical methods that 
Foucault and his colleges usually practiced’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘this literature 
has situated itself firmly within the temporal horizon of the near present’ (ibid.). I 
would go one step further here, and suggest that much contemporary studies in 
governmentality—or analyses of power more generally—have even forsaken the 
recent past for an analysis of the contemporary itself, and do, indeed, express a 
“neo!liberal bias” (Walters 2008; 2012: 50). In addition, it seems to me that in 
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much contemporary studies in governmentality, the aforementioned critical 
question—of not wanting to be governed thusly—has been, at least to a certain 
extent, displaced. By this, I mean that this fundamental question posed by this 
attitude of critique, this will not to be governed like that, seems to have been 
consumed by a concern for providing detailed empirical descriptions of 
techniques. An admiral goal, in and of itself, but to what end? From an ethico!
political point of view, such description losses much of it theoretical justification 
if it does not take on board the finalité of this critical ethos. That is, of 
complementing historical and/or contemporary description with a contingent 
normative critique that is grounded not in some abstract universal principle: 
“man”, but is precisely immanent to, and, indeed, imminent in, the will not to be 
governed in that way.  
One of the central questions to be posed in the thesis is how applicable is 
the work of Foucault (and others) to analyzing power as it is practiced to!day in 
our contemporary present by questioning it from the point of view of our 
actuality. (In order to highlight the fact that “today” is being used in a technical 
sense—i.e. as a particular conceptualization of, and analytic of, “the present”—I 
shall revert to writing it as a hyphenated compound term: to!day, which literally 
means “on—the or this—day”: Old English: from tó “at, on” + dæg “day”.) More 
specifically, then, the thesis asks how applicable is that work in relation to the 
different ways in which it has been taken!up (appropriated), understood 
(interpreted), and used (applied) in the study of power generally and 
governmentality specifically. Another question, following of from the first, 
concerns the effect on Foucaultian critique, on the aforementioned critical 
attitude and critical question, of doing non!historical studies in governmentality. 
What happens to the critical question of “not wanting to be governed like that” 
when this question is posed not to history but to the contemporary? 
I think one of the greatest strength of Foucault’s conceptualization of power, 
and later of government, is that it is conceptualized and studied historically. Or, 
stated differently, ‘it was not [Foucault’s] practice to deliver evaluations of 
current affairs’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiii), at least not in his book!length 
publications. It is its greatest strength in that posing the question of power in this 
way—that is, in term of a history of thought (archaeology) and a history of our 
present and of ourselves in our present (genealogy)—it draws our attention to 
the historical, local, and contingent nature of the present, of how the present was 
made, of contemporary thought, and above all of subjectivity, and thus raises the 
critical question of the exercising of relations of power to!day. In doing so, it 
discloses that which we have come to take!for!granted, that which has become 
unassuming, out!of!sight, and thus out!of!mind, that which is not seen and thus 
goes without saying; not because these things have been forgotten or repressed, 
nor because they have been masked by some interested party, but because what 
has come to be take!for!granted is so central to our very existence, so integral to 
our mundane and routine everyday practices, that we cannot (can no longer) see 
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it. Like the proverbial water to a fish, we are immersed in it, absorbed and 
surrounded by it; we are it. We no longer see what may be seen and we no longer 
say what goes without saying because these things are ‘below the line of 
visibility’ (Veyne 1998: 156).  
On the other hand, I think that Foucault’s untimely use of history is, 
however, one of its greatest weaknesses, not in and of itself but because this 
central, even fundamental, question of history tends to be discarded, occluded, 
forgotten, or simply ignored in many of the studies of power undertaken today 
that employ Foucault’s conceptualization of power in some way. This sense of 
“untimeliness” comes from the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Mediations in 
which, in situating himself as a classicist, he state that ‘I do not know what 
meaning classical studies could have for our time if they were not untimely – that 
is to say, acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us 
hope, for the benefit of a time to come’ (Nietzsche 1997b: 60). It is this sense of 
untimeliness that is lost to critique in much contemporary research on the 
contemporary. As Rabinow and Rose (2003b) conceive this ‘Foucault’s diagnosis 
of the present does not proceed by attempting a comprehensive analysis of these 
practices as they exist today, but by seeking the conditions that have made these 
practices possible’ (ibid.: xiii). In contradistinction to this practice, there is a 
general tendency in analyses that use Foucault’s work to analyze relations of 
power, the exercise of power, technologies of power, strategies of power, and so 
on, and so forth, to study power in its contemporaneity; they are analyses not of 
its historical conditions of possibility but of its contemporary manifestations, its 
actuality. That is to say, they study the present from the perspective of its own 
actuality. (Throughout the thesis, the term “actuality” will be used not only to 
denote our present, to!day, this moment in time contemporary with the moment 
of writing, and so on, but also to connote a particular conceptualization of our 
present, the present viewed from the perspective of a singularity, and so forth.) 
Moreover, such studies tend to analyze the contemporary present where the 
phrase “the present” is substantialized as a set of circumstances, a particular 
condition, or as a specific state!of!affairs. Such a practice is common practice in, 
say, sociology—i.e. “postmodern society” (Lyotard 1984), “post!industrial 
society” (Bell 2008), “risk society” (Beck 1992), “the information age” (Poster 
1990, 1995), “surveillance society” (Lyon 1994, 2001), “the age of terror” (Morton 
and Bygrave 2008)—but should be avoided when undertaking an analytics of the 
contemporary. Moreover, it stands in stark contrast to the fundamentally 
historical and non!substantive nature not only of Foucault’s own researches 
concerning the problem of power, problems of knowledge and truth, of 
governors and governed, of subject and self, and so forth, but also of other 
Foucaultian inspired research; for instance, some of the studies in 
governmentality. Here, I follow Rose (1999) and others in ‘conceiving of our 
present [not] as an epoch or a state of affairs,…[but rather]…as an array of 
problems and questions, an actuality to be acted upon and…to be made 
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amenable to action by the action of thought’ (ibid.: 11). That is to say, the present 
can and should be conceptualized as something akin to what Foucault once 
called ‘a transactional reality’ (Foucault 2008a: 297): a reality that not only 
precedes and acts as a condition of possibility for such transaction, but that is also 
constituted in transaction. One of the central tropes of Foucaultian critique is to 
render visible what is not seen and what goes without saying. The question then 
becomes, “How are we to do this seeing and saying for ourselves without 
recourse to history?”, where history is the critical tool par excellence (see O"Farrell 
2005).  
This disjunct—between archaeologico!genealogical histories of our present 
and analyses and descriptions of the contemporary present—raises a number of 
questions that seem to have been either passed by or by passed, and thus not 
raised as a problem. How applicable, for example, are Foucault’s “methods”, 
which are essentially methods for doing historical analyses (i.e. archaeology and 
genealogy), to undertaking studies of power as it is exercised to!day that 
question it not in terms of the historicity of it conditions of possibility but it terms 
of its conditions of actuality? What, if anything, is gained or lost in transposing 
“tools” for doing history into tools for studying our present from the perspective 
of itself? Or, since transposition implies reflection, of simply using such tools 
non!historically or even ahistorically? Looking at this more reflectively, are there 
any tools in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical tool!boxes—tool!boxes 
kitted out for doing history, albeit of a unique form—which can be taken up and 
effectively employed in studying relations of power as they are exercised to!day? 
That is to say, for undertaking a critical analytics of power without recourse to 
describing its historical conditions; that is, to describing the conditioned without 
recourse to describing what conditioned the conditioned.  
 
Now, there are numerous different possible pathways into—and out of—the 
works of Foucault. There are so many diverse and promising points of departure 
that deciding where to begin can leave one in a vertiginous state of paralysis. 
And secondary studies are often of little help here, in that each new study tends 
to bring out a different facet of Foucault’s writing. I was going to say that what is 
to be presented here is not commentary, but this is not quite correct; it is a 
commentary, of sorts. Nevertheless—and taking on!board the citation from Klee 
that opened this introduction—it is only commentary to the extent that I want to 
investigate the work of Foucault and others in order to set us on our way. What is 
presented here, then, is not an explanation, and is less an exposition or 
explication; rather, it is more like a rumination that slowly chews!over the 
specific question at hand before digesting it in the form of manufacturing our 
own tools. To paraphrase Dean (1994: 2), but giving his sentence a different twist, 
“the present work is not an attempt to codify Foucault’s methods but to find out 
how far one can get by reflecting on them in the context of the particular problem 
at hand”; namely, of questioning our present and ourselves, from the stand!point 
7 
 
of our own actuality, in terms of power. In other words, I want to broach the 
question of how to go about questioning power, as it is exercised to!day, from 
with the perspective of our present, from within what I will call a broadly 
Foucaultian perspective. What I mean by this phrase not exactly “Foucault’s 
perspective” but a derivative thereof; that is, as something akin to what Barry, 
Osborne, and Rose (1996a) have called an ethos.   
I think Foucault put forward, and indeed practiced, one of the most 
sophisticated and thought through “methods” for broaching the question of 
power; that is, for interrogating relations of power and the techniques that allow 
for their exercise. What Foucault presents us with in his writings is neither a 
“theory of power” (if by theory we mean an abstract set of principles that explain 
some aspect of reality) nor a “methodology” for studying power (if by 
methodology we mean a unified science of method). What is presented there, 
rather, is an approach or, more specifically, a number of approaches for 
questioning concerning relations of power and their exercise; where the very 
term “power” forms part of that approach (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012). 
This work on power was subject to constant revision and re!elaboration in 
Foucault’s lifetime, and it has not remained static since his death in 1984. On the 
contrary, it has been taken up, used, developed, and modified by numerous 
others; most directly in that rather loosely collected body of work that goes under 
the general heading of studies in governmentality (see, e.g. Arts, Lagendijk, and 
van Houtum 2009; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b; Binkley and Capetillo 2010; 
Bratich, Packer, and McCarthy 2003; Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011b; 
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Corbridge et al. 2005; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 
1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; Hannah 2000; Inda 2005; Lemke 2012; Li 2007; 
Miller and Rose 2008; Nadesan 2008; Rose 1999; Walters 2012). My Foucaultian 
perspective will draw not only upon the work of Foucault but also on a number 
of texts from this extensive literature. 
When I say that Foucault has produced a “method” for broaching the 
question of power, it is essential to get clear about this term. In talking about 
method, I am not thinking about “methodology”; that is, of something like a 
systematic treatise, or theory of method, and so on, nor a methodical procedure 
to follow, and so forth. Rather, what I have in mind is more like theoretical 
reflections that pose questions of method vis!à!vis the specific work being 
undertaken. On this view, methods are ad hoc constructions, but they are 
constructions constructed from and within a certain mode of thought. It is this 
mode of thought that I am calling a Foucaultian perspective. Consequently, the 
term “method” will be used exclusively in this sense. What I want to avoid, 
above all, are the pitfalls and potential dangers of falling into the trap of either 
“applicationism” (Walters 2012) or “Foucaultianism” (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: 
viii). In this context, applicationism is ‘the tendency – perhaps a habit as much as 
a practice – to regard governmentality [and an analytics of power more 
generally] as a fully formed perspective that one simply applies to a particular 
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area or topic’ (Walters 2012: 5). As Walters goes on to note, ‘[a]t its extreme, 
applicationism risks turning the analytical toolbox into a self!contained 
theoretical system’ (ibid.). Thus, in thinking about and reflecting upon what 
‘Foucault’s thought offer[s] for the analysis of our present and our future?’, I 
want to avoid the tendency of ‘seeking to define a singular approach or a unique 
methodology which we can then apply to our current concerns’ (Rabinow and 
Rose 2003b: vii). In other words, I want to proceed not in terms of a 
Foucaultianism, but in terms of a broadly Foucaultian perspective. What I want to 
do here, then, is not to formulate a systematic procedure that can be applied to 
different instances but, rather, to reflect upon what this perspective might look 
like and how and in what ways it might be applicable to questioning our present 
from the perspective of our actuality, and to questioning our actuality in terms of 
power. 
In order to counter the tendency towards applicationism, and thus by 
extension towards Foucaultianism, Walters calls for ‘an attitude towards 
research’ that takes the form of a ‘critical encounter’ (Walters 2012: 5). The problem 
I have with the word “encounter” is twofold. Firstly, the term denotes something 
like a face!to!face meeting (from Latin incontr"re “in front of”, from in! “in” + 
contr" “against”, Oxford English Dictionary; OED hereafter); in other words, it 
suggests the meeting of two separate and discreet entities and is thus suggestive 
of the distinction and opposition between research subject and research object. 
What we need to bear in mind is that both subject and object are constituted in, 
by, and through such an encounter and, indeed, that such constitutions are 
constitutive of the encounter itself—and vice!versa; that is to say, we need to take 
into account, when approaching things from our Foucaultian perspective, that 
these things are mutual, reciprocal, and immanent to one another. Secondly, the 
term has connotations of an adversarial meeting or the meeting of opposing 
forces in conflict (OED). Now, whilst it is the case that in questioning concerning 
the exercising of relations of power we are questioning from a position of 
‘counter!power [contre!pouvoir]’ (Foucault 2001b: 540), such questioning needs to 
avoid falling into oppositional politics, value judgements, polemics, and 
denunciations. That is to say, we need to avoid ‘posing the question of power in 
terms of good and evil [en terme de bien ou de mal]’, and instead question it ‘in 
terms of existence [en terme d#existence]’ (ibid.). What it means to question power 
in terms of existence or, rather, what such an analysis entails and how we can use 
this, will be explicated as the thesis unfolds. 
Bearing these two points in mind, if we take “encounter” to mean ‘an 
unexpected meeting’ (Walters 2012: 5)—that is, if we conceptualize such an 
encounter as a constituted!constitutive event—that is to say, as an event in 
thought—, then it is in this sense, I think, that such an encounter can be critical 
(i.e. effective, e.g. Foucault 1998: 369!391; or in terms of an “attitude” or ethos, 
e.g. Foucault 1997: 303!319; see also Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a): the will not 
to be governed like that. 
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 Problematics  
This question of histories of the present verses present!day analyses of our 
actuality is only the most obvious problem in “applications” of Foucault’s 
“method”. In addition to this question of historicity, and perhaps derived from it, 
there are further questions to be asked vis!à!vis using Foucault’s 
conceptualizations and analytics of power for studying the exercising of relations 
of power in our actuality.  
 1 – A first set of questions relate precisely to carrying out studies of power 
in institutions, organizations, establishments, associations, and so forth. One of 
the central shifts that took place with the emergence of genealogy and the 
concurrent emergence of a positive and productive conceptualization of relations 
of power in Foucault’s thought in the 1970s, was precisely the recognition that 
one cannot effectively broach the question of relations of power and of its 
exercise, vis!à!vis thought—by looking at the internal workings of what Foucault 
called institutions (Foucault 2006b). Foucault’s point, I think, is not that it is not 
possible to pose the question concerning power in this way; rather, it is that 
something is missed in doing so. In relation to the kind of analysis Foucault had 
undertaken in History of Madness, for example, he states that, ‘I no longer think 
that the institution is a very satisfactory notion. It seems to me that it harbors a 
number of dangers, because as soon as we talk about institutions…we take the 
individual, the group, and the rules which govern them as given, and as a result 
we can throw in all the psychological or sociological discourses’ (ibid.: 15). He 
goes on to state that, ‘what is essential is not the institution with its 
regularity…but…the practical dispositions of power, the characteristic networks, 
currents, relays, points of support, and differences of potential that characterize a 
form of power, which are…constitutive of…both the individual and the group’ 
(ibid.). Consequently, ‘before tackling institutions, we have to deal with the 
relations of force in these tactical arrangements that permeate institutions’ (ibid.).  
 2 – A second problem with using Foucault’s conceptualization of power, 
and his methods for questioning it, to undertaking studies of power in 
organizations, institutions, and so forth, is the specific form of questioning that 
Foucault’s historical analyses of relations of power and its exercise took. For 
example, most studies of power in institutions, organizations, and so forth are 
what we could call studies of everyday life; that is to say, they study—
ethnographically, participatorially, experientially, interpretively, and so forth—
the exercise of power as it manifests itself in real!time in the day!to!day 
functionings and on!going activities of modern institutions: they look at what 
actually takes place or at what really happens, and so forth. Now, whilst this is 
certainly a legitimate way of broaching the question of power institutionally in its 
contemporaneity, it bears little resemblance either to the domain or to the 
method of Foucault’s own enquiries: which are neither anthropological, nor 
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sociological, nor ethnographical enquiries, historical or otherwise. A brief survey 
of Foucault’s most cited book—Discipline and Punish—evidences this difference.   
What Foucault looks at in this study are not the day!to!day activities of 
what went on in eighteenth century punitive practices or nineteenth century 
penal institutions; what he addresses, rather, are rules, ordinances, petitions, orders, 
measures, plans, and so forth, and their positivity or dispositivity. That is to say, he 
examines the multiple and heterogeneous discourses and technical practices that 
formed the conditions of possibility of disciplinary power, and thus of the birth of 
the modern prison. This helps to explain why Foucault turns to Bentham‘s (1843 
[1787]) architectural plan for a house of inspection, rather than Howard’s (1780 
[1777]; 1791 [1789]) descriptions of goals, houses of correction, prisons, and 
lazarettos, and so forth. In the former, we have an English utilitarian philosopher, 
jurist, and social reformer, sat at a desk in Crecheff, White Russia, in 1787, 
thinking about, writing out, and diagramming a plan for a house of inspection 
(Bentham 1843), an inspection!house that was never constructed in exact 
accordance with the original plan, but a plan that has nevertheless had profound 
effects upon our present and upon ourselves; I do not see how any of this could 
have been rendered visible and thus intelligible by way of ethnography—even 
those of the kind undertaken by actor!network theorists (e.g. Latour 2005; Law 
and Hassard 1999)—or other interpretivist methodologies; historical or 
otherwise. If we are to undertake an analytics of the contemporary equivalent of 
such programmes, how are we to go about doing this? Is it that what Foucault 
analyzes and describes in Discipline and Punish assumed the form that it did 
because what is expressed there took place in a time and in a place that is not our 
own—in short, are ethnography and interpretation ruled out because of history? 
I do not think so. Rather, it is that the very object of enquiry is not something that 
can be disclosed (rendered visible, made apparent) and thus rendered intelligible 
by way of such methods. For even if this event took place in 1787, there are surely 
accounts that could have been consulted vis!à!vis what actually took place in the 
various places of confinement situated throughout Europe in the late eighteenth 
century. And, indeed, such texts do exist. The most obvious example of the latter 
are those studies undertaken and published by another Englishman, the 
philanthropist and prison reformer, John Howard (1726—1790). 
Between 1775 and 1790, Howard, a self!appointed inspector of prisons, 
visited numerous houses of correction, city and town!gaols, bridewells, 
lazarettos, hospitals, schools, and workhouses, and so forth, across England and 
Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and in “some foreign prisons”: France, Flanders, 
Holland, and Germany, as well as Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and 
elsewhere (Howard 1780; 1791). Howard not only inspected such institutions, he 
also talked to prisoners, to their gaolers, as well as the doctors of the time. He 
presents the reader not only with detailed descriptions of the condition he saw, of 
the condition of the prisoners, of their treatment at the hand of their keepers, but 
also of the design and layout of some of the houses of confinement (maps and 
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measurements), along with descriptions of the practices that took place there and 
some of the juridical procedures involved. In other words, these materials, along 
with other texts such as Blackstone’s (1775 [1765!1769]), are ripe for undertaking 
a kind of historical ethnography of everyday life in late eighteenth century 
institutions of confinement. And yet, in Discipline and Punish, Howard is 
mentioned a mere three times, is discussed and referenced only once, and this is 
in relation to something other than his prison texts (Foucault 1977a: 123, 200); 
whereas Bentham (1748—1832), by way of his panoptic plan, is discussed at 
length, and mentioned, referenced, and noted some thirty four times (ibid.: 200!
264, 316!317, 327). What we are dealing with here is, I think, not explicitly a 
methodological question but a philosophical one; or, rather, the choice of method 
is an effect of a certain philosophical ethos: ‘[p]hilosophy is a diagnostic 
undertaking, archaeology is a method for describing thought’ (Foucault, letter, 
cited in Defert 2013a: 32). 
Rather than “ethnography”, we can say that what Foucault undertook was 
more akin to a certain kind of ethnology; not of “behavior” or “ideas”, however, 
but of thought and rationality: ‘I could define…[a form of research like my 
own]…as an analysis of the cultural facts characterising our culture…[, 
as]…something like an ethnology of the culture to which we belong’; an 
ethnology, that is, ‘of our rationality, of our “discourse”’ (Foucault 1999: 91; see 
also 2002a: 411). What is of significance in this quote, which comes from an 
interview given not long after the publications of The Order of Things (in 1967), is 
less the appeal to ethnology (and, in The Order of Things, to psychoanalysis and 
linguistics) than the form of analysis that ethnology is said to undertake, as 
Foucault conceptualizes this. This form of analysis seek to by!pass the positing of 
“man” as an “empirico!transcendental doublet” posited by the “analytics of 
finitude”, and thus seek to avoid passing through the “being of man”. In Chapter 
10 of The Order of Things, Foucault conceptualizes ethnology as a ‘counter!science’ 
(Foucault 2002a: 416), a “counter!science” that does not interrogate ‘man himself, 
as he may appear in the human sciences’, but questions ‘the region that makes 
possible knowledge [savoir] about man in general’ (Foucault 2002a: 412). Both 
ethnography and ethnology have the same etymological root in the Greek ethnos 
(“people, nation, class, caste, tribe, group”, and the like; OED). Whereas the “!
graphy” suffix of the former can be said to denote writing about other cultures, 
and the “!logy” of the later can be said to denote the science or discourse on other 
cultures, the way in which Foucault conceptualizes ethnology is to invert it to 
mean something like a study of the discourse of a culture (ethno + logy: culture + 
discourse; OED), and of the thought and/or rationality inhabiting them.  
Whilst it is probably the case that Foucault came to question the notion that 
“man” would soon be erased ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ 
(Foucault 2002a: 422), I think he never gave up his aversion to “man” as an 
explanatory principle or interpretative strategy. Moreover, I think it is precisely 
this aversion that is being play!out in his appeal to Bentham rather than Howard 
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in Discipline and Punish. It is also this aversion that is appealed to in Foucault’s 
later writings; for instance, in the discussion of “philosophical anthropology” and 
“social history” in ‘Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume Two’ (Foucault 1997: 
200) or in his presentation of not analyzing “behaviours” or “ideas” but 
problematization and practices in the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure (Foucault 
1985: 10!13). This, then, is why Foucault turns to the theory!programme of the 
panopticon rather than a description of everyday life. 
Foucault addresses just this point in ‘Questions of Method’, in which he 
poses the following rhetorical question to himself: ‘[y]ou say to me: Nothing 
happens as laid down in these “programs”, they are no more than dreams, 
utopias, a sort of imaginary production that you aren’t entitled to substitute for 
reality. Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon isn’t a very good description of “real life” in 
nineteenth!century prisons’ (Foucault 2001d: 232). To which he replies, ‘[i]f I had 
wanted to describe “real life” in the prisons, I indeed wouldn’t have gone to 
Bentham. But the fact that this real life isn’t the same thing as the theoreticians’ 
schemes doesn’t entail that these schemes are therefore utopian, imaginary, and 
so on’ (ibid.). And this because ‘these programs induce a whole series of effects in 
the real…: they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behavior, they act as 
grids for the perception and evaluation of things’ (ibid., emphases added; see also the 
discussion in ‘Omnes et Singulatim’, ibid.: 319!320). That is to say, they form 
those things still have value and meaning for us, even if or perhaps because we 
can no longer see them and thus they go without saying. What such analyses 
analyze, then, is not some kind of historical ethnography; we are not presented 
with an anthropological or historical sociological description of everyday life, à la 
Goffman (1961). On the contrary, what they undertake is what Foucault referred 
to in his later writings as a critical history of thought or a materialist history of 
rationality: epistemological (knowledge, science, truth) and technological 
(political and/or ethical) reason. 
What is offered in Discipline and Punish, are not simply analyses of what was 
actually done by people to people in the day!to!day practices of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century punitive practices. Rather, and for the most part, what we are 
presented with are descriptions of prescriptions describing what is and 
prescribing what was to be done, what should be done, what ought to be done, 
and so on, and how these were to be done, and so forth, vis!à!vis the government 
of others: what we might call punitive reason. They are, in short, what Foucault 
termed programmes (what was to be done, what should be done, what ought to be 
done) and techniques (the specific ways in which what should be done, etc., were 
to be carried out); both of which are captured by what Foucault called 
“technologies of power”. Stated slightly differently, and applying a phrase from 
The Use of Pleasure to Foucault’s broader projects, the object and/or target of 
Foucault’s critical histories were ‘“practical” texts, which are themselves objects 
of a “practice”’ (Foucault 1985: 12). Technologies of power are prescriptive 
discourses, not—or not just—physical technical devices: they are as much 
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contrivances as they are contraptions. Foucault was not just writing about material 
existence, but also about how particular forms of material existence gives rise to 
certain conceptualizations, practical thought, calculation, technological 
rationality: this is what is meant by the expression ‘a materialism of the 
incorporeal’ (Foucault 1981: 69). Such a project is undertaken, archaeologically, 
by interrogating the specific forms of thought (a history of thought), and, 
genealogically, by enquiring into the material and practical conditions of 
possibility of thought, ‘the situations that give rise to it’ (Foucault 1998: 308), and 
in terms of the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, 
made or makes possible ‘the consequences it gives rise to’ (ibid.). 
Hence—pace Alford (2000), Garland (1990), Semple (1992), and others—
Foucault does not, for example, ‘mistake the utopian discourse of prison reform 
for its practice’ (Alford 2000: 134). On the contrary, commentators such as Alford 
et al mistake Foucault’s archaeology of discourses for analyses of actual, concrete, 
everyday (lived!experience?) practices. The confusion here is not that ‘Foucault 
presents the utopian ideals of eighteenth!century prison reformers, most of 
which were never realized, as though they were the actual reforms of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (ibid.); rather, it is that readers such as 
Alford, Garland, and others read him as such. For Gordon (1980), this 
‘misunderstanding consists in a conflation of historical levels which reads into 
the text two massive illusions or paralogisms’ (ibid.: 246). On the one hand, there 
is the ‘illusion of “realisation” whereby it is supposed that programmes 
elaborated in certain discourses are integrally transposed to the domain of actual 
practices and techniques’ (ibid.). On the other hand, there is the ‘illusion of 
“effectivity” whereby certain technical methods of social domination are taken as 
being actually implemented and enforced upon the social body as a whole’ 
(ibid.). In other words, the conflation resides in certain readings of Foucault, 
rather than in Foucault’s archaeologico!genealogical descriptions and 
presentation of these discourses and practices. 
What most social scientific theories, researches, studies, ethnographies, and 
so forth, do are to formulate ways and means of understanding and/or explaining 
what we are, what we do, and the world in which we live (see, e.g. Foucault 1985: 
10). What Foucault does is something rather different; and this difference is a 
history of thought analyzed archaeologically. Perhaps this is why the taking up 
of Foucault’s concept of power and/or genealogy is often accompanied by an 
additional external element; three well know example being Deleuze (Hardt and 
Negri 2000), Freud (Butler 1997), and Gramsci (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). My 
point, here, is not to criticize or problematize these specific studies, which have 
been highly influential in opening up new problem spaces for research. Rather, it 
is to pose a question that they exemplify, and this concerns the apparent need to 
supplement the work of Foucault with such additional elements. What Foucault’s 
histories can be said to study are precisely just such ways of questioning, 
researching, and explaining who we are, how we do things, and how we (should, 
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ought to) live; and specifically, the ways in which such knowledge (savoir) is 
connected to the exercising of relations of power (pouvoir). Specifically, he 
undertakes a history of thought that examines the problematizations that give rise 
to such enquiries and government (Foucault 1985: 10). That is to say, he studies 
those knowledges and those practices that deal, in one way or another, with that 
epistemic and technical matrix of intra!related questions concerning what Steiner 
(1980) has called ‘the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the 
good life’ (ibid.: 338, emphases added). In other words, it interrogates the 
connections and intra!relations between the human sciences and governmental 
rationalities; or, stated otherwise, of the relation there is between power and 
knowledge exemplified in the phrase power!knowledge (or knowledge!power, 
savoir!pouvoir). 
We can best access this by taking up the claim made in the ‘Preface’ to 
Dreyfus and Rabinow’s (1983) influential exposition on Foucault’s thought. In 
prefacing their book, Dreyfus and Rabinow state that Foucault has come up with 
a new ‘method for the study of human beings’ (ibid.: xvii); true, but only if we 
understand this in a certain way. What Foucault’s work embodies is not a new 
effort to develop a method for the study of human beings, if by this we mean a 
questioning concerning “what is it to be human?” It is a new method for the 
study of human beings, however, if by this we mean a way of studying the 
different and differential ways in which, historically, in the West, human beings 
have studied themselves: in terms of relations of knowledge and science, in terms 
of relations of power and government, and in terms of relation to self and ethics. 
If this is not evident in the kinds of studies Foucault undertook—and I happen to 
think that it is—then it is clearly evidenced in two places.  
Firstly, this way of doing things is evidenced in a comment Foucault made, 
vis!à!vis thought, to the effect that ‘[w]e can envisage…two kinds of philosopher: 
the kind who opens up new avenues of thought, such as Heidegger, and the kind 
who in a sense plays the role of an archaeologist, studying the space in which 
thought unfolds, as well as the conditions of that thought, its mode of 
constitution’ (Foucault 1999: 86); Foucault clearly situates himself, and is 
undoubtedly situated, in the latter. Secondly, there is the 1971 debate between 
Foucault and Chomsky (1997), which is demonstrative of such an archaeology of 
thought in action. In this debate, Chomsky puts forward a vision of the just 
society (the good life) and describes how that society is to be brought into being 
(the political order), both of which are premised upon his understanding of 
creativity being an essential and innate capacity of human beings (the nature of 
human nature) (see, e.g. ibid.: 128). What is interesting about this debate is the 
exasperation and disbelief on the part of Chomsky concerning Foucault’s 
criticisms of his position. Chomsky’s astonishment stems from the fact that he 
does not—and, from within the confines of his own position, perhaps cannot—
comprehend the place from which Foucault is making his critique; that is to say, 
Foucault does not put forward an alternative theory of the nature of human 
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nature and the political order conducive to the good life, but, rather, questions 
the very historicity, and thus contingency, of the thought inhering in Chomsky’s 
own position. 
Of course, it could be argued that Foucault nevertheless has an implicit or 
tacit, and thus unacknowledged, ontology vis!à!vis human nature (see, e.g. Han 
2002). Thus, for example, it could be argued that in his discussion of Bentham’s 
panopticon there is an implicit understanding of what it is to be human in his 
description of the ways in which human beings internalize the structures or 
conditions in which they are enmeshed (the panoptic mechanism). This would be 
true were it not for the fact that what Foucault is describing here is not a real 
world event—i.e. a description of everyday life—but rather the logic, the reason 
or rationality inhabiting the thought expressed in Bentham’s discourse vis!à!vis 
the government of others; and, more specifically, the ways in which Bentham’s 
discourse constitutes the very objects of which it speaks. On this view, what 
Foucault is describing is not a human nature (ontology), but a historically 
delimited understanding of the nature of human nature which organizes not only 
Bentham’s understanding of the “good life” but also his schematic of the political 
order (technology) which is conducive to that “good life” and, more specifically, 
is conducive to the production of the type of persons who should populate it.  
The object and target of Foucault’s enquiries, the domain of analysis, then, 
is not human being; his question is not “What is it to be human?” or “”What is 
‘Man’?”; nor is it that set of question that gets subsumed under this philosophical 
anthropological question: “What can I/we know?”, “What should/ought I/we 
do?”, “What may I/we hope? (Kant 1992: 538; 1998: 677; see Foucault 2008b: 74). 
Rather, the domain of analysis of Foucault’s enquiries are precisely those 
inquiries that have attempted not only to provide answers to these questions, but 
also those discourses that have proposed or prescribed actions for conducting the 
conduct of others based upon or inhabited by such answers. Hence, not “What 
can I know?” but rather “What was/is known?” or “What is to be known?”, 
“How is it that what was/is known is known (and not something else)?” “How is 
it that what was/is known is?”; not “What should I do?” but rather, “What was/is 
done?” or “What is to be done?”, “How is it that what was/is done is done (and 
not something else)?”; not “What may I hope for?” but rather, “What was/is 
hoped for?”, “How is it that what was/is hoped is hoped for (and not something 
else)?”; and so on and so forth. This is a subtle, yet fundamental, distinction. 
Foucault has not come up with a winning formula for posing the question “What 
are we?”. Rather, the aim or objective of Foucault’s archaeologico!genealogical 
studies, in asking such questions as “What are we now?”, “What is our present?”, 
“What are we as a part of this present?”, and so forth, was ‘to create a history of 
the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ 
(Foucault 2001d: 326). Stated otherwise, it looks, in a very specific way 
(archaeologically, genealogically), at how “the history of our thought has made 
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us what we are” (Foucault 1983a), or, more pertinently, of what we take ourselves to 
be in our contemporary present and in our actual relations to ourselves.  
 3 – A third problem concerns the specific “levels” that are the target of 
Foucault’s archaeologico!genealogical researches; or, stated otherwise, it 
concerns confusion over, and/or a flattening out or conflation of two levels at 
which Foucault’s critical histories work. These levels are most clearly expressed 
in the distinction Foucault makes between two levels of knowledge; namely, 
savoir and connaissance. The distinction to be drawn between savoir and 
connaissance, however, is not one of a difference in kind or substance (ontology) 
but of a difference in levels of conceivability: savoir is pre!conceptual; it is, to use 
Veyne’s metaphor, the hidden base of the iceberg (savoir), which is made of the 
same “stuff”—ice—as the visible part (connaissance) (see Veyne 1998). Perhaps 
part of the confusion between these two “levels” stems from the fact that both of 
these terms are translated into English as “knowledge”, and thus the distinction 
between savoir and connaissance is not always made clear in translation. Without 
wanting to go into too much detail here, since we shall return to this question 
later in the thesis, suffice it to say that, for Foucault, savoir are the practical and 
material condition of possibility of connaissance. This distinction is also played out 
in terms of the different targets of archaeology and genealogy respectively: in the 
Collège de France lecture course on Psychiatric Power, for example, Foucault talks 
of doing an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) and a genealogy of knowledge 
(connaissance) in which the latter is ‘the indispensable other side’ to the former 
(Foucault 2003b: 239; 2006b: 239). I would contend that most, but certainly not all, 
research that undertake studies of power—in studies in governmentality, in 
organization studies, and in the social sciences more generally—have as their 
target not the archaeological level of savoir (power, pouvoir; self, soi), but the 
genealogical level of connaissance (domination, consciousness of oneself). That is to 
say, they have as their target power as it manifest itself in institutions (entities, 
containers) and not the conditions of possibility of the exercising of a relation of 
power; or, stated otherwise, the conditions of possibility of governmental 
rationalities and practices or political reason. 
 4 – A fourth set of problems relate to the question concerning subjectivity. 
On the one hand, it should be stated up!front and without equivocation that 
neither knowledge (savoir), nor power (pouvoir), nor ethics (soi), nor discourse, 
nor technologies, and so forth, make, manufacture, or socially construct actual 
people. On the contrary, what they do or, rather, what they are looked at as 
doing, is what Hacking calls “making up people”, which is another way of 
saying they ‘create… new ways for people to be’ (Hacking 2002: 99!114, 100); 
they produce subject position. That is to say, they fabricate positions which 
people—individuals, groups, populations, and so on—may come to occupy in 
the real or in the imaginary: they produce positionalities. Thus, when Foucault 
notes in The Archaeology of Knowledge (The Archaeology, hereafter), that discourses, 
as practices, ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 
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49), he does not mean that discourse makes substantive objects, or even 
substantive subjects as objects; rather, it is that known objects are the correlative 
of a discursive practice, as are enunciative modalities (or the knowing subject). 
As Gordon puts it, vis!à!vis power, ‘[i]t must be pointed out that the 
“subject”…is thought of by Foucault as a fictive or constructed entity (as are 
certain objects) though this does not mean that it is false or imaginary. Power does 
not itself give birth to actual people, but neither does it dream subjects in to existence’ 
(Gordon 1980: 239, emphasis added); Gordon goes on to note that ‘[t]he key here 
to Foucault"s position is his methodological scepticism about both the ontological 
claims and the ethical values which humanist systems of thought invest in the 
notion of subjectivity’ (ibid.).  
On the other hand, in those studies undertaken by Foucault that can be said 
to have broached the question concerning power, either indirectly (History of 
Madness, The Birth of the Clinic) or directly (Discipline and Punish, The Will to 
Knowledge), what was researched was ‘the constitution of the subject as it may 
appear on the other side of a normative division’ (Foucault 1998: 461, modified). 
That is to say, the object and target of power thus discussed were what we can 
call the “excluded”, the “marginalized”, the “degenerate”, or, more succinctly, 
the abnormal: the “mad”, “insane”, or “mentally ill”; the “sick” or “ill”; 
“criminals” and “delinquents”; the “sexually depraved”, the “hysteric”, or the 
“pervert”; and so forth. This stands in stark contrast to the object and target of 
power discussed, for example, in studies of power in organizations (Clegg, 
Courpasson, and Phillips 2006; Jermier, Knights, and Nord 1994; McKinlay and 
Starkey 1998); studies which tend to be analyses not of dividing practices but of 
the world of work (ergono!politics or ergonomo!power); and thus not studies of 
what, by any stretch of the imagination, could be called the “abnormal”. Now, 
whilst it is the case that in his historical enquiries Foucault notes, for example, the 
‘swarming of disciplinary mechanism’ (Foucault 1977a: 211) to spheres of life 
beyond the domains that dealt with what were considered to be the “abnormal”, 
this still begs the question of how applicable such studies are to contemporary 
studies of power, and of power in organization, vis!à!vis the “normal”. In such 
studies, what, if anything, needs modifying, and what are the possible costs of 
such modifications? 
 5 – A fifth problem concerning questioning power, is that Foucault is often 
approached as having provided a “theory” of power and concomitant 
“methodology” for studying it; namely, genealogy. Once again, this stands in 
stark contrast to the general thrust of Foucault’s own studies, which, despite their 
often authoritative tone, remained rather tentative vis!à!vis the question 
concerning power: both in terms of theorization and in terms of method (see, e.g. 
Foucault 2001d: 311). In ‘The Subject and Power’, for example, Foucault asks, ‘Do 
we need a theory of power?’ to which he replies, ‘Since a theory assumes a prior 
objectification, it cannot be asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this 
analytical work cannot proceed without an ongoing conceptualization. And this 
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conceptualization implies critical thought’ (Foucault 2001d: 327). In addition, 
Dreyfus and Rabinow note how, in discussions with them, Foucault stated that 
his conceptualization of power “remains elusive but important” (see the "Preface" 
to Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: xiii; see also, Foucault 1988: 103ff.). As a final 
example, in an interview from 1978, Foucault was asked about some comments 
he had made concerning power in discussion with Deleuze in 1972 (Foucault 
1977b: 205!217), to which he responded, ‘[i]t would be bold of me indeed if I were 
to tell you that my ideas on this subject are clearer now [in 1978] than at that time 
[in 1972]. I still believe…that the way in which power is exercised and functions 
in a society like ours is little understood. Of course, there are sociological studies 
that show us who the bosses of industry are at present, how politicians are 
formed and where they come from; but there are also more general studies, 
usually inspired by Marxism, concerning the domination of the bourgeois class in 
our societies. But, under this general umbrella, things seem to me to be much 
more complex’ (Foucault 1988: 103). It is this complexity that we attempt to 
render visible. 
More specifically, of the two approaches developed by Foucault for doing 
history (archaeology and genealogy) the one that is most often cited and used in 
studying the contemporary exercise of power in its contemporaneity—namely, 
genealogy—because of the ways in which it poses its question in a vertical 
dimension (i.e. diachronically), is the one aspect of Foucault’s historical studies 
that perhaps suffers most from not doing historical research. Conversely, the 
method that seems to best offer some tools for studying power in its 
contemporaneity—namely, archaeology—is, more often than not, simply passed 
over. What we tend to see here are brief summaries, accompanied with reference 
to The Archaeology, that archaeology was the method that Foucault used in the 
1960s, which was dropped in favour of the more robust genealogy in the 1970s. If 
we add to this mix the observation that genealogy itself is not a method (at least 
not in the same way that archaeology can be conceptualized as a method), but a 
mode of orientation and a form of historical narrative, then this problem is 
doubly compounded.  
 6 – A final problem—perhaps in part a consequence of the problems 
discussed above, and the problem concerning genealogy in particular; and 
perhaps in part a consequence of the taking up of Foucault’s work on power in 
the social sciences—is the use of Foucault’s descriptions of certain forms or kinds of 
power as being models of power, or something like ideal types (e.g. Clegg 1998: 34; 
for a discussion of this, see Rose, O"Malley, and Valverde 2006: 99). When I say 
“ideal type”, here, I am specifically referring to how Foucault conceptualized this 
term (Foucault 2001d: 230ff.), which is not necessarily an accurate depiction of 
Weber’s use of the concept. That said, what I mean by models or ideal types, 
then, is the taking up and applying of such concepts as disciplinary power, 
pastoral power, bio!political power, liberal or neo!liberal power, or other 
rationalities and strategies of government, not as descriptions of historically 
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specific modes of exercising power, but as “models” which are imposed on or 
superimposed upon contemporary practices (the most obvious example being 
Foucault’s description of Bentham’s Panopticon, and his subsequent 
conceptualization of panopticism). These contemporary practices are then 
rendered intelligible, analyzed, and evaluated in terms of the extent to which 
they do or do not correspond to the model or ideal type thus imposed. What is 
happening here is that Foucault’s and others histories of the present are being 
taken—and taken up and used—not as histories of the conditions of possibility of 
present but as descriptions and/or depictions of the present. The problem with 
this is that if we undertake an analysis of power by way of the concept of 
discipline (panopticism) or of neo!liberalism, for example, the chances are that 
what we will end up finding are precisely disciplinary (panoptical) or neo!liberal 
arts of government. In other words, if we frame the very thing we are going to 
analyze as being neo!liberal, for instance, then this already points us in a 
particular direction, delimiting what it is we are able to see and say, thus perhaps 
missing what is most important, pressing, or central to what we are questioning. 
As Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde (2006) put it in relation to studies in 
governmentality, ‘[t]he orientation of governmentality work…is not ideal 
typification, but an empirical mapping of governmental rationalities’ (ibid.: 99). 
 
What is being questioned here, and this list of problems is by no means 
exhaustive, is the very notion of application, and all the baggage that comes with 
this term. However, rather than approaching Foucault’s various historical 
descriptions of relations of power and the exercising of power as models, 
templates, archetypes, or ideal types, and so on, I think it is best to approach 
them as being historical descriptions of certain temporally (historical), spatially 
(geographical), and materially (practical) delimited modalities of power. It might 
prove useful here to differentiate, conceptually and analytically, between “model” 
and modality. Both “model” and “modal” have the same etymological root in 
mode (from Latin modus, OED). However, whereas the former term (Latin 
modulus: “a small measure, a standard”) refers to “measure, size, extent, 
quantity”, and so forth, the later term (Latin mod"lis: “of or pertaining to a 
mode”) relates more to “way, manner, method, fashion, style”, and the like. A 
model, then, can be thought of as being a copy of an object, a representation or 
description of a structure; it can be thought of as something that is copied or used 
as the basis for a related idea, process, or system; or it can be thought of as being 
a simplified version of something complex used in analyzing or solving problems 
or making predictions (OED). A modality, on the other hand, can be 
conceptualized as pertaining to mode or form; that is, as a way, manner, or form 
of doing something. Whereas model, conceptualized thus, refers, directly or 
indirectly, to substance, structure, or manifestation, a modality, thus 
conceptualized, relates to the “how?” of doing something—its mode—without 
necessarily referring to a referent (ibid.). As with other such distinctions and/or 
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differentiation made throughout the thesis, this distinction is not meant as a 
generality or as something that can be abstracted from the specific problem at 
hand. Rather, they are technical, analytical, and catachrestic/nominal concepts 
aimed at disclosing the specificity of the object and objective of contemporary 
studies in governmentality whose domain of study is the contemporary itself. 
Hence, we should treat these various conceptualizations of power, and, 
indeed, power itself, as being modalities not models; and what we should take 
from such analyses and descriptions is not so much what is analyzed and 
described (its content: the particular modality) but the specific form of analysis 
and description; what Rabinow and Rose call ‘a certain ethos of investigation’ 
(Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiv). In other words, in “applying” Foucault’s method, 
vis!à!vis his conceptualizations of and historical descriptions of power, what we 
“apply” is power as a grid of intelligibility and not as what has been made 
intelligible. By way of example; what I think we should take from Foucault’s 
analyses and descriptions of panopticism is not the panoptic principle (either as 
model or metaphor) for questioning power in our contemporary present but, 
rather, the analytics of power employed by Foucault. That is to say, what we 
should question, in their specificity, are (1) the ways in which it forms the objects 
of its knowledge and the targets of its practice (intervention); (2) the relations of 
power (antagonistic, agonistic, etc.): their governmental modalities; (3) the ways in 
which it elaborates the “how” of its exercise: the techniques or tactics it seeks to 
employ or deploy (its articulation of the re!con!figuration of space!time!matter, 
or what I shall call environments); and (4) the overall thematics or strategies it 
unintentionally comes to form, but readily puts into effect. What I am calling 
environments here, is related to, though not identical to, Poovey’s (1995) and 
Miller’s (1994) concept of ‘abstract spaces’, which they use to characterize 
‘governable zones’ (see Rose 1999: 31ff.). I am not so much interested in the 
different ways in which ‘space is produced and organized in the exercise of 
power’ (ibid.), as I am in the ways in which space!time!matter matrices or 
environments are conceptualized as spaces to be produced and organized, not 
just effects of the exercise of power but as the very means in, by, and through 
which a relation of power to be exercised. We will return to the theme later in the 
thesis. 
The point of the forgoing exposition was to highlight a number of problems 
vis!à!vis analyzing relations of power, as they are exercised to!day, from the 
perspective of our actuality. Rather than approach these tendencies negatively, I 
want to approach them positively as being demonstrative of a very real concern: 
that of broaching the question of relations of power, of the exercising of those 
relations, of the techniques that allow for those relations to be exercised, and the 
ends towards which such techniques are employed as these relations, exercise, 
techniques, and ends are articulated to!day. What I want to do in the thesis, 
therefore, is to pose the question of whether it is possible to undertake such 
analyses of power—that is, to question it in its contemporaneity—that are able to 
21 
 
maintain not only the critical force of Foucault’s historical analyses of power but 
also, and more specifically, to remain faithful to the philosophical, political, and 
ethical ethos of Foucault’s critical histories. In short, I want to ask if it is possible 
to undertake a critical analysis of contemporary relations of power by using 
Foucault’s conceptualization  of power but without doing history; that is, being 
non!historical not ahistorical. The aim of this questioning is neither to promote 
nor to produce an ahistorical understanding of power. Nor, however, is it to 
advocate doing non!historical studies rather than undertaking thoroughly 
historical enquiry; the latter can and should be undertaken whenever and 
wherever this is possible. Rather, the aim of posing this question—of moving 
from history to the present—is to see if it is possible to use Foucault’s 
conceptualizations of relations of power and some of the methods he developed 
to interrogate it where historical enquiry is, for whatever reason, not possible. 
Here, I will take the extreme situation in which historical research, even of our 
recent past, is not possible. If we are able to answer in the positive concerning 
this extreme case, then doing studies of our very recent history should also be 
possible. It should also be noted that in undertaking analyses of power in its 
contemporaneity in no way excludes using historical (i.e. genealogical) analyses 
done by Foucault and others, providing that they are taken precisely as 
genealogical histories of the present and not as ethnographic depictions of the 
present. What I would like the reader who has been kind enough to read what 
has been written to take from this exposition is not just the solutions or 
workarounds proposed but, more specifically, the posing of questions and the 
working through such positions. The aim of the thesis, then, is to make a modest 
contribution to the furtherance of studies in governmentality by thinking through 
some of the problems related to undertaking a governmental analytics of the 
present. 
 Method  
As Rose notes, ‘[s]tudies of governmentality practise a certain kind of 
empiricism’ (Rose 1999: 55): ‘analyses of governmentalities are empirical but not 
realist. They are not studies of the actual organization and operation of systems 
of rule, of the relations that obtain amongst political and other actors and 
organizations at local levels and their connection into actor networks and the 
like…studies of governmentality are not sociologies of rule. They are studies of a 
particular “stratum” of knowing and acting’ (ibid.: 19). In undertaking non!
historical, and thus rather circumscribed, studies in governmentality—i.e. an 
architectonics of control—I too want to propose a certain kind of empiricism. One 
of the things that needs to be avoided, at all costs, in undertaking studies in 
governmentality or an analytics of power more generally is ‘a naturalistic counter!
vocabulary’ (Saar 2008: 235, emphasis added). One way of avoiding such a 
vocabulary is by way of nominal and catachrestic concepts—concepts whose 
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‘function lies in describing…phenomena to reveal and signify their malleability 
and instrumentalizability and in constructing legible constellations between 
relations of…power on the one hand, and…knowledge on the other’ (ibid.). As 
Saar goes on to state, ‘deciphering these constellations is defamiliarizing and 
performative’ (ibid.).  
The empiricism put forward here follows on from Foucault’s claim that he 
is ‘an empiricist’ (Foucault 1988: 106); but the kind of empiricism to be practiced 
here needs to be separated out from some conventional ways of thinking about 
this term. It needs to be distinguished, that is, from epistemological debates 
concerning the “methodologies” of the social sciences, from Anglo!Saxon 
empiricism and its fetishism of the facts, and from the valorisation of (lived) 
experience and the denigration of theory, and so forth (see, Rose 1999: 12, 55). 
Rather, the empiricism being proposed here ‘is a method of inventivity, the 
invention of concepts as objects of an encounter, a here!and!now encounter 
which produces ever new, ever different “heres” and “nows”’ (ibid.; see, Deleuze 
1994: xx; see also Walters 2012). The kind of empiricism I propose and that we are 
to practice when undertaking an analytics of the contemporary is what we will 
call conceptual empiricism. Such an empiricism builds what Deleuze calls “nominal 
concepts” or ‘[c]oncepts with finite comprehension’ (Deleuze 1994: 14). Such 
concepts, which ‘intervene to resolve local situations…change along with the 
problems’ (ibid.: xx) they address. My use of concepts, however, is not just 
nominal; it is also catachrestic (Spivak 1996). Catachresis connotes the improper 
use of words, the application of a term to a thing which it does not properly 
denote, or the abuse or perversion of a trope or metaphor (OED). Spivak calls the 
‘proximate naming’ of things catachrestic (ibid.: 143). Regarding what she takes 
to be Foucault’s nominal and proximal naming of “power”, Spivak states that 
‘“[p]ower” in the general sense is therefore not only a name, but a catachresis. 
Like all names it is a misfit. To use this name to describe a generality inaccessible 
to intended description is necessarily to work with the risk that the word “is 
wrested from its proper meaning”, that it is being applied “to a thing which it 
does not properly denote”’ (ibid.: 145!146). The use of catachrestic concepts here is 
designed precisely to throw into relief what we think we know about the 
concepts we use, to get us to think about our use of such concepts, and to think 
about the work that such concepts can perform. 
I have a passion for etymology, which will be use it to build “nominal and 
catachrestic concepts”, concepts that are to be used as tools for rendering visible a 
particular stratum of the contemporary in its contemporaneousness. Etymology 
is used here, however, not to recover the essential meaning of a term by 
excavating is lost origin (à la Heidegger) nor to describe its historical and sematic 
embedding (à la Derrida) but to open!up the possibilities not so much of what a 
term can mean, but of the work and of the kinds of work it can be expected to 
perform. In doing this, I am following Rose’s observation that ‘concepts are more 
important for what they do than for what they mean’; that is to say, for ‘the way 
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in which they are able to provide a purchase for critical thought upon particular 
problems in the present’ (Rose 1999: 9). For instance, my use of the term 
“present” here does not name a contemporary set of objective conditions, a 
situation, or a state!of!affairs, but conceptualizes the present as a conjuncture, as 
what Walters calls a ‘pluralized entanglement of many times’ (Walters 2012: 113), 
but also of many spaces and places, of many modes of thought and regimes of 
practices, of what we are (no longer) and what we are (in the process of) 
becoming, of problems and rejoinders, of relations of power and relations of 
resistance, of subjectivity and truth, and so forth. In other words, the present is 
conceptualized as a complex matrix of multiple and heterogeneous 
entanglements. Etymologically, present (from the Latin praesens) means “being 
there”, but it can also mean “at hand” (from prae! “before” + esse “to be”: literally, 
“to be before”). But the term also has another meaning in which it carries the 
sense of a “thing offered or given” (OED). In my use of the term, I am less 
interested in what it means than the work it can be expected to perform. On the 
one hand, it, along with other synonyms such as “to!day”, the “contemporary”, 
“actuality”, and so forth, is being used in the fairly conventional and 
unproblematic sense of “this point in time”, “existing at the time of speaking or 
writing”, that is our actualité; on the other hand, it is used to conceptualize our 
actuality it terms of the “being there” of what has been “given” to us. 
Likewise, “power” does not name a thing that is the object of our enquiry; it 
is a way of looking, of rendering visible, it is a grid of intelligibility. Equally, and 
as we shall see, “control” does not characterize a set of practices (where to look), 
it conceives a problem space of and for research: it is a way of looking; it is a 
perspective that is perspectival, it is an inquisitorial concept. These terms are 
neither definitions (a precise statement of the essential nature of a thing) nor 
representations (ideal types, states!of!affairs) nor exactly characterizations (the 
marking out of the precise form of a thing); they are concepts or 
conceptualizations: ‘[a] concept is a brick. It can be used to build a courthouse of 
reason. Or it can be thrown through the window’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 
xii). Concepts are perspectival; they do not erase reality (they are not idealist), 
they render visible; as such, they are partial, selective, and biased. 
If the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be said to have 
witnessed what Foucault called ‘the “governmentalization” of the state’ 
(Foucault 2007b: passim), then from the late 1970s onwards what we have seen 
and, indeed, are seeing is something like the privatization of government. By this 
I do not only mean a shift from pubic to private ownership, from state!run to for!
profit as well as not!for!profit organizations, but also a shift from pubic to private 
in terms of a move from the collective and social to the individual and the 
personal. That is to say, we are witnessing—and, in fact, are an integral part of—
are reconfigurations of the relations of governor to the governed, and vice!versa, 
and a rebalancing of the relation of all and one (‘Omnes et Singulatim’). Unlike 
the governmentalization of the state, which, for the most part, is now settled, this 
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de!governmentalization or, perhaps better still, this re!governmentalization of 
the state, or, in any case, this privatization of government, is on!going, in!process, 
in!formation, and so forth, and so it is unclear when and where it will end, and if 
and how it will shape up into an overall strategic formation, drift, or pattern. In 
other words, ‘[w]hat counts is that we are at the beginning of something’ 
(Deleuze 1992a: 7). Since we are neither in the middle nor at the end of 
something, but at a particular conjuncture, marked by a specific disjuncture 
(beginning, not origin), we need to be circumspect about the kinds of claims that 
we can make. What this means is that we need a certain kind of circumspective 
conceptualization: the conceiving of “catachrestic and nominal concepts with 
finite comprehension”. 
 Outline  
The thesis is presented in five parts. The forgoing discussion outlined the 
problems to be addressed.  
In Part Two, I situate the work of Foucault by looking not for a central 
thematic but for what I take to be a certain philosophical problematic. This 
philosophical problematic is posited as being a mode of rendering visible what 
we are, what we say, and what we do. The central problematic of the thesis—
broaching the question of power from the perspective of the present—is then 
reworked through this philosophical way of seeing and saying and thinking and 
doing. Problems of applying such an approach non!historically, though not 
ahistorically, are considered.   
 In Part Three, I examine two modes of rendering visible used by Foucault: 
genealogy and archaeology. Genealogy is approached not as a method or 
methodology but as the aim or finalité of Foucault’s project, which is to furnish a 
genealogy of the subject. Archaeology, for its part, is discussed as being the 
method of such a project. In working through what takes place in the 
genealogical and archaeological moments of Foucault’s work, I seek to re!figure 
each in such a way as to make them available for questioning the present order of 
things from within that very order, and thus for questioning the exercising of 
relations of power as they are to be exercised to!day. 
 Part Four rethinks the concept of power, through the concepts of 
government and governmentality, as control. Control is presented as being an 
empty concept to be filled out by way of empirical enquiry. This enquiry is 
presented as taking the form of an analysis of the programmatic aspect of 
technologies of government: their architectonics. Reconfiguring the programmatic 
aspect of government as an architectonics, and taking up the concept of control, 
both gives us an object of enquiry and a field in which to work. I call such 
analytical field!work in the contemporary an architectural analytics, and the aim of 
such an analytics is to render visible the relational aspect of control by disclosing 
the techniques in, by, and through which that relation is to be exercised.   
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Part Five concludes the thesis by drawing the above together and thinking 
through the possible costs and benefits of such an approach.   
 
 
 
26 
 
27 
 
PART  TWO: TO  SEE  AND  SAY  WHAT  WE  ARE  TO!DAY  
Why does man not see things? He is himself standing in the 
way. 
(Nietzsche, Daybreak).  
I.  TO  RENDER  VISIBLE  
Out of a certain methodological rigor, and much to the chagrin of those of us who 
would seek to grasp what it was he was doing, Foucault never really defined his 
concepts, his technical termes d#art. When he did offer a view upon them, this was 
nearly always either in relation to the particular project at hand (the lectures at 
the Collège de France are exemplary instances of this) or given in interviews in 
response to a particular question or a specific set of questions. Where such 
responses do take place, and where they are presented in an extended form, what 
we are invariable presented with are a series of things that such concepts are not 
(e.g., Foucault 1972). Again, this, no doubt, is down to the aforementioned 
methodological rigor, which, perhaps counterintuitively, refrains from pinning 
things down. This is only counterintuitive, however, if we fail to recognize that 
Foucault’s modus operandi, or one of his many modi operandi, is not to close things 
down by setting boundaries or by encasing concepts in definitions, but to ‘open 
things up…to complicate, not simplify…to multiply lines of investigation and 
possibilities for thought’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: vii). In short, the task is to 
open!up problem spaces with and by way of what I, following Deleuze (1994) 
and Rose (1999), will call nominal concepts (for a discussion of the creative or 
inovative aspect of such concepts, see Rabinow and Rose 2003b: x!xii, xv). Since 
to “define” (from Latin de! “completely”, “thoroughly” + f$n$re “to bound”, “to 
limit”) is “to bring to an end”, “to determine”, “to settle the limits”, and so forth 
(OED), it would, in fact, and from such a position, be counterintuitive to 
formulate such definitive definitions. Consequently, when approaching the work 
of Foucault, we should perhaps rescind from trying to narrow down what such 
concepts denote, what they signify, or what they mean, and so forth, and instead 
try to figure out what such concepts do in the specific work in which they are 
employed or, and more specifically, of what we can do with them in our own 
work.  
In reflecting upon questions of method vis!à!vis questioning our present 
from the perspective of our own actuality, in thinking about how to look at 
ourselves from where we are and where we stand, can we simply take up and 
apply, as is, some notion or other of what Foucaultian archaeology and 
genealogy are? Not only is this latter question open to oft!times contentious 
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debate, using either of these concepts, separately or together, to elaborate the 
present, and to do so from the perspective of to!day, without any reflection upon 
the work that each does and that they do together, and upon their applicability to 
such a task, is, I contend, a highly problematic and questionable enterprise. The 
alternative to this, however, is not to pin down, as systematically and precisely as 
possible, what these terms mean. Rather, it is to conceptualize what these 
concepts do or can do or, more importantly, of what we can do with them. There is 
not, therefore, an attempt made here to state what it was that Foucault was really 
doing, or to make claims, on his behalf, about what he meant when he said what 
he said. Rather, I am working in the field of what we can call a Foucaultian 
problematic. There is a particular kind of reading that I want to avoid here; this 
type of reading attempts to discern a common thematic running throughout all of 
Foucault’s writings: Dreyfus and Rabinow’s “interpretive analytics” (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983), Elden’s “mapping the present” (Elden 2001), Han’s 
“transposition of the transcendental” (Han 2002), Mahon’s “genealogical 
problematic” (Mahon 1992), Rajchman’s “ethic of free thought” (Rajchman 1985), 
Sheridan’s “political anatomy” (Sheridan 1980), and so forth, and, of course, the 
almost ubiquitous “critical ethos”. For whilst it is certainly possible to read 
Foucault in these and many other ways—though not in any way at all—I do not 
want to follow this path. 
When I say, as I will go on to do, that Foucault rendered visible, I am not 
attempting to find a central thread that will tie his various researches into 
madness, illness, political economy, criminality, government, and sexuality, and 
so forth, together, stitching the patchwork into a coherent whole—or to criticize it 
for its failure to maintain such coherence. Needless to say, this kind of “quilting” 
performs an essential and important task; but it is not my task. In other words, I 
do not want to approach it in term of being a philosophical—or political or 
ethical—doctrine or even an œuvre; rather, I want to approach it as being a 
practice; specifically, as being a political, ethical, and philosophical practice of 
rendering visible. To render visible, then, is not being taken to be a central 
thematic but as a philosophical problematic: “How are we to render visible the 
order of things from within the very order of the contemporary order of things?” 
What I am attempting to get at here can be made clearer by way of Oksala’s 
(2010) claim concerning ‘Foucault’s politicization of ontology’ (ibid.: 445). Oksala 
claims that ‘Foucault’s thought accomplishes the politicization of ontology with 
two key theoretical moves. The first is the contestation and provocation of all 
given and necessary ontological foundations…The second…is thus the exposure 
of power relations and their constitutive role in our conception of reality’ (ibid.). 
This, or so it seem to me, is a fairly accurate depiction or, in any case, is a useful 
description of the work that Foucault undertook. However, rather than proceed 
in this way—that is, in terms of making claims on behalf of Foucault and the 
work he undertook—I want to move in another direction by asking how we can 
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put that work to work, what kinds of work we can expect it to do, and thus what 
kinds of work we can expect to do with it.  
Of course, both approaches require a certain amount—and a certain kind—
of commentary, but the emphasis shifts from the one to the other in that we 
become less focused upon what it was that Foucault did or upon his own 
interpretations of what he did or of trying to reconstruct such interpretation, and 
so forth, and become much more attuned and thus more attentive to what it is 
that we can do or that we want to do with the work of Foucault as we understand 
this. Thus, for example, instead of stating that “‘Foucault’s thought accomplishes 
the politicization of ontology”, I would want to say something like “I want to 
politicize ontology, and I want to do this by taking up and developing some of 
the themes and concepts worked out and worked over by Foucault”. This is, 
undoubtedly, a subtle but nonetheless important distinction; it is also a 
distinction that it is not always easy to maintain, and that is thus not always 
maintained. By way of example, when I set up the central problematic of the 
thesis—that concerning questioning our present from the perspective of itself—
by drawing attention to a statement Foucault made in The Archaeology that states 
‘it is not possible for us to know our own archive’ (Foucault 1972: 130), what I am 
saying is not “because Foucault said this then it must be true and therefore it 
must be respected; consequently, we should give up all attempts to know our 
own present from the self!same standpoint”. Rather, what I am saying is that 
“this statement opens up a problem space in which we can do some work; a 
space in, by, and through which we can reflect upon the problem at hand”.  
Here, somewhat ironically, the thesis takes as its guide some comments 
Foucault made in 1967 concerning commentary and criticism: ‘contemporary 
criticism’, Foucault notes, ‘is formulating a sort of new combinative scheme with 
regard to the diverse texts that it studies, its object texts’ (Foucault 1998: 286). 
Such criticism is neither ideology critique, deconstruction, hermeneutics, nor 
some other form of discourse analysis, etcetera, but is, rather, a re!combinatorial 
construction: ‘[i]nstead of reconstituting the immanent secret, it treats the text as 
a set of elements…among which one can bring out absolutely new relations, 
insofar as they have not been controlled by the writer’s design and are made 
possible only by the work itself as such’ (ibid.: 286!287). In this way, we are freed 
from the authority and authorial intent of the author: ‘[t]he formal relations that 
one discovers in this way are not present in anyone’s mind; they don’t constitute 
the latent content of the statements, their discreet secret. They are a construction, 
but an accurate construction provided that the relations described can actually be 
assigned to the material treated’ (ibid.: 287). On this view, and in this way, 
something new and inventive, yet objectively correct, can materialize: ‘[w]e’ve 
learned to place people’s words in relationships that are still unformulated, said 
by us for the first time, and yet objectively accurate’ (ibid.). Thus, neither 
deconstruction nor reconstruction but a re!combinatorial construction, said by us 
for the first time; in other words, this is my own invention. With this in mind, we 
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are freed to pursue our discussion unconstrained by the constraints of pure 
commentary, whilst all the while attempting to remain within the confines of 
what can objectively be stated. Such an approach refrains from polemics and 
pedantics and yet is an attempt to get it right. 
 
To begin, I claim that neither archaeology nor genealogy are methodologies in 
the conventional sense of this term. They do not laydown or layout clearly 
demarcated principles and procedures that we must follow; nor are they 
underpinned by an explicit theory (ontology) or built upon a clearly defined 
theoretical edifice concerning what is. Rather than theory there is 
experimentation (hypothesis and testing); and rather than methodology there are 
questions of method (perspective). Better still, and perhaps demonstrating a debt 
to Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, both archaeology and 
genealogy, or so it seems to me, are more like two different ways of looking, of 
seeing and saying, of thinking and questioning too, of rendering visible; they are 
perspectives that are perspectival. However, this is not an analysis of 
“phenomena” (i.e. the relationship between conscious and world; the way a 
subject perceives an object, etc.; analyses which invariable pass through the 
“being of “man””) but of events (where this terms has the sense of an event in the 
history of “our” thought); that is, they are analyses of the relation between events 
and thought (where thought is an ‘act that posits a subject and an object’, Foucault 
1998: 459). Taking up this schema, what is presented here is an experimentation 
and a questioning of method vis!à!vis questioning our actual present from the 
perspective of this present itself. The goal is not to produce either a theory of 
power or a theory of method; nor is it to produce a methodology, fixed once and 
for all time, for broaching the question of power and/or government. A key 
tenant of Foucault’s critical output, and a key for interpreting that output, is 
specificity. Hence, we need to be specialized in our approach to questioning 
concerning contemporary governmentality. What we are questioning concerning 
are methods for analyzing relations of power, the objects that are the target of 
their intervention, the relation of governor to governed, the techniques that 
permit those relations to be exercised, and the forms of reality, modes of 
existence, and types of subjectivity that such techniques seek to bring into being; 
and to question all this as it is practiced to!day form the perspective of our own 
contemporality. 
The principle aspects of the taking up of the question concerning power that 
I specifically want to interrogate are threefold, and each concerns a question of 
method. Firstly, it concerns the question not only of the substantiality of power, 
but also of having some kind of ontological commitment to a thing called or 
named “power”; that is to say, it is a question that concerns Foucault’s 
nominalism. Secondly, it concerns the relation of archaeology to genealogy and 
vice!versa; more specifically, it concerns whether genealogy should be viewed as 
a method in its own right or as more of an orientation and framework that 
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orientated and framed Foucault’s critical histories. Third and lastly, and more 
importantly, it concerns the question of the relationship between the critical and 
the historical or between critique and history: given that Foucault’s critical tool 
par excellence was history, is it possible to do Foucaultian critique without doing 
history? The point of such an exercise is not to criticise others for their 
appropriation, supposed incorrect interpretations, or to reproach them for their 
questionable applications; the point, rather, is to demonstrate the cost for the 
analysis of such appropriations, interpretations and/or applications, and to point 
to how things could, perhaps, be done differently. In other words, what is to be 
presented here is not a corrective, but is more like starting afresh and 
conceptualizing what we might call “first principles”. What I am interested in 
here, is not just a question of being faithful to the letter of Foucault’s texts, 
chapter and verse. Rather than being solely concerned with the question of 
correct interpretation, I am just as much more concerned with the cost/benefit of 
conceptualization and application, and, indeed, of the application of such 
conceptualizations. That is to say, I am not only concerned with interpretation 
but also, and perhaps more so, with utilization; or, rather, since these are not 
mutually exclusive, I am interested in doing an interpretation in terms of 
utilization. 
1 – Whilst it is generally acknowledge that, for Foucault, power is not a 
substance—that is to say, it is not a thing that can be possessed, but is an agonistic 
and non!egalitarian relation between people—it is the particular modality of a 
specific relationality—there is, perhaps, an unacknowledged ontological 
commitment to a “thing” called power contained within the very expression 
“analytics of power”, or other such expressions: this is why I prefer the phrase 
“studies in governmentality”, although there are problems here too. This is aptly 
demonstrated in a text written by Hoy (1986) in which he ‘situate[s] Foucault"s 
conception of “power/knowledge” in relation to other attempts to clarify the 
nature of power, particularly by comparing it with the procedure of “ideology 
criticism” as developed by the Frankfurt School and more recently by the Oxford 
social theorist Steven Lukes’ (ibid.: 123). The main problem here, as I see it, is the 
view that Foucault’s conceptualizations and analytics of power are somehow 
commensurable ‘with more traditional social theory’ (ibid.: 123!124). I want to 
suggest the opposite; namely, that Foucault’s conceptualization of power is, 
indeed, incommensurable with other “theories of power”—social, critical, or 
otherwise—precisely because they are theories. Theory requires a referent, but 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power has no referent. Thus, whilst it is 
acknowledged that, for Foucault, power is non!substantive, that it is not only 
negative but also positive and productive, and so forth, there is still a potential to 
ascribe to Foucault an ontological commitment to a thing called power. Such a 
potential is evidenced in Hoy’s claim that Foucault’s ‘analytics of power is not 
intended to tell us what power really is, but only where to look’ (ibid.: 135, 
emphasis added). For Spivak, in such formulations, ‘a general, naturalized 
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referent for the word “power” is tacitly presupposed and, indeed, attributed to 
Foucault’ (Spivak 1996: 143). Spivak goes on to note that ‘[i]t is as if, although 
Foucault"s interests are not realist, he [nevertheless] has an ontological 
commitment to a thing named “power”’ (ibid.). Spivak’s comments concerning 
Hoy’s statement, and other similar formulations, is instructive in that she does 
not criticise the supposed deficiencies of such formulations but, rather, notes the 
alienness of Foucault’s conceptualization of power and the paleonymy of 
language. That is, the historical and semantic embedding, and thus the apparent 
naturalness and unmotivatedness, of language on the one hand, and the 
‘functions of any subject’s relationship to language’ on the other (ibid.: 144). 
What I want to take from Spivak’s discussion is less the criticism of a certain 
position—after all, Hoy’s text is now close to thirty years old—and more the 
continuing problems posed of the paleonymy of language (re: both of and in). The 
consequences of such paleonymy—or the cost, if you will—for analyses of power 
are central. For to even talk of “analyses of power” or “studies in 
governmentality” is demonstrative of the problems posed by language; this 
problem is doubly compounded, for example, in those studies which aim to 
undertake analyses of power in organizations (see, for example, Clegg, 
Courpasson, and Phillips 2006: 5ff.). That is to say, not only do such formulations 
pose a “thing” that can be analyzed (power), they also locates that thing in a 
“place” or “space” (organizations). Such a formulation is not only demonstrative 
of the potential pitfalls of an unacknowledged ontological commitment to a thing 
named power, it also demonstrates the problems posed by language vis!à!vis an 
ontological commitment to entities called organization(s). This stands in stark 
contrast to Foucault’s claim that “power does not exist” (‘Le pouvoir, ça n#existe 
pas’, Foucault 2001b: 302, see also, 340ff.; in addition, see Foucault, Gordon, and 
Patton 2012: 105ff.). Taking this claim seriously has serious consequences for 
broaching the question concerning power, and no more so for the form that such 
questioning will take. Principally, if power does not exist, “How can one 
undertake an analysis of it?” Since there is nothing—no “thing”—to undertake an 
analysis of, how can we question power. 
What we can do—and, I think, what Foucault and others do—is to 
undertake what Foucault called an analytics of power. The term analytics here has 
connotations of a form of analysis that breaks!down, dissects, or de!composes, a 
de!struction, to use Heidegger’s term, though not a deconstruction in Derrida’s 
sense of this term (see Foucault 1997: 118). Power—or, rather, relations of 
power—for its part, is taken, “nominally” or nominalistically, as a word that lends 
itself to naming ‘a complex strategical situation in a given society’ (Foucault 1978: 
93): it is the “proximate naming,” by way of a “catachrestic nominalism” (see, Spivak 
1996), of the articulation of agonistic and nonegalitarian relations and 
technologies and rationalities of government (“conducting conducts” and 
arranging probability, Foucault 2001d: 341, modified). As Foucault put this in The 
Will to Knowledge, ‘[w]e must, no doubt, be nominalist: power, it is not an 
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institution, and it is not a structure, it is not a certain strength [puissance] of which 
some are endowed: it is the name that lends itself to a complex strategic situation 
in a given society’ (Foucault 1978: 94, modified). I would go one further here and 
say that power is not so much a “name that lends itself to a complex strategic 
situation”, as it is a name that lends, gives, or attributes itself to a description of or 
to describing “a complex strategical situation”; or, perhaps better still, to the 
means—the approach, the way of seeing and saying—by which one undertakes 
such an analytical description: one describes things in terms of power. As Rose 
(1999) puts it, vis!à!vis government, ‘[g]overning…should be understood 
nominalistically: it is neither a concept nor a theory, but a perspective’ (ibid.: 21, 
emphasis added). 
An analytics of power, then, breaks down or de!composes the complex 
strategical situation that power lends itself or gives itself to naming by dissecting 
it into its constituent elements and constitutive aspects; it breaks it down into its 
often humdrum and mundane, sometimes complementary, sometimes 
conflicting and contradictory, but always multiple and heterogeneous, 
components, positions, and dispositions. An analytics of power scrutinises the 
micro!physics of such complex strategical situations. As we shall see, one 
undertakes an analytics not—or not only—because of some philosophical debt to 
Kant (Djaballah, 2008) or Heidegger (Rayner, 2007), but because the exercising of 
relations of power themselves tends to be analytical (i.e. it de!composes, it breaks 
things, time, space, bodies, processes, movements, etc., down in to their simplest 
and most rudimentary elements). This is especially true of disciplinary power: 
‘[d]iscipline organizes an analytical space’; it is an ‘analytical arrangement 
[aménagement] of space’; an ‘analytical partitioning of time, gestures, and bodily 
forces’; ‘a meticulous and ever more analytical observation’ (Foucault 1977a: 143, 
203, 221, 227, emphases added). It is called an analytics of power not because of 
some thematic choice concerning a theory of power and a concomitant method 
for studying it (genealogy), but because the exercising of relations of power, 
technologies of government, governmentalities, and so forth, themselves tend to 
be analytical. In other words, there is neither an ontological nor an 
epistemological commitment to a thing called Power (with a capital “P”). On this 
view, to undertake an analytics of power, vis!à!vis an analytics of programmes, is 
not simply to do an analysis of power, it is to undertake analyses in terms of 
power. That is to say, it is a form of analysis that breaks down breakdowns 
(problematizations) and responses to such breakdowns (programmes). It is a 
mode of enquiry that analyse programmes by de!composing their com!posing 
(from Latin com! “together” + poser “to place”, hence to place together; OED) of 
composites (or the en!framing of what is thus enframed, see Elden 2001) that aim 
to have the function of dis!posing (from Latin disponere: “put in order, arrange, 
distribute”, from dis! “apart” + ponere “to place”; hence, to place apart in the sense 
of ordering, controlling, regulating, and so forth, arranging: aménagement; OED). 
Or, stated otherwise, it de!composes the positing together (Ge!stell) of what is 
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posed together (Gestell) in a dispositive (see Heidegger 1977: 15n14, 19n17; Elden, 
1998: 105!106, 142; 2001: 78!79, 110!111; Rojcewicz 2006: 90!110; see also the 
discussion on page 185 below).  
Power is not the naming of a referent—it is not exclusively used as a noun—
but an approach—i.e. as a verb. Pace Hoy, or, more specifically, the formulation 
his text expresses, a Foucaultian analytics of power does not tell us where to look 
but is, rather, a way of looking: ‘the point of view of power is a point of view of 
method…it [is] a way of approaching things. Nothing more’ (Foucault, Gordon, 
and Patton 2012: 106): power is a perspective that is perspectival. On this view, 
one does not undertake an analysis of power, in organization or elsewhere; one 
does analyses ‘made in terms of power’ (Foucault 1978: 92, emphasis added). 
Because the exercise of relations of power itself tends to be analytical, and 
because the condition of possibility of power are the conditions that renders its 
exercise intelligible (Foucault 1978: 93; see also, Spivak 1996: 147), to undertake 
analysis “made in terms of power” is to undertake an analytics of power. Of course, 
such a solution does not do any ‘solving or denying’ of the problem of 
paleonymy (Spivak 1996: 144), but it does acknowledge the problem.  
 2 – This talk of an analytics of power leads us on to a second question; this 
concerns the interrelation between archaeology and genealogy. It does so because 
to suggest doing analyses made in terms of power begs the question of how one 
undertakes such an analytics on the one hand, and why one should undertake 
such an analytics on the other. That is to say, or so I will argue, it raises the 
question of archaeology and genealogy respectively. In this section, we will deal 
with archaeology; in the following section, genealogy. 
If we not only view relations of power non!substantively, but also without 
any epistemological or ontological commitment to a thing named power (or to 
things called organizations), then how are we to question concerning power, its 
exercise, technologies, strategies, and so on, and so forth? What “method” is 
“applicable” to the study of such a conceptualization of power? We can attempt 
to answer this question in a roundabout way by looking at how Foucault 
questioned concerning power; that is, to look at the form or modality (way of 
seeing and saying, of looking and questioning, of rendering visible, etc.) of his 
analyses and not just their content. Now, there has been a tendency, perhaps 
much less prevalent to!day, of breaking down Foucault’s critical histories into 
three distinct, and often discontinuous, phases, each with its own object, and 
each with its own method. This series runs as follows: 1960s, an archaeology of 
knowledge; 1970s, a genealogy of power; 1980s, a problematization of ethics (e.g. 
Davidson 1986). Implicit—or not so implicit—in these narratives is the 
imposition of the notion of discontinuity onto Foucault’s own critical thought. 
The part of the story we are concerned with here, concerns the so!called move 
from archaeology to genealogy. This story has slightly different versions: one is 
of the failure of archaeology and its replacement with a more robust genealogy; 
another is of the assimilation of archaeology into genealogy; and yet another 
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concern the supplementing of archaeology with genealogy. What each and all of 
these versions of the story tacitly presuppose, however, is that genealogy is itself 
a method or methodology (the same goes for problematization and ethics, but 
that does not concern us here.)  
This way of understanding the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, because of 
the way it delimits archaeology to the 1960s and the question of knowledge, and 
situates the questioning of power in the 1970s and genealogy, removes the 
question concerning relations of power form the remit of archaeological research. 
This, or so I will argue, has a certain number of ramification and implications for 
anyone wishing to broach the question concerning power, historically or 
otherwise; not least of which is that it overplays the significance of genealogy for 
such undertakings. In contradistinction to the aforementioned understanding, I 
contend that Foucault only ever had one method, if we can even call it this, and 
this method (i.e. approach, perspective, etc.) was an archaeology of knowledge 
(savoir); also occasionally referred to by Foucault as an ‘archaeology of silence’ 
(Foucault 2006a: xxviii), an ‘archaeology of the medical gaze’ (Foucault 1973, 
modified), an ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ (Foucault 1970), an 
‘archaeology of thought’ (Foucault 1999: 86), an ‘archaeology of discourse’ 
(Foucault 1997: 123), an ‘archaeology of the emergence of power’ (Foucault 2003a: 
26), an ‘archaeology of historical knowledge’ (Foucault 1998: 284), an 
‘archaeology of geographical knowledge’ (Foucault 1980: 67, 192), an 
‘archaeology of psychoanalysis’ (Foucault 1978: 130), and an ‘archaeology of 
problematizations’ (Foucault 1985: 13). The point being that all these instances 
denote an archaeology of savoir or of savoir!pouvoir (or of savoir!pouvoir!soi).  
The first thing to note here, vis!à!vis an analytics of power, is that Foucault 
never used the phrase “genealogy of power”. This phrase is an exemplary 
instance of a term or phrase being used and propagated in the secondary 
literature finally being attributed back to the primary source of that literature. It 
is perhaps this process, along with commentaries on the essay ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History’, that has led to the presupposition that not only is genealogy 
a method, but that it is the methodology Foucault used in his historical studies of 
power. If we look a little closer at Foucault’s work concerning the period—
roughly, the first two!thirds of the 1970s—in which he is supposed to have made 
a shift from an “archaeology of knowledge” to a “genealogy of power” then 
something quite interesting materializes. However, rather than detail the 
numerous instances in which Foucault discusses the relation between 
archaeology and genealogy (see, e.g. Foucault 1981; 1997: 11ff., 17ff.; 2006b: 239, 
256n13; 2003a: 26, 26n*, 332ff.; 2003c: 11!12; all of which demonstrate a much 
greater degree of consistency in Foucault’s thought regarding archaeology and 
genealogy than he is often given credit for), we can look at just two, which 
embody the form, if not the exact content, of the others. 
In a lecture Foucault gave to the French Society of Philosophy in 1978 called 
‘What is Critique?’ (Qu#est!ce que la critique ?) he states that, ‘the word knowledge 
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[savoir]…refers to all the procedures and all the effects of knowledge 
[connaissance] that are acceptable at a given moment and in a defined domain; 
and…the term power [pouvoir]…does nothing other than cover a whole series of 
particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to induce 
behaviours [comportements] or discourses’ (Foucault 1996b: 394, modified; see 
also, Foucault 2007a: 60). Here, Foucault situates not only an analysis of 
knowledge (savoir) but also that of power (pouvoir) at ‘the level, more or less, of 
archaeology’ (Foucault 1996b: 395, modified; see also, Foucault 2007a: 61). That 
archaeology is presented as the method for questioning both knowledge (savoir) 
and power (pouvoir)—and also, somewhat later, the relation to self (rapport à soi)—
is supported in what Foucault states in a discussion following a lecture he gave at 
the Berkeley History Department in 1983 on the theme of The Culture of the Self. In 
this discussion, Foucault was asked about archaeology, genealogy, and the 
possible relation between them. He stated that “I use those two words in very 
different meanings and in order to indicate two different sets of problems”, and 
he goes on to clarify this by stating that archaeology “deals with a set of 
discourses”, whereas “genealogy is both the reason and the target of analyzing 
those discourses as events”. He concludes his answer to this question by stating 
that, “genealogy is the finality of the analysis, and archaeology is the material 
and methodological framework”. Following this explication, Foucault was asked, 
“so, you never stopped doing archaeology?” to which he replied, “no! I never 
stopped doing archaeology, and I never stopped doing genealogy; genealogy 
defined the target and aim of the work, archaeology indicates the field in order to 
do genealogy” (Foucault 1983b; in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault presents a 
similar understanding of the work that he undertakes when he presents it as 
being ‘genealogical in its finality [finalité] and archaeological in its method’, 1997: 
315, modified). 
What should be clear from this brief exposition—which is intended to do no 
more than raise a question regarding the notion that Foucault abandoned a failed 
archaeology in favour of a more robust genealogy, and that genealogy is the 
methodology for studying power—is not only that Foucault can be read as never 
having not stopped doing archaeology but also, and more specifically, that 
firstly, archaeology can be read as being Foucault’s only method (perspective), 
and that, secondly and consequently, archaeology can be read as being central to 
Foucault’s analytics of the exercising of relations of power. That said, why would 
we want to read Foucault in this way, that is, against the grain of what Gutting 
(2002) has called the “convention wisdom” of dividing Foucault’s work into three 
distinct periods? Of the litany of problems that are the effect of this 
schematization, the one that concerns us here is that, as noted, it removes the 
questioning of the exercising of relations of power form the remit of 
archaeological research and, by extension, from a materialist history of rationality 
or thought, because it situates both of these purely under the heading of 
genealogy. Posing the problem as we have done above allows us to (re)read 
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archaeology as being Foucault’s only method—genealogy, as we shall see, being 
both a form of historical narrative and a critique of the present. Consequently, 
archaeology, as a tool for analyzing technology, offers the intelligibility key for 
posing the question concerning the exercise of relations of power in the present.  
 3 – As noted, archaeology is, to a certain extent, synchronic in that it deals 
with events or with discourse and discourses as events or as series of events: it 
analyzes technologies as events. Genealogy, for its part, is much more diachronic; it 
weaves these events or series of events into the historical fabric that forms the 
backcloth—or, at any rate, part of the materiality—of our present: it is a 
diagnostic of how the present became logically possible. Stated otherwise, it 
questions concerning the different and differential ways in which our past both 
‘engenders and is incorporated in a certain conception of the present’ (Gordon 
1980: 241). This is made evident, to a certain degree, by the respective levels at 
which archaeology and genealogy work or the respective levels that are the 
target of archaeological and genealogical looking and questioning. These levels 
can be evidenced by way of the distinction discussed above that Foucault draws 
between savoir and connaissance; where archaeology is “an archaeology of savoir”, 
and genealogy is “a genealogy of connaissance” (Foucault 2006b: 239, 346, see also 
378).   
Archaeology question savoir which ‘refer[s] to the conditions that are 
necessary in a particular period[, and concerning a particular domain,] for this or 
that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be 
formulated [by a subject]’ (Foucault 1972: 15n2). Connaissance, for its part, refers 
to ‘the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it’ 
(ibid.); and so a genealogy of connaissance (or of what Foucault later called 
veridiction: a history of the “politics of truth”, 2001d: 13, 131!133; 2007a: passim) 
presents a particular narrative of the historical trajectory of such connaissances vis!
à!vis ourselves and our contemporary conjuncture: a genealogy of the subject, a 
history of the present, a history of truth, a historical ontology of ourselves, and so 
forth. On this view, genealogy is not a method as such, but is more like an 
orientating framework and a form of historical narrative; it is the reason for 
doing archaeological study: it is a form of what Dean (1994) calls critical and 
effective history. What the addition of genealogy adds to the mix, or so it seems to 
me, is a complexification of the causality of Foucault’s historical narration; it 
emphasizes the contingency of the past and thus of the present, and it situates 
relations of power as being one point from which the present arrives (not origin, 
but the multiple and heterogeneous events from which the present arrived). 
In broaching the question of archaeology and genealogy in this way, we are 
lead on to the question of history and critique, and of what cost to critique of not 
doing historical analyses but, rather, analyses of our contemporary present, vis!à!
vis power, from the perspective of our contemporary conjuncture itself. Put 
simply, genealogy, as a history of the present, constitutes the diagnostic part of 
Foucault’s critical histories: genealogy is a diagnostic, and what it diagnoses is 
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the to!day of our contemporary present (Deleuze 1992b). Archaeology, for its 
part, is a form of analysis; it constitutes the analytical part of Foucault’s critical 
histories (ibid.). The problem concerning genealogy and doing contemporary 
analyses of the exercising of relations of power, as it is exercised to!day, is that in 
order to be able to do genealogy, and hence critique thus understood, one 
requires a difference: one has to be able to ask ‘[w]hat difference does today 
introduces with respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault 1997: 305); that is, where 
yesterday does not refer to the day before to!day, but rather to a prior 
conjuncture in which things were seen and said and thought and done otherwise 
than they are to!day. And the reason for describing this difference, and the 
historical formations from which this difference emerged, is to disclose the 
partiality and contingency of the present; it is to demonstrate that there is neither 
universality nor necessity (i.e. transcendentality) concerning the form of our 
current practices: the practices of psychiatry, medicine, punishment, government, 
sexuality, and the relation to self, for example. If what we are analyzing are not 
the historical formations of such practices—the multiple and heterogeneous 
conditions that form the conditions of possibility of disciplinary power, for 
instance—but questioning a practice as it is practiced to!day from the perspective 
of this to!day, then what constitutes the hook that will enable us to do critique? It 
is to this question to which we now turn.  
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II.  THE  VISIBLE!INVISIBLE  
We shall try to render visible, and analysable, that immediate 
transparency that constitutes the element of…[our]…possibility. 
(Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge) 
Foucault once said that ‘[t]he only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is 
precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest’ (Foucault 1980: 53!
54). This, it seems to me, is precisely the position that one should take up in 
relation to Foucault’s thought. It is the only position that really grants to such 
thought its full force and critical weight: ‘I would like my books to be a sort of 
tool!box in which others can go rummaging to find a tool which they can use 
however they wish in their own domain. […] I do not write for an audience, I 
write for users, not readers’ (Foucault 2001a: #136, 1391, 1392, my translation, 
emphasis added; see also, Foucault and Deleuze 1977; 1996a: 149). And what 
Foucault says of his own use of Nietzsche (‘if commentators then say that I am 
being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest’, 
Foucault 1980: 54) is equally applicable to our use of Foucault. With this in mind, 
I want to move beyond the now over!used and over!worked “tool!box approach” 
in relation to the writings of Foucault and others. Rather, I want to approach their 
work on power and/or government by way of what I will call a “work!shop 
approach” (see, e.g. Dean 1996). In an interview from 1975, Foucault stated that, 
‘[a]ll my books, whether History of Madness or the one we’re talking about [i.e. 
Discipline and Punish], are, if you like, little tool boxes [petites boîtes à outils]. If 
people want to open them, use a particular sentence, idea, or analysis like a 
screwdriver or wrench in order to short!circuit, disqualify or break up the 
systems of power, including eventually the very ones from which my books have 
issued…well, all the better!’ (Foucault 1996a: 149). Whereas the tool!box 
approach seeks to appropriate such “tools” from the aforementioned writings 
(e.g. discourse, practice, technology, discipline, bio!power, panopticism, 
advanced neo!liberalism, governing!at!a!distance, etc.), I want to think this 
appropriation differently.  
All tools are made using other tools or equipment; my work!shop approach 
aims to reflect upon what this equipment is so as to be able to think about this 
making, and to think about how such making may allow us to manufacture tools 
specific to our particular projects: a kind of bespoke tool!box approach, if you will. 
That is to say, I approach the work of Foucault and others less in terms of a box 
(container) containing ready!made tools (content) than as a work!shop equipped 
with equipment from which we can fashion our own tools. The advantage of the 
term “work!shop”, here, is that it not only denotes a place of manufacture 
(production, construction, fabrication, etc.), it also has connotations of a meeting 
place for the purpose of discussion, collaboration, and experimentation. In both 
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instances, my work!shop approach points to a space or place in which industrial 
work can be done (industrial: from early Latin indostruus; from indu “within” + 
stem of struere “to build”; OED; hence to build within the frame!work on power 
and/or in governmentality.)  
The principle piece of equipment that I am going to be employing here are 
the different and differential ways in which ‘Foucault “rendered visible”’ (Rabinow 
and Rose 2003b: viii, emphasis added). But what does this mean? Or, to be more 
precise, what does rendering visible entail? What Rabinow and Rose are 
appealing to here, perhaps by way of Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), is the 
famous statement, made by the Swiss artist Paul Klee (1961). In this statement, 
Klee states that ‘[a]rt does not reproduce the visible, but makes visible’ (ibid.: 76). 
The term “art” in this statement denotes “graphic art”, and what Klee was 
highlighting is the way in which ‘the very nature of graphic art…lures us to 
abstraction’ (ibid.). The point Klee is making is that ‘[t]he purer the graphic 
work…the less well!suited it will be to the realistic representation of visible 
things’ (ibid.). As we shall see, it is certainly the case that Foucault’s work can be 
conceptualized by way of the concept of “making visible”; and, as we shall also 
see, this sentence from Klee can help us to conceptualize what this entails. 
Nevertheless, it can only do so on condition that we put aside what Klee was 
getting at with this statement and take it up and use it in another way; which is 
to say, in our own way. I want to take up Klee’s sentence, then, not in the 
direction of abstraction—quite the obverse—, but as a heuristic with which to 
conceptualize our Foucaultian perspective as itself being perspectival. That is to 
say, as a way of seeing, as a way of saying too; as ways of seeing and saying that 
“make appear” (faire apparaître) or “render visible” (rendre visible); as a “grid of 
intelligibility” (grille d#intelligibilité) for “rendering intelligible” (rendre intelligible) 
way of seeing and saying and thinking and doing. The phrase Foucault seems to 
have used most is “faire apparaître” (there are far too many instances to cite here, 
and they run from History of Madness to the History of Sexuality), which I translate 
as “to make appear” (or “to make apparent”). However, since for something to 
appear means for it “to come forth into view, to become visible” (OED), to “render 
visible” and to “make appear” are more or less synonymous was of saying the 
same thing, and I will use them in this way. 
We can say that to re!produce the visible—and the “the” is important here—
is to re!create or re!construct what is already visible to us and, more specifically, is 
seen by us and then to re!present it to ourselves in whatever form this re!
production takes: text, schematic, painting, graphic, sculpture, and so forth. The 
prefix “re!“ in each of these verbs denotes “again” and thus has connotations of 
something being “done for a second time” (OED). Hence, to reproduce the visible 
is to make us see what we already see, and perhaps to get us to see what we see 
in new and novel ways; that is, to get us to see what we already see differently. 
Now, to make or render visible (minus the “the”) could be understood as a 
practice that seeks to make visible what is not visible; that is to say, as an attempt 
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to get us to see what, for whatever reason, we cannot see because it is not visible 
to us: by way of microscopes, telescopes, oscilloscopes, and stethoscopes, and so 
forth. Here, it would be a question of making visible what is not visible and not 
seen; this is not Foucault’s, and thus our, modus operandi. ‘Making appear what 
one does not see’, Foucault once noted, ‘can sometimes be the effect of using a 
magnifying instrument’, on the other hand, ‘to make seen what one does not see can 
also be to shift level, to address a level that hitherto was not historically 
pertinent, [a level] which had neither moral, nor aesthetic, nor political, nor 
historical value’ (Foucault 1980: 49, modified, emphases added).  
In moving to this other “level”, our Foucaultian perspective aims to render 
visible or make appear that which is precisely visible but unseen or, more 
specifically, not seen. Whilst I am playing upon visuals concepts and metaphors 
here, to keep with the notion of rendering visible, it should be noted that “to not 
see” is contiguous with “to not say” or with “that which goes ‘without saying’” 
(see Veyne 1998). Here, it is a question of rendering visible what is visible (from 
Latin v$sibilis: “that may be seen”; from v$sus, past participle of vid%re, “to see”, 
OED) but invisible; what we might call the visible!invisible (what may be seen!but 
is not seen). To render visible, in this sense, then, is not to move towards the lure 
of abstraction; it is to move towards concretion. To render visible is to make 
appear the mundane empirities of our present and of ourselves; it is to make 
visible, and thus to render intelligible, the material and practical conditions of 
possibility of our present and of ourselves; it is also to make legible the material 
and practical conditions that our present and ourselves make possible. The 
differentiation between the visible and the invisible here is not of the order of the 
“manifest” and the “latent” or the “overt” and the “covert”, and so forth, but is 
more of the order of the gestaltian figure/ground in which ground is not a 
foundation that founds but is a background that recedes as the figure advances. 
Paul Veyne (1998), Foucault’s one time student and colleague, uses the 
metaphor of ‘the “concealed base of the iceberg”’ (ibid.: 150) to help describe, and 
to get us to think about, what is visible to us but not see by us: ‘[i]f practices are, 
in one sense, “hidden” and if we may provisionally call them the “concealed base 
of the iceberg,” it is quite simply because “practice” shares the fate of nearly all 
our behavior…: we are often aware of it, but we have no concept for it’ (ibid.: 
153!154). Veyne’s metaphor is useful in that it helps us to see that what is visible 
to us but not seen by us is made up of the same “stuff” as what we do see: ‘the 
concealed base of an iceberg is not some agency [(like the Freudian id) or a prime 
mover (like the relation of production)] that is different in nature from the 
exposed tip; it is made of ice, like the rest…[and, consequently, it]…is accounted 
for in the same way as the rest of the iceberg’ (ibid.: 156). However, this iceberg 
metaphor is unhelpful in that it suggest that we do not see what we do not see 
because it is in some sense “submerged”; hence the image of surface and depth, 
and all the adjectives describing what we do not see as being “concealed”, 
“hidden”, “heavily veiled”, and so forth; hence too, the suggestion that what is 
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hidden, and so on, is hidden in depth. Now, whilst it may be the case that we do 
not see what we do not see because ‘it is below the line of visibility’ and is thus 
‘largely preconceptual’ (ibid.), this is not because it is “hidden in depth” but 
because it is hidden in plain sight; that is to say, it is because it is ‘too much on the 
surface of things [trop à la surface des choses]’ (Foucault 1996a: 58; the full sentence 
reads: ‘I attempt to render visible [rendre visible] what is invisible only because it 
is too much on the surface of things’). Rather than employ all these terms 
concerning depth and masking, what is visible and yet invisible is invisible 
because, to use Heidegger’s term, it has withdrawn: ‘[t]he peculiarity of what is 
proximally ready!to!hand is that, in its readiness!to!hand, it must, as it were, 
withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready!to!hand quite authentically’ 
(Heidegger 1962: 99 [H. 69]). 
Etymologically speaking, to render (French: rendre) is “to give back”, “to 
return”, or “to recompense” (from Latin redd&re: “to give back, return, restore”:  
from red! “back” + dare “to give”, OED). Hence, to “render visible” is to give back 
visibility to that which is visible but invisible or not seen; which is to say, it is to give 
back visibility to that which is precisely visible. What is made visible is not 
something invisible, if by this term we mean something that has been masked or 
covered over, something that has been forgotten or is a secret, or something 
hidden or that has been made to look like something else (i.e. the distortion of the 
truth). On the other hand, if we take invisible in the etymological sense of 
“unseen” or “not seen” (from Latin invisibilis: “unseen”, “not seen”; from in! 
“not” + v$sibilis, OED), then to render visible or make appear is to given back 
visibility to what may be seen but is not seen. The sense given to “invisibility”, 
then, is not that of the title of H. G. Wells’ (1897) classic The Invisible Man (i.e. of 
someone that is materially and physically present but cannot be seen because 
they are masked, cloaked, or veiled); rather, it has the sense of someone who is 
materially and physically present, and who is perfectly visible, out in the open, as 
it were, and yet remains unseen or who is not seen (like an introvert at a party 
who withdraws to a corner or a secret agent who has been trained to blend in, it 
has connotations of being indistinguishable, unexceptional, bland, generic, 
nondescript, and so forth). That is to say, invisible means not seen because it does 
not stand out, because it does not register, because it is part of the background 
furniture of the world and, because of this very fact, remains unnoticed. 
In addition, the terms “appear” or “visible” in the phrases “make appear” or 
“render visible” should not be conflated with the purely ocular, with sight or 
perception, with what is seen by the eyes, and so forth. On the contrary, it refers 
to practices, processes, and procedures that are as much conceptual as they are 
perceptual, as much practical as they are theoretical, as corporeal as they are 
cognitive, as material and they are immaterial, and so forth. On this view, to 
render visible by bringing the visible!invisible back to visibility is to bring it into 
awareness, to make apparent; it is to render the pre!conceptual conceptualizable. 
What we aim to render visible, and thus to make appear, is what renders visible 
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into appearance; what we aim to make to appear, and thus render intelligible, is 
that which comes to appearance as intelligible. For example, and in relation to 
psychiatric practices and the birth of the asylum (e.g. Foucault 2006a, 2006b), 
Foucault stated that ‘[i]n the fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the 
discontinuities, and the thresholds that appear within it, psychiatric discourse 
finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving 
it the status of an object—and therefore of making it manifest [faire apparaître], 
nameable, and describable’ (Foucault 1972: 41). In other words, what we are 
attempting to make visible are the different and differential ways in which things 
have come into appearance, have been made visible, and thus rendered 
intelligible, as something to be known, as something to be governed, or as some 
aspect of ourselves to be reflected upon and transformed. On this view, 
archaeology (and genealogy) is not simply a way of analyzing  practices of seeing 
and saying (see Shapiro 2003); it is, itself, a practice of seeing and saying, of 
rendering visible and intelligible, and so forth. 
This task of rendering visible—of giving back visibility to what may be seen 
but is not seen because it is too much on the surface of things—is essentially a 
philosophical task: ‘[i]t has long been known that the role of philosophy is not to 
discover that which is hidden [ce qui est caché], but to render visible [rendre visible] 
that which precisely is visible; that is to say, to make appear [faire apparaître] that 
which is so close, which is so immediate, which is so intimately bound to 
ourselves that, because of this, we do not perceive it’ (Foucault cited in Lemke 
2012: 73!74, whose translation has been slightly amended). To render visible 
and/or make appear, then, are tasks that are neither scientific (whose task it is ‘to 
make known what we cannot see [de faire connaître ce que nous ne voyons pas]’, 
Foucault 2001b: 541), nor social scientific (this is no “sociology of power”, 
Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106; see also Dean 1996; Rose 1999), but 
philosophical; and, vis!à!vis an analytics of power, it is the task of an analytical 
philosophy of the political (‘La philosophie analytique de la politique’, Foucault 2001b: 
534ff.). 
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III.  A  “WORK!SHOP  APPROACH”  
But what is to be rendered visible in this way? And, more specifically, how is what 
is to be rendered visible to be made apparent? It is here, I think, that we begin to 
get at the non!central core around which our Foucaultian perspective must orbit. 
Whilst it should be clear from the above that this has something to do with our 
present (“What are we to!day?”), and ourselves (“What are we to!day?”), what is 
to be rendered visible are the relations that obtain—or, for Foucault, the relations 
that have obtained historically—between subject and object, and the relation of 
this relation to what Foucault called ‘the “games of truth” [les « jeux de vérité »]’ 
(see Foucault 1998: 459!463). More concretely, to render visible our present and 
ourselves by rendering visible subject!object relations, the true!false relations, 
and the relations between these, is not simply to look at what is (i.e. in terms of 
ontology); rather, it looks at what is made (i.e. in term of technology). More 
explicitly still, it looks at what is made (object, subject, technique, environment, 
etc.; knowledge, truth, domination, and so forth) by looking at what went into its 
making (i.e. practices—discursive or not). As Veyne puts it, ‘[w]hat is made…is 
explained by what went into its making at each moment of history; we are wrong 
to imagine that the making, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made’ 
(Veyne 1998: 160!161).  
1 Analytics  
Rather than taking what appears to us as a transhistorical natural object (i.e. 
“madness” or “illness”; “life”, “labour”, or “language”; “crime” or the 
“economy”; “population” or “sexuality” etc.), and then look at the variant 
historical practices through which this object has been approached, Foucault 
inverts this process not only by looking at how different objects (and subjects) 
have been made historically, but also by looking at what, at certain specific 
historical conjectures, went into their making. That is to say, instead of taking a 
natural object and looking at the differing historical attitudes (sensibilities, 
mentalities, mind!sets, world!views, and so forth) towards it and through which 
it has been approached, Foucault looked at the historical practices (discursive or 
not) from which a multiplicity of objects—which may all go under the same 
name: “madness” or “crime”, etc.—have been made intelligible for a specific kind 
of subject: ‘In considering statements in themselves, we will not seek, beyond all 
these analyses and at a deeper level, some secret or some root of language that 
they have omitted. We shall try to render visible [rendre visible], and analysable, 
that immediate transparency [si proche transparence] that constitutes the element of 
their possibility’ (Foucault 1972: 112, emphases added). 
There are two dimensions to rendering visible or making appear. On the 
one hand, there are the attempts to render visible ‘the modes according to which 
the subject was able to be inserted as an object in the games of truth’ (Foucault 
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1998: 461); this is what we can call the archaeological dimension of rendering visible 
(Foucault 1998: 460; 1985: 11!12)—it is the “method” of rendering visible the 
relations that obtain between subject and object and games of truth (Foucault 
1997: 315). On the other hand, there are the attempt to render visible “what our 
present is” (Foucault 2007a: 130) and “what we are to!day” (Foucault 1999: 91); 
this is what we can call the genealogical dimension of the analysis (Foucault 1985: 
11!12)—it is the finalité, aim, or purpose of rendering visible, and what it aims to 
render visible is our present and ourselves (Foucault 1997: 315). Our work!shop, 
then, is not only equipped with tools for rendering visible, it is equipped with 
two specific types of equipment: archaeology and genealogy. These tools, 
however, should not be thought of as occupying two different sections of our 
work!shop dedicated to two fundamentally different tasks; rather, they constitute 
two different dimension of the same space or grid. The tools we can manufacture 
with them may be different, but they fit together to form an overall way of 
rendering visible and thus of making apparent and, by extension, of rendering 
intelligible.  
In addition to these two dimensions, however, there is a third dimension 
that cuts across them, and this concerns three different sets of practices, which 
themselves render visible and intelligible the objects, subjects, and regimes of 
truth respective to each: these concern knowledge (relations de savoir), power 
(rapports de pouvoir) or government, and ethics (rapport à soi) or self. Archaeology 
and genealogy are two different yet interrelated modes of rendering visible, of 
making what is visible but not seen seeable and sayable; knowledge, power, and 
self (or truth, governmentality, and ethics) are three different yet interrelated 
points of view from which to render visible; they are three ways of looking at and 
of making appear what is not seen and what goes without saying seeable and 
sayable. The term I am most interested in here is “power” or pouvoir and, 
specifically, the way in which Foucault conceptualizes power not merely as an 
object of study, but as a way of posing questions: power as a point of view of 
method (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106).  
The French term pouvoir can be translated as a noun: “power”, or as a verb: 
“to be able” (Elden 2001: 106); as Spivak notes, ‘in its various conjugations, 
[pouvoir] is the commonest way of saying “can” in the French language’ (Spivak 
1996: 150!151). When Foucault uses the term “power” (pouvoir), it is always used 
as shorthand for relations of power (Foucault 1997: 291), and he studies these 
relations by looking at the techniques, tactics, mechanism, and so forth, that allow 
for their exercise or that enable these relations of power to be exercised (Foucault 
2007a: 135). What the term power captures, then, is both a relation (relation(s) de 
pouvoir or rapport(s) de pouvoir) and a technique: ‘[t]he exercise of power consists in 
“conducting conducts” and in arranging probability’ (Foucault 2001d: 341, 
modified, emphasis added; this important sentence will be discussed in more 
detail in Part Four of the thesis). Thus, pouvoir is a tidy little concept for thinking 
about and questioning relations of power and the techniques that allow for these 
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relations to be exercise; or, stated otherwise, for capturing, in a single term, the 
exercising of relations of power. However, as the second part of the aforecited quote 
makes clear—i.e. “arranging probability”—, there is a further sense of “to be 
able” encapsulated in Foucault’s use of the term pouvoir: probability. One way of 
thinking about this additional aspect runs as follows: ‘if the lines of making sense 
of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those 
things with that something which are possible within and by the arrangement of 
those lines’ (Spivak 1996: 151). Another, perhaps more straightforward or 
prosaic, way of thinking about this is to say that ‘[t]o be governed is not…to have 
a form imposed upon one’s existence’, rather, it is ‘to be given the [very] terms 
within which existence will and will not be possible’ (Butler 2004: 314). In other 
words, ‘[p]ower is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of 
conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245!246), which aim to bring about 
conditions of probability. Thus, from our Foucaultian perspective, power not 
only denotes forms of relations and techniques of constraint; it has connotations 
of forms and techniques of constraint that enable, but that enable only within the 
delimited and thus limited terrain of this constraint (hence “arranging 
probability”). In addition to the two senses of pouvoir noted above, then, 
Foucault’s conception, use, and analysis of this term ‘attempts to capture this 
creative, productive sense [of power], rather than merely the forceful, repressive 
sense’ (Elden 2001: 106) of this term (i.e. puissance).   
Hence “power”, as a translation of pouvoir—and not of puissance, the latter 
of which has connotations of “(brute) force”, “strength”, “might”, “potency”, and 
so on—, is a highly compact and polysemic concept that captures not only 
relations of power and the techniques that allow for those relations to be 
exercised, it also conceptualizes those techniques as productive of subjects and 
objects because productive of environments (at least in terms of their intent); that 
is to say, of the very reality (or environmentality) in which such subjects and 
objects may appear. As Foucault put this in Discipline and Punish, ‘[w]e must 
cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
“excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In 
fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth. The individual and the knowledge [connaissance] that may be gained of him 
belong to this production’ (Foucault 1977a: 194, emphases added). This is why we 
should pose the question of power not in terms of ‘good and evil’ (i.e. in terms of 
puissance) but ‘in terms of existence’ (Foucault 2001b: 540). However, pace Spivak 
(1996: 152), I do not think Foucault operationalizes the same kind of analytical 
and conceptual distinction between pouvoir and puissance as he does between 
savoir and connaissance. Rather, if there is an equivalent term to connaissance in 
relation to pouvoir, then this term is domination (see Elden 2006: 59).  
Hence to render visible, from the point of view of power, is to render visible 
a relation of power (conducting conducts, governmental modality), the 
techniques the enable that relation to be exercised (tactics, arranging probability), 
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the type of reality it seeks to bring into existence, the types of objects to be known 
and to be governed, and the modes of subjectivity that the exercising of a relation 
of power seeks to enable; that is to say, what it aims to make probable or actually 
makes possible (reality, objects, subjects, knowledge, etc.). In other words, 
“power” is an exemplary example of all of Foucault’s technical termes d’art in that 
it is a polysemantic manifold that does not provide a unitary definition (a theory 
of power), but is a conceptualization that draws together an assemblage of 
associated and interrelated concepts. Whilst archaeology looks at the forms of 
these relations, techniques, knowledges, and so forth, genealogy looks at the 
material and practical conditions of possibility (their provenance) of their 
formation (their emergence), and at the material and practical conditions that they 
actually, but unintentionally, make possible (not their product but their effects); 
which is to say, our present and ourselves. It is here that we arrive at the central 
problematic of the thesis. 
The practice of rendering visible our present and ourselves, by way of 
making apparent the formations, forms, and transformations of objects, subjects 
(governmental modalities), techniques, and strategies, and so forth, is a practice 
that aims to make appear, by giving back visibility and thus intelligibility, to that 
immediate transparency, which, because it is too much on the surface of things, 
and is thus so intimate to what we are, to what we say, and to what we do—it is 
what we are, say, and do—, we cannot (can no longer) see it. Making visible what 
can be seen but is not seen is a bit like the scene in the 1999 film The Matrix where 
Laurence Fishburne’s character, Morpheus, tries to explain to Neo, played by 
Keanu Reeves, what the Matrix is: “The Matrix is everywhere, it’s all around us, 
here even in this room. You can see it out your window or on your television. 
You feel it when you go to work, or go to church or pay your taxes… 
Unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for yourself” 
(Wachowski and Wachowski 2000: 300, emphasis added). The problem is, unlike 
Neo, we cannot be “freed” from our matrices by being extricated from them; in 
other words, we cannot see our matrix for ourselves from its outside, from a 
position of exteriority. Nevertheless, like Neo, in order to be able to see it for 
ourselves, we need to detach ourselves from ourselves and from our present in 
some way, so as to grant ourselves the sight needed to see ourselves in our 
present. To be able to return the visible!invisible to visibility, consequently, 
requires that we somehow loosen ourselves from that which is so intimately 
bound to ourselves—what we are, say, and do—that we cannot see it; that is, we 
somehow have to create a critical distance between ourselves and our present 
and what we are, say, and do to!day so as to be able to see ourselves and say to 
ourselves what we are, what we say, and what we do to!day.  
As is generally well known, Foucault performed this critical distancing by 
way of history, that is to say, by way of archaeological and genealogical enquiry. 
This is not simply an appeal to history, however, but a posing of philosophical 
question to history and of historical questions to philosophy (Foucault 1997: 201!
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202; see also, 2007a: 150); of undertaking detailed historical analyses of the 
concrete and historical a priori, the positivities, dispositivities, and effectivities of 
historically specific regimes of practices (discursive or not), and by using such 
historical analyses to render visible and thus intelligible ourselves in our present 
actuality. The central question to be addressed in the thesis, vis!à!vis questioning 
our present and ourselves from the perspective of our present and ourselves in 
terms of power, is “How are we to do this seeing for ourselves?” That is to say, 
“How are we to render visible?” The central problem here, and the central 
problematic to be addresses in the thesis, is that we cannot simply transpose 
“Foucault’s methods”, which are essentially methods for doing history or 
historical analyses, and “apply” them to our present and ourselves from the 
stand!point of our actuality. Since, the problem to be attended to here is not one 
addressed to how Foucault did historical analyses (this will be dealt with later in 
the thesis) but questions how we might take up these ways of seeing and saying 
to question our present form its own actuality and ourselves from our own 
actuality, and since, as Dean notes, ‘[t]here are no a priori grounds…on which one 
could justify “doing” history’ (Dean 1994: 23), the central problematic to be 
addressed here does not concern the viability or otherwise of Foucault’s 
approach to history but concerns his very use of history. That is to say, I am less 
concerned here with the mechanics of doing archaeology and genealogy than I 
am with the reasons or theoretical justifications for doing and/or using history as 
a practice of rendering visible.  
2 Diagnostics  
From the first, Foucault characterized his work as a diagnosis of the present (see, 
e.g. Foucault 2006a: xxxiii; 1973: xix; 1970: xxvi; 1972: 131), famously describing it 
in Discipline and Punish as a ‘history of the present’ (Foucault 1977a: 31), and yet, 
Part II of The Order of Things aside, these works rarely describe, analyse, or 
comment upon the present in which they were written. We get numerable 
descriptions of the humble beginnings of that which is still ‘familiar to us today’ 
(Foucault 2006a: 504), of that ‘from which we have not yet escaped’ (Foucault 
1973: 198), and that ‘still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge’ 
(Foucault 1970: 420!421), and so on, and so forth. But most of these studies 
abruptly stop at a horizon—usually before the end of the 19th Century—they 
seem unwilling or unable to go beyond: a point that should be neither 
overplayed (e.g. Baudrillard 2007: 34) nor underemphasized. When Foucault did 
comment upon, describe, and/or analyse his own present to any great extent, this 
was invariably in interviews. Thus, whilst the aim or objective of Foucault’s 
critical output was this diagnosis of the present, the ways in which he undertook 
this was by way of an historical analytics that rendered visible thus making a 
diagnostics possible.   
This, at least, is how Deleuze (1992b) formulates Foucault’s philosophical 
activity: ‘[i]n each [dispositive] we have to untangle the lines of the recent past 
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and those of the near future: that which belongs to the archive and that which 
belongs to the present; that which belongs to history and that which belongs to 
the process of becoming; that which belongs to the analytic and that which belongs to 
the diagnostic’ (ibid.: 164). Here, the past, history, and the archive are elements of 
an analytics; the near future, the present, and the process of becoming all belong 
to a diagnostics. As Deleuze goes on to note, ‘[i]n most of his books [Foucault] 
specifies a precise archive…But that is one half of his task…He formulates [the 
other half] explicitly only in the interviews which take place contemporary with 
the writing of each of his major books: what can be said nowadays about 
insanity, prison, sexuality?’ (ibid.: 165). The principle point to be drawn from 
Deleuze’s description is that this latter task, that of diagnosis, ‘required a 
different form of expression from the lines which were drawn together in his 
major books’ (ibid.: 166). 
In the essay in which the above remarks are made (‘What is a dispositif?’), 
Deleuze cites what he calls ‘a fundamental passage’ from The Archaeology , which, 
he claims, ‘is valid for the rest of Foucault’s work’ (ibid.: 165). I reproduce the 
passage here—of which Deleuze cites only the second half (beginning with ‘The 
analysis of the archive…’)—because of the way in which it captures, and is thus 
demonstrative of, the problem at hand; vis!à!vis questioning the contemporary 
political order of things from within that very order of things. 
It is evident that we cannot exhaustively describe the archive of a society, a culture, or a 
civilization; nor even, no doubt, the archive of an entire epoch. On the other hand, it is not 
possible for us to describe our own archive [il ne nous est pas possible de decrire notre 
propre archive], since it is from the interior of its rules that we speak...The archive is not 
describable in its totality; and it is inescapable in its actuality [i.e. in our present]. It gives 
itself in fragments, regions and levels, all the more, no doubt, and with greater precision, 
the more time that separates us from it…And yet how could this description of the archive 
justify itself…if it persisted in only ever describing the most distant horizons? Should we 
not approach as close as possible this positivity…and this archive system that allows us to 
speak today about the archive in general? Should we not illuminate, if only in an oblique 
way, that enunciative field of which it is itself a part? The analysis of the archive, then, 
comprises a privileged region: at once close to us, but different from our actuality, it is the 
border of time that surrounds our present, that overhangs it and indicates it in its 
otherness; it is what, outside us, delimits us. The description of the archive deploys its 
possibilities…from the discourses that have just ceased to be our own; its threshold of 
existence is established by the cut that separates us from what we can no longer say, from 
that which falls outside our discursive practice...In this sense, [an analysis of the archive] is 
applicable as a diagnostic of ourselves. Not because it would allow us to draw up a table of 
our distinctive traits and to sketch out in advance the figure we will have in the future. But 
[because] it deprives us of our continuities; it dispels this temporal identity where we like 
to look at ourselves to ward off the ruptures of history…The diagnostic, thus understood, 
does not establish the facts of our identity by the interplay of distinctions. It establishes 
that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourse, our history the 
difference of times, our selves the difference of masks. That difference, far from being 
forgotten and discovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and that we do (Foucault 
1972: 130!131, modified, all emphases added). 
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May I be excused for citing such a lengthy passage; the reason for doing so is that 
it both demonstrates and captures the critical question and thus unfolds the 
problem space in which we are to work: “If we cannot describe our own archive, how 
can we describe what we are to!day from within the confines of our own actuality?” 
Preferring to let this passage speak for itself, I do not want to comment upon it 
beyond drawing attention to the italicized sentences. Firstly, and quite clearly 
and categorically, it states that “it is not possible for us to know our own 
archive”; in other words, it is not possible for us to render visible our own 
visible!invisible. Secondly, and consequently, the only access that we have to our 
own archive, the only way to render visible our actuality, is by way of those 
“discourses that have just ceased to be our own”, and this because it makes 
visible our own archive by noting the difference from what it no longer is. Which 
means that, from the perspective of archaeology, and indeed of genealogy, the 
closer we get to our own actuality, the harder it is for us to render visible and 
intelligible and thus to describe that actuality vis!à!vis our visible!invisible.  
This is made clearer in an interview from 1967, in which, in discussing The 
Order of Things, Foucault notes that he can ‘define the classical age in its 
particular configuration by the twofold difference that contrasts it with the 
sixteenth century, on the one hand, and with the nineteenth century, on the 
other’ (Foucault 1998: 293). This is not so, however, when it comes to what 
Foucault calls the modern age (‘which begins around 1790 to 1810 and goes up to 
about 1950’): ‘I can define the modern age in its singularity only by contrasting it 
with the seventeenth century, on the one hand, and with us [in our actuality], on 
the other hand’ (ibid.). He concludes by noting that ‘[i]t is a matter of pulling 
oneself free of that modern age…whereas for the classical age it’s only a matter of 
describing it’ (ibid.). On this view, the only access we have to questioning our 
own actuality, when questioning it from the perspective of itself, is by 
philosophizing with a hammer (Nietzsche 2005: 136, 153ff.): ‘as soon as we are 
obliged to question the words that still resonate in our ears, that are mingled with 
those we are trying to speak, then archaeology, like Nietzschean philosophy, is 
forced to work with hammer blows’ (Foucault 1998: 293). But is this really the 
case? Is the only way to question our present and ourselves, from where we are 
and where we stand, by way of the brute force of the pounding blows of a 
hammer? Or are there more subtle tools than hammers to be employed? We shall 
address these questions in more detail in Part Three of the thesis. 
As noted above, this problem of the proximity between what is to be 
questioned and described and our own actuality is not purely a restriction 
pertinent to the so!called archaeological period but, as Deleuze noted, is equally 
applicable to all of Foucault’s work, and hence to genealogy. Genealogy, as a 
history of the present and a historical ontology of ourselves, is a diagnostics—
and a strategics—of the present, not a description and less still a depiction of either 
our present or ourselves in our actuality. As Foucault put it in his essay on Kant 
and Enlightenment, critical history asks ‘What difference does today introduce 
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with respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault 1997: 305). In other words, whilst The 
Archaeology is the only place in which Foucault framed his work in terms of an 
analysis of the archive (i.e. ‘the general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements’, Foucault 1972: 130), the point being made about 
certain historical configurations, ourselves in our present actuality, and the 
relation of such an analyses to historical description, runs through all of 
Foucault’s critical and effective histories.  
3 Strategics  
The foregoing discussion has been designed to raise but one question: “How to 
research our own actuality from the perspective of this actuality? “How are we to 
question the contemporary order of things from within that very order?” Or, 
more specifically, “How to question the exercising of contemporary relations of 
power from within the contemporary itself?” and to do all of this without 
recourse to historical research. As I hope the foregoing discussion has made clear, 
this is by no means a straightforward question, and is certainly not a question of 
the unproblematic “application” of Foucault’s “methods”. Whilst, at a strictly 
empirical level, it may be possible—and relatively unproblematic—to take up the 
work of Foucault and others as a box of ready!made tools and apply them to 
contemporary concrete phenomena; at a more philosophical level, and 
specifically of posing the philosophical problem of present, and of how to 
question that present by establishing some critical distance from it, is anything 
but a given. The sentence that rings between our ears in thinking through such 
application, and that poses a question to be asked and opens up a problem space 
within which to work, is that “it is not possible for us to describe our own 
archive”. Now, whilst this may be said to be a problem of archaeology, to which 
genealogy was the solution, I do not think that this is the case. That is to say, I 
think that it is a problem not only for archaeology but also for genealogy. 
Like the later appeal to genealogy, archaeology already begins with a 
problem in our own present: ‘[t]his kind of research is only possible as the analysis 
of our own subsoil…[;] the subsoil of our modern consciousness of madness…[or 
the subsoil of our consciousness of meaning]…If there were not something like a 
fault line in this soil, archaeology would not have been possible or necessary. In 
the two cases these are the critical analysis of our own condition’ (Foucault 1998: 263, 
emphasis added). The take up of genealogy—which I think neither replaced nor 
displaced archaeology, but takes over a number of its themes and problems 
whilst simultaneous supplementing the kinds of historical narrative it is possible 
to make—turns around two interlinked but differential conceptualizations of 
historical description and present actuality. Archaeology, as practiced in The 
Order of Things—and, to a certain extent, as described in The Archaeology—, 
questions and analyzes the horizontal axis of historical transformations (Foucault 
1991a: 58!59; 1998: 285); that is to say, in this work, it deals almost exclusively 
with the synchronic. Now, whilst this synchronicity ‘provides us with a snapshot, 
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a slice through the discursive nexus’ (Bevis, Cohen, and Kendall 1993: 194), this 
slice can be quite broad, encompassing years, decades, or even centuries. On the 
other hand, archaeology, as practiced in History of Madness and The Birth of the 
Clinic, also dealt with the vertical axis of historical mutation (Foucault 1997: 202; 
1998: 285, 382). It is this vertical (i.e. diachronic) axis, I contend, that genealogy 
takes over and supplements, and not archaeology per se. And, I would wager, 
that it is this aspect of archaeology—the aforementioned diagnostic aspect of 
archaeology—that Foucault was referring to when he stated that his ‘archaeology 
owes more to Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly so called’ 
(Foucault 1998: 294).  
In other words, pace Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 79ff.), I do not think 
archaeology was a methodological failure that was unseated and supplanted by a 
more robust Nietzschean genealogy. On the contrary, I think The Archaeology, as a 
reflection upon and extension of the analysis undertaken in the previous works, 
and especially of Part II of The Order of Things (Foucault 1996a: 65ff.; 2001a: 1274, 
‘The Order of Things became The Archaeology of Knowledge’, which, in turn, became 
‘a dynastics of knowledge [dynastique du savoir]’; see Faubion 1998: xxxiii; and the 
translator endnote in Foucault 2010: 169n6), was rather successful in what it set 
out to do; that is, not to situate itself between the transcendental and the 
historical (Han 2002), but to avoid the category of the transcendental altogether 
(Webb 2005a, 2013; cf. Thompson 2010). I do not want to get into a discussion 
here concerning the transcendental and/or the empirical/historical in the work of 
Foucault; in addition to the works just cited, such a discussion can be had in the 
debate between Koopman (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), and McQuillan (2010) and 
Thompson (2010). That said, one of the key terms of The Archaeology is 
“dispersion”, and one of its principle insights is that causality is multiple and 
heterogeneous; that the more one looks the more levels, temporalities, 
spatialities, materialities, and practicalities multiply; that there is no terminus to 
such research, only more detail: Foucault described the epist%m%, for example, as 
‘a space of dispersion’, as ‘an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of 
relationships’ (Foucault 1991a: 55). Perhaps it is this observation that led Foucault 
to take up, in his own idiosyncratic way, Nietzsche’s perspectivism and hence 
genealogy. That is to say, unlike Borges’ (1999) cartographers, we can never map 
a territory in toto, and thus the particular mapping that takes place—the lines 
drawn, the scale and the detail, the key to understanding, and so forth—is 
undertaken from a particular perspective, a perspective formed and informed by 
way of a particular conceptualization of the present; a conceptualization of the 
present formed and informed by way of the questioners particular relation to that 
present; a present that is not only to be mapped but also transformed.  
On this view, the taking up of genealogy is not a consequence of the failure 
of archaeology, as worked out in The Archaeology, but of its relative success (see, 
e.g. Defert 2013b: 274; Webb 2013: 162ff.). For Webb, The Archaeology works out a 
form of analysis that recognizes that ‘[t]here are conditions underpinning 
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knowledge, and they are historical, not transcendental; but their history cannot 
be levelled down to that of empirical events’ (Webb 2013: 11). ‘Foucault’s 
challenge’, Webb continues, ‘is to explain what status they do have, if they are 
neither transcendental conditions nor empirical causes’ (ibid.). Webb views 
Foucault as having largely responded to this challenge, even if he ‘did not solve 
the problem once and for all’ (ibid.: 162). On this view, then, The Archaeology  not 
only made the emergence of genealogy possible, it also made possible the 
manifold and differentiated ways in which archaeological and genealogical 
modes of enquiry were taken up, combined, deployed, and employed by 
Foucault in his proceeding works. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Foucault’s 
so!called archaeological period, a period that is said to culminate in The 
Archaeology, is that knowledge itself is perspectival. By perspectival, here, I do not 
mean a fixed constitutive subject looking at the same natural object from many 
different points of view but, rather, that there is a complex relation between 
subject and object in which each is mutually constituted by way of the material 
and practical conditions—i.e. the concrete and historical a priori—of that relation 
(see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459!463), and, moreover, that such ‘conditions may be 
transformed by the conditioned to which they give rise’ (Webb 2013: 162). In 
other words, the achievement of Foucaultian archaeology is the thought that the 
relations between subject, object, and conditions (i.e. practices) are immanent and 
mutually constitutive.  
What takes place from Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France 
(Foucault 1981) onwards, is the double gaze of archaeology and genealogy (see, 
e.g. Foucault 2013: 225; 2006b: 13, 238!239; 2003c: 10!11). This is clearly 
demonstrated in Foucault’s Collège de France lectures; it is also evidenced in the 
first of Foucault’s last two publications, in which he frames his project precisely 
as having both archaeological and genealogical dimensions. In this text, and in 
presenting a retrospective perspective of his overall project—a project that 
analyzed neither ‘behaviors [empirical] or ideas [transcendental], nor societies or 
their “ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being gives itself as 
[that which] can and must be thought and the practices from which they [said 
problematizations] are formed’—Foucault stated that ‘the archaeological 
dimension of the analysis permits the analysis of the forms of problematization 
themselves’, whilst ‘its genealogical dimension, [permits the analysis of] their 
formation from practices and their modifications’ (Foucault 1985: 11!12, modified, 
emphases added). That is to say, the archaeological axis analyzes, horizontally or 
synchronically, the forms of problematizations themselves, whilst the 
genealogical axis analyzes, vertically or diachronically, the practices out of which 
forms of problematization are formed (their provenance) and through which they 
and the practices from which they arrived are modified and transformed (their 
emergence). 
 The reason for this shift, then, is not that archaeology deals with the 
discursive and genealogy brought in the whole question of the non!discursive 
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(reading History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic should dispel this myth), 
nor is it that archaeology did not pose the question of power, which is said only 
to emerge with genealogy. Rather, it is the way in which each poses the 
philosophical question of the problem of the present; as Dean (1994) puts it ‘The 
Archaeology gives no explicit account of how the historical description of the 
positivity of discourse is to be mobilised in terms of current purposes and issues’ 
(ibid.: 17). This, according to Dean, is because ‘while [archaeology’s] “positivism” 
may well be a technique capable of finding the level proper to its objects, it 
remained incapable of articulating its own purposes and relation to the present’ 
(ibid.: 18). On this view, whilst ‘archaeology could reflect upon its own theoretical 
effects’ it could not, however, ‘account of its strategic purposes’; genealogy, as 
Dean notes, ‘is far better placed to do so’ (ibid.). 
Whereas archaeology seemed content to diagnose our present by describing 
the conditions of possibility of the ground or the sub!soil beneath our feet, 
genealogy—perhaps taking up Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach 
(‘philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
change it’, Marx 1977: 158), but giving it a Nietzschean twist—is not only 
concerned with diagnosing the present by describing its sub!soil, but also with 
using such diagnoses to effect a transformation. That is to say, it not only 
diagnoses the present, it strategizes our actuality (see, e.g. Foucault 2007a: 64!65). 
Whereas archaeology had noted that it was due to a certain rift in our own sub!
soil that made archaeological analyses of the past possible, genealogy notes that 
analyses of our past could be used to bring about possible transformations in our 
present. The point, however, is that neither Foucaultian archaeology—as 
thematized in The Archaeology or later—nor Foucaultian genealogy—whether that 
of Nietzsche or that of the Kant of ‘What is Enlightenment?—give descriptions of 
the present from the stand!point of this present itself. 
Whilst it is possible to endlessly debate whether or not we can have access 
to our own archive (or, to put it another way, whether we can have access to the 
visible!invisible of the contemporary order of things by means of and in terms of 
this very order), if we are taking Foucault seriously (and since we are talking 
about using his “methods” generally and his analyses on power specifically, then 
presumable we are), then this question of rendering visible and legible what we 
are to!day by way of the historical conditions that have made us what we are 
cannot simply be by!passed when taking up the question of rendering visible, 
legible, and intelligible our present not from the perspective of its history but 
from the perspective of our own current actuality, from of contemporality. On 
the other hand, we cannot simply dismiss or give up such questioning based on, 
or because of, what Foucault said or did. Rather, we have to take it up for 
ourselves as a question to be posed and a problem to be addressed.  
The principle problem, as I see it, is a question of finding some method or 
other, some approach, to give it its correct name, which will give us the same kind 
of critical distance to our present that Foucault’s use of history and of historical 
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analyses gave to him. How, for example, are we to render visible the subject!
object relations and their relations to true!false relations in contemporary 
discursive and non!discursive practices? How can we use such practices to 
render visible the present when it is these very practices we are attempting to 
render visible, and to do so in term of the different and differential ways in which 
they constitute their objects, form their subjective modalities, conceptualize their 
techniques, and thematize their strategies. And how can we do this without 
recourse to either transcendental conditions or, in any case, to the meaning giving 
subject, on the one hand, and empirical causes, if by this terms we mean the 
manifest or that which is both visible and seen, on the other. Rather, what we need 
to describe is the materialism of the incorporeal contemporary with the practices we 
are to question. Are there any tools, then, in Foucault’s tool!box, or in those of 
studies in governmentality more generally, that will enable us to do such work? 
Failing this, can we mobilize such equipment to manufacture our own tools that 
will provide us with the critical distance require to render visible our present and 
ourselves? From our Foucaultian perspective, such a detachment cannot be 
objective, if by this we mean what Haraway (1988) called a ‘god!trick’; that ‘view 
from nowhere’ (Nagel 1996) that sees ‘everything from nowhere’ (Haraway 1988: 
581; vis!à!vis governmentality, see Dean 1996)}. Rather, critique has to question 
our own actuality and contemporary governmentality from within the current 
order of things. It is to a working through and working out of this problematic, 
by way of a discussion of the mechanics of Foucaultian genealogy and of 
Foucaultian archaeology, to which we now turn. 
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PART  THREE: SEEING  THE  PRESENT  
The concern to say what is going on…is not so much inhabited 
by the desire to know how it could take place, everywhere and 
always; but rather by the desire to figure out what hides 
underneath this precise, floating, mysterious, absolutely simple 
word: “today”. 
(Foucault, 'For an Ethics of Discomfort'). 
I.  RENDERING  VISIBLE  
Foucault began the first of two lecture delivered in English at Dartmouth College 
on the 17th and 24th of November in 1980, entitled ‘About the Beginning of the 
Hermeneutics of the Self’ (Foucault 2007a: 147!167, 169!191), with a brief résumé 
of the work he had been doing for the previous twenty or so years; in doing so, 
he presented the following schematic: ‘[T]he aim of my project is to construct a 
genealogy of the subject. The method is an archaeology of knowledge [savoir], and the 
precise domain of the analysis is what I should call technologies. I mean the 
articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject’ (ibid.: 
152, emphases added). In our deliberations on questioning power and 
government in their contemporality, in thinking about how to question it from 
the perspective of both the will not to be governed like that and from our own 
present, I will take this passage as both our point of departure and as a schematic 
that will organize the structure of the remainder of the thesis. That is to say, I will 
broach the questions concerning the Objective, the Method, and the Domain of an 
analytics of contemporary governmentality, of what I will call an architectural 
analytics of the architectonics of control. In this part of the thesis, we will look at the 
aim and method; in Part Four, we shall explore the domain. 
 Now, it is certainly the case that Foucault gave many such presentations of 
his overall project; not all of which converge. The reason for employing this one 
as our starting point and organizing principle is not that it best captures the 
essence of Foucault’s critical output but that, in detailing the aim or objective, the 
method, and the domain of analysis in the way that it does, it best suits our 
purpose. As noted, in commenting upon Foucault’s thought so as to forge our 
own tools, my aim is to be neither polemical nor pedantic; it is, however, an 
attempt to get it right. What is meant by this is not the disclosing of the one and 
only correct reading of Foucault but, rather, a productive recombinatorial 
reading that nonetheless attempts to remain faithful to what we will call a 
Foucaultian ethos. In other words, my aim is not to legislate upon how I think the 
work of Foucault should or must be employed; it is not a question of imposing 
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limits upon its use, but of recognizing and acknowledging both its limits in use 
but also its potential for other uses.  
 1 – Concerning the aim of what Foucault calls his project, this is to 
construct a genealogy of the subject. Foucaultian genealogy is not simply a 
synonym for history, nor is genealogy more generally simply history ‘correctly 
practiced’ (e.g. Nehamas 1985: 46). Rather, genealogy is ‘history differently 
practiced’, and this difference ‘can only be accounted for philosophically’ (Saar 
2008: 297). There is, of course, no single or fixed meaning, no sole monolithic 
definition, to be ascribed to genealogy. Saar (2002), for example, notes three 
layers to genealogy: genealogy as history or historical method; genealogy as 
critique or evaluation; and genealogy as a kind of writing or genre. Similarly, 
Walters (2012: Ch. 4) identifies three styles of genealogy: genealogy as descent 
(which should read provenance); genealogy as re!serialization and counter!
memory; and genealogy as the retrieval of forgotten struggles and subjugated 
knowledge (ibid.: 112). Evidently, these do not represent three hermetically 
sealed watertight containers; the different layers or styles mingle with one 
another and intermingle with each other. Nonetheless, there are three central 
thematics that cut across this ‘multi!layered conceptual practice’ (Saar 2002: 232) 
or these three stylistic variants. The first is the question concerning the subject 
and subjectivity (see ‘The Subject and Power’ in Foucault 2001d): “what are we to!
day?” The second is an orientation towards and an overriding concern for our 
contemporary present, for our actuality, to!day (see the essays collected in Part 1 
of Foucault 2007a): “what are we to!day?”. And the third concerns transformation: 
on the one hand, it concerns transformation vis!à!vis the one doing the 
questioning in questioning their own present (see the first lecture of Foucault 
2010); on the other hand, it concerns the implications and transformations of the 
one reading such questioning: its audience (see ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’ 
in Foucault 2001d). Whilst the first two points are more or less accepted, it seems 
to me that the two elements comprising the third are often overlooked. 
In addition to the above, neither Saar’s nor Walters’ nor any other depiction 
of genealogy that I have read has been of much use when it comes to actually 
thinking about doing research; that is to say, concerning the actual “how?” of 
doing or “applying” genealogy (Dean 1994: 14). This, however, is not a deficiency 
of such depictions; rather, it is that genealogy is not, in and of itself, a method, at 
least not in any conventional sense of this term, nor, I might add, is it a method in 
the way in which archaeology can be conceptualized as a method. On the 
contrary, and as Foucault notes in the aforecited passage, it is the finalité (end 
goal, purpose, aim, objective, etc.) of his project; and this finality was to render 
visible “the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects” (see the reference on page 15 above). The genealogical aspect of 
Foucault’s work, then, is diagnostic and strategic; it asks “What are we to!day?” 
(diagnostics) and “How might we be otherwise?” (strategics). A genealogy of the 
subject (a history of the present or a historical ontology of ourselves) is to be re!
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worked here into what I will call “field!work in subjectivity” that is, at one and 
the same time, field!work in the present: contemporary subjectivity or the subject 
in its contemporality. What we have to locate is a non!historical diagnostics; or a 
diagnostics that uses genealogies done by others but that does not do its own 
historical research. 
2 – As the aforecited passage goes on to note, the means by which one 
undertakes a Foucaultian genealogy, however conceptualized, is by way of an 
archaeology of knowledge (savoir). It is the absence of archaeology in studies in 
governmentality specifically, and/or in an analytics of power more generally, I 
think, that has created a vacuum or void that has been filled either by the 
importation of all kinds of methods or methodologies (social scientific or 
otherwise: interpretivist, ethnographical, etc.), or the wedding of Foucault to 
other theorists, philosophers, and/or researchers (i.e. Freud, Gramsci, 
Wittgenstein, etc.). Taking on!board Foucault’s statement to the effect that the 
method by which one undertakes a genealogy of the subject is by way of an 
archaeology of knowledge (savoir), I want to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
archaeology back into studies in governmentality specifically, and into an 
analytics of power more generally. Proceeding in this way will, I think, help us if 
not to answer the question then at least to pose it vis!à!vis how to go about doing 
such genealogies of contemporary governmentalities. Saar, for example, views 
The Archaeology as being ‘arguably insignificant’ to Foucault’s genealogy (Saar 
2002: 233); and archaeology, as a method, is very rarely mentioned in books on or 
about governmentality. This, even though the central questions posed by such 
studies: ‘“Who or what is to be governed?” “Who governs what?” “With what 
techniques?” [and] “To what ends should they be governed?”’ (Rose, O"Malley, 
and Valverde 2006; see also Dean 1999; Rose 1999), are arguably archaeological 
questions; that is to say, they question the object of government, the modalities of 
government, the techniques of government, and the ends of strategies of 
government. 
The point here, however, is not to criticise genealogies of governmentality, 
but to think about, and to demonstrate the centrality of archaeology to such 
thought concerning the “how?” of genealogy and of doing studies in 
governmentality. Genealogy is, undoubtedly, a way of doing history, of 
questioning provenance and emergence, of doing critique through counter!memory, 
struggles, and subjugated knowledge, and so forth, but the way in which 
genealogy does all of these things, at least in the work of Foucault, is by cutting!
out and stitching together events or series of events, and these events, or an 
analysis thereof (événementialisation: “eventialization”), are the province of 
archaeological research (see Foucault 1996b: 393!395; see also 2001d: 226ff.). What 
we have to do is to treat our present and ourselves—our contemporary actuality 
from which we question our own present—as an event or as a series of events; 
that is, as events in contemporary thought. 
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An archaeology of knowledge (savoir) is not discourse analysis (Rabinow 
and Rose 2003b: xxi), it does not analyse such discourses as psychiatry, clinical 
medicine, linguistics, biology, and political economy, criminology and penology, 
and so forth. Such knowledge would be designated by Foucault by the term 
connaissance. What an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) analyses, as this is 
articulated in The Archaeology, and as later taken up by genealogy, are the 
concrete and historical a priori, the conditions of possibility, the material and 
practical space in which a specific positivity emerged, and thus from which a 
particular discursive formation was formed or from which it arrived. Thus, for 
example, the savoir of madness is not psychiatry; rather, it is that whole practical 
(punitive and therapeutic, Foucault 2006a: Part One) and discursive (medicinal, 
ibid.: Part Two) ensemble out of which and from which all the “psy!” sciences 
(connaissances) could emerge (ibid.: Part Three): not just psychiatry, but also 
psychology, psychoanalysis, psychosurgery, psychopharmacology, 
psychometrics, and so forth (see, e.g. Rose 1989, 1996a). In other words, all these 
“psy!“ sciences have their conditions of possibility in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century punitive and therapeutic practices dealing with madness and medical 
discourses on madness, and in nineteenth century discursive practices 
concerning mental illness. Likewise, the savoir which gave rise to the birth of the 
prison was not criminological or penological discourses; rather it was that whole 
ensemble of disciplinary techniques—monastic life, military drill, schooling, the 
factory, hand writing, posture and gait, handling a rifle, the plague town, etc.—
that made the positivity or, rather, the dispositivity of discipline possible, and 
thus made prison and the punitive reason inhabiting it both thinkable and 
practicable; that is to say, a reality that was simultaneously to be brought into 
existence and to be acted upon.  
This is why Foucault also calls an archaeology of knowledge “a history of 
systems of thought” (Foucault 1997: 9, 201), a “materialism of the incorporeal” 
(Foucault 1981: 69), “a critical history of thought” (Foucault 1998: 459), or “a 
materialist history of rationality” (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 102, 106), 
and so forth; it interrogates the materialism (practices or the concrete and 
historical a priori) of the incorporeal (the thought inhabiting practices—discursive 
or not). Archaeology maps out the space—the savoir—in which something 
became thinkable and the space in which that thought unfolds; that is to say, how 
something became thinkable—in a rational, calculative, statistical, and/or 
administrative terms—in the specific ways in which it was thought: vis!à!vis 
power, how something became thinkable as governable. In a sense, genealogy 
performs a double operation; it looks at formation and transformation; at 
provenance and emergence; it looks not only at the material and practical 
conditions of possibility of thought but also at the material and practical 
conditions that thought, thus thought, made or makes possible (Foucault 1985: 
11!12). Archaeology, for its part, examines the form of the thought thus thought.  
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 3 – The precise domain that an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) analyzes 
in order to do a genealogy of the subject, Foucault states, is the domain of 
technology; where technology is understood as “the articulation of certain 
techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”. Technology is the 
field in which one works when doing archaeologico!genealogical enquiry. 
Technology, here, does not refer to the technological devices in, by, and through 
which a programme of government is implemented and institutionalized. Rather, 
and in relation to epist"m" and tekhn", it refers to ‘a practical rationality governed 
by a conscious goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364). In relation to the government of the 
self, this refers to the articulation of knowledge (savoir) and techniques of self; in 
relation to the government of others, which is our object of study, it refer to the 
intra!relation between knowledge (savoir) and power (pouvoir), to knowledge!
power or power!knowledge. Since we are to discuss the domain of our 
Foucaultian perspective in Part Four of the thesis, I will not discuss it in any great 
detail here. 
What is being proposed here is not an analytics of power in general but a 
study in governmentality; albeit a very specific and circumscribed study in 
governmentality. I am going to broach this question of technology—of discourse!
technique—by way of the concept of governmentality, which, to a certain extent, 
came to displace, but not replace, that of power!knowledge (Foucault 2010: 4!5). 
In a lecture from 1980, Foucault informed his audience that the trajectory of his 
analyses of the history of thought ‘was more or less organized, or revolved 
around, the notion of dominant ideology’ to which he highlighted two successive 
displacements. Firstly, ‘from the notion of dominant ideology to that of power!
knowledge’, and secondly, ‘from the notion of knowledge!power to the notion of 
government by the truth’ (The quote is from an as yet unpublished lecture given by 
Foucault on the 9th January 1980 entitled On the Government of the Living. It is 
cited by O’Farrell on the “Foucault Resources” website: http://www.michel!
foucault.com/quote/2004q.html, April 2004, accessed on 23 March 2014). Foucault 
conceptualizes government ‘in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for 
directing human behavior’ (Foucault 1997: 81). It is important to remember here, 
however, that what an archaeology of knowledge undertakes is a (critical) history 
of (systems of) thought, or a materialist history of rationality. And so, when 
Foucault talks about techniques and procedures, I take him to be talking about 
the different and differential ways in which these have been thought, of the 
material and practical conditions of possibility of this thought, and of the 
material and practical conditions that this thought, thus thought, made possible. 
So far, we have looked at how Foucault’s analytics of power does not tell us 
where to look for power but operationalizes relations of power as a way of 
looking at their exercise. We have noted how the work that Foucault undertook 
was a practice that attempted to render visible and make appear certain 
historical, and thus contemporary, practices, which, through becoming so 
integral to our very existence, we cannot or can no longer see. And we have seen 
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how this practice aims to give back visibility to what is invisible by way of an 
archaeological analytics and a genealogical diagnostics (and strategics). In this 
part of the thesis, I want to explore in more detail the mechanics of these analytic 
and diagnostic/strategic practices. In looking into the work that these respective 
practices undertook by way of our work!shop approach, I want to think about 
how can we manufacture our own tools for questioning the exercising of 
relations of power in its, and our, actuality. In taking up the framing of 
Foucault’s work in terms of its aim (finalité) and method, I begin by unpacking 
what I take to be the structure of Foucaultian genealogical diagnosis by focusing 
upon two aspect of genealogical historiography evidence in the essay ‘Nietzsche, 
´Genealogy, History’; namely, provenance and emergence, and then discuss their 
relation to the present. I then follow this by looking at how archaeology—as both 
an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) and as an archaeology of 
problematizations—undertakes a history of thought. Specifically, I look at the 
work archaeology performs in rendering visible the work of thought by way of a 
close reading of the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things. This reading is undertaken 
through the heuristic of Heidegger’s conceptualization of the ontological 
difference. Having unpacked the structure of genealogical diagnosis and the 
archaeological analytics of thought, I then turn to using the equipment provided 
by the foregoing exposition to manufacturing some tools that can then be used 
for thinking about how to question the exercising of relations of power in their 
actuality from the perspective of our contemporality.  
To get ahead of myself somewhat, the “solution” to the problem posed by 
genealogy and archaeology—of what they do and, more specifically, of how they 
do it—to non!historical analyses vis!à!vis the aforecited questioning of power, 
will be to undertake an archaeology that renders visible problematizations 
evidenced in what I will call provent forms of existence; provent forms of life that 
are themselves rendered visible not by way of a genealogical history of the 
present but by way of what I, following Rose (2009), will call a genealogy of possible 
or potential futures emergences. 
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II.  GENEALOGY  AND  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PRESENT  
[G]enealogy has to be invented anew as situations change.  
(Rabinow and Rose, ’Foucault Today’) 
What are we to!day? What is this instance that is ours? What is our actuality? 
What is my actuality? And what am I doing when I speak about this actuality? 
What is happening to!day? What is happening right now? What is happening 
around us? What is our present? What is the present field of possible 
experiences? (see, e.g. the text collected in Part I. of Foucault 2007a). This series of 
questions, in one way or another, haunted all of Foucault’s writings from History 
of Madness to the final volumes of the History of Sexuality. And yet, as noted, 
Foucault never really discussed his own present—i.e. his own actuality 
contemporary with each writing—in any of his major book!length publications. 
Rather, what we are presented with are historical studies of the past, of our past, 
that are aimed at a diagnosis of the present, an analysis of our own reality or 
actuality. These studies pose, historically, the philosophical question of the 
present: ‘[n]o doubt the most infallible philosophical problem is that of the 
present time, of what we are at this precise moment’ (Foucault 2001d: 336, 
modified). There are three separate yet interrelated questions to this mode of 
enquiry: “What are we to!day?”, “How did we become what we are?”, and “How 
might we be otherwise?”. Foucault, following Nietzsche, calls this mode of 
enquiry genealogy. In other words, genealogy is not only a diagnostic (“What are 
we to!day?”, and “How did we become what we are?”), it is also strategic (“How 
might we be otherwise?”); it is the latter, I think, that marks its departure from, 
and an important difference to, Foucault’s archaeology of the 1960s (see Dean 
1994: 17!18).  
Foucaultian genealogy, however, is neither a fixed set of coordinate for 
mapping history (Bevir 2008; Cook 1990; Davidson 1986; Krupp 2008; Mahon 
1992; Owen 1995; Saar 2002; Spiegel 2001; Visker 1990, 1995; Wilson 1995), nor a 
definitive set of features to be mapped: possible genealogies include, but are not 
limited to, a genealogy of knowledge (connaissance) (Foucault 2006b); a genealogy 
of abnormality (Foucault 2003a); a genealogy of knowledge (savoir), a genealogy 
of racism (Foucault 2003c); a genealogy of technologies of power (Foucault 
2007b); a genealogy of the modern state (Foucault 2008a); a genealogy of the 
subject, a genealogy of the modern subject (Foucault 2005); and a genealogy of 
truth!telling in the political field (Foucault 2010, 2011). It is, nevertheless, and as 
Foucault practiced it, a mapping of history that maps the present (Elden 2001) 
and it maps the present so as to map!out ourselves, and there is, nonetheless, a 
certain structure to genealogical diagnosis. It is this structure that we shall 
explore here. The reason for examining the structure of genealogic diagnostics is 
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neither purely to provide a commentary on Foucault’s method, nor simply to 
copy Foucaultian genealogy. Rather, it is to grasp the arrangements of 
Foucaultian genealogy in order to set us on our way, so as to invent a new mode 
of genealogy relevant to and relative to our own situation.  
As discussed previously, genealogy, like archaeology, is one of the 
modalities deployed by Foucault’s for rendering visible, but the way in which it 
renders visible is by recourse to our history and the different and differential 
ways in which our past both engendered and is incorporated in a particular 
conceptualization of our present. In addition, I have also noted how such 
recourse to history is blocked to us when we attempt to question our present 
whilst being delimited to a stand!point situated within the limits of our own 
contemporality. What I want to do in looking at the structure of genealogical 
diagnostics/strategics is to take it up not as a ready!made “tool” to be deployed, 
but as a piece of equipment to be employed in manufacturing our own tools. The 
tools I seek to fashion are being manufactured in order to give us a particular 
critical purchase upon our own present when grasped from the perspective of 
itself. In looking at the structure of genealogical diagnosis, I will focus upon three 
elements constitutive of that structure; three elements which we can then employ 
in our own way to question the present from the perspective of to!day. 
What is presented here does not aim to provide a definitive statement 
concerning what genealogy is (I should be so bold); nor does it pose directly the 
question of the relation of genealogy to archaeology (e.g. in terms of asking “Did 
genealogy supplement, appropriate, or replace archaeology?”); rather, what is 
presented here is a reworking of some of the themes of genealogy in light of the 
problem at hand. As noted, this problem concerns the “how?” of doing non!
historical research from within the frame of a Foucaultian perspective; that is, not 
research that is un!historical or ahistorical but research that does not take the 
past, even the recent past, as its principle and primary domain but, on the 
contrary, that takes our present as the field in which we are to work (diagnostics), 
and to work upon our present and the possible futures it embodies from the 
perspective of itself (strategics). In other words, I am less concerned with 
providing a definition of what genealogy is, than I am with thinking about what 
genealogy does or, more specifically, about what we can do and thus of what we 
can do with it vis!à!vis the aforementioned problem. 
It is generally recognized that Foucaultian genealogy is, in some way or 
other, related to Nietzschean genealogy. However, and despite Foucault’s claim 
to be ‘simply Nietzschean’ (Foucault 1988: 251), Foucaultian genealogy is no 
simple or straightforward appropriation, replication, or repetition of its forebear. 
Rather, there is a complex interrelation and interplay between genealogy as 
practiced by Nietzsche (e.g. 1996) and genealogy as practiced by Foucault. 
Moreover, Foucaultian genealogy—and its relation to archaeology—did not 
remain static throughout Foucault’s writings, but was subject to continuous 
revaluation and modification. This can be seen, for example, in the adjustment 
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from war as an analytic of relation of power conceptualized as “antagonistic 
relations” (Foucault 1977a, 2003c) to government as an analytics of power 
conceptualized as “agonistic relations” or “strategic games between liberties” 
(Foucault 2007b, 2008a). It can also be seen in the complementing of a genealogy 
of morals (Foucault 1978; see also, 1988: 48; 2001d: 224) with a genealogy of ethics 
(Foucault 1985, 1986; see also, 1997: 253!280, 281!301). Hence, the response to the 
question “What is Foucaultian genealogy?” would be “Which one?” 
In taking up the statement given in the reference cited above concerning 
genealogy (i.e. as being the aim of Foucault’s project: a genealogy of the subject), 
and its relation to archaeology (as its method) and technology (as its domain), what 
I want to do in this chapter is to look at the structure of genealogical diagnostics, 
where genealogy is conceptualized as a diagnostics of our present and thus of 
ourselves—that is, as both a history of the present (Foucault 1977a: 31) and a 
historical ontology of ourselves (Foucault 1997: 262ff., 315ff.; 2010: 20!21)—as well as 
a strategics concerned with being otherwise. In proceeding in this way, I do not 
want to present a description of genealogy in toto; rather, I want to focus upon 
three aspects of genealogical diagnosis (i.e. the provent, the emergent, and the 
present) that I see as being pertinent to undertaking an analysis of our 
contemporary present from the perspective of this present itself (and ourselves). 
And I want to take!up these three aspects as constituting the aim, and thus the 
framework, of our project; that is, as a version of a genealogy of the subject 
framed not in terms of being a history of the present but orientated towards what 
Rose calls ‘a history of potential futures’ (Rose 2009: 5, emphasis added).  
In order to detail the structure of Foucaultian genealogy, I am going to look 
at the 1970 essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (Foucault 1998: 369!391). Now, 
strictly speaking, this essay is neither a treaties on methodology nor a reflection 
on method but is what Dean calls a ‘form of intellectual labour performed on 
Nietzsche’s writings’; that it to say, it is ‘not primarily a statement of Foucault’s 
method’ (Dean 1994: 17, see also 14). Nevertheless, in discussing provenance 
(Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung) in relation to Nietzschean genealogy, the 
essay does give us something to work with vis!à!vis what I have called the 
structure of genealogical diagnosis, by which I mean a specific mode of rendering 
visible certain practices in which things were rendered visible. In addition, the 
reading we are presented with in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ concerning 
these two aspects bears more than a passing resemblance to some of the central 
claims of The Archaeology. This, of course, may be due to the influence of 
Nietzsche upon this earlier text, but then The Archaeology cannot simply be 
reduced to a single influence, which points to the possibility that there is a 
broader tendency being played out in both of these texts; it is this tendency that I 
want to plug!into.  
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1 The  Provenant  
In his discussion of provenance and emergence in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 
Foucault explicitly situates Nietzsche’s use of these terms in opposition to his use 
of the term “origin” (origine, Ursprung), and thus in opposition to a metaphysics 
of origin and, by extension, to what Dean calls ‘synthetic philosophies of history’ 
(Dean 1994: 4, 18, see Ch. 3 for a fuller discussion). Whilst it is possible to 
translate Herkunft as “descent” (as in the English translation of this text; see, 
Foucault 1998: 373; see also, Nietzsche 1996: 4), the French term that Foucault 
uses is not descente but ‘provenance’ (Foucault 2001a: 1008). Because of the possible 
associations of “descent” with such notions as “lineage” or “pedigree” (see Geuss 
2001), I shall use the English equivalent of the term used by Foucault—this being 
provenance. Moreover, provenance, which etymologically denotes “to come forth” 
(from Latin provenire; from pro! “forth”+ venire “to come”; OED), is more in line 
with Foucault’s exposition than are either “descent” (with its connotations of 
moving from a higher to a lower form) or “pedigree” (with its connotations of 
lineage and noble breeding). A term related to provenance, but now obsolete, is 
provene, which has the sense of “to come as proceeds or produce” (OED). We can 
use this term to conceptualize provenance not only as those practices, discourses, 
events, and so on, from which what emerges arrives, but also in the sense that 
what arrives in such an emergence arrives as something produced, as the proceeds 
of a procedure or process. In conceptualizing provenance as the coming forth of 
what emerged (i.e. Entstehung; what is “brought forth”, its “formation”, its “birth 
[naissance]”), then, it has the sense of the material and practical conditions—the 
“background” (which is another possible translation of Herkunft)—, from which 
something arrives or the sense of “where things come from”: an emergence 
arriving from (en provenance de) humble beginnings (bescheidene Herkunft).  
On this view, genealogical research on provenance in not unrelated to 
archaeological research on the conditions of possibility, the concrete (Foucault 
2006a, 1973) and historical a priori (Foucault 1970, 1972; 1998: 460) of a practice 
(discursive or not), and, above all, on dispersion (e.g. Foucault 1998: 297!333, 
passim; see also Webb 2013: 34ff.). Understood thus, provenance (Herkunft) has 
clear correlations to what, in The Archaeology, Foucault called a ‘system of 
dispersion’ (Foucault 1972: 37): genealogy ‘seeks the subtle, singular, and 
subindividual marks that might possibly intersect…to form a network that is 
difficult to unravel’ (Foucault 1998: 373). In other words, provenance, humble 
beginnings, are pre!subjective (ibid.). Genealogy, in attempting not to unpick this 
complex network, but to follow certain threads pertinent to the analysis, an 
analysis framed by way of a particular perspective of the present ‘goes in search 
of the beginning—of the innumerable beginnings that leave that hint of colour, 
that mark almost effaced that cannot deceive a little historical eye’ (Foucault 
2001d: 374, modified). As such, genealogical research on provenance ‘allows the 
recovery, under the unique aspect of a character or a concept, of the proliferation 
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of events through which (thanks to which, against which) they were formed’ 
(ibid., modified). Since Foucault did not provide us with a “treaties” on 
genealogy, in the way he did with archaeology, we can thus use some aspects of 
the discussion in The Archaeology to flesh out genealogical research on 
provenance (on the fleshing out of genealogy with some of the vertical aspects of 
archaeology see Foucault 1991a; 1998: 297!333; and 1981). 
Provenance, when this refers to the formation of an object or a series of 
objects, for example, seeks to map out ‘the common space in which diverse 
objects stand out and are continuously transformed’ (Foucault 1998: 313). This 
space is mapped out by way of its ‘surfaces of emergence’, its ‘authorities of 
delimitation’, and its ‘grids of specification’ (Foucault 1972: 41!42) through which 
an object—discursive or practical—comes forth. A surface of emergence refers to 
that practical space or those practices within which a certain object first came to 
light. Thus, for example, Foucault notes that ‘[i]n the case of nineteenth century 
psychopathology, they were probably constituted by the family, the immediate 
social group, the work situation, the religious community’ (ibid.: 41), and so 
forth. In other words, it refers to those practices in which an object came to be 
problematized as an object to be known and as a target of governmental 
intervention. The authorities of delimitation refer to the formation of specific 
groups who are then able to delimit, designate, name, and established what was 
thus problematized as an object (ibid.); that is, as an object of human scientific 
investigation and of punitive and/or therapeutic intervention: psychopathology, 
medicine, criminology and penology, juridical discourse, and so on, and so forth. 
Lastly, the grids of specification refer to the schemas according to which what 
was to be known and what was to be governed were organized, divided, 
contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, hierarchized, derived from one another 
as objects of knowledge and targets of intervention (ibid.: 42). That is to say, it 
refer to ‘both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done and codifying 
effects regarding what is to be known’ (Foucault 2001d: 225). 
Likewise, in relation to the formation of what, in The Archaeology, Foucault 
called ‘enunciative modalities’ (Foucault 1972: 50!55), and what we can call 
governmental modalities (enunciatiion + technique): modes of subjectivation. This 
refers to who is speaking or acting: psychiatrist, doctor, prison warder, and so 
forth (ibid.: 50); to the sites from which and through which they speak or act: 
asylum, hospital, military barracks, prison, and the like (ibid.: 51); and the 
relation that obtains between the speaking, acting, governing subject and a 
domain or group of objects conceptualized as both object to be known and the 
target of a governmental practice (ibid.: 52); or, stated otherwise, of the relation 
between those who are to be governed and those who are to govern. The same 
goes for concepts (ibid.: 56ff.) or techniques, and thematic choices or strategies 
(ibid.: 64ff.). 
One of the dimensions that genealogy supplements in relation to an 
archaeological analytics of the formation of objects is that at the root of this 
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formation is not just a ‘regular existence’ (Foucault 1998: 313), ‘systematicity, 
theoretical form, or something like a paradigm’ (Foucault 1980: 113) but, as 
History of Madness had already made clear, a relation of power that takes the form 
of strategic games between liberties, a governmental modality that seeks to 
operationalize that relation, and forms or structures of domination. And the 
analysis of statements (énoncés) is supplemented with the analysis of techniques; 
that is to say, in looking at and rendering visible, and thus intelligible, “the 
articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the 
subject”; or, to put it succinctly: power!knowledge—pouvoir!savoir. One thing to 
bear in mind here, is that the term “énoncé” can be translated as both “to say, to 
express, to state” and “to set out, to lay down”, and so forth. It is this double 
meaning that allows us to correlate statement and technique; a correlation whose 
significance will become clearer when discussing government as both a relation 
(conducting conducts) and a technique (arranging probability) that are analyzed 
archaeologically. 
Consequently, research on provenance (that is, on where things arrived 
from, on their concrete and historical a priori), ‘does not found/ground, quite the 
contrary: it disturbs what we perceived immobile, it fragments what we thought 
united, it shows the heterogeneity of what we imagined [to be] in conformity 
with itself’ (Foucault 1998: 374!375, modified). And this includes our present, our 
history, and, above all, ourselves: ‘[g]enealogy, as an analysis provenance, is 
therefore the articulation of the body and history. It must show the body totally 
imprinted by history and history ruining the body’ (ibid.: 375!376, modified).  
The task of genealogy, as this pertains to provenance, ‘is not to demonstrate 
that the past actively exists in the present’; rather, in following ‘the complex chain 
of provenance [la filière complexe de la provenance]’, the task is to ‘maintain that 
which took place in the dispersion that is its own’ (ibid. 374). In other words, 
genealogical research on provenance seeks to map out the multiple and 
heterogeneous humble beginnings and the different and differential ways in 
which they became posited together in what is posed together and thus ‘gave 
birth to what exist and has value for us’ (ibid.). By proceeding in this way, we 
‘discover that at the root of what we know and what we are there is not truth and 
being, but the exteriority of accidents [découvrir qu#à la racine de ce que nous 
connaissons et de ce que nous sommes il n#y a point la vérité et l#être, mais l#extériorité 
de l#accident]’ (Foucault 1998: 374, modified; the English translation of the final 
sentence makes it sound as if it is truth and being that are rooted in the 
exteriority of accidents, whereas it is what we know and what are that are thus 
rooted). 
Genealogical research on provenance, then, aims to map out “systems of 
dispersion”, the “concrete and historical a priori”, the “multiple and 
heterogeneous ensembles”, the humble beginnings, and so forth, from which 
what was formed, arrived; hence all the references to “birth”: the birth of the 
asylum (Foucault 2006a: 463ff.), the birth of the clinic (Foucault 1973), the birth of 
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the prison (Foucault 1977a), the birth of social medicine (Foucault 2001d: 134!156), 
the birth of bio!politics (Foucault 2008a); it is this birth that the term emergence 
refers to. 
2 The  Emergent  
As well as being translated as “emergence”, Entstehung can also be translated as 
“appearance”, “development”, “formation”, “nascency (birth)”, and so forth. 
Etymologically, emergence has the sense of “to bring forth” (from Latin emergere 
“rise out or up”, “bring to light”; from ex! “out” + mergere “to dip”, “to sink”). On 
this view, it not only has the sense of a sudden appearance, arising, or coming to 
light, or as something being brought forth (OED), it also has the sense of “to come 
into being” (i.e. “genesis”, see Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012): ‘Entstehung 
designates…emergence [l’émergence], the point of sudden arising [le point de 
surgissement]. It is the principle and law of a singular appearance’ (Foucault 1998: 
376, modified). Even though genealogy take as its point of departure a 
problematization in the present, and thus questions provenance and emergence 
from the point of view of a particular conceptualization of the present, the 
emergence to be described cannot be explained by what exists for us to!day: 
‘[j]ust as we are all too often inclined to seek provenance in a continuity without 
interruption, we would be wrong to give an account of emergence by [recourse 
to] its final term. As if the eye had appeared, since the beginning of time, for 
contemplation; as if punishment had always been intended to make an example’ 
(ibid., modified; Nietzsche 2006: 50!51).  
Rather than account for the past in terms of the present, genealogy 
undertake a history of the present (Foucault 1977a: 31); consequently, what is 
present in our present is ‘nothing more than the current episode of a series of 
servitudes [d’asservissements]’ (Foucault 1998: 376, modified). What genealogical 
research on emergence aims to render visible is the birth of a pure singularity: ‘the 
singularity of madness in the modern Western world, the absolute singularity of 
sexuality, the absolute singularity of our moral!legal system of punishment’ 
(Foucault 2007a: 63). And it describes such events as being the conditions of 
possibility of ‘the elusive singularity of the present’ (Rabinow 1997: xviii).  
For Foucault, emergence, the birth of a singularity—the asylum, the clinic, 
the prison, etc.—always occurs or takes place within the play of ‘a certain state of 
forces’ (see e.g. Foucault 2006b: 345). At the time of writing ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History’, or, in any case, not long thereafter, Foucault conceptualized 
such forces in terms of adversarial conflict, battle, and war; as antagonistic 
relations (see, e.g. Foucault 1977a: 308; 2003c: passim) rather than the agonistic 
relations he came to associate with governmentality. The difference here is 
between an antagonistic relation in which forces are mutually and actively 
opposed in a struggle against each other (from Greek antagonistes, from anti! 
“against” + agonizesthai “to struggle”, from agon “contest”) and an agonistic 
relation (i.e. minus the “anti!“)  in which forces compete against each other in a 
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kind of game (OED): ‘[r]ather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would 
be better to speak of an “agonism”—of a relationship that is at the same time 
mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face!to!face confrontation that paralyzes 
both sides than a permanent provocation’ (Foucault 1998: 342).  
Hence, the difference is the difference between a field of battle (Foucault 
1977a: 290, 308) and a playing field. Whether one employs the model of war, or the 
schema of government, or even the concern to take care of oneself, as an 
interpretive strategy, genealogical research on emergence ‘must show the game, 
the manner in which these forces struggle against one another’ (Foucault 1998: 
376, modified). In other words, what is to be accounted for is not so much the 
play of regularities, but a ‘relation of power as the a priori of practices’ (Foucault 
2006b: 345). In accounting for the multiple and heterogeneous beginnings (the 
conditions of possibility, the concrete and historical a priori, the dispersion, etc.) 
from which an emergence arrived, and in accounting for the specific formation of 
a pure singularity, genealogical research has to describe ‘the entrance of 
forces…their eruption’, by detailing ‘the leap with which they jump from behind 
the scene onto centre stage’ (Foucault 1998: 377, modified): that is, from 
provenance to emergence. What genealogical research on emergence aims to 
render visible, then, are the different and differential ways in which ‘the subject 
that knows [le sujet qui connaît], the objects to be known [les objets à connaître], and 
the modalities of knowledge [les modalités de connaissance] are so many effects of 
these fundamental implications of power!knowledge [pouvoir!savoir] and their 
historical transformations’ (Foucault 1977a: 27!28, modified). 
Genealogical research on provenance and emergence—and before it 
archaeological research on dispersion and formation—is what prevents the analysis 
from being reduced to either transcendental condition: structures of 
consciousness, transcendental philosophy, philosophical anthropology—or 
empirical causes: the empirical order of things, the human sciences, social history 
(Foucault 1997: 200ff.; see also Webb 2005a; 2013). For whilst the provent 
constitutes conditions, conditions that are empirically causal in that they form the 
conditions from which what emerged arrives; these conditions are not located in 
the subject (they are sub!individual and/or pre!subjective), and their effects are 
not reducible to empirical causes. This is because both conditions and causes do 
not determine, in a deterministic way, what follows, they merely lay!out a space 
in which the emergence of what emerged was made possible by its provenance. 
That is to say, what happened, what was made, was contingent. Etymologically, 
contingent means “to touch together” (from Latin con! “together” + tang$re “to 
touch”), and it denotes “having contact or connexion“, but it also has 
connotations of “happening or coming by chance; not fixed by necessity or fate; 
accidental, fortuitous” (OED). Contingent, then, does not mean arbitrary; it 
means conditioned by conditions but not causally determined or necessitated by 
said conditions. In other words, contingency is opposed to necessity; it has the 
sense that what happened was contingent upon certain conditions, but these 
71 
 
conditions only made what happened possible, that they are neither 
deterministic nor made necessary. The task for the genealogist—and, indeed, for 
the archaeologist—is to describe how, out of all the possibilities that these 
conditions potentially made possible, what materialized transpired and not 
something else: how what was said was said and not something else; how what 
was done was done and not something else; how what was thought was thought 
and not something else, and so forth. In addition, it has to account for how what 
was said, done, thought, and so on, were said, done, and thought in the 
particular ways in which they were said, done, and thought, and not in some 
other way.  
These conditions (dispersion, provenance, concrete and historical a priori) 
set out a space of possibility in which something could come into existence 
(emergence), but they neither determine that existence nor necessitate its birth; 
they merely made it possible. In addition, these conditions can only really be 
rendered visible by way of the retrospective or regressive gaze (Foucault 2007a: 
151) of the genealogist who is situated within a particular conceptualization of 
the present. For example, all the practices discussed in the section on ‘Discipline’ 
in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977a: 135!288) did not cause the prison to 
come into existence; the prison was an effect of these causes, not their product 
(Foucault 2007a: 64; see also 2001d: 278). Or, to be more precise, they are effects 
produced if by the latter we mean “brought forth” (from pro! “forth” + ducere “to 
bring”, OED), and not the execution of a design that results in the intended 
product. Rather, in coming to form a much broader horizon of practices (an 
epistemic and technical matrix of discourses and practices) of the disciplinary 
kind, they opened up a space in which prison became seeable, sayable, thinkable, 
and practicable. In other words, these dispersed, multiple, heterogeneous 
practices constitute the conditions of possibility for the formation of a 
disciplinary dispositive, and it is out of this disciplinary dispositivity that the 
prison emerged, from which it was formed, and which gave to it its birth. These 
conditions are not reducible to empirical causes, however, due to the fact that the 
possible genealogical mapping of the provenance of an emergence is, potentially 
at least, without end: the more one looks, the more interrelated and 
interconnected discourses, techniques, practices, and events, and so forth, one 
finds—this is what is meant by dispersion.  
3 The  Present   
There is a third element, often implied but rarely discussed, which is the raison 
d’être or finalité, to use Foucault’s term, for doing genealogical research. And this 
concerns the different and differential ways in which provent and emergent forms 
of existence still have value and meaning for us: that is to say, of the ways in 
which our past is present in a particular conceptualization of our present, and the 
ways in which our past both engenders and is incorporated in this 
conceptualization. There are two elements to this history of the present and 
72 
 
historical ontology of ourselves; in asking “What are we to!day?”: it undertakes a 
genealogical diagnostics; in asking “How we became what we are” it also poses 
the question of “How might we be otherwise”: it undertakes a genealogical 
strategics (see, e.g. Foucault 2007a: 60!65).  
Genealogy, then, is a perspective that is perspectival; it starts from the 
position that ‘everything in the world is at least in principle connected to 
everything else’ (Nehamas 1985: 79; see also, Nietzsche 1968b: #634). How objects 
are constituted, how subjects capable of knowing such objects and having 
dealings with them are formed or modified, how certain knowledges and 
techniques are articulated and employed by the subject and deployed in relation 
to the object, and how all of this is drawn together in, by, and through the 
constitution or thematization of the specific goals of a particular practice; these 
are all the effects of a certain cutting specific to that practice (Foucault 1977a: 27!
28): psychopathology, clinical medicine, linguistics, biology, political economy, 
criminology and penology, sexology, liberal and neo!liberal government, ethics, 
and so forth. That is to say, certain of these relations are emphasized, certain 
others withdraw, whilst others still are ignored or, since ignored implies a 
conscious intent, perhaps we should say go unnoticed and slip into the 
background. In looking at what was/is made, we have to look at what went into 
the making; this means, we have to look at how certain connections came to be 
made, how what was drawn together and woven into the fabric of our world 
came to be drawn together, how certain relations came to be taken as given 
whilst other relation were not taken at all.  
What we have to render visible are the combinations and re!combinations, 
the configurations and reconfigurations, that draw together certain relations, 
intra!relations, inter!relations, and correlations. How is it, for example, that 
certain types of behaviour came to be thought of as criminal and articulated in 
juridical and punitive practices whilst other types of behaviour were not? How is 
it that certain types of behaviour came to be categorized as mental illness, and 
came to be articulated upon certain juridical and curative practices on the one 
hand, and articulated upon psychical, social, neurophysiological, and 
biochemical process on the other? How did particular aspects of sexual activity 
come to be articulated upon certain ethical practices of the self on the one hand, 
and related to the essential kernel of the very truth of our being on the other? 
“Things” here, then, does not denote substances, attributes, qualities, 
characteristics, and so forth (which are all effects of a certain cutting: i.e. 
connaissances) but connote relations. If everything in the world is interconnected, 
which connections come to be made, taken as pertinent, or emphasized, and thus 
which relations come to be taken as given vis!à!vis a particular practice or an 
ensemble or regime of practices? It is this taken!as!given that we have to turn 
into a question; that is, to transform ‘the constative [in]to the subjunctive…the  
necessary [in]to the contingent’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xix). 
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Nevertheless, even here, the possible relations that may be mapped in 
describing the birth of a singularity that still has value and meaning for us from 
multiple and heterogeneous conditions are immeasurable. One of the central 
questions posed in The Archaeology was how to describe the unity of a discursive 
practice (Foucault 1972: 31ff.). The answer given there is that the unity of a 
discursive formation is given in a certain regularity of which it is possible to 
describe the laws or rules of formation: its positivity. What genealogy adds to this 
(and I am not entirely sure whether it supplants it or supplements it) is that what 
is to be described, vis!à!vis the unity of a particular regimes of practices, is 
related to the particular perspective on the present which formed the point of 
departure for the analysis: ‘[t]hat punishment in general and the prison in 
particular belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I have 
learnt not so much from history as from the present’ (Foucault 1977a: 30). 
Therefore, out of all the possible things to be mapped, what is mapped, the 
coordinates that are to be described, the events pertinent to the analysis, and so 
forth, are dependent upon one’s point of departure in a particular 
conceptualization of the present. This is one reason that genealogy is described as 
being a history of the present; it is also why Foucault described such histories as 
“fictions” (Foucault 1980: 193; 2001d: 242; see Bellour 1992; O"Leary 2009; Rayner 
2003; Smith 1994); that is, as something invented that is, nonetheless, objectively 
accurate (see the discussion on page 29 above). The task of genealogical research 
on provenance and emergence is to describe how what came to be (statement + 
technique = technology, etc.) came to be what it was and not something else; the 
way in which this is done, from a Foucaultian perspective, is by doing a history 
of its making not as a product but as an effect (Foucault 2007a: 62). It is precisely 
this mode of rendering visible our present and ourselves which is lost to us when 
we do such rendering from the perspective of our actuality.  
If we look at Discipline and Punish, what made possible the emergence of the 
prison—made possible, mind; not causally determined—was a whole dispersion 
of disparate practices—both discursive and non!discursive—which, nonetheless, 
were cut across by a certain rationality; that is, by both a rationale (justification) 
and reasoned reflection (calculation)—Foucault called this rationality discipline: 
discipline is the positivity or, rather, the dispositivity (Foucault 1980: 197) from 
which the prison was born. In other words, just as The Order of Things sought to 
show how ‘the naturalists, economists, and grammarians [of the Classical age] 
employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form 
their concepts, to build their theories’ (Foucault 2002a: xii), so Discipline and 
Punish sought to shows how practices as different as schooling, monastic life, 
clinical medicine, military training, and the organization of work, as well as 
prison, and so forth, are all inhabited by a certain rational technique vis!à!vis 
governing others, and in doing so, it demonstrates a certain isomorphism 
between the ways in which these disparate practices formed the target of their 
practice, established their governmental modalities, formed their techniques, and 
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thematized their strategies. What made possible the birth of the prison was, 
therefore, a much broader set of disciplinary practices and techniques than those 
taken up, invested, deployed, and employed in, by, and through punitive reason. 
This “more” is what is captured by genealogical research on provenance. The 
formation of the prison, the specific technique it uses, and of the various 
discourses of prison reform, penology, criminology, and so forth that it deploys 
and employs are mapped out by way of genealogical research on emergence. The 
ways in which not only the formation and emergence of the prison but also this 
broader disciplinary rationality came to be present in a certain conceptualization 
of our present, that is, as something that still has values and meaning for us, this 
is the element of a genealogical strategics; in posing the question concerning what 
we are and how we became what we are, it aims to show that what we are has 
been made, that it is contingent, and thus that it can potentially be unmade and 
possibly remade. In other words, and in addition to these two questions, it poses 
a third question: how might we be otherwise; how can we unmake and thus 
remake ourselves. The effects that such strategic analyses aims to bring about is 
not simply that we think differently about the prison or some other such practice, 
nor is it specifically to transform what it is we think about; rather, it aims to 
transform how we think about these things and, consequently, to transform 
ourselves: this is why Foucault called his book ‘experience books’ rather than 
‘truth books’ (Foucault 2001d: 246; see, e.g. O"Leary 2008; 2009; Rayner 2003). 
Provenance seeks to map the ‘network of contingencies from which [an 
emergence] emerges’ (Foucault 1998: 450). Emergence, as a moment of arising, 
points to an historical mutation; however, what emerges or arises is not, of 
necessity, something totally new, rather, it can, and often is, a reconfiguration 
and reorganization, a drawing together of things that were previously disparate, 
isolated, unrelated, and so forth, or that were related in different ways; and, 
because of this very process, what arises, what is brought forth are new objects, 
new subject positions (enunciative, governmental, and/or ethical  modalities), 
new concepts and techniques, and new strategies. Genealogical history, as 
regressive history, goes from a problem in the present to the emergence of a 
singularity—e.g. the birth of the asylum, the birth of the clinic, the birth of the 
prison, etc.—to what made that emergence possible: its provenance. It maps out 
the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought (provenance) and 
the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made possible (a 
singular emergence, the present); it maps out the conditions of possibility of that 
which ‘gave birth to what exist and has value for us’ (Foucault 1998: 374). 
Archaeology, to which we now turn, analyzes the thought made possible by and 
thus inhabiting an emergence conceptualized as a singularity: a history of 
thought or an archaeology of problematizations. 
An analytics of provenance looks at those local and contingent, multiple 
and heterogeneous practices out of which an emergence arrives or from which 
the birth of singularity is brought forth; and analytics of emergence looks at 
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problematization as an event in which a tipping point is reached, an event 
horizon as it were, or a critical mass, in which the overall ways of seeing and 
saying and thinking and doing relative to a specific domain of practices become a 
problem to which more general solutions are presented. An emergence is thus 
the reorganization in depth of prior sets of practice. Whilst emergence designates 
or names a singularity, provenance is not singular, but nor is it plural: it is 
manifold; it connotes local, contingent, and heterogeneous multiplicities. 
Genealogy, as a history of the present and as a historical and critical ontology of 
ourselves, is the analysis of the birth of a singularity born from a manifold 
heterogeneity, of a singularity that still has value and meaning for us: ‘as 
opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principal cause 
burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a genealogy, 
that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a 
singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the 
product, but rather the effect’ (Foucault 2007a: 64). 
As a way of looking, of rendering visible, genealogy corresponds to ‘the 
acuity of a glance that distinguishes, divides, disperses, that leaves differences 
and the margins at play—a sort of dissociating glance capable of dissociating 
itself,…of effacing the unity of that human being that is supposed to bear the 
sovereignty of its past’ (ibid.: 379, modified). It is a glance that ‘reintroduces into 
becoming everything we had thought immortal in humans/man […] to the extent 
that it introduces discontinuity into our very being’ (ibid.: 379, 380, modified). 
Whilst we cannot show, either by description or by demonstration, how the 
present was made when questioning it from the perspective of itself, in referring 
to the work of Foucault and others we can surly accept that it was made, 
piecemeal and willy!nilly; that is to say, contingently. In other words, we can 
acknowledge that there is nothing determinative, necessary, or universal in what 
we are—or take ourselves to be—, what we do, and the world in which we live; 
that all of these things, which seem to us to be so stable, durable, almost 
inevitable, are contingent upon our history and the different and differential 
ways in which our past is present in a particular conceptualization of our present 
(i.e. the present itself is manifold). In other words, whilst we may be doing non!
historical research—that is, researching the present from the perspective of 
itself—, this does not mean that such research is un!historical or ahistorical. It 
simply means that our perspective toward the present and on the present moves 
in a different direction; and this direction is what we, following Rose (2009), can 
call a “genealogy of potential futures emergences” of “possible future presents”. 
To undertake such a genealogy is to pose questions to a tomorrow that will never 
come and that we will never know. 
We shall leave all this to one side for the moment, and turn our attention to 
archaeology and the history of thought. We will return to both it and the 
discussion on archaeology in the concluding section of this part of the thesis. 
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III.  ARCHAEOLOGY  AND  THE  HISTORY  OF  THOUGHT  
Philosophy is a diagnostic undertaking, archaeology is a 
method for describing thought. 
(Foucault, letter) 
 
From 1970 until his death in 1984, Foucault held a chair at the Collège de France 
which was given the title Histoire des systèmes de pensée or “History of Systems of 
Thought” (see Paul Rabinow"s ‘Introduction’ to Foucault 1997). What does 
Foucault mean by thought? What is a system of thought? What does it mean for 
thought or for systems of thought to have a history? How is an analysis of the 
history of thought critical? How does one go about doing such a critical history of 
(systems of) thought? And what is the relevance of a history of thought to us? 
What does it do and what can we do with it in questioning the contemporary 
order of things from within that order? Since we are attempting to see if it is 
possible to re!make Foucault’s analyses of history into analyses of our 
contemporaneity, is it possible to translate Foucault’s critical history of thought 
into a critical analysis of contemporary thought? In order to address these 
questions, and this last question in particular, we will first have to get a handle 
on what Foucault meant by thought. Having done this, we can then broach the 
question of the possibility of re!figuring a critical history of thought into a critical 
analysis of contemporary thought. 
At this point, you may well be asking what all this has to do with the 
question concerning power, which, after all, is concerned with how some attempt 
to conduct the conduct of others. In response to this question, I would beg your 
indulgence. Since I am arguing that Foucault’s conceptualization of relations of 
power can only be properly understood by situating it within the broader scope 
of a history of thought, we first need to get clear about what this history of 
thought is. Furthermore, since we are enquiring into whether or not it is possible 
to employ some of the equipment Foucault used in his historical analyses of 
relations of power to manufacture our own tools for analyzing relations of power 
in their contemporaneity, we first need to examine whether or not it is possible to 
transform a critical history of thought into critical analyses of contemporary 
thought. Thus, in this chapter I address the latter of these questions. 
Taking as our point of departure a passage from the original ‘Preface’ to The 
Order of Things, I will attempt to ascertain the “level” at which or upon which 
archaeological research works, how this “level” is played out in the distinction 
Foucault makes between savoir and connaissance, and why this level is of interest 
to the archaeologists of knowledge (savoir) and power (pouvoir), of discourse, of 
problematization, and of technology. In doing so, I hope to gain an 
understanding not so much of what Foucault meant by “thought” but more what 
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a history of thought does and of what it means to do “a history of thought”, and 
thereby construct our own analytics of thought. In our endeavour to get a handle 
on the specific “level” of archaeological research, I shall draw upon Heidegger"s 
notion of “the ontological difference”; that is to say, his conceptualization of the 
differentiation between “being” and “beings” (Heidegger 1982). Now, strictly 
speaking, given Foucault’s comments vis!à!vis Heidegger in his final interview—
‘[f]or me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher…[m]y entire 
philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger 
(Foucault 1988: 250ff.)—this is not adding a supplemental to Foucault’s thought. 
However, and having said that, my intention here is not to invoke Heidegger so 
as to indicate his possible influence upon the thought of Foucault; nor is it to 
stage what Milchman and Rosenberg (2003) call an Auseinandersetzung or “critical 
encounter” between Heidegger and Foucault, however admirable this may be; 
nor, finally, is my objective to combine their respective works so as to arrive at a 
third synthetic position. Besides which, it would simply be absurd to reduce the 
complexity of a thinker like Foucault to one primary influence, even one as 
complex as Heidegger. Not only is it possible to state that Foucault’s thought is 
intensely Kantian (e.g. Djaballah 2008; Han 2002), intensely Nietzschean (e.g. 
Mahon 1992; Owen 1994; Shapiro 2003), and intensely Heideggerian (e.g. Elden 
2001; Rayner 2007); into this heady mix can be thrown The Annales School, 
Althusser, Bachelard, Bataille, Binswanger, Blanchot, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, 
Deleuze, Dumézil, Freud, Hegel, Klossowski, Levi Strauss, Marx, Merleau!Ponty, 
and Raymond Roussel, to name but a few. 
The reason for not wanting to proceed in this way is that I want to avoid the 
inevitable distractions that would result from such a form of enquiry. In short, 
there is neither presumption nor argumentation concerning the possible relation 
between the thinking of these two thinkers. More exactly, Heidegger’s 
conceptualization of the ontological difference or, rather, a certain underplayed 
aspect of that differentiation, which did not seem to have greatly concerned 
Heidegger himself, is being taken up and employed as an intelligibility key with 
which to render intelligible Foucault’s thought on thought. That is to say, I take 
up this aspect of the ontological differences as a conceptual tool, as a heuristic 
device, with which and through which to render intelligible and thus more 
usable Foucault’s conceptualization and analytics of thought. The objective being, 
moreover, to render intelligible Foucault’s conceptualization and analytics of 
thought in such a way as to make them available for undertaking critical analyses 
not of thought’s history but of our own present contemporary thought. In 
summary, the reading that I undertake here is perspectival, which is another way 
of saying it is motivated; and this can only ever mean that it is “partial,” 
“selective,” and “biased”.  
As noted, the aspect of the ontological difference that I am to employ here 
is, I think, rather marginal to Heidegger’s broader concerns. As far I as have been 
able to ascertain, it was only discussed to any great extent in two places; firstly, in 
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the section of Being and Time that looks at ‘Analysis of environmentality and 
worldhood in general’ (Heidegger 1962: specifically, 95!104; see also, 286!288, 
406, 410); and secondly, in the section of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology that 
deal with ‘The Temporal interpretation of being as being handy’ (Heidegger 
1982: 303!313). In addition, my reading of this aspect of the ontological 
differentiation is informed as much by Dreyfus’s (1991, specifically Ch. 4) account 
of this as it is by Heidegger’s discussion. Since I am employing the ontological 
difference as a conceptual device with which to construct an understanding of 
Foucault’s conceptualization of thought, it behoves me to say something 
regarding my understanding of, and taking up of, the ontological difference. Of 
course, whilst a certain form of scholarship deals with the correctness of such 
interpretations, in what follows, I am more interested in what work this analysis 
allows us to do that I am with concerns of learnedness or erudition.  
1 – My motive for taking up and using a certain aspect of the ontological 
difference is that I saw in it a way to think about, and thus to get a handle on, 
what it is that Foucault does with such concepts as “thought,” “materiality,” and 
“rationality,”, and so forth, and thus what doing a “critical history of thought” 
entails. Using this heuristic “apparatus” in this way, thus discloses one possible 
way of situating Foucault’s “analytics of power” within this form of enquiry. As 
noted, my aim is not to ask “where did he get this or that from?” but, rather, to 
make the concepts of thought, materiality, rationality and, consequently, the 
conceptualization of power, more intelligible and thus, accordingly, more usable.  
2 – My taking up of the ontological difference is, to a certain extent, 
uncomplicated. By this I do not mean that it is simplistic; rather, I mean that I am 
not concerned here with the different ways in which Heidegger himself 
questioned concerning the ontological difference (by way of “De!sein,” by way of 
“being”) or attempted to move beyond this differentiation (by way of 
“appropriation”). On the contrary, I simply take up the differentiation of the 
ontological difference as a heuristic without questioning it in and of itself. To do 
otherwise would make the thesis too burdensome and derail the focus from 
focusing upon the question at hand: namely, that of questioning the exercising of 
contemporary relations of power from within the perspective of our own 
actuality.  
3 – I take it that the ontological difference designates or discloses the 
differentiation between “being” (Sein) and “beings” (das Seiende, the things!that!
are) or, stated otherwise, between “the being of entities” and “entities” 
themselves or, as a final approximation, between what Heidegger called “the 
clearing” and “what shows!up in the clearing” (Heidegger 1962: 171; 1993: 217!
265).   
4 – Da!sein (there!being, being!there), which is often taken as a synonym for 
“human beings”, is being understood here not as a synonym for “people”—either 
individually or collectively—but, rather, to refer to “a form of life” or “the modes 
of existence” of a people.  
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5 – I take it that historical, cultural, and practical “ways of existing” embody 
and express historically, culturally, and practically specific understandings of 
being (ontology), and that Da!sein has a dim or implicit awareness of this 
understanding (the pre!ontological). Here, and despite the fact that in The Order 
of Things Foucault stated emphatically and categorically that ‘[i]n any given 
culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines 
the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or 
silently invested in a practice’ (Foucault 1970: 168), there can be no question of 
ontology being a unity that unifies all experience (fundamental ontology); rather, 
ontology is approached as being a dispersed multiplicity of diverse, diverging, 
intersecting, and overlapping local and/or regional ontologies (see Dean 1996; 
Rose 1996c); a position taken up in The Archaeology (Webb 2013: 56). That is to 
say, there is no appeal to transcendental conditions here; neither structures of 
consciousness nor empirical causes. 
6 – Furthermore, I take it that the term “understanding” here does not, or 
does not only, denote mental comprehension but, understood etymologically 
(from under “among, between” + standan “to stand” + ing), connotes “standing in 
the midst of” (OED). I also take “being,” as “be!ing,” to mean the enactment of 
“what is” (i.e. in the same way that skiing is “to ski”, that is, the act of traveling 
on skis; or that singing is “to sing”, that is, the act of making melodic sounds with 
one’s voice, etc.). Consequently, I take it that an “understanding of being” means 
something like standing in the midst of the enactment of what is; and, indeed, as 
connoting such standing as being an integral part of said enactment.  
7 – I take the ontological difference, as the differentiation between being and 
entities, as being disclosive of three different modes of the being of entities: 
Zuhandenheit, Unzuhandenheit, and Vorhandenheit; and of three different kinds of 
entities that have these ways of being: Zuhanden (to!hand), Unzuhanden (un!to!
hand) and Vorhanden (at!hand). “Zuhandenheit” has been variously translated as 
readiness!to!hand, handiness, or availableness, and “Zuhanden” as ready!to!hand, 
handy, or available; “Unzuhandenheit” as un!readiness!to!hand, unhandiness, or 
unavailableness, and “Unzuhanden” as un!ready!to!hand, unhandy, or unavailable; 
“Vorhandenheit” as presence!at!hand or occurrentness and “Vorhanden” as present!
at!hand or occurrent (see Heidegger 1962; 1982, 1996; see also, Carman 2003; 
Dreyfus 1991). In following Dreyfus (1991), I will use available(ness), 
unavailable(ness), and occurrent(ness) to refer to these three modes of the being of 
entities and the entities that have these modes of being. Available (from avail + !
able), has the sense of “able to be effectual, serviceable, or of use” (OED); 
unavailable thus has the sense of not able to be of avail in the aforecited way; 
whilst occurrent has the sense of something presenting itself (from Latin 
occurrere, from ob “against, toward” + currere “to run”); thus occurrent has the 
sense of extent: a “standing forth, prominent, visible”, that is as something 
“standing above a surface” and so “standing forth to view” (OED). 
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8 – In addition, I take it that the first two ways of being and the entities that 
have these ways of being are ontological, whilst the third is what Heidegger called 
merely ontical (merely, here, is not used in a derogatory or pejorative sense, but 
more in terms of “just standing there”); and that both the ontological and the 
ontical have their condition of possibility in an ontology. 
9 – Lastly, I take the ontological difference as disclosing three modes of 
comportment of Da!sein towards the entities that have the aforementioned ways 
of being: (i) “non!thematics circumspective absorption” towards the available; (ii) 
from “deliberate coping to involved deliberation to theoretical reflection” towards the 
unavailable; and (iii) “thematic cognition” towards the merely occurrent or extant 
(Dreyfus 1991). This description thus describes my understanding of the 
ontological difference as described by Heidegger (1962, 1982) and discussed by 
Dreyfus (1991).  
10 – Finally, I should reinforce a point here: in taking up this 
conceptualization of the ontological difference, I want to deploy certain 
Heideggerian schemes without being either committed to, or being held to 
commit to, any general Heideggerian position. My taking up of the above 
understanding of the ontological difference, which is not taken up in term of 
influence or appropriation but as an experimental heuristic that opens up the 
question of problematizations, will be embellished upon and elaborated in more 
detail as the chapter progresses. 
1 A  Materialism  of  the  Incorporeal   
The specific passage from the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things that I take up as our 
point of departure here, concerns Foucault’s discussion of those people whose 
ability to use language has been impaired by aphasia (a “disorder” caused by 
brain damage). The passage concerns ‘certain aphasiacs’, who ‘when shown 
various differently colored skeins of wool on a table top, are consistently unable 
to arrange them into any coherent pattern’ (Foucault 2002a: xix). What Foucault is 
drawing attention to here is the way in which the surface of the table top ‘in 
which things are normally arranged and given names’ is ‘unable to serve in [the 
aphasiacs] case as a homogeneous and neutral space in which things could be 
placed so as to display at the same time the continuous order of their identities or 
differences as well as the semantic field of their denomination’ (ibid.: xix!xx). 
Foucault notes that within this simple space, ‘the aphasiac will create a 
multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in which nameless resemblances 
agglutinate things into unconnected islets; in one corner, they will place the 
lightest!colored skeins, in another the red ones, somewhere else those that are 
softest in texture, in yet another place the longest, or those that have a tinge of 
purple or those that have been wound up into a ball’ (ibid: xx). But this order is, 
for the aphasiacs, too unstable and/or fragile to be maintained, and ‘no sooner 
have they been adumbrated than all these groupings dissolve again’, and this 
because ‘the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may be, is still 
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too wide not to be unstable’ (ibid). The aphasiacs, endlessly grouping and 
regrouping the different skeins, arranging and rearranging them, configuring 
and reconfiguring different islet becomes ‘more and more disturbed’, finally 
‘teetering on the brink of anxiety’  (ibid).  
What Foucault is drawing our attention to here, as with his description of 
Borges’ quote from “a certain Chinese encyclopaedia” also presented in the 
‘Preface’, is not just the aphasiacs inability to create and maintain order, but also, 
and more specifically, the apparently neutral rectangular surface of the table!top 
that acts as both background and support for such orderings. We could also say 
that Foucault uses this example to demonstrate both the contingency of a 
particular mode of order and the transience of such orderings. In other words, 
the aforecited passage is used to differentiate between the table top—the 
background and support of order—, what is so ordered, and the act or practice of 
grouping the particular groupings arranged within the space or upon the 
surface—on the “top”—of the table: empirical orders. 
 Fundamental  Codes  
We can clarify this differentiation—between the background and support of order 
and the empirical orders or practices of ordering—by recourse to further passages 
from the ‘Preface’. We can begin by looking at how Foucault presents “order” 
itself. In the ‘Preface’ he states that  ‘[o]rder is both that which is given in things 
as their inner law, the secret network in accordance with which they as it were, 
gaze at one another, and that which only exists through the grid of a glance, 
attention, language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order 
manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the 
moment of being stated’ (ibid.: xxi, modified). There are possible overtones here 
of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference, and although I do not wish to 
read this in terms of influence, as noted, it may be instructive to see how this 
parallel unfolds. 
Firstly, order is posed in terms of two dimensions: on the one hand, there is 
that which is given in things themselves, which we shall discuss in a moment; on 
the other hand, there is that which only exists through the grid of practices—
“seeing” and “saying” (on the “seeable” and the “sayable”, see Deleuze 1988: 
47ff.)—where order manifests itself: as we shall see, this “grid” is what Foucault 
called the “empirical”, and it is governed by what he called the “fundamental 
codes of a culture”. This can be read as invoking something like the 
differentiation between “beings” and “being” that the ontological difference 
names, and the understanding of being which this differentiation expresses. 
Secondly, what is given in “things” themselves is a hidden network that 
determines how they face or interact with one another. There are clear parallels 
or correlations here with Heidegger’s notion of “equipment”, in which 
equipment is what it is only in its relation to other equipment or to an equipmental 
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contexture (Heidegger 1982: 309), environment, or world: the aforementioned 
“hidden network”. Thirdly, order manifests itself in the space of a grid that has 
no existence beyond a glance, attention (an examination), a language; in short, 
beyond that grid of intelligibility—the fundamental codes of a culture—
inhabiting practices: for Heidegger, being is not itself an entity—it is what makes 
entities show!up as being the entities that they are. These practices are governed 
by what Foucault called ‘the fundamental codes of a culture,’ which has 
connotations of the understanding of being of that being for which being is an 
issue for it: namely, Da!sein (“there!being”).  
This is made clearer in the passage that follows: ‘[t]he fundamental codes of 
a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, 
its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—establish, from the start, 
for every man, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and in which he 
will find himself’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, emphasis added, modified). Since the 
notion of the “fundamental codes of a culture” is an expression used exclusively 
in The Order of Things (see Webb 2005a, 2013), and since its place in the broader 
Foucaultian lexis is somewhat marginal, I take “fundamental” here to mean 
“basic” [fondamentaux], as in basis or base, as in the foundation or base of a 
building, but also as in the primary principle or groundwork of a system: that is 
to say, I take it to mean “primordial”. Similarly, I take “code” not to mean 
something like intentional programming but, rather, to mean that which 
unconsciously, pre!reflectively, and/or pre!conceptually governs practices: 
“code” understood as organising principle; that is, as the pre!ontological 
understanding of being. 
Of course, when dealing with the work of Foucault, “fundamental” or 
“primordial” cannot mean “origin” or “original” (for a critique of the 
metaphysics of origin see "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Foucault 1998: 369!
391) but, rather, the ground!work of that which sets something on its way: the 
arkh", that is the prefix of archaeology. Here, arkh" is taken as a polysemic term 
embodying a multiplicity of meanings: from the most concrete: ‘the arche of a 
plant lies in the soil from which it is nourished’; to the concrete: ‘in the sense of 
birth or generation’; to the more general: ‘“foundation” or “ground,” whatever 
institutes and sustain the site for a thing’s existence’; to the most general and 
abstract sense of “grounding”: ‘the element or principle of a thing, which 
although undemonstrable and intangible in itself, provides the conditions of the 
possibility of that thing’ (see Sandywell 1996: 142ff.). Interestingly enough, arkh" 
has a further set of connotations, which relates it to ‘rule, governance, or political 
direction’ (ibid.: 144ff.). We will return to this understanding of the arkh" of a 
thing and its relation to our understanding of archaeology in Part Four of the 
thesis.  
Since, as Dreyfus (1991: 16) notes, for Heidegger our everyday practices—
way of life/form of existence—embody an ontology, it is not absurd to see in 
these “fundamental codes” or the apparently neutral surface of the table!top, a 
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correlate of what Heidegger called an understanding of being. Stated otherwise, 
the table!top itself can be correlated to what Heidegger called “the clearing” (the 
specific understanding of being embodied in practices); that is, that “illuminated” 
space in which what shows!up shows!up as “something”, as being what it is; or, 
more specifically, as being this “thing” that it is and not something else (on this 
“as!structure”, see, Harman 2002: 68ff.). This ties in with Dreyfus’s observation 
that ‘Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing governs activity, its 
“unobtrusive governance”’ (Dreyfus 1991: 191; the reference is to Heidegger 
1993: 236).  
Given that the notion of “fundamental codes” does not sit well with either 
Heidegger’s conceptualization of the understanding of being (there is no 
codification here, as such) or with Foucault’s later work, and given that the 
influences upon Foucault’s thought were many and varied (I am thinking 
specifically of Cavaillès, Bachelard, and Canguilhem here; see, e.g. Gutting 1989; 
Kusch 1991; Thompson 2008; Webb 2005a, 2013), it is possible to see in this notion 
of “the fundamental codes of a culture” a composite grid of intelligibility 
intended to invoke something like the ungrounded ground that grounds what is 
(or what comes to be). The ‘important point’ about “groundless grounds”, as 
Braver (2012) puts it in his text on Wittgenstein and Heidegger, ‘is that both terms 
are in effect: while the grounds of all thinking lack the kind of foundation 
philosophers have long dreamt of, and thus are groundless, they still function as 
grounds for finite creatures like us’ (ibid.: 11). From our Foucaultian perspective, 
the groundless grounds that ground are historically constituted; that is to say, 
they are neither located in transcendental conditions nor empirical causes but 
are, nonetheless, constituted in, by, and through historical processes. 
 Empirical  Orders  
The differentiation Heidegger makes between being and beings is, anyway, not 
so original. If taken as the ground (being) and what is grounded (beings), then 
there are parallels or analogies between this differentiation and other dualisms 
such as the Kantian founding/founded, the Marxist base/superstructure, the 
Freudian unconscious/conscious, the structuralist langue/parole, or the Gestalt 
ground/figure, and so on. In each of these pairs, the former term is what 
constitutes the latter or the latter terms are specific expressions of the former, and 
so forth. What I think is original in Heidegger’s notion of the ontological 
difference is not so much the differentiation itself, but the working out of that 
differentiation and the analytic that this makes possible. Specifically, what I take 
to be the basic insight here is the way in which Heidegger’s working out of the 
ontological difference discloses three modalities of differentiation between the 
being of entities and the entities that have these ways of being: availableness/the 
available, unavailableness/the unavailable, and occurrentness/the merely occurrent. 
For Heidegger, the being of those entities that are to!hand—whether available or 
85 
 
unavailable—is ontological, whereas the being of those entities that are merely at!
hand is ontical. I take the way in which entities are—ontological, ontical; to!hand or 
merely at!hand—to be historically, discursively, and practically constituted; that 
is to say, they are the “effect” of specific historical, discursive, and practical 
understandings of being (plural). 
It is through the clearing, then, that what shows!up shows!up as what 
matters, understood in both senses of this term: that which materialises (matter), 
and that which is cared about, in one way or another (that with which we are 
concerned or that which becomes a point of concern). In ‘The Origin of the Work 
of Art,’ Heidegger has this to say about the clearing, ‘[i]n the midst of beings as a 
whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in 
reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. 
This open centre is therefore not surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting 
centre itself encircles all that is…That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands 
within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing 
grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves 
are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, 
beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees’ (Heidegger 2001: 51!52). 
Thus, the clearing is that space in which we dwell in which what shows!up for us, 
shows!up as being this being that it is. Moreover, what shows!up at this “level” 
(and by “level” here, I mean level of involvement and/or absorption) shows up as 
being available or ready!to!hand: the aforecited “empirical orders”. Furthermore, it 
is possible to correlate the ways in which these fundamental codes govern our 
everyday practices—its “unobtrusive governance” or that which “establish for 
every man the empirical orders (availableness or readiness!to!hand) with which he 
will be dealing”—with what Heidegger referred to as our ‘pre!ontological’ 
understanding of being (Heidegger 1962: 32).  
The “fundamental codes of a culture give to every man the empirical orders 
with which he will be dealing,” and govern those empirical orders, because every 
man already has an implicit, pre!conceptual (i.e., sub!individual, pre!subjective) 
understanding of what these fundamental codes are; in other words, every man 
(e.g. Da!sein) has a pre!ontological understanding of being. It is this pre!
ontological understanding of “what is” that “governs” the different ways in 
which “we” comport “ourselves” towards “beings”: that is to say, towards such 
entities as language, perception, exchanges, techniques, values, practices, and so 
forth. It should be noted here that “pre!ontological” does not denote before or 
prior to the ontological—i.e. in temporal succession—but, rather, connotes our 
dim or implicit awareness of “what is” prior to this awareness being disclosed or 
made explicit by ontology—or, as we shall see, by way of a problem. In Being and 
Time, Heidegger states that, ‘[h]ere “Being!ontological” is not yet tantamount to 
“developing an ontology”. So, if we should reserve the term “ontology” for that 
theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then 
what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein’s “Being!ontological” is to be 
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designated as something “pre!ontological”. It does not signify simply “being!
ontical”, however, but rather “being in such a way that one has an understanding of 
Being”’ (ibid., my italics; see also Dreyfus 1991: 16ff.). 
 Empirical  Sciences  
The fundamental codes (ontology) that govern the empirical orders (the 
ontological: availableness), however, are only half the story; the other half of the 
story are those explanations that attempt to explain as explicitly and as exactingly 
as possible the different schemas of order (the ontical): ‘[a]t the other extremity of 
thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations 
which explain why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what 
principle can account for it, and why this particular order has been established 
and not some other’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii). Scientific theories, philosophical 
interpretations, universal laws, principles, a particular order; these can be read as 
correlates of what Heidegger called the ontic:  pure occurrentness that deals with 
entities that are merely occurrent: that is, “objects” that are “things” ‘abstracted 
from their practical context’ and understood ‘as existing independently of us and 
our understanding’ (Carman 2003: 122, 136). That is to say, the (scientific) 
knowledge (connaissance) concerning the nature, properties, qualities, 
characteristics, and so forth, of specific extant beings or of occurrent entities as 
such: their size and shape, the materials from which they are made, their 
composition and structure, their weight and density, their colour and texture, 
and so on, and so forth. 
 Thus, what Foucault presents in the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things can be 
understood in terms of, or by reading it through and in relation to, what 
Heidegger called “the ontological difference” (Heidegger 1982; see also Han 2002: 
54ff.). That is to say, it can be rendered intelligible by way of the differentiation 
disclosed by the ontological difference between ontology (fundamental codes), 
the ontological (availableness/available: empirical orders), and the merely ontic 
(occurrentness/occurrent: scientific theories, philosophical reflections, and so forth). 
The relationship between the fundamental codes of a culture that are both 
the background and support of empirical orders of things on the one hand, and 
the scientific theories and philosophical reflection that explain order on the other, 
is that the former (ontology, pre!ontological) are the condition of possibility not 
only of the empirical orders (the ontological) but also of the scientific theories 
and philosophical interpretations (the ontic). As Heidegger notes, ‘[t]he 
ontological difference says: [a] being is always characterized by a specific 
constitution of being’ (Heidegger 1982: 78). As Stuart Elden puts this, ‘[o]ntic 
knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, it 
is the knowledge of the sciences, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on 
which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, [it is] the a 
priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences’ (Elden 2001: 9). But the a 
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priori here are not a synthetic a priori or a priori structures of consciousness; 
rather, they are material conditions of existence: historical a priori means the 
historical material conditions of possibility, and thus of existence, of empirical 
knowledge. On this view, ontic knowledge is formed on the basis (is founded in 
or grounded in) the ontological, which is itself grounded in the material 
conditions of existence of a set of practices that embody a particular 
understanding of being: ontological knowledge is the condition of possibility of ontic 
knowledge. Foucault discusses something along these line in The Birth of the Clinic 
in which, for example, the transformations in the ontical forms of the medical 
gaze (le regard medical) are based upon shifts at a “deeper” level; that is, in 
transformations not only in medical practices but also in social, economic, and 
political practices, and thus in the ontology these practices embody: Foucault 
talks, for instance, of a ‘formal reorganization, in depth...that made clinical 
experience possible’ (Foucault 1973: xiv). 
 “Median  Region”  
Nevertheless, Foucault’s project was not Heidegger’s project. Heidegger had a 
single goal: the relentless, tireless, and tenacious pursuit of the “meaning of 
being” which he undertook, at least in his later works, through a history of being 
(for a different reading of the relationship between The Order of Things and the 
work of Heidegger, see Schwartz 2003). Ultimately, Foucault’s studies were not 
phenomenological but archaeologico!genealogical: his project, if we can use this 
term in relation to his work, was neither an existential analytic of Da!sein, nor 
was it a more general history of the meaning of being; it was, rather, a historical 
ontology of ourselves and a critical history of thought: is asks “How did the 
history of our thought make us what we are?”. We have to be clear about the 
object of Foucault’s historical studies before we can ask the question of the tools 
he used to undertake such studies, and whether or not it is possible to 
manufacture our own tools for undertaking our own studies of our 
contemporary. One thing that should be noted here, is the way in which 
Foucault’s studies avoided any recourse to “the being of man”, where “man” is 
understood, by way of the analytic of finitude, as an empirico!transcendental 
doublet (Foucault 1970: Part II; see also Thompson 2008; Webb 2005a, 2005b, 
2013). 
What most theories, researches, studies, ethnographies, phenomenologies, 
and so forth, do is to formulate ways and means of understanding who and what 
we are, what we do, and/or the world in which we live. In such studies, “man” is 
not only the objects of knowledge; “s/he” is also the subject who knows (Foucault 
1970: 312). What Foucault did was something rather different. As noted, what is 
expressed there is a way of studying the different and differential ways in which, 
in the West, human beings have attempted to study or have studied human 
beings. That is to say, Foucault questioned the historicity of the different ways in 
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which “we” have questioned and come to understand “ourselves”, and what 
were the effects of this historical questioning in, on, and upon our present. More 
specifically, Foucault did not study consciousness (either structured internally or 
structured by external conditions), meaning, or what is a thinking being (Was ist 
der Mensch?), but attempted to study the thought and rationality inhabiting 
practices (see Foucault 1997: 199!205).  
When Foucault details material and practical conditions, these are not 
empirical causes (conditions of existence) that structure behaviour (social 
relations) or ideas (consciousness); they are the concrete and historical a priori of 
thought (Foucault 1985: 11ff.). Hence, there is recourse to neither “philosophical 
anthropology” (‘a general theory of the human being’) nor “social history” 
(‘economic and social context’) but, rather, to the domain of thought and its 
history (ibid.: 200; see also 1998: 459!463). As Foucault put this in a discussion 
following the lecture on ‘The Culture of the Self’ at Berkeley in 1983, his problem, 
‘is not the history of behaviour, the pattern of behaviour, the rules of 
behaviour…[and so forth,]…it is not a problem of social history, it is a problem of 
thought’ (Foucault 1983b). This is a subtle yet fundamental distinction. As noted, 
it is why Foucault turned to Bentham (1995 [1787]) and not Howard (1780, 1791) 
in Discipline and Punish (see the discussion on page 10 above). Foucault did not 
come up with a winning formula for posing the question “what is it to be 
human?” Rather, the aim or object of Foucault’s archaeo!genealogical studies was 
‘to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings 
are made subjects,’ and his work ‘dealt with three modes of objectification that 
transform human beings into subjects’ (Foucault 2001d: 326). The first studied the 
human sciences and moved in the direction of the epist"m"; the second and third 
studied power and self respectively and moved in the direction of tekhn" (we 
shall elaborate on epist"m" and tekhn" and the distinction between them in Part 
Four of the study). 
Perhaps this is why there is no “ontology”, as such, in Foucault’s writings 
(see, e.g. Han 2002; the original title of Han’s book, L#Ontologie manquée de Michel 
Foucault, translates as something like “The Missing—Lacking or Failed—
Ontology of Michel Foucault”). By this, I mean that Foucault was not trying to 
disclose who we are or what the world is; rather, the questions he poses concerns 
“what our present is”, and how it, and thus ourselves, became what it is or what 
we are. This is why there is no theory of knowledge (connaissance) in Foucault’s 
writing but, rather, an archaeology of knowledge (savoir); it is also why there is 
not a theory of power (puissance) in Foucault’s studies but, rather, an analytics of 
relations of power (rapport de pouvoir); it is why, moreover, there is no theory of 
the subject (consciousness) in Foucault’s writing but, rather, a questioning of 
ethical practices and relation to self (rapport à soi). In short, there is no theory per 
se in Foucault; there are only “questions of method” and a general organising 
framework. Stated otherwise, there is an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) or 
critical history of thought on the one hand and, on the other hand, a genealogy of 
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the subject or a history of the present and a historical ontology of ourselves. 
Foucault’s historical studies were, as he put it, “genealogical in their finality 
(“What are we to!day?”) and archaeological in their method (“How did the 
history of our thought make us what we are?”)” (see Foucault 1997: 315ff.; 1983a). 
If we are to remake or reconfigure the finality (finalité) and method of Foucault’s 
historical studies into the aim and method for doing contemporary studies of our 
contemporary, then we will have to rethink and reconfigure archaeology and 
genealogy respectively.  
Since Foucault’s archaeological studies focused primarily upon the human 
sciences, and since, as we have noted, such sciences are ontical, then it would 
seem that Foucault’s project was not ontology, fundamental or otherwise, after 
all, but was, rather, a study of the ontic sciences. However, this is not exactly 
correct either; whilst Foucault certainly studied ontic knowledge, he studied their 
formation, transformation, and mutation and, consequently, he did not remain at 
this level. What Foucault investigated, to the extent that this can be discerned 
from the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things, was something like the space that opens 
up between the ontological (empirical orders or the availableness) and the ontic 
(scientific theories or the merely occurrent). This space is described in the ‘Preface’ 
in the following way: ‘between these two regions [ontological empirical orders 
and ontic scientific theories], so distant from one another, lies a domain which, 
even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless fundamental: it is 
more confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to analyse’ (Foucault 2002a: 
xxii, my italics, my gloss in brackets). And the reason for focusing upon this 
intermediary yet fundamental domain—the in!between of the empirical orders 
and scientific knowledge (connaissance)—even if this is less easy to analyse, is that 
‘[i]t is here that a culture, imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders 
(ontological) prescribed for it by its primary codes (ontology), instituting an 
initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, 
ceases to let itself be traversed by them, loses its fondness for their immediate 
and invisible powers, [and] frees itself sufficiently to notice that these orders may 
not be the only or the best possible ones’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, modified). 
When a culture is given this discrepancy between the primary codes and its 
empirical order, when there is a disjuncture between that which governs and 
what is governed, such a culture then ‘finds itself faced with the brut fact that 
there is, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves 
orderable, that belong to a certain mute order; in short, [it finds itself faced with 
the fact] that there is order [bref qu#il y a de l#ordre]’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, 
modified). In short, that is, it finds itself given order. However, when Foucault 
states that, through this initial separation, disjunction, and loss of transparency a 
culture finds itself faced with the fact that there is order, we should not read into 
this that a culture finds a transhistorical, universal, or unchangeable, order: 
“Being” (with a Capital “B”). Rather, we should read this as saying that a culture 
discovers that the codes governing the empirical orders given to it (the pre!
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ontological) and the theories that explain them (the ontic) were based upon a 
prior ordering of things (a particular historical understanding of being) and that 
this order is neither the only possible form of order nor necessarily the best one. 
In short, and in this very process, the culture then comes upon another order; 
that is, “this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there is order:” 
which is to say, it is given order.  
This is confirmed when the text continues ‘[a]s though emancipating itself 
to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids [i.e. those 
empirical orders governed by the fundamental codes], the culture superimposed 
on them [the empirical orders] another kind of grid which neutralized them, 
which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same 
time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its 
primary state’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii). That is to say, in those barely noticeable 
shifts in which “a culture imperceptibly deviates from the empirical orders 
prescribed for it by its primary codes,” that culture’s pre!ontological 
understanding of what is, and the ontic knowledge built upon this ontology, is 
thrown into relief or revealed, and, in this very process, is excluded by way of the 
emergence of a new order of things. As Foucault states, ‘[i]t is in the name of this 
order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and 
rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, regarded as a positive 
ground, that general theories as to the ordering of things and the interpretations 
it calls for will be built (Foucault 2002a: xxii, modified). It is on the basis of being 
given a new understanding of being (there is order: ontological knowledge) that 
new scientific theories and philosophical interpretations (ontical knowledge) will 
be formed.  
The space that opens up when a culture deviates from the empirical orders 
given to it by the primary codes thus seems to disrupt not only those primary 
codes and the empirical orders they govern, but also the scientific reflections on 
order itself that they make possible. Foucault refers to this space as a “median 
region” (région «médiane»): ‘between the already “encoded” gaze and reflexive 
knowledge [connaissance] there is a median region that sets free order in its very 
being […] This “median” region…, in so far as it manifests the modes of being of 
order, can be given [give itself] as the most fundamental…[I]n every culture, 
between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon 
order itself, there is the naked [bare] experience of order and of its modes of 
being’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii!xxiii, modified, my italics). This “median” region, as 
a domain situated between the empirical orders governed by the basic codes of a 
culture and reflexive knowledge (connaissance), is, as noted above, intermediary. 
This means that it not only sits between the empirical and knowledge 
(connaissance) but also that it acts or mediates between them and, in that very 
mediation, it “manifests the mode of being of order”; and this is why, for 
Foucault, it is fundamental. As Foucault notes, The Order of Things employed a 
form of analysis that attempted ‘to rediscover on what basis knowledge 
91 
 
[connaissance] and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge 
[savoir] was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element 
of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be 
reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and 
vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault 2002a: xxiii).  
The “middle” or “median region” then is neither the ontological (the 
empirical orders: positivity) nor the ontical sciences (empirical knowledge: 
connaissance); rather, it is that space in which our pre!ontological understanding 
of what is loses its transparency, poses problems, comes to be questioned, and 
becomes transformed. In short, what an analysis of this “median region” 
examines is what Foucault referred to as historical mutations in knowledge (savoir). 
History of Madness, for example, examined the ‘rapid mutation which, in the space 
of a few years, brought to the surface of the European world a new knowledge 
and new treatments for madness’ (Foucault 2006a: 460, emphasis added). The 
Birth of the Clinic analyses ‘an essential mutation in medical knowledge’ that took 
place ‘at that turning point in the eighteenth century’ (Foucault 1973: xviii, 
emphasis added, see also xi, xv, 51). The Order of Things examines ‘the mutation 
that occurred in the entire Western episteme towards the end of the eighteenth 
century’ (Foucault 2002a: 224, emphasis added). Discipline and Punish examines 
‘the mutation of the punitive system [that took place] at the threshold of the 
contemporary period’ (Foucault 1977a: 139, emphasis added). And The Will to 
Knowledge, as a final example, examines the ‘mutation [that] took place 
[concerning ‘the technology of sex’] at the turn of the nineteenth century’ 
(Foucault 1978: 117, emphasis added).  
What each of these studies interrogates, then, are these transformational 
spaces in which the empirical orders governed by a historically specific cultural 
table top undergoes a mutation and transmutes and transforms into another table 
top; thus giving rise to a different set of empirical orders (positivity) and attendant 
scientific theories (empirical connaissance). Figured by way of the ontological 
difference, archaeology can be said to questions those historical mutations in 
knowledge (savoir) that open up when the availableness of a culture (it historically 
specific understanding of being) losses its transparency, and thus when the ontic 
knowledge (connaissance) built upon a cultures pre!ontological understanding of 
“what is” lose their self!evidence, comes to be questioned, and comes to be 
replaced or supplanted. In short, what Foucault questioned, can be rendered 
intelligible by noting the difference disclosed by the ontological difference. 
Accordingly, what Foucault means by the “concrete” (Foucault 2006a, 1973) or 
“historical a priori” (Foucault 2002a, 1972), is precisely this “middle region” 
between the ontological (the empirical orders) and the ontic (reflexive 
knowledge); it is this in!between in which there are mutations and 
transformations in and of knowledge (savoir). Thus, Han (2002) is right to note 
that Foucault does not assimilate the fundamental codes of a culture (its 
ontology) to the historical a priori (its empirical orders or the available) and that he 
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does indeed distinguish between the two; pace Han, however, this does not 
equate to some impossible third way (ibid.: 54ff.).  
From the above, and bearing in mind that we are not equating but 
correlating, heuristically, Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference with 
Foucault’s characterisation of thought, we arrive at the following:  
1 – The “basic” or “fundamental codes of a culture” can be correlated with 
what Heidegger calls (a cultures) understanding of being.  
2 – That these “codes” or “understandings” govern the entities that all of 
us—including scientists and philosophers, etc.—deal with in our daily lives, and, 
in fact, governs our very orientation or comportment towards what is. That is to 
say, that what Foucault calls the “empirical” can be correlated to what Heidegger 
calls availableness/the available, and that both of these are ontological. 
3 – That what Foucault terms reflective knowledge—empirical knowledges, 
scientific theories, philosophical reflections, etc.—can be understood as correlates 
of what Heidegger characterized as the ontical sciences or ontic knowledge; that 
is to say, theoretical reflection can be correlated with what Heidegger called 
extantness/the extant. 
4 – That the emergence of a separation between the codes of a culture and 
its empirical order, or when there is a disjunct between what governs and that 
which is governed, can be correlated to Heidegger’s reflections upon those 
moments or events in which on!going activity is disturbed, and of the kinds of 
entities that we deal with and that have this way of being. That is to say, what 
Foucault denotes as the “median” region can be correlated to what Heidegger 
calls unavailableness/ the unavailable. Needless to say, it is this fourth point, the 
“median” region where things breakdown, where on!going practices are 
interrupted, and thus where what we have been dealing with now stands in our 
way, that is of primary concern to us here.  
For Heidegger, such disruption in which that which was to!hand becomes 
more and more un!to!hand, or how what is unobtrusive become more and more 
obtrusive is privative; however, the privative here is merely one way of clarifying 
what he calls the positive (Heidegger 1982: 309). Privative, here, does not mean 
private—i.e. as opposed to public—but rather has the sense of being deprived; it 
has the sense of “the taking away or removal of something”. Hence, privative 
here does not mean individual or personal but the unobtrusiveness becoming 
obtrusive (OED). Likewise, positive is not used in the sense where it would be 
opposed to the negative, but rather denotes when something is “formerly and 
explicitly laid down or imposed”, “expressed without qualification”, “stated 
explicitly”, and so forth (OED). Heidegger calls the sciences, which deal not with 
being but with beings, positive sciences. They are positive because ‘they posit the 
beings with which they are occupied’ (Hofstadter 1982: xxix, emphasis added): in 
Foucault’s terminology, they posit ‘a subject and an object’ (Foucault 1998: 459). 
What Foucault’s archaeological studies research, then, are the concrete and 
historical a priori, the positivities, and the discursive formations from which 
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positive empirical sciences—or other regulative, coordinated, and 
comprehensible activities—arrive. The positivity of a discursive formation refers 
to a ‘four!level system which governs a discursive formation’ (Foucault 1998: 
321); and this four!fold refers to what The Archaeology designated as (1) the 
formation of objects (Foucault 1972: 40!49), (2) the formation of enunciative 
modalities (ibid.: 50!55), (3) the formation of concepts (ibid.: 56!63), and (4) the 
formation of strategies (ibid.: 64!70); what Foucault earlier called ‘objects, 
operations, concepts, and theoretical options’ (Foucault 1991a: 54, 56!57) or the 
‘referential’ (Foucault 1998: 314), the ‘enunciative divergence’ (ibid.: 315), ‘a 
theoretical network’ (ibid.: 318), and ‘a field of strategic possibilities’ (ibid.: 320). The 
“positivity” of a discourse is what makes it ‘possible, in a group of statements, to 
register and describe one referential, one type of enunciative divergence, one 
theoretical network, [and] one field of strategic possibilities’ (ibid.: 321). When 
one can identify such a positivity ‘then one can be sure that they belong to what 
can be called a discursive formation’ (ibid.). In addition, ‘[t]he ensemble thus 
formulated from the system of positivity, and manifested in the unity of a 
discursive formation, is what might be called a knowledge [savoir]’ (ibid.). In 
short, it is the ‘the systems of positivity’ that both ensures the unitary grouping of 
a discursive formation and allows for its intelligibility. But what gives rise to 
such positivities, formations, and knowledge; from whence do such formations, 
transformations, and mutations emerge; and to what do they give rise? 
2 Problematizations  
There is a term that Foucault’s uses throughout his writings, but which only 
comes to full significance in his later thought, that aptly captures this “middle” or 
“median region” that not only The Order of Things but also History of Madness and 
The Birth of the Clinic and also, I think, Discipline and Punish, The Will to Knowledge, 
and the redefined History of Sexuality sought to address. This term is 
“problematizations”. We can clarify this situation by way of a second point of 
departure, this time coming from the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, in 
which Foucault introduces a number of ‘Modifications’ concerning his earlier 
work (Foucault 1985: 3!13). Foucault used a number of avatars for the historical a 
priori, amongst which was what the later Foucault called the “games of truth” 
(see the ‘Introduction’ to Han 2002; see also O"Farrell 2005: 62ff.). In 
‘Modifications’, Foucault states that his concern for many years has been an 
analysis of the “games of truth”, and he characterizes such an analysis as 
analyzing  ‘the games of truth and error through which being constitutes itself 
historically [l’être se constitue historiquement] as experience; that is to say, as that 
which can and must be thought’ (Foucault 1985: 6!7, modified, my italics). 
Somewhat later in ‘Modifications’, Foucault goes on to state that the target of 
such analyses was ‘not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their #ideologies,# 
but the problematizations through which being gives itself [l’être se donne] as that 
which can and must be thought and the practices from which they are formed’ 
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(Foucault 1985: 11, modified, problematizations and practices are italicised in the 
original, the other italics are mine; see also Dean 1996: 214!215).  
From this and the preceding citation, we can paraphrase Foucault’s 
statements so that they now read that his analyses are of the specific ways in 
which “being constitutes itself historically as that which can and must be thought” 
by way of “the problematizations through which being gives itself as that which 
can and must be thought”. Nevertheless, despite the obvious Heideggerian 
overtones of these passages, and of my paraphrasing of them, Foucault’s 
reference to “being” is not exactly the same as Heidegger’s being or, at any rate, it 
is used in a much more restrictive or delimited sense. For Heidegger, being refers 
to the being of entities per se; whereas, for Foucault, being refers not to the being 
of beings in general, but to those being for which being, and especially its own 
being, is an issue for it; namely, human beings or Da!sein: ‘[f]or Heidegger, it was 
through an increasing obsession with techne as the only way to arrive at an 
understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with Being. Let’s turn the 
question around and ask which techniques and practices constitute the Western 
concept of the subject’ (Foucault 2007a: 152; see also Dreyfus 2003: 30ff.). Stated 
otherwise, it refers to the historical understanding of human “being” that is 
constitutive of human “beings”, which is itself constitutive of the understanding 
of human beings as “subjects” and “objects”. Earlier in this same ‘Introduction’, 
for example, Foucault states that ‘the proper task of a history of thought’ is to 
‘define the conditions in which human beings “problematise” what they are, 
what they do, and the world in which they live’ (Foucault 1985: 10): specifically, 
they problematize the human being of human beings. Similarly, in a text written 
under the pseudonym “Maurice Florence”, Foucault characterizes the 
archaeological study of knowledge (savoir) as only dealing with those “games of 
truth” ‘in which the subject itself is posited as an object of possible knowledge 
[savoir]’ (Foucault 1998: 460, modified). We shall return to the significance of the 
formation of objects and the formation of subjects (enunciative modalities) to the 
archaeological research of savoir, and thus to a history of thought, below. 
Returning to the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault situates the 
analyses of forms of problematizations within the domain of archaeological 
research, whilst genealogy addresses itself to the practices from which forms of 
problematizations are formed, modified, and transformed: ‘The archaeological 
dimension of the analysis is used to analyze the very forms of problematization; 
its genealogical dimension, their formation from practices and their 
modifications’ (Foucault 1985: 11!12, modified). It is unclear whether the last 
“their”, the one pertaining to modifications, is pointing to the practices from 
which forms of problematizations are formed or to the forms of 
problematizations themselves, or to both. The published English translation (‘The 
archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to analyse the forms 
themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyse their formation out 
of the practices and the modification undergone by the latter’, ibid.) makes it 
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seem as if genealogy analyses the formation of forms of problematization out of 
practices and of how such forms of problematization modify the practices from 
which they were formed (which would then have the appearance of something 
like a dialectic). My more literal translation suggests that genealogy analyses the 
formation of forms of problematization from practices and the modifications of 
both forms of problematization and the practices from which they were formed. 
On this view, what genealogy analyses is not just the modification of practices 
but also the modifications of forms of problematizations in practice. The 
difference is subtle, I admit; whereas the published English translation places the 
emphasis upon the modification of practices, my revised translation places the 
emphasis upon the modification of forms of problematizations in practices; that 
is, on the synchronous transformations (horizontally within an epistemic and 
technical matrix: “torture” or “punishment” or “discipline”) and diachronous 
mutations (vertically from one epistemic and technical matrix to another: from 
torture to punishment to discipline, etc.) in knowledge (savoir).  
The paragraph that immediately follows the above citation is equally vague 
on this point: ‘[t]here was the problematization of madness and illness arising out 
of social and medical practices, and defining a certain pattern of “normalization;” 
a problematization of life, language, and labor in discursive practices that 
conformed to certain “epistemic” rules;…a problematization of crime and 
criminal behavior emerging from certain punitive practices conforming to a 
“disciplinary” model[; and a problematization of]…sexual activity and sexual 
pleasures…through practices of the self, bringing into play the criteria of an 
“aesthetics of existence”’ (Foucault 1985: 12). Note that the chronology of these 
examples is the same as Foucault’s book length studies: History of Madness, The 
Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, Discipline and Punish, and The History of 
Sexuality series. Note too, how we have a repetition of provenance and emergence in 
that certain forms of problematization are formed from, or arise out of, specific 
sets of practices; but whether normalisation, epistemic rules, a disciplinary 
model, aesthetics of existence, and so forth, refer to the modification of practices, 
the modification of problematizations, or both of these, remains less clear. What 
we can say is that forms of problematization are formed from practices, and since 
practices embody an ontology (being constitutes itself historically by giving itself 
to be thought), problematizations cannot be identified with or be correlates of 
this ontology. Perhaps we can also say that normalisation, epistemic rules, a 
disciplinary model, aesthetics of existence, and so on, are correlates of ontic 
knowledge (i.e. connaissance); which would tie into Foucault’s statement 
concerning doing a genealogy of connaissance.  
This would seem to be the expression of an earlier version of the 
‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure (‘Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 
Two’) in which Foucault states that the analyses of experience, and in this 
instance the experience of sexuality, analyses ‘the correlation of a domain of 
knowledge [savoir], a type of normativity, and a mode of relation to the self; it 
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means trying to decipher how, in Western societies, a complex experience is 
constituted from and around certain forms of behavior: an experience that 
conjoins a field of knowledge [connaissance]…, a collection of rules…, and a mode 
of relation between the individual and himself’ (Foucault 1997: 200). Note here 
that the “domain of knowledge (savoir)”, “type of normativity (pouvoir)”, and 
“relation to self (rapport à soi)” are all situated at the same level, that is, at the 
level of savoir; whilst the “field of knowledge (connaissance)”, the “collection of 
rules (domination)”, and the “relation between the individual and himself 
(consciousness of oneself and others)” are, likewise, situated at the same level, 
only now it is at the level of connaissance. Note too, that the thrust of the 
paragraph is that the former “axes” are the condition of possibility of the latter. 
This would seem to confirm our hypothesis that epistemic rules, normalisation, 
aesthetics of existence, and so forth, are ontical. On this view, forms of 
problematizations occupy that same “middle region” between the ontological 
(i.e., empirical orders) and the ontic (i.e., theoretical reflections on order) 
discussed in The Order of Things. What is also clear from the above passage is that 
archaeology deals with or analyses these forms of problematization, and that this 
analysis addresses those “events” in which there is or has been an “effective 
problematization by thought”. Thus, we have archaeology, problematization, and 
thought.  
A number of questions remain to be addressed before we go into more 
detail about the level of archaeological research, a history of thought, and 
problematizations. Firstly, there is the question concerning Foucault’s 
differentiation between savoir and connaissance and of how this differentiation is 
relatable to the ontological difference. Secondly, there is the question concerning 
the formation of objects and the formation of subjects, and their relation to an 
archaeology of savoir or a (critical) history of (systems of) thought or a materialist 
history of rationality. Lastly, there is the question of the relation of 
savoir/connaissance and subject/object to problematizations, thought, and its 
history. 
 Savoir/Connaissance  
The difference and differentiation between savoir and connaissance can be 
rendered intelligible by way of a passage in which Foucault attempts to clarify 
the work that archaeology undertakes. Firstly, he states that this term, 
archaeology, ‘designates not exactly a discipline but a domain of research’ 
(Foucault 1998: 261). He then clarifies this domain by stating that ‘in a society, 
different bodies of learning [les connaissances], philosophical ideas, everyday 
opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices, and police activities, 
mores—all refer to a certain implicit knowledge [savoir] special to this society’; 
that ‘[t]his knowledge [savoir] is profoundly different from the bodies of learning 
[des connaissances] that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories, 
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and religious justifications, but…is what makes possible at a given moment the 
appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice’; and that it is ‘this knowledge 
[savoir] that [Foucault] wanted to investigate, as the condition of possibility of 
knowledge [connaissance], of institutions, of practices’ (ibid.: 261!262). The 
conceptual and analytical distinction that Foucault draws between savoir and 
connaissance, then, would seem to be fundamental not only to his researches, but 
also to our own attempt to get a handle on archaeology, problematizations, and 
thought (and thus on relations of power or governmentality). However, as is so 
often the case with Foucault’s technical termes d’art, there is little or no sustained 
discussion of this differentiation, not even in The Archaeology .  
In his ‘Introduction’ to the second volume of Essential Works of Foucault, 
1954!1984, Faubion (1998) states that Foucault’s use of savoir and connaissance, 
although they ‘take on technical nuances of their own,’ are never ‘at great 
variance with ordinary French’ (Faubion 1998: xxviii, cf. Sheridan Smith"s 
comments cited below). ‘Savoir,’ Faubion notes, ‘is at once a verbal and a nominal 
form—“to know” as well as “knowledge”’ (Faubion 1998: xxviii). He goes on to 
note that its general sense is related to such English expressions as “awareness”, 
“cognisance”, and especially “savvy”. Connaissance is a noun, and has the verbal 
form of connaître; it corresponds to such English terms as knowledge (learning), 
acquaintance (familiarity with), and also cognition and consciousness. Faubion 
suggests that for Foucault, savoir refers not to things known but, rather, to ‘things 
to be known, one way or another, with less or greater rigor from one instance to 
the next’ (Faubion 1998: xxix, emphasis added). Whereas connaissance, in its 
technical usage, ‘consistently evokes modes of knowledge tied to highly 
developed apparatuses of justification and mode of competence supported by 
well!crystallised apparatuses of “background training”’; here, Faubion notes, 
‘connaissance always has its closest affinities with science’ (Faubion 1998: xxix). 
Sheridan Smith, the translator of The Archaeology, offers the following 
slightly different description of Foucault’s employment of these terms: 
‘Connaissance refers…to a particular corpus of knowledge, a particular discipline 
– biology or economics, for example. Savoir, which is usually defined as 
knowledge in general, the totality of connaissances, is used by Foucault in an 
underlying, rather than an overall, way (Sheridan Smith, cited in Foucault 1972: 
15n2, my italics). Sheridan Smith then presents Foucault’s own clarification 
regarding his usage of these terms (presumably given by Foucault to Sheridan 
Smith when he was translating the book): ‘By connaissance I mean the relation of 
the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the 
conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object 
to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated’ 
(Foucault 1972: 15n2). Note that savoir refers to the necessary conditions for 
subject (“enunciative modality”, in the language of The Archaeology) and object to 
be given to connaissance; in other words, savoir already refers in some way to 
subjects and objects. However, and taking into consideration the above 
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discussion of this term, it refers not just to subject and object but, rather, to 
objects to be known (that is, to their formation), and to the formation of subjects 
capable of knowing such objects. This point is made clearer in the only sustained 
discussion that I have been able to find, in English translation, regarding the 
different ways in which Foucault employs savoir and connaissance: this comes 
from an interview with Trombadori given in 1978 (Foucault 2001d: 239!297).  
In this interview, Foucault states that ‘I use the word %savoir% while drawing 
a distinction between it and the word #connaissance”. I see %savoir% as a process by 
which the subject undergoes a modification through the very things that one 
knows [connaît] or, rather, in the course of the work that one does in order to 
know [connaître]. It is what enables one both to modify the subject and to 
construct the object. Connaissance is the work that makes it possible to multiply 
the knowable objects [les objets connaissables], to manifest their intelligibility, to 
understand their rationality, while maintaining the fixity of the inquiring subject’ 
(Foucault 2001d: 256). Foucault goes on to note that the target of archaeological 
research is ‘precisely a matter of recapturing the construction of a connaissance, 
that is, of a relation between a fixed subject and a domain of objects, in its 
historical roots, in this movement of savoir which makes the construction 
possible’ (ibid.). Now, this work that one does in order to know (connaître), this 
savoir that is the condition of possibility of connaissance, and which involves the 
processes of modifying the subject and constructing the object, I argue, is 
precisely what Foucault called the “work of thought” (Foucault 1997: 118ff.). 
“Thought”, here, does not denote the act of thinking, mental activity or faculties, 
the formation and arrangement of ideas in the mind, structures of consciousness, 
cognition, and the like (which would invoke “a general theory of the human 
being” and thus imply a “philosophical anthropology”), nor does it donate the 
structuring of consciousness, and so on, by way of the material conditions of 
existence (which would invoke the “economic and social context” and imply  
“social history”), but connotes an “act that posits a subject and an object” (see, 
e.g. Foucault 1997: 199!205; 1998: 459!463). 
It is here that an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) becomes if not 
synonymous with a critical history of thought or materialist history of rationality 
then certainly contiguous with it; that is to say, whilst these phrases are not 
exactly identical, they are very closely allied: ‘[i]f what is meant by thought is the 
act that posits a subject and an object, along with their various possible relations, a 
critical history of thought would be an analysis of the conditions under which certain 
relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations 
constitute a possible knowledge [savoir] (Foucault 1998: 459, emphases added). Note 
that thought is an act that posits a subject and an object and the relation between 
them, that a critical history of thought is an analysis of the conditions in which 
such an act of positing a subject and an object and the relations between them is 
actionable, and that the relations thus posited  constitute knowledge (savoir): 
“savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or 
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that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be 
formulated”. Note too, that what constitutes a possible knowledge (savoir) is not 
just the positing of a subject and an object, but specifically the posing of a relation 
between them. 
Elden (2001) has suggested that there is a parallel between the difference 
established by Foucault between savoir and connaissance, and the distinction 
Heidegger makes between ontological and ontic knowledge (ibid.: 99). In making 
this parallel, Elden suggests that ‘[f]or Heidegger, the question of being is an 
ontological question, which aims “at ascertaining the a priori conditions...for the 
possibility of the sciences which examine entities” – ontic knowledge’ (ibid.; the 
citation in double quotation marks is from Heidegger 1962: 31). Thus, ontology is 
what makes ontic knowledge possible; ontology is the a priori of ontic knowledge. 
The parallel with Foucault’s differentiation of savoir from connaissance, as Elden 
formulates this, is as follows: ‘[j]ust as Heidegger read Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason not as a theory of ontic knowledge (an epistemology) but rather of 
ontological knowledge (an ontology), so too must we understand Foucault’s 
archaeology as a theory of ontological knowledge (savoir) rather than of ontic 
knowledge (connaissance)’ (ibid.). Elden goes on to note that for Kant and the 
early Heidegger, questioning the conditions of possibility of knowledge (the a 
priori of knowledge) was ‘radically ahistorical’, but that for Nietzsche, the later 
Heidegger, and Foucault, this question becomes fully historical; that is to say, 
‘ontology is historicized as a historical ontology’ (ibid.), which questions not the a 
priori of knowledge but the “concrete and historical a priori” of knowledge. The 
problem here is that I do not think this reading, whilst compelling, holds for very 
long; and it does not hold for very long for a very specific reason, which we shall 
return to in a moment. Preliminarily, we can say that whilst Foucault’s work can 
be said to be a historical and critical ontology of ourselves, as Elden notes 
elsewhere, this is not an ontology ‘of “what is?” but one of “how what is is?”’ 
(Elden 2005: 356). On this view, Foucault’s work is not just concerned with what 
is made but also, and more specifically, with what went into its making and, to 
this extent, the target of that work, so it seems to me, is not explicitly ontological 
but technological. 
As we shall discuss in more detail below, strictly speaking, for Heidegger, 
in our everyday comportment towards entities—that is to say, in our dwelling 
within a particular set of practices that embody a pre!ontological understanding 
of being—there are no subjects and objects (see Dreyfus 1991). On the contrary, in 
such a pre!ontological mode of comportment, there is simply the “there!being” 
(Da!sein) of a ‘non!thematic circumspective absorption in references or 
assignments constitutive for the readiness!to!hand [availableness] of a totality of 
equipment’ (Heidegger 1962: 107). Now, strictly speaking, Foucault’s 
archaeology—and, by extension, his critical history of thought—is pre!eminently 
concerned with examining formations: of “objects”, of “subjects” or what The 
Archaeology referred to as “enunciative modalities”, but also of 
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“concepts”/”techniques”, as well as “strategies” (Foucault 1972: 40ff., 50ff., 56ff., 
64ff.; 1998: 459ff.; see also Faubion 1998). Moreover, the difference between savoir 
and connaissance is fundamental to this investigation; therefore, neither can be a 
correlate of the ontological, as such. 
 Objects,  Subjects,  and  their  Formation  
The madman was not a ready!made transhistorical object simply awaiting 
discovery by the classical age, but nor was this object an invention of the doctors 
or physicians of the day. Rather, the madman was the product of certain 
definable material conditions (not only what The Archaeology delineates as 
“surfaces of emergence”, “authorities of delimitation”, and “grids of 
specification”, Foucault 1972: 40ff.; but also what Foucault referred to as ‘social, 
economic, or political processes’, see, e.g. Foucault 1997: 117). The object of 
archaeology is to retrospectively define and describe these material conditions of 
existence as the conditions of possibility of such objects, knowledges (savoirs) as 
the conditions of existence of knowledges (connaissances) and discourses —this is 
what is meant by “historical a priori”. It is also important to grasp what Foucault 
does and does not intend by the terms “subject” and “object”, and of the 
modality of their formation in the formation of a relation between them. For 
Foucault, the possible relations between a subject and an object or a domain of 
objects is not a relation between a self!sufficient mind—a self!certain or self!
transparent subject (Descartes), a transcendental consciousness (Kant), a 
transcendental ego (Husserl), etc.—and an independent reality composed of 
natural objects. Nor is it one of natural ready!made self!standing objects being 
represented as mental content in the minds of constituent subjects. Rather, for 
Foucault, the problem of the subject, the object, and the possible relations 
between them, is three!fold:  
1 – The first problem relates to what he calls the subjects ‘mode of 
“subjectivation”’; that is to say, it examines ‘what the subject must be, to what 
condition it is subject, what status it must have, what position it must occupy in 
the real or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that 
type of knowledge [connaissance]’ (Foucault 1998: 459, modified). This mode of 
the subjects “subjectivation” is dependent upon the type of knowledge 
(connaissance) involved.  
2 – The second problem concerns what Foucault referred to as the objects 
‘mode of objectivation”; it consists in ‘determining under what conditions 
something can become an object for a possible knowledge [connaissance], how it 
may have been problematized as an object to be known [connaître], what 
procedures of cutting it may have been subjected, the part of itself that is 
considered pertinent (ibid.: 460, modified), and so forth. The mode of an objects 
“objectivation” is dependent upon the type of knowledge (savoir) involved.  
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3 – The third problem relates to the mutual development and 
interconnection of modes of objectivation and modes of subjectivation in, by, and 
through which “games of truth” come into being (ibid.). Previously, we noted 
that, for Foucault, the “games of truth” referred to those “games of truth and 
error through which being constitutes itself historically as that which can and 
must be thought”. Foucault now characterizes the “games of truth” ‘not [as] the 
discovery of true things but the rules according to which what a subject can say, à 
propos certain things, depends on the question of true and false’ (ibid.). There are 
clear parallels here between the modes of objectivation and modes of 
subjectivation and what The Archaeology called “the formation of objects” and 
“the formation of enunciative modalities”; thus demonstrating the continuity of 
these archaeological questions. 
This series of questions posed by a critical history of thought—‘which are 
those of an “archaeology of knowledge”’ (ibid. emphasis added)—do not concern 
‘just any game of truth’, but, as noted, concern only ‘those in which the subject 
itself is posited as an object of possible knowledge [savoir]’ (ibid. modified), and 
thus the principle question being asked of such “games of truth” is ‘[w]hat are 
the processes of subjectivation and objectivation that make it possible for the 
subject qua subject to become an object of knowledge [connaissance], as a subject?’ 
(ibid.). Subjects here are not socially constructed; they are modified or transformed 
as enunciative (or technical, governmental, or ethical) modalities, that is to say, as 
subject positions. Nor are the objects that are posited socially constructed; they 
are constituted as discursive objects of a possible knowledge (connaissance)—or as 
the target of intervention of a possible relation of power (or as an object of self!
reflection). Thus, subject and object are not socially constructed by way of the 
linguistic fixing of meaning or by social conditions of existence; they are 
modified and/or constituted in, by, and through the work of thought. 
For the sake of argument, let us say that savoir, in its nominal form—
knowledge—and perhaps used in a catachrestic and nominalistic way, refers to 
the ontological; that is to say, to those background sets of practices that embody 
an understanding of being. In its verbal form, however, savoir refers not to 
“knowledge” but, rather, to “to know”. On this view, Foucault’s archaeology is 
primarily addressed to savoir in its verbal form; consequently, we should not 
really talk of an archaeology of “knowledge” (or a will to “knowledge”) but, rather, of 
an archaeology of “to know” (or a will “to know”). Thus, neither thought nor savoir, 
in its verbal form, can be correlates of ontology since, as noted above, there is 
neither subjects nor objects at this “level” (i.e. at this level of involvement and 
thus at this level of awareness). However, connaissance does seem to be a correlate 
of ontic knowledge, as Elden claimed, since at this “level” we do indeed find 
both fixed subjects and a domain of (occurrent) objects. On this view, both 
“thought” and “savoir” seem to occupy that “median” and intermediary 
“region”, that space between the empirical orders governed by the fundamental 
codes of a culture and that cultures scientific theories or philosophical 
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interpretations—the difference of the differentiation of being and beings—that The 
Order of Things designates as the target of archaeological research.  
 The  Discursive  and  the  Non!discursive  
Another element of Foucault’s thought that needs some clarification before we 
finally come to a discussion of problematizations and an analysis of its forms, is 
the distinction he is said to make between the discursive and the non!discursive: 
specifically, that archaeology deals with the former, whilst genealogy deals with 
the later; and, by extension, that since genealogy refers to the non!discursive, and 
genealogy analyses power, that the analysis of power must also be an analysis of 
the non!discursive. This, or so it seems to me, is the standard reading, for 
example, of the analysis undertaken in Foucault’s so!called genealogical text par 
excellence: Discipline and Punish. We will discuss the discursivity of Foucault’s 
analytics of power in later in the thesis; here, I simply want to set the stage for 
this later discussion.  
In a seminar following a lecture that Foucault gave at Berkeley in 1983 on 
the theme of ‘The Culture of the Self’, Foucault states that the general theme of 
his research is a ‘history of thought’ (Foucault 1983b). He goes on to state that 
‘thought cannot be disassociated, of course, from discourses’ and, more 
specifically, that ‘we cannot have any access to thought—either to our own 
present thought, to our…contemporaries thought, or, of course, [to the] thought 
of people of previous periods—…but through discourses’ (ibid.). He concludes 
by stating that ‘that is the necessity of the archaeological consideration’ (ibid.). 
Since the only access that we have to thought, as Foucault conceived this, is 
through discourse or discourses, the necessary target of a critical history of 
thought, therefore, must be discourses. So, what of the non!discursive?  
In a moment, we will discuss in more detail Foucault’s notion of 
problematization and its relation to thought and, hence, to the discursive. For 
now, we can simply note that what gives rise to such problematizations is 
precisely the realm of the non!discursive or, in any case, of one possible 
conceptualization of this domain. Problematizations or, rather, specific forms of 
problematization, emerge out of practices (provenance, the concrete and 
historical a priori, etc.). Now, these practices can be practiced for a long time 
before there is what Foucault calls an ‘effective problematization by thought’ 
(Foucault 1997: 118). What gives rise to such forms of problematizations are 
‘social, economic, or political processes’; processes whose ‘only role is that of 
instigation’ (ibid.: 117). These social, economic, and political processes (e.g. 
demographic explosion, shift from agriculture to industry, transition from 
mercantilism to liberalism, etc.), whose only role is that of instigation—that is to 
say, initiating or activating an effective problematization in, by, and through 
thought, but not determining the directions such problematizations and their 
rejoinders will take (ibid.: 118)—are precisely what Foucault meant by non!
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discursive practices. The Order of Things notwithstanding, all of Foucault’s 
historical studies—those dealing with knowledge, those dealing with ethics, and, 
yes, those dealing with power—took these non!discursive processes into account. 
However, that is only one possible figuration of the non!discursive; the other 
conceptualization is what we might call the effects of thought. Whereas the former 
conceptualization of the non!discursive looks at the material and practical 
conditions of possibility of thought—its concrete and historical a priori—this 
latter conceptualization looks at the material and practical conditions that 
thought, thus thought, made or makes possible. Here, the non!discursive 
becomes synonymous with the institutional, which, nonetheless, is still, at least in 
part, discursive (Foucault 1972: 67ff.; 1980: 197ff.). By institution(al), Foucault had 
in mind ‘[e]verything which functions in a society as a system of constraint and 
which isn’t an utterance, in short, all the field of the non!discursive social’ 
(Foucault 1980: 197!198). On this view, genealogy does, indeed, examine the non!
discursive conditions of possibility of discourse and the non!discursive 
conditions that discourse make possible: the institutional; however, and as we 
shall see, this does not mean that an analytics of the exercising of relations of 
power focuses exclusively upon non!discursive practices. 
The emphasis placed upon the differentiation between the discursive and 
the non!discursive is, I think, largely a product of secondary commentary, and is 
the result of comprehending Foucault’s analyses of discourse as being something 
like a linguistic analysis of language; hence the oft taken!for!granted assumption 
that the distinction to be drawn between the discursive and the non!discursive is 
a differentiation between the linguistic and the non!linguistic, between text and 
context. On the other hand, Foucault himself does not seem to have given such 
import to this distinction. In discussing his notion of the dispositive, for example, 
Foucault state that ‘[i]t doesn’t much matter for my notion of the [dispositive] to 
be able to say that this is discursive and that isn’t. If you take Gabriel’s 
architectural plan for the Military School together with the actual construction of 
the school, how is one to say what is discursive and what is institutional? That 
would only interest me if the building didn"t conform with the plan. But I don’t 
think it’s very important to be able to make that distinction, given that my problem isn’t a 
linguistic one’ (ibid.: 198, emphasis added). What Foucault does place emphasis 
upon, however, are practices per se—discursive or not—and the role that they 
play in instigating the formation of forms of problematizations and their 
rejoinders and, consequently, of the formation of discourses (see, for example, 
Foucault’s discussion on thought and practices in Foucault 1997: 199!205). On this 
view, then, the non!discursive is both multiple and heterogeneous cause and 
singular effect of the discursive, whereas the discursive itself refers to specific 
forms of problematizations and their rejoinders that take the form of explicit 
programmes. 
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 Forms  of  Problematization  
Let us begin by looking at how Foucault characterizes problematizations, relate 
and compare this characterisation to the foregoing discussion of the “median 
region” presented in the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things, and then see how we can 
understand this notion of problematization—the “middle region”—and it’s 
relation to thought by way of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference. 
We can begin by situating the question concerning problematizations within the 
project of what Foucault called a history of thought. Foucault presented this in 
the following way in an interview with Paul Rabinow in 1984 (’Polemics, Politics, 
and Problematizations’): ‘[f]or a long time, I have been trying to see if it would be 
possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of 
ideas (by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the 
history of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of 
action). It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the 
history of thought—this was what one could call the element of problems or, 
more exactly, problematizations’ (Foucault 1997: 117). Thus a history of thought—
which, as we have noted, is analogous to an archaeology of knowledge (savoir)—
proceeds by way of analyses of problematizations; what in the ‘Introduction’ to 
The Use of Pleasure, Foucault referred to as an archaeology of problematizations. 
What, however, is a problematization?  
We have, in fact, already noted this above: it is that space that opens up 
when a culture, or a specific set of practices with a culture, “imperceptibly 
deviates from the empirical orders prescribe for it by its primary codes”, 
“superimposes on the primary codes another kind of grid”, and, on this new 
basis, “criticise the primary codes and renders them partially invalid”. In other 
words, a history of thought, undertaken by way of an archaeology of 
problematizations, ‘tries to analyse the way institutions, practices, habits, and 
behaviour become a problem for people who behave in specific sorts of ways, 
who have certain types of habits, who engage in certain kinds of practices and 
who put to work specific kinds of institutions’ (Foucault 2001c: 74). In other 
words, an analysis of problematizations analyses those historical events in which 
the “empirical orders with which we deal”, which are governed by the 
“fundamental codes of a culture”, essentially “breakdown”. It analyses ‘the way 
an unproblematic field of experience or set of practices which were accepted 
without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, 
raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the 
previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions’ (ibid.). On this 
view, a ‘history of thought…is the history of the way people begin to take care of 
something, of the way they became anxious about this or that for example, about 
madness, about crime, about sex, about themselves, or about truth’ (ibid.). The 
distinction that Foucault makes between these unquestioned, familiar, silent 
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practices—the empirical orders and their basis in a fundamental code—and 
thought itself is revealing. Foucault notes that ‘[w]hat distinguishes thought is 
that it is something quite different from the set of representations that underlies a 
certain behavior; it is also something quite different from the domain of attitudes 
that can determine this behavior. Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct 
and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of 
acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and to question 
it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals’ (Foucault 1997: 117, emphases 
added). 
Thinking this through the forgoing discussion of the ontological difference, 
“thought is what allows us to “step back”” from our non!thematic 
circumspective absorption in on!going activity, and to present this on!going 
activity to ourselves, or to have it presented to us, as an “object of thought”. For 
these transparent, unquestioned, and familiar on!going activities, activities that 
we do not see “because they are too much on the surface of things”, to have 
become an object of and for thought something quite specific has to have taken 
place: ‘for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is 
necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made 
it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around 
it’ (ibid.). It is clear that thought does not refer to what takes place in the silent 
practices (circumspective absorption towards the available); rather, thought 
inhabits practices to the extent that those practices have become problematic, 
when the visible!invisible begins to lose its invisibility; or, rather, thought is both 
immanent to (and, indeed imminent to), and an effect of, a certain form of 
problematization.  
Stated otherwise, “thought” refers neither to the fundamental codes of a 
culture (ontology), nor to the empirical orders prescribed by these codes (the 
ontological), nor, moreover, does it refer to philosophical interpretations or 
scientific theories, and the like (the ontic), for which the codes act as their 
condition of possibility. Rather, thought refers to those events in which the 
empirical orders and the theories or interpretations that explain them, which are 
governed by the basic codes of a culture (time and place) becomes problematic 
and are given to (be) thought; that is to say, when there has been an “effective 
problematization in, by, and through thought”. Thought is the act of “stepping 
back” in which the previously silent habits—the empirical orders governed by 
the fundamental codes—are presented to us as “an object of thought”. This 
stepping back, however, is not a conscious stepping back into disinterestedness 
and abstraction—it is more concrete that this. Rather, the “step back” is simply 
the act of stepping back from doing what was being done or, more specifically, a 
stepping back from doing what was being done in the specific way in which it 
was being done because something has intervened or disrupted such on!going 
activity, because something now stands in our way; something that is 
conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive.   
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There are clear parallels or correlates (but not identity or isomorphism) here, in 
Foucault’s conceptualization of the way in which familiar and unquestioned 
practices become a problem, with Heidegger’s notion of the ontological 
difference, as discussed above. More specifically, there are parallels with 
Heidegger’s descriptions of the ways in which that difference discloses the 
movement by which the available (to!hand)—by becoming conspicuous, obtrusive, 
or obstinate—becomes what Heidegger calls the unavailable (un!to!hand) and, 
ultimately, becomes the merely extant (at!hand). Now, strictly speaking, the 
ontological difference does not designate the difference between the ontological 
and the ontic; or, rather, it does designate this difference but it designates it in a 
very specific way. What the ontological difference states is the difference between 
“being” and “beings”, or between the ground and what is grounded, or between 
the clearing and what shows!up in the clearing, and so forth. We can better 
understand the differentiation made by the ontological difference by way of 
what, in Being and Time, Heidegger calls Zuhanden and Zuhandenheit (Heidegger 
1962: 98) on the one hand, and Vorhanden and Vorhandenheit on the other (ibid.: 
48, see also 67ff., 91ff.). Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit refer to the specific mode 
of being of entities, and the entities that have these specific ways of being are 
referred to as Zuhanden (to!hand) and Vorhanden (at!hand). For Dryefus, these 
two sets of terms specifically designate two particular ways of non!human being: 
‘[t]here are two basic ways of being. Being!human, which Heidegger calls Dasein, 
and nonhuman being. The latter divides into two categories: Zuhandenheit and 
Vorhandenheit’ (Dreyfus 1991: xi).  
For Harman, however, these two sets of terms refer to two different modes 
of being of any entity whatsoever, including the being of human beings (Harman 
2002: 9). Foucault’s position, as conceptualized here, would seem to be closer to 
Harman’s than it is to Dreyfus’s since he is concerned with the different ways in 
which human being, in the figure of “man”, has been constituted as an object for 
knowledge (objet pour un savoir) and as a subject that knows (sujet qui connaît) in 
the formation of a domain of knowledge (connaissance) (Foucault 2002a: 340; 1966: 
247). What these terms—Zuhanden(heit), Vorhanden(heit)—point to are specific 
human orientations or modes of comportment towards entities; that is to say, 
towards what shows!up in the clearing. And the relation to the ontological 
difference is that the former sets of terms—availableness/available—pertain to the 
ontological (Zuhanden(heit)); whilst the latter—extantness/extant—denote the 
merely ontic (Vorhanden(heit)). Now, there is a third set of terms, which we will be 
primarily concerned with here, that occupy a “middle region” between 
Zuhanden(heit) and Vorhanden(heit): that is to say, “between” the ontological and 
the ontic—or the difference of the ontological difference. As noted above, this 
“middle region” denotes a mode of being that Heidegger refers to as 
Unzuhandenheit (“unavailableness”), and the entities that have this way of being 
are called Unzuhanden (“unavailable” or “un!to!hand”). As suggested above, this 
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latter pair of terms seems to have been rather marginal to Heidegger’s broader 
concerns, and the reading of it presented here is more indebted to Dreyfus’s 
(1991) reading of Heidegger than it is to Heidegger (1962, 1982) himself. 
  
Heidegger’s starting point is neither conscious theoretical reflection (thinking 
without doing) nor purely practical activity (doing without thinking) but, rather, 
‘our “dealings” in the world and with entities within!the!world’: ‘[t]he kind of 
dealing which is closest to us is…not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that 
kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its 
own kind of “knowledge”’ (Heidegger 1962: 94, 95). The mode of comportment 
towards those entities that get taken up, used, produced, and so on, that we 
encounter in such concernful dealings are what Heidegger calls availableness and 
the entities that have this mode of being are called available. At this level—i.e. at 
this level of involved absorption—there are no subjects and objects as such; nor, 
strictly speaking, are there “human beings” handling or manipulating “things”. 
As Nietzsche once famously put it, ‘there is no “being” [i.e. substantive 
substratum] behind doing, acting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction 
imposed on the doing—the doing itself is everything’ (Nietzsche 1996: 29; for a 
slightly different translation, see Nietzsche 2006: 26). That is to say, there is no 
substantive constituent subject manipulating self!standing natural objects; rather, 
there is simply an on!going activity: the there!being or being!there (Da!sein) of a 
non!thematic circumspective absorption of an involved doing things with the 
“stuff” (Zeug: “equipment“) given in order to move towards a specific outcome: 
Heidegger’s “in!order!to”, “towards!which”, “with!which”, “for!the!sake!of!which”, 
and so forth (see, e.g. Heidegger 1962: 95!122).  
In our average everyday encounters with entities what we encounter are not 
mere “things” but “stuff” (Zeug); that is, “equipment” that can be taken up, 
manipulated (in the none!pejorative sense of this term), and used to get 
something done. This stuff is not limited to tools such as hammers, screwdrivers, 
and wrenches, but refers to anything which can be manipulated and/or of which 
we can say “it is”: thus not only hammers and nail but also ideas and concepts, 
mythical figures and fictional characters, institutions and organizations, theories 
and practices, and so on and so forth. Heidegger calls this stuff “equipment”: ‘[w]e 
shall call those entities which we encounter in concern “equipment”. In our 
dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, 
measurement. The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. 
The clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of 
equipment—namely, its equipmentality’ (ibid.: 97). Now, strictly speaking ‘there 
“is” no such thing as an equipment’ (ibid.). Rather, equipment is only equipment 
in relation to other equipment. Since ‘equipment is essentially “something!in!
order!to”’ (ibid.) it can only be the equipment that it is in relation to the totality of 
equipment—its equipmentality—of this “in!order!to”: ‘[e]quipment—in 
accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other 
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equipment: inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, 
windows, doors, room’ (ibid.). In other words, a piece of equipment is what it is 
and, in fact, that it is at all, is what it is in terms of its relation to other stuff and in 
terms of what this stuff is to be used for: ‘[w]hat and how it is this entity, its 
whatness and howness, is constituted by this in!order!to as such, by its 
involvement’ (Heidegger 1982: 283). 
Both our concern and the entities we manipulate in concern are 
subordinated to this in!order!to, and the more we are involved in doing what we 
are doing, in using the things we are using to get done what needs to be done, the 
more engrossed we become in doing, the more both our practices and the stuff 
that we use become transparent: ‘[d]ealings with equipment subordinate 
themselves to the manifold assignments of the “in!order!to”. And the sight with 
which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection’ (Heidegger 1962: 98). 
The entities that we encounter in absorbed circumspection are ‘not grasped 
thematically as an occurring Thing’ but as entities that are available; that is to say, 
that are to!hand. Those entities that have the mode of being available, ‘in order to 
be ready!to!hand,’ must ‘withdraw;’ so too must the practices themselves and, 
indeed, the practitioner; that is, they become transparent: ‘[t]he ready!to!hand 
[available] is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that 
circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of 
what is proximally ready!to!hand is that, in its readiness!to!hand [availableness], it 
must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready!to!hand quite authentically’ 
(ibid.: 99). Heidegger continues by noting that ‘that with which our everyday 
dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with 
which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced 
at the time; and this is accordingly ready!to!hand too. The work bears with it that 
referential totality within which the equipment is encountered’ (ibid.). As noted 
above, in such skilfully, routine, and habitual employment of equipment, or in 
our non!thematic circumspective absorption toward the available, there are, 
strictly speaking, neither subjects nor objects; there is merely an ongoing!activity. 
Rather, it is when such on!going activity is interrupted or disturbed in some way 
that subjects (thematic consciousness) and objects (the extant or occurrent) first 
begin to show forth and reveal themselves—that is, to emerge. It is through such 
interruptions in ongoing activity that we take a “step back”, or are called forth to 
take a step back, from said on!going activity, and to present that activity to 
ourselves, or to have it present itself to us, as an “object of thought”. 
Heidegger describes three way in which such disturbances come about and 
in which the available progressively becomes more and more unavailable and, in so 
doing, finally announces the merely occurrent or extant. These disturbances are: 
(1) “conspicuousness” (Auffälligkeit, which could be translated as “peculiarity” or 
“abnormality”), (2) “obtrusiveness” (Aufdringlichkeit, which could be translated as 
“intrusiveness”), and (3) “obstinacy” (Aufsässigkeit, which could be translated as 
“insubordination”, “rebelliousness”, or “recalcitrance”) (ibid.: 102!107). As 
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Heidegger states, ‘[t]he modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy 
all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence!at!hand 
[occurrentness] in what is ready!to!hand [available]’ (ibid.: 104). As Dreyfus 
formulates this, these ‘three modes of breakdown’ constitute the ‘increasingly 
serious disturbances in which a conscious subject with self!referential mental 
states directed towards determinate objects with properties gradually emerge’ 
(Dreyfus 1991: 71). Stated otherwise, it is through such breakdown, interruption, 
and possible cessation that what shows!up in the clearing shows!up as a problem 
to be addressed; it is here too, where we get the formation of objects and the 
formation of subjects (enunciative and/or technical modalities). 
1 – Conspicuousness: when entities that have the mode of being available are 
encountered as unusable, ill!suited to the task at hand, or simply damaged in 
some way, that equipment has the mode of being something conspicuous in that it 
shows itself as being something unavailable. Such an encounter, however, is not 
yet thematic: ‘[w]e discover its [the equipment’s] unusability…not by looking at it 
and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in 
which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes 
conspicuous’ (Heidegger 1962: 102, my gloss in brackets). Heidegger goes on to 
state that with such malfunctioning equipment ‘[p]ure presence!at!hand 
[occurrentness] announces itself…only to withdraw’ in that ‘it is put back in to 
repair’ (ibid.: 103). The occurrentness of such equipment announces itself, but 
only temporarily since either the equipment is repaired, or it is replaced, or some 
other equipment is used. Consequently, the disturbance is short lived, and thus 
‘no new stance on the part of Dasein is required’ (Dreyfus 1991: 72). 
2 – Obstinacy: When equipment is obstinate, there is a move from a mode of 
deliberate coping—i.e. circumspection—to one of involved deliberation. When 
equipment is neither broken nor missing but nonetheless stands in the way of our 
doing what we are doing, that equipment has the mode of being obstinate, since 
it prevents us from going on with our on!going activity: ‘[a]nything which is un!
ready!to!hand [unavailable] in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see 
the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance 
before we do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence!at!hand 
[occurrentness] of the ready!to!hand [available] makes itself known in a new way 
as the Being of that which still lies before us and calls for our attending to it’ 
(Heidegger 1962: 103!104). In this way, what was transparent becomes more 
explicit; because something stands in the way of on!going activity, we deliberate 
on how to proceed and engage in reflective planning: ‘[t]he scheme peculiar to 
[deliberating] is the “if!then;” if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to 
use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will 
be needed’ (ibid.: 410; see also Dreyfus 1991: 72). Heidegger calls such long!range 
planning “envisioning” (ibid.). 
3 – Obtrusiveness: Equipment is obtrusive when it is missing or not “to!
hand”; that is, when it is unavailable or un!to!hand. When equipment is obtrusive 
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in this way, there is a transition from involved deliberation and its concern to a 
mode of theoretical reflection and its objects—the extant or occurrent. In other 
words, we move closer to a substantive constituent subject reflecting upon self!
standing independent objects: ‘[t]he more urgently we need what is missing, and 
the more authentically it is encountered in its un!readiness!to!hand 
[unavailableness], all the more obtrusive does that which is ready!to!hand 
[available] become—so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of 
readiness!to!hand [availableness]. It reveals itself as something just present!at!
hand [occurrent] and no more’ (ibid.: 103). In such a situation, we either enter a 
deficient mode of concern in which we just stand and stare at that which is just!
occurrent!and!no!more or we take on a new detached mode of comportment 
towards entities in which we take on a ‘theoretical stance towards things and try 
to explain their underlying causal properties’ (Dreyfus 1991: 79).  
As Dreyfus goes on to note, ‘[o]nly when absorbed, on!going activity is 
interrupted is there room for such theoretical reflection (ibid.). Theoretical 
reflection is a mode ‘of knowing…[that]…has the character of depriving the 
world of its worldhood in a definite way’ (Heidegger 1962: 94). Dreyfus suggests 
that Heidegger wants to stress three points concerning theoretical reflection. We 
can state these three points in the following terms: we move from dealings!with to 
(1) having!to!deal!with to (2) having!to!think!about!dealing!with to (3) purely 
thinking!about!that!with!which!we!deal. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to 
think of this in terms of a linear, progressive succession, and for a number of 
reasons. For Heidegger, it is our dealings!with the available that are the conditions 
of possibility both for our having!to!deal!with or having!to!think!about!dealing!with 
the unavailable and our merely thinking!about!that!with!which!we!deal: the occurrent. 
Moreover—and going back to Foucault—, for Foucault, it is the median 
region between the empirical and the theoretical that is not only most 
fundamental but also intermediary; that is to say, that mediates between these 
two domains. Thinking of this in terms of formations, transformations, and 
mutations of knowledge (savoir) – when things break down in the most severe 
way, when entities becomes totally unavailable, then the very entities with which 
we are having!to!deal!with, having!to!think!about!dealing!with, or merely thinking!
about!that!with!which!we!deal are open to developments, modifications, and 
transformations; and so too are the “we” who are having!to!deal!with what is 
“conspicuous”, having!to!think!about!dealing!with what is “obstinate”, or merely 
thinking!about that which is “obtrusive” in response to an effective 
problematization in, by, and through thought. For example, in Western society’s 
dealings!with a certain population whose behaviour has always been viewed, in 
one way of another, as being problematic has variously dealt with that 
population in terms of folly, in terms of madness, and in terms of mental illness 
(Foucault 2006a). However, it is not that these things emerged prior to the 
practices which subsequently came to deal!with them; rather, a domain of 
practices emerged for dealing!with this group of individual who behaviour came 
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to be seen as problematic and only subsequently became thought of as being in 
error, as being mad, or as being mentally ill: objects, as Veyne notes, are the 
correlates of practices, and not vice!versa.    
Since it is here, in these moments of breakdown, that subject and object 
emerge or are formed, and since, for Foucault, such formations are the condition 
of possibility of connaissance or ontic knowledge, we shall call this third mode of 
being of unavailableness, the entities that have this way of being (the unavailable), 
and the mode of comportment towards such entities (theoretical reflection) “pre!
ontical” (see, e.g. Spivak 1996: 148). The “pre!”, here, denoting prior to or, indeed, 
the a priori of, ontic knowledge (connaissance). The pre!ontical is still something 
ontological in that the conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy of the 
unavailable is something still inhabited by the available. However, it is pre!ontical in 
that it is here that subject (theoretical reflection) and objects (the unavailable that 
announces the merely occurrent) of knowledge (savoir) are formed, and that are 
the a priori of the subject and object of knowledge (connaissance) and of a domain 
of knowledge (connaissance). Hence, pace Elden (2001), savoir does not denote the 
ontological and connaissance the ontical; rather, we can say that savoir in its 
nominal form—“knowledge”—can refer to the ontological but that in its verbal 
form—“to know”—it refers to what I have called the pre!ontical, and that 
connaissance (domination, consciousness of self) does, indeed, denote the merely 
ontical. By extension, we can also say that pouvoir refer to this same level as 
savoir, and thus that it too denotes the pre!ontical (i.e. the concrete and historical 
a priori or the provenance from which an emergence arrives). 
What is significant here is not just that with conspicuousness, obstinacy, and 
obtrusiveness, the available losses its availableness in being something unavailable, 
thus announcing the purely occurrent, but also the broader equipmental 
contexture of what these things were being used for—their equipmentality—is 
lit!up, as it were; and, as we shall see, in certain events modified and/or 
transformed: ‘[w]hen equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive 
assignment of the “in!order!to” to a “towards!this” has been disturbed. The 
assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather ‘there’ when we 
concernfully submit ourselves to them. But when an assignment has been 
disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the assignment 
becomes explicit’ (Heidegger 1962: 105, second emphasis added). In other words, 
with the announcement of the occurrent in the breakdown of on!going activity 
concerned with the available, what is also thrown into relief is the whole set of 
background practices—the in!order!to, with!which, for the sake!of!which, etc.— or 
the whole ‘equipmental contexture’ (Heidegger 1982: 309) of which they formed 
a part. To put this in other words, the visible!invisible is lit!up and becomes 
something merely visible. 
For Heidegger, this transition from the available to the unavailable to the 
merely occurrent takes place in everyday ongoing activities, and it is a transition 
in which the switch from one mode to the other is itself an on!going activity: 
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when the pen I am using runs out of ink I have to stop and think, look for a new 
pen, take it up, and then continue writing, and so forth. For Foucault, 
problematizations refer to much broader and more general cultural processes, 
which, although questioned at the micro!practical or micro!physical level, 
nonetheless bring about historical transformations and historical mutations in a 
culture. It is perhaps here that the parallels or correlates between the breakdown 
disclosed by ontological difference and an analytics of problematizations itself 
breaks down. Nevertheless, I think the parallel is useful as one possible way of 
unpacking Foucault’s conceptualization of problematizations in, by, and through 
thought. That is to say, of describing the “how” of “the way an unproblematic set 
of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and out 
of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new 
reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, 
practices, and institutions”. Stated otherwise, it helps us to think about those 
“problematizations through which being gives itself as that which can and must 
be thought”. And, in addition, is help us to conceptualize, and thus analyze, the 
ways in which effective problematizations by thought gives rise to specific forms 
of rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes. In other words, 
problematizations, conceptualized thus, are what can grant us the critical 
distance to ourselves in our present that will grant us access not to our own 
archive in toto but, proximally and partially, and through the programmes that 
are a response to such problematization, and their descriptive and prescriptive 
aspect, to render visible something of what we are, what we do, and the world in 
which we live. 
What is thrown forth by way of such problematization is not just 
subjectivity but human being, which is to say, forms or modes of existence, or 
ways of being human, albeit local and regional forms of existence. Since what is 
problematized are specific ways of doing particular things with “stuff”, and since 
these ways of doing things are what both inhabit and perform forms of existence, 
it is these forms of existence that are problematized; moreover, it is modes of 
existence that are proposed as a means to overcome, by!pass, or work!around the 
conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness thrown forth by a 
problematization. In analysing, analytically, the specific form of a particular 
problematization by questioning the programmes that are its rejoinders, in 
analyzing both the descriptive and prescriptive elements of such theory!
programmes, what may be disclosed is both that which ‘we are (what we are 
already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ (Deleuze 1992b: 
164). In other words, it enables us to produce a ‘drawing of what we are and 
what we are ceasing to be’ and, at the same time, to outline a ‘sketch of what we 
are becoming’ (ibid.) 
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3 A  Critical  Ontology  of  Ourselves  
Whereas Foucault’s work of the 1960s can be said to have focused primarily, 
though not exclusively, upon the question concerning conditions of possibility—
i.e. the conditions of possibility of exercising certain specific relations of power—, 
from the start of the 1970s onwards, there was a shift of emphasis as it began to 
look at the different and differential ways in which ‘[p]ower is exercised not only 
subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 
245!246). That is to say, it not only looked at the material and practical conditions 
of possibility in which and from which certain discourses and practices emerged, 
it also looked at those discourses and practices which attempted to bring into 
existences certain material and practical conditions and, moreover, it looked at 
the real but unintended effects of such programmes: the material and practical, 
epistemic and technical conditions they actually brought into existence. It is these 
discourses and practices that Foucault called technologies; technologies that are 
the effect of and a response to certain forms of problematization. It is in this sense 
that what we are questioning concerning is not ontological but technological or, 
as stated earlier, it is ontological only to the extent that it is technological (i.e. pre!
ontical): not “what is” but nor simply “how what is is”; rather, it looks at specific 
programmes that attempt to fabricate reality, programmes whose unintended 
effect were what went into the making or constitution of what is: the present (see 
Gordon 1980).  
Of course, the ontological difference can only be taken up as a trope, an 
analytical device, a nominalist and catachrestic conceptual tool, or as a heuristic 
technology of and for thought. To do otherwise would not only go against the 
grain of the ethos of Foucault’s work and thought, it also runs the risks of a 
metaphysics (Heidegger 2002; see also Dreyfus 2003; Han 2003; Stambaugh 1969). 
Foucault, above all, historicized. To posit the ontological difference as anything 
other than a tool or a technology of and for thought would be to posit an 
ahistorical or, in any case, a transhistorical structure. For whilst one may 
comprehend the ontological difference historically as an historical ontological 
difference—that is to say, whilst one may undertake a genealogy of historically 
distinct ontological differences—one would still, nonetheless, be positing a 
transhistorical differentiation: being/beings, ontological/ontic, (un!
)availableness/extantness, and so forth.  
And even if we reject a totalising, single unified understanding of being in 
preference to multiple ontological differences, we are still, once again, positing a 
dualism. There is nothing necessarily wrong with either of these alternatives, in 
and of themselves; however, to employ them in this way would be counter to the 
philosophical, political, and ethical ethos of Foucault’s work and thought: it 
would be to accept transhistorical dualism (the transcendental and the 
empirical?) and thus metaphysics, all of which Foucault sought to bypass. On 
this view, the historical ontological differences would be just a modern or 
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contemporary way of understanding; and it should only be deployed, at least in 
relation to the work of Foucault, with this understanding up front and in clear 
view. Therefore, we do not propose the ontological difference—or the difference 
(the /) of the ontological difference—as a description of the real (fundamental 
ontology) but, rather, ontological differences as a grid of intelligibility for 
understanding the formation of the real: a critical and historical ontology. 
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IV.  TO  RENDER  VISIBLE  OUR  ACTUALITY  
In each [dispositive] it is necessary to distinguish what we are 
(what we are already no longer), and what we are in the 
process of becoming. 
(Deleuze, ‘What is a Dispositif?’) 
Having laid out the foregoing understanding of the structures of genealogical 
diagnosis and archaeological analytics, what tools are available in each respective 
approach to questioning the present, in and of itself, from the perspective of 
itself? As should be evident from the above, both archaeology and genealogy 
have a complex relation to certain conceptualizations of the present that they 
both, in their own way, attempt to render visible and thus intelligible, to what 
they analyze, diagnose, and strategize. As should also be clear, neither 
archaeology nor genealogy broach the question of the present directly, that is, 
from the perspective of the present itself, and certainly not in terms of presenting 
detailed descriptions or depictions of our contemporary actuality. Rather, they 
undertake historical research in the horizontal and vertical dimension 
respectively. This is clearly demonstrated in what is taken to be Foucault’s 
genealogical text par excellence: Discipline and Punish. Even a quick glance at the 
contents of the book is demonstrative of this dual dimension. The four parts of 
the book deal, horizontally, with successive epistemic and technical matrices, and 
the rationality inhering therein, of four historically (and geographically) specific 
punitive practices: “torture” (supplice), “punishment”, “discipline”, and “prison”. 
However, it also traces, vertically, the conditions of possibility of the emergence of 
the prison, as a historically singular figure, from the foregoing practices (its 
provenance); that is, as a singularity that still has value and meaning for us in our 
own time: ‘[t]his book is intended as a correlative history of the modem soul and 
of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico!legal complex 
from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, from 
which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity’ 
(Foucault 1977a: 23). In other words, the book as a whole can be read as detailing 
the conditions of possibility of a particular conceptualization of our present; or, at 
least, of the present in which the book was written (i.e. 1974): ‘[t]he history of this 
“micro!physics” of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element 
in a genealogy of the modern “soul”’ (ibid.: 29).  
Indeed, most of Foucault’s book length studies follow a similar plan or 
schematic. The exceptions—The Birth of the Clinic, The Use of Pleasure and The Care 
of the Self—, merely cover one such epistemic and technical matrix: roughly 1780!
1820, classical Greek culture, and Greco!Roman culture of the first two centuries 
of our era, respectively. Of course, and a statement made in The Order of Things 
aside (‘[i]n any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one 
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episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge’, Foucault 
1970: 168), the horizontal dimension is not representative of an epoch, cultural 
totality, Weltanschauung, mentality, sensibility, or spirit of an age, and so forth 
(Foucault 1972: 15; see also 1991a: 55), but merely of a time and a place in which 
what was seen and said and thought and done, were seen and said and thought 
and done in contemporaneously similar or analogous ways but in ways 
differently to other times and places, and, specifically, to our own time and place. 
In addition, the horizontal dimension does not disclose a monolithic, fixed, 
stable, and mute order, but describes a series of transformations; transformations 
that eventually give way to historical mutations. Thus we can see how the 
horizontal and the vertical, the synchronous and the diachronous, the 
archaeological and the genealogical, and so forth, are stitched together forming a 
tight descriptive web in undertaking a history of the present and a historical 
ontology of ourselves. And whilst such history is undertaken from a perspective 
in and on the present, neither the synchronous analytics nor the diachronous 
diagnostics nor the contemporary strategics describes our present or ourselves 
from the perspective of our present and ourselves.  
Hence, we seem to have arrived at a dead!end; such historical studies act as 
a diagnostics of our present that strategize that present in terms of the possibility 
of it being otherwise, but they do so by rendering the present visible not in its 
own terms but in terms of an analytics of its historical, material, and practical 
possibility. This apparent dead!end, however, is only the case if we were to take 
up archaeology and genealogy, as is; that is, as ready!made tools. If, on the other 
hand, we broach them in terms of our work!shop approach—as equipment from 
which to fashion our own tools—, then two possible openings appear. The first 
opening came about through my reading of the ‘Introduction’ to Rose’s (2009) 
The Politics of Life Itself—in which he proposed to undertake not a history of the 
present but ‘a cartography of an emergent form of life’ that took the form of ‘a 
history of the potential futures it embodies’ (ibid.: 5)—and then thinking this 
through in terms of the forgoing discussion of the diagnostic structure of 
genealogy. The second opening suggested itself in working the concept of 
problematizations through the ontological difference, and in thinking about what 
a problem is, how such problematizations can be conceptualized as a form of 
breakdown in on!going practices, and how such breakdowns may grant us the 
critical distance we need to pose the question of our present and ourselves from 
within the perspective of our own actuality. That is to say, these two openings 
offer us the aim and the method of undertaking an analytic of our actuality, and 
thus of the exercising of contemporary relations of power, undertaken from the 
point of view of our own present. It is to a discussion of these two possible 
openings to which we not turn.   
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1 Towards  a  Genealogy  of  Future  Emergences  
In the ‘Introduction’ to The Politics of Life Itself, and in relation to the specific 
research being undertaken there, Rose notes that ‘I do not think we can proceed 
simply by applying the now familiar tropes of genealogy and “histories of the 
present”’ (Rose 2009: 4). For Rose, the task of such genealogical work, that of 
destabilizing the present by pointing to its contingency, no longer ‘seem[s] such a 
radical move’, and this because, for him, ‘our own moment in history is one of 
maximal turbulence’ (ibid.: 5). In such a moment, in which the present always 
already presents itself as contingent, what is required, according to Rose, is ‘to 
emphasize continuities as much as change, and to attempt a more modest 
cartography of our present’ (ibid.). This mapping of the present, in emphasizing 
continuities, would not ‘seek to destabilize the present by pointing to its 
contingency, but to destabilize the future by recognizing its openness’ (ibid.). 
This form of enquiry, ‘in demonstrating that no single future is written in our 
present,…might fortify our abilities…to intervene in that present, and so to shape 
something of the future that we might inhabit’ (ibid.). This double move, of 
situating the present as a condition of possibility of a potential future, and as the 
possibility of intervening in the formation of that future, thus offers to us the 
opportunity for a diagnostics and a strategics. That is to say, it open up a space 
the we may occupy as the objective of our questioning concerning the 
contemporary order of things from within that very order and the potential 
futures it embodies. Rose thus calls his book, and the kind of work that is done 
there, ‘a preliminary cartography of an emergent form of life, and a draft of a 
history of the potential futures it embodies’ (ibid.). Whilst I differ from Rose vis!
à!vis his depiction of genealogy, I find his call for a history of emergent futures 
both promising and suggestive, vis!à!vis questioning the present from the 
perspective of itself. 
 Since, relatively speaking, our present is neither more nor less in flux that 
it ever was, and since the contemporary is always already a certain conjecture of 
our history and our future— ‘what we are (what we are already no longer), and 
what we are in the process of becoming’ (Deleuze 1992b: 164; see also 1992a; 
1995: 174!175; 1998)—, that is to say, it is already a transformative event, it seems 
to me that genealogy is always pertinent and, if not quite necessary, then 
certainly applicable in rendering visible certain aspects of how we have become 
what we are, how we came to do what we do, and how the world in which we 
live was made possible. That is to say, since genealogy is a history of our present, 
and since our present is not fixed but is always on the move, genealogical 
histories will always be pertinent to describing the difference that to!day 
introduces with regards to yesterday. If Foucault, or someone else, were to sit 
down to write a history of the birth of the prison from the perspective of our 
present (i.e. the present of 2014 and not 1974), would we still be presented with 
the same historical narrative, the same genealogy, as is presented in Discipline and 
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Punish (see, e.g. Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiii)? In other words, would the focus 
of the study still be a political technology of the disciplined body, or would it 
place its emphasis upon some other such technology: pedagogics, therapeutics, 
confessional techniques, incitations to attaining one’s full and true potential, and 
so forth. I will leave this as a hypothetical question, since I merely want to point 
out that genealogical analyses are always pertinent to undertaking histories of 
our present.  
However, I also find Rose’s conceptualization of a history of potential 
futures both suggestive and promising vis!à!vis the particular problem at hand, 
especially when we think such a mode of enquiry through the forgoing 
discussion of the structure of genealogical diagnostics, apropos provenance 
(Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung). Whilst Rose calls for a cartography of the 
present that seeks to map out emergent forms of life that point to potential futures, 
what I want to suggest, in taking up and reworking this, is doing field!work in 
the present that maps out provent forms of life that point to potential future 
emergences. Here, it is not so much a question of doing a history of potential 
futures, as it is a question of doing what I will call a genealogy of possible future 
emergences and potential future presents. 
What we have to map out is not the emergence or birth of a singularity that 
we are not able to predict and cannot possibly know, but the contemporary 
dispersion—or elements or an element thereof—of practices (and the 
materialities, discourses, and techniques they embody) that may or may not be 
portent of such a potential future emergence. Just as genealogy does not take a 
“things” final term as being its cause or origin, so we cannot take what will be 
brought forth (the emergent) as being caused by what is coming forth (the 
provent). Rather, we have to leave what may be brought forth in abeyance as an 
open possibility or potentiality and thus as an open question. Instead, we can 
question concerning what certain “authorities” want to happen, of the different 
and differential ways in which they figure and/or reconfigure the real as both a 
problem space to be intervened and as an actuality to be brought into existence, 
and of the knowledges and techniques that they seek to deploy concerning these 
ends. That is to say, we have to remain within the field of dispersion that our 
present is and maintain that field in the dispersion that is proper to it; we have to 
remain within the humble beginnings of a future that may never come and that 
we will never know; within the provenance, the concrete and “contemporary” a 
priori, from which such potential future emergences may (or may not) arrive. In 
other words, the field in which we are to work is not that of emergence or 
Entstehung but that of the provent or the provenant, of Herkunft. This is our 
Nietzschean/Foucaultian ‘Herkunfts!hypothesen’ (Nietzsche 1892: viii; Foucault 
1998: 371; translated as ‘hypothesis on the genealogy of morals’ in Nietzsche 
1996: 6; and as ‘hypothesis on descent’ in Nietzsche 2006: 5!6; but also as 
“genealogical hypothesis” and “hypothesis concerning origins”, see, e.g. 
Acampora 2006: 14n7). That is to say, it is our provenance!hypothesis or hypotheses 
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on provenance. Hence, not ‘a preliminary cartography of an emergent form of life 
and the possible futures it embodies’ (Rose 2009: 258!259, emphases added), but 
an analytics of the present by way of field!work in provent forms of life (i.e. 
existence in the broad sense of form of life) and the possible future emergences 
they may embody. The aims, however, are the same: ‘[t]o open the possibility 
that, in part through thought itself, we might be able to intervene in that present, 
and so to shape something of the future we might inhabit’ (ibid.: 259). 
 If genealogy, understood at once as a history of the present and an 
historical ontology of ourselves looks at provenance and emergence—the coming 
forth of what is brought forth; the multiple and heterogeneous points from which 
an emergence arrives—then a genealogy of possible futures looks at the coming 
forth from which what may be brought forth might arrive. However, as with the 
causality in genealogical histories of the present, there is neither a determinative 
nor a necessary causal chain between what is (the provent present) and what 
may be (a future emergence or a future present). Of course, that latter mode of 
genealogy—as a history of potential futures—looks at contemporary struggles 
but not in order to do a regressive history of their conditions of possibility, but 
precisely in order to take them up themselves as being the conditions of possible 
of potential futures. In other words, rather than doing an analytics of the past so 
as to do a diagnostics that strategizes the present, we can do analytics of the 
present so as to undertake a diagnostics of possible futures; a move that 
strategizes both the present and its potential or probable futures. As Rose notes, 
such an enterprise ‘is always a risky exercise’ (Rose 2009: 4); not least because, as 
Foucault astutely observed, ‘things never work out as planned’ (Foucault 2001d: 
231). In other words, in analyzing those plans, programmes, schemas, diagrams, 
and so forth, whose goal or teleology is the formation of certain conditions of 
existence, we need to be cognizant of the fact that there is no direct causal link 
between dispositivities and their effects, between the dispositive and the 
effective.  
Obviously, and quite intentionally, posing the aim of the project in terms of 
undertaking field!work in the provenance of potential future emergent forms of 
life is somewhat ironic, since it is not possible—i.e. it is impossible—to know 
what events, what material, discursive, and technical configurations, what 
practical arrangements, what specific composites of provent forms of existence 
will give rise to a future emergence, that is to say, to an event in the future 
history of our thought. This is no futurology, and so the reason for positing the 
aims, and thus the orientating framework, of questioning the present from the 
perspective of itself in this way is, then, not to predict what the future will be—
and thus what we will be—; nor is it to speculate on what we may become, what 
we might do, and what the world in which we may live might possibly look like. 
On the contrary, framing the project in terms of being a genealogy of potential 
futures is to do two things. On the one hand, it is to signpost our aim of 
describing the present, of rendering visible what “hides underneath this precise, 
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floating, mysterious, absolutely simple word: to!day”. On the other hand, it is to 
signpost a certain methodological prescription and precaution in describing to!
day; it sounds a cautionary note vis!à!vis not substantializing the present as 
something that is solid or fixed, that is stable or complete; that is, it takes the 
present as being neither beginning nor end but as a certain conceptualization of a 
specific conjunction. As noted above, genealogy is perspectival, which means 
that there is no single and definitive answer to the question of “what our present 
is” and thus of “what our future might be”. It is also to take note that what we 
are describing—the provent present as condition of possible future emergence—
is in!process or in!formation, and that the tomorrow to come will never be as we 
think precisely because of the work of thought. In other words, the aim of such a 
diagnostics is not so much ‘to destabilize the present by pointing to its [historical] 
contingencies’, but nor it is exactly ‘to destabilize the future by recognizing its 
openness’ (Rose 2009: 5). Rather, what we aim for sits somewhere between these 
two critical tasks: it is to broach the question of the provent present and of what 
we are to!day in terms of becoming.  
The aim of such study is to be “untimely”; which is to say, ‘acting counter to 
our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time 
to come’ (Nietzsche 1997b: 60). If the task of (Nietzschean and) Foucaultian 
genealogy is to get us to think differently about where we are by looking at 
where we arrived from, then the task of a genealogy of potential future 
emergences is to get us to think about where we are by looking at where we are 
going or, rather, by looking at where various authorities are attempting to take 
us, and thus where we are attempting to take ourselves, all the while being fully 
cognisant of the fact that “things never work out as planned”. 
2 Towards  an  Archaeology  of  Problematizations   
To question the present from the perspective of our own actuality in terms of a 
genealogy of possible future emergences is to question the present as the provent; 
that is, as being the provenance from which such future emergences may arrive. 
But how should we approach the present conceptualized as the provent? This 
raises a number of questions: “Which practices do we analyse?”, “How do we 
locate such practices?” “How do we know the practices we have thus located are 
pertinent?”, “How do we known that these practices, and not some others, will 
come to form the conditions of possibility of potential futures?” One of the 
central elements of genealogical diagnosis is a technique for questioning our past 
that works through the schema that just because something was dropped from 
the historical record, does not mean that it had no effects (Gordon 1980). For 
example, Bentham’s architectural plan for a house of inspection never 
materialized, and had been largely dropped for the historical record prior to it 
being excavated, analyzed, and described by Foucault, both in his Collège de 
France lectures and in Discipline and Punish. And yet, as these descriptions show, 
it nonetheless had an effect upon the history of our present and, subsequently, 
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upon our present itself. Consequently, ‘because non!realised programmes tend to 
be dropped from the official record, it becomes all the more important and 
fascinating to investigate what may have been the mode of their real but 
unprogrammed effects’ (ibid.: 248). We can turn this around an state that because 
it is not possible for us to predict, and thus to know, what will be the real but 
unprogrammed effects of present!day technologies of power, of the techniques 
and discourses of contemporary governmental programmes, all such 
programmes are, at least in potentia, targets of and for analysis. Field!work in the 
provent present is ‘neither a set of speculations about the future nor 
a…meditation on the present’; rather, ‘such speculations and meditations’ form 
the object that we are attempting to analyze (Rose 2009: 3). Hence, any discourse 
that has as its concern the directing of human conduct is open for analysis; be it 
self!help books; treatise on how to raise one’s children; guidance concerning 
pedagogics or therapeutics; medicinal discourses concerning the health of a 
population or on being responsible for one’s own health; texts on management, 
leadership, or organizational practices, or legislation a the level of political 
sovereignty. All these things, and everything in between, are open to analysis 
providing that they deal, in some way, with the question concerning the 
conducting the conduct; either conducting the conduct of others, conducting 
one’s own conduct, or both at the same time.  
 In addition to questioning discourses that have as their target the directing 
of human conduct, another aspect that marks such discursive formation off as 
being pertinent for analysis is that in doing the former, they can be read as 
responding to a problem in the particular domain to which they are addressed. 
And it is here, I think, the a Foucaultian conceptualization of problematizations 
can be taken up, modified, and employed as a tool in, by, and through which we 
can gain a critical purchase upon the present conceptualized as the provent. In 
other words, it is by way of the forgoing conceptualization of Foucault’s concept 
of problematization that we may be granted the critical distance to ourselves that 
will allow us to render visible the visible!invisible that we are and that we do.  
Etymologically speaking, “problem” denotes “to throw forward” (from pro 
“forward” + ballein “to throw”; OED). On this view, and as a technical (i.e. 
conceptual and analytical) term, a problem throws forth that which was 
previously out of sight and thus out of mind, as a question; it throws into relief 
the on!going activity in which we were circumspectively absorbed. On this view, 
problematization names this process of throwing forth or of being thrown forth; 
it makes that which is not seen and goes without saying seeable and sayable. 
Problematizations, thus understood, do not disclose what has been forgotten, 
masked, or hidden; they simply throw forth that which was visible but unseen 
and verbalizable but unsaid (e.g. Veyne’s hidden base of the iceberg). Thus 
understood, Foucault’s conceptualization of problematization has a certain 
kinship with, though is not identical to, Heidegger’s descriptions of the ways in 
which what was “to!hand” (Zuhanden) becomes “un!to!hand” (Unzuhanden), and 
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in that very process become that which is merely “at!hand” (Vorhanden). 
Problematization connotes those events in which ways and means of seeing and 
saying and thinking and doing, ways and means that may have been practiced 
for a long time, that were commonplace and thus to a certain extent obvious, 
taken!for!granted, out of sight and thus out of mind, as it were, unproblematic 
and thus unthought suddenly become a problem. It interrogates those events in 
which that which went without seeing and saying, things being what they were, 
no longer make sense, things being what they are. It is these events that signpost 
an effective problematization in, by, and through thought. In undertaking an 
archaeology of problematizations, what we are interested in are not so much the 
conditions of possibility that bring forth such events, nor the possible conditions 
for which such events came forth, but the rejoinders to such problematizations that 
take the form of explicit programmes. That is to say, for methodological reasons, 
since we are questioning the present from the perspective of itself, we are less 
interested in the question concerning formation, than we are in the question 
concerning conceptualization. Or, stated otherwise, we are only interested in the 
question of formation to the extent that this is disclosed in programmes that are 
the rejoinders to problematizations. In addressing discourses that have as their 
target and object the conducting of conduct, and in looking at how these 
discourses can be read as specific rejoinders to particular problems, the 
discourses themselves may disclose something of the problem to which they are 
a response. In doing so, they may tell us something about the visible!invisible 
inhabiting the on!going activity that has thus been disturbed. In addition, in 
attempting to respond to the specific form of problematization, such discourses 
present us with certain prescriptions and codifications regarding what is to be 
done and what is to be known. That is to say, they render visible what various 
authorities want to happen, and as such, reveal something of the direction in 
which we are moving. On this view, they disclose or render visible something of 
what our present is; that is, its provenance. This concerns not only how a 
problem was thought but also, and more specifically, of how thought intervenes, 
of how questions were posed and answers given. It is through effective 
problematizations by thought that objects appear, that subjects capable of 
knowing and dealing with objects are modified or transformed, that techniques 
and knowledges are articulated, and that ends and goals are proposed. It is these 
discourses, programmes, or technologies of power that form the domain of 
analysis that a genealogy of potential future emergences analyzes by way of 
archaeological analytics of problematizations.  
Such programmes, and the technologies of power they articulate, are 
exemplary expressions of the provent present, of the problematizations of 
thought expressed therein, and of a schematic of a possible future present; they 
are aspects of contemporary actuality that may form the conditions of possibility 
of a potential future emergence; that is to say, they signpost the space/place from 
which a future emergence may arrive.  
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3 Towards  an  Analytics  of  the  Contemporary  
I noted above that the aim of Foucault’s project was a genealogy of the subject, that 
the method was an archaeology of knowledge—which I took in the direction of an 
archaeology of problematizations—, and I noted how I was going to use this schema 
as both a point of departure and an organizing principle for working through 
how we might employ these to manufacture some tool for ourselves in 
undertaking an analytics of the contemporary. Now ‘[t]he purpose of 
genealogically directed history’, Foucault notes in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History’, ‘is not to uncover the roots of our identity but, on the contrary, to 
relentlessly dissipate it’; on this view, genealogy ‘does not undertake to locate the 
unique hearth from where we come,…[but seeks]…to make appear [faire apparaître] 
all the discontinuities that cross us’ (Foucault 1998: 387!388, modified, emphasis 
added). A genealogy of the subject, however, is not exactly a “genealogy of 
subjection/subjectivation”; rather, to do a genealogy of the subject is to do ‘a 
history of the different modes of subjectivation of human beings in our culture’ 
(Foucault 2001d: 326, modified, emphasis added). The means by which one 
undertakes such a Foucaultian genealogy of the subject is by looking at one or 
more of three modes of objectification/objectivation: knowledge, power, self (ibid.; 
see also 1997: 262ff.). The difference or distinction that can be drawn between 
modes of objectification and modes of objectivation (modes d#objectivation) on the 
one hand, and modes of subjection (mode d#assujettissement) and modes of 
subjectivation (modes de subjectivation) on the other, is not always clear in 
Foucault’s writings (see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459ff.; 2001d: 326ff.). This, I think, is 
not due to some lack or failure of analytical rigor but is, rather, a by!product of 
the highly complex relations, interrelations, and correlations between subject and 
object. 
Firstly, for example, there are the different ways in which the subject is 
made either an object of knowledge, or a target of political intervention, or, 
additionally, as an object of or for self!reflection. Secondly, there are the different 
ways in which being made object constitutes subjects: the living, speaking, 
labouring subject, for instance; or the mad, ill, or docile subject; or, on the other 
hand, the subject conscious of themselves and others. Lastly, there are the 
modifications of the subject in the processes of coming to know the object (e.g. 
enunciative modalities), or in acting upon the actions of others (governmental 
modalities), or in acting upon one’s own actions (ethical modalities). Now, these 
are not three separate processes but have complex interconnection and 
interrelation that need to be unpacked empirically. 
For the sake of clarity, lets us take up the view of technology as referring to 
the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject, 
that modes of objectification/subjection deal with the formation of objects and 
subjects as correlatives of technologies of power, and that modes of 
objectivation/subjectivation deal with the different ways in which the self relates 
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to itself as an object and constitutes itself as a subject by way of technologies of 
self. In the former, subject and object, are the correlates of power!knowledge; in 
the latter they are the correlatives of self!knowledge. The distinction that can be 
drawn, then, between these two two!fold modalities is that the former 
modalities—objectification, subjection—are, to a certain extent, passive: they relate 
to how human beings are constituted as object and subject or ‘how we have 
indirectly constituted ourselves’ (Foucault 2001d: 403); it ties into the notion of 
subjection (assujettissement), though not necessarily subjugation (i.e. domination). 
The latter modalities—objectivation, subjectivation—are more active; they relate 
to how human beings are directed to constitute themselves as subject and object or 
‘[h]ow…we directly constitute our identity’ (ibid.: 404; see also Kelly 2009: 87ff.; 
Rabinow 1996: 7ff.). In order to save time and space, I shall refer to 
“objectification” and/or “objectivation” as “modes of objectification” and 
“subjection” and or “subjectivation” as “modes of subjectification”. What needs to 
be born in mind when reading these terms, however, is that they refer to both the 
passive and active sense of constitution, and that that which is being invoked 
when these terms are used should be evidenced from the context within which it 
they are used, vis!à!vis the forgoing differentiation. 
To get back to the point I was making regarding a genealogy of the subject, 
such a genealogy is not a history of subjectivity, as such, but is more like a history 
of the different modes in, by, and through which subjectification and 
objectification take place. That is to say, to do a genealogy of the subject is to do a 
genealogy of the different modes of subjectification by looking at the different 
modes of objectification. Hence to do a genealogy of the subject, as this pertains 
to an analytics of power or studies in governmentality, is not to undertake a 
“genealogy of power”; rather, it is to undertake ‘a genealogy of technologies of 
power’ (Foucault 2007b: 36, emphasis added), since it is by way of an analytics of 
governmental technologies that we are able to disclose the modalities of 
objectification and thus render visible the modes of subjectification. That is to 
say, in order to be able to do a genealogy of modes of subjectification by looking at 
one or more of the three modes of objectification, we need to render visible the 
specific forms of problematization in, by, and through which the subject, qua 
subject, has been problematized as an object and, more specifically, we have to 
interrogate those rejoinders to said problematizations that take the form of 
explicit programmes, programmes in which the thought, thus thought, unfolds 
and through which their rationality is disclosed. 
In posing these questions historically, we pay attention to the specific ways 
in which human being constitutes itself by giving itself as that which can and 
must be thought, and we look at the practices from which such a 
problematization arrived and through which such a problematization is modified 
and transformed (e.g. Foucault 1985: 11!13). In posing these questions non!
historically, which is to say, in questioning the present from the perspective of 
itself, however, we are more or less limited to questioning the specificities of the 
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forms of problematizations themselves and, where this is possible, to disclosing 
something concerning the practices from which they were formed. That is to say, 
we are delimited to questioning the provent present and its forms of 
problematizations by interrogating contemporary discourses that construct 
programmes for the formation of some future present and for the formation of 
the kinds of people who will inhabit it. 
Now, the subject, for Foucault, is something of a fictive or constituted entity 
(see Gordon 1980). Foucault never talks about the actual making of real people. 
Rather, he ask how and in what ways discourses that formulate programmes for 
the formation of the real conceptualize the forms or kinds of subjectivity they 
want to bring into existence and thus to populate said real. What such a mode of 
enquiry ask is: what material is to be worked upon or worked over in the 
formation of such subjects, what discourses concerning the subject do they call 
upon (human sciences) and/or contribute to, what techniques are to be deployed 
and/or employed in the formation of such subjects and the realities they are to 
inhabit, and what is the being of human beings that is the telos of their 
prescriptive practice. Here, it is not a question of asking what the subject is, or 
how people resist, or how individuals form self!identities, vis!à!vis resistance, 
and so forth. Rather than putting forward a theory of human being, or of looking 
at the constitution of actual individual human beings, it enquires into the 
different and differential modes in, by, and through which human beings are to 
be made subjects by enquiring into the different and differential ways in which 
human being gives itself as that which can and must be thought: how is human 
being given to human beings as an object of thought, and how are human beings 
made subject through thought itself, how has human being been problematized 
as a question to be posed and as an answer to be worked through and given, and 
what might be the effects of such problematizations and programmes. 
As Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke (2011a) put it, ‘[g]overning means 
creating lines of force that make certain forms of behavior more probable than 
others’ (ibid.: 13), and what we are to question in studies in governmentality are 
the programmes that want or attempt to programme these lines of force, that 
attempt to architecture the real or environ environments: arrange probability. 
However, this does not mean undertaking an enquiry—ethnographical, 
interpretivist, or otherwise—concerning how people actually move within such 
line of force (ibid.). Rather, it means enquiring into the “how” of how people are 
incited, induced, encouraged, directed, conduced, and so forth, into moving 
within said lines. That is to say, the focus of studies in governmentality, or of an 
analytics of power more generally, ‘is on the interrelations between regimes of 
self!government and technologies of controlling and shaping the conduct of 
individuals and collectives’, and ‘not on what human beings governed by these 
regimes and technologies actually say and do’ (ibid.). As Bröckling, Krasmann, 
and Lemke go on to state, studies in governmentality undertakes ‘a “genealogy 
of subjectification”…[; they]…do not retrace transformations of subjectivity, but 
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the way in which the subject has become a problem at certain historical moments 
and which solutions have been arrived at…[;] they do not ask what the subject is 
but which forms of subjectivity have been invoked, which modes of knowledge 
have been mobilized to answer the question of the subject, and which procedures 
laid claim to’ (ibid.: 14!15). In other words, such studies do not research 
subjectivity but, rather, enquire concerning the “modes of subjectification”, and 
they do this by questioning the “modes of objectification” in, by, and through 
which human beings are—or are to be—made subjects. 
A central aspect of such an enquiry is, of course, resistance, but resistance 
here is conceptualized in a very specific way. As Nealon (2008) notes, ‘[b]y far 
and away, “resistance” remains the humanist or neohumanist concept most 
consistently affirmed in so!called post! or antihumanist thought’ (Nealon 2008: 
94). Nealon quite skilfully unpacks the so!called problem of resistance in 
Foucault, and he does so by tackling that other supposed lack in Foucault’s 
researches and writings: agency. For Foucault, so it seems to me, discursive 
formations, regimes of power, and ethical modalities of the self, and so forth, 
whilst being the effect of human activity and practices are, more or less, and for 
the most part, out of our hands; that is to say, whilst they are undoubtable the 
effects of human agency—people doing things with stuff—they are not the 
product of a human agent (efficient cause). Things act, and because things act they 
interact, which means they act upon the actions of each other, and because they 
act upon the actions of each other they are not only able to act in unison they are 
also able to act against each other, which is to say, they resist each other. In other 
words, an action upon an action always already implies an action upon the act 
that acts upon, which is to say, it already implies resistance. Thus, what 
constantly needs to be born in mind is ‘the strictly relational character of relations 
of power’ (Foucault 1978: 75). 
Here, however, I do not think it is the case that “resistance comes first” and 
that power is a response to said resistance (Nealon 2008: 104), but nor is it that 
power comes first, and resistance is a response to power; rather, relations of 
resistance, relations of power, and the possible relations between them are 
immanent and mutually constitutive. Resistance, like the term power, is a name 
then lends itself to naming a complex strategical situation but from the other side, 
as it were. As Foucault puts it, resistance is ‘the other term [l#autre terme] in 
relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite [vis!
à!vis]’ (Foucault 1978: 96, modified), and like a relation of power, resistance too 
comes from below. In other words, like power, resistance has multiple and 
heterogeneous humble beginnings; it too is sub!individual or pre!subjective 
(Foucault 1978: 95!96). And like the relation between government and critique or 
between the will to govern and the will not to be governed thusly, resistance 
‘only exists in relation with something other than itself’ (see Foucault 1996a: 383); 
that is to say, that which it is resisting; which is another way of saying ‘some 
instituted practice, discourse, episteme, [or] institution’ (Butler 2004: 304). On this 
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view, resistance is less like a heroic manning of the barricades (Nealon 2008: 110; 
Rose 1999: 279) and is more like the conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive 
breakdowns that give pause for thought, and thus give rise to problematizations 
in, by, and through thought, on the one hand, and, on the other, to rejoinders to 
such problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes. Hence, it is the 
interplay between resistance—in the form of the conspicuous, the obstinate, or the 
obtrusive—and order that gives rise both to the thought (subject, object, and the 
relations between them) and to the rationality (reason and rationale) articulated 
by and thus inhabiting governmental technologies and their programmes. 
As Foucault notes, a certain practice may have been practiced for a long 
time before there is an effective problematization by thought; and thus the task of 
an analytics of thought, and thus of programmes of power and the technologies 
that express them, is precisely to account for the specific form of said 
problematization. That is to say, the task is ‘to define the conditions in which 
human beings “problematize” what they are, what they do, and the world in 
which they live’ (Foucault 1985: 10). There were, for example, both “odd people” 
or people with diseases and certain practices that dealt with them (see Hacking 
2002: 99ff.) long before there was an effective ‘problematization of madness and 
illness arising out of social and medical practices’ (Foucault 1985: 12). The task of 
a genealogical diagnostics, then, is precisely to account for the “how” of this 
problematization: how did it come into existence, what instigated it, what form 
did it take, and what responses did it provoke, what urgent need were these 
responses a response to, in what ways did being give itself as that which can and 
must be thought, what were the practices from which it was formed and through 
which it was modified and transformed, how was this thought thought, in what 
space did the thought thus thought unfold, how was the problem deliberated, 
what calculations were made, and what rational responses were given, and so 
forth. 
Since we are dealing with the question concerning the governmental, and 
since what government seeks to govern is, ultimately, the conduct of human 
beings, it follows that what is conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive, here, is 
human being. To question the provent present by way of its problematizations, 
then, is to enquire into the different and differential ways in which human being 
constitutes itself in, by, and through giving itself as that which can and must be 
thought and, by way of the rejoinders to such problematizations that take the 
form of explicit programmes, to the different and differential way in which that 
thought intervenes and the way in which thought, thus thought, unfolds, vis!à!
vis knowledge, power, self. Such a problematization may occur at different levels 
and within different domains: it may, for instance, concern how we problematize 
and conceptualize the “nature of human nature”; it may concern how we 
problematize and conceptualize the “good life” (the “good society”), it may 
concern how we problematize and conceptualize the “political order” conducive 
to this “nature” or that “good life”; or it may concern a combination of these or 
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some other aspect of what “we” are, of what “we” say and do, and of the 
“world” in which “we” live. In the last instance, however, such problematization 
invariable come back to the being of that being for which being is an issue for it. 
Hence, what needs to be questioned, analytically, is the specific form of 
problematization and the particular forms of conceptualization as these inhabit 
discourses that propose programmes for the formation of the real or of some 
future present. 
On this view, then, “strategic games between liberties” are the “stuff” from 
which problematizations are made, and in response to which discourses that 
construct programmes for the formation of a present or future present are 
formed. If there were no resistance, by which I mean resistive forces, then there 
would be no need for control, and thus no need for programmes of control. 
Resistance is the alpha and omega of relations of power and vice!versa. The 
relation between relations of power and relations of resistance is not one of 
binary opposition: “resistance/power” but one of a “face!to!face”, vis!à!vis, 
encounter. They are less like two sides of the same coin and more like a mirror 
image of each other or like the two sides of a Möbius strip: ‘resistance is never in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault 1978: 95). Whilst there is a 
veritable treasure trove of technologies of power—those reflected, deliberated, 
calculated, and rationalized techniques and discourses concerning the subject 
whose articulation constitute governmentality—there is neither an epist"m" nor a 
tekhn" of resistance. Technologies of power seek to bring into existence a certain 
political order of things (conducting conducts) by prescribing and codifying the 
setting!out or laying!out of specific order to things (arranging probability), but no 
such discourse exists, vis!à!vis resistance. For if such a discourse were to exist, it 
would no longer be a discourse of resistance but would merely be another 
governmental technology: the will not to be governed thusly or like that is not a 
will to be governed like this or in this way. On the one hand, then, we could say 
that to undertake an analytics of the exercising of relations of power or a study in 
governmentality is always already to be doing an analysis of resistance. On the 
other hand, however, because there is no tekhn" of resistance, as such, and from 
within the confines of a study in governmentality, we cannot account for it in the 
same ways in which we can account for technologies of power or 
governmentalities vis!à!vis an analytics of problematizations and programmes. It 
is to a working through of the form that an analytics of the latter may take, vis!à!
vis questioning the contemporary order of things from with the contemporary 
order, to which we now turn. 
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PART  FOUR: THE  ARCHITECTRUE  OF  CONTOL  
I have been trying to make visible the constant articulation I 
think there is of power on knowledge and of knowledge on 
power. 
(Foucault, 'Prison Talk'). 
 
I.  GOVERNING  TO!DAY  
The question that has been the driving force of this thesis is the question 
concerning the applicability of Foucault’s histories of thought and histories of the 
present—vis!à!vis his conceptualizations and analytics of relations of power and 
his diagnoses and strategizations of the present—to posing such question to the 
present from the perspective of the itself. Thus far, we have positioned Foucault’s 
histories as being a mode of enquiry that renders visible, we have looked at two 
such forms of making visible (genealogy and archaeology), and we thought these 
through in terms of manufacturing some tools for questioning the exercising of 
relations of power evidenced in the contemporary orders of things from within 
the perspective of this very order. We have arrived at the following aims and 
methods: to undertake field!work in present!day subjectivity by questioning the 
provent present in terms of its problematizations and their rejoinders, which take 
the form of explicit programmes. What I want to do in this, the penultimate part 
of the thesis, it to look at how all of this relates to questioning relations of power, 
as they are exercised to!day, from the perspective of this to!day.  
I noted at the start of the thesis that questioning the exercising of 
contemporary relations of power from the perspective of the present itself was to 
be a form of questioning that took up a position within a certain “will not to be 
governed like that”. I also noted that in proceeding in this way, I wanted to 
propose some tools for critiquing the “will to govern”, as this is expressed in 
multiple and heterogeneous programmes, in such a way as to maintain them in 
the dispersion that is proper to them. Reactivating this counter!will in studies in 
governmentality, in questioning the will to govern from the stand!point of 
‘counter!power’ (Foucault 2001b: 540), is neither to write from the perspective of 
resistance nor is it to write about resistance—historical or otherwise—as such. 
Not writing explicitly about resistance or resistive forces is a criticism that is 
often levelled at Foucault and those who have followed in his wake, and 
specifically those who work from the within the field of studies in 
governmentality. However, such criticism fails to take into account that there is 
no tekhn" (nor epist"m") of resistance (see, e.g. Nealon 2008: Ch. 5). On the 
contrary, and in contrast to discourses, programmes, and/or technologies of 
government, resistance tends to be more extemporized than rationalized. That is 
to say, whereas the will to govern is expressed through rationalized knowledges 
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and calculated techniques, through reflected and deliberated, diagrammed and 
schematized discourses, and the like, resistance tends to be much more, how 
should we put it… ad hoc, makeshift, grass!roots, informal, improvised, and so 
forth (none of the adjectives really captures what I want to say, and all have the 
potential to naturalize and/or substantialize resistance; let us say that these are 
catachrestic and nominal concepts). On the other hand, to take a stand within 
counter!power, to question the will to govern from the position of the counter!
will not to be governed thusly, is not to take up a position exterior to relations of 
power; that view from nowhere, which would allow us to see clearly and to 
criticise government from the perspective of truth. Rather, it is precisely to 
broach the question of the ‘government of men [sic] by truth’ (Foucault, 
unpublished lecture from 9 January 1980, cited on http://www.michel!
foucault.com/quote/2004q.html, under April 2004).  
As we shall see, and from within the confines of the Foucaultian perspective 
laid out in the forgoing chapters, there is no outside of power, there is no domain 
of liberty in which relations of power are suspended, and thus from which one 
could attack power. However, pace Fraser (1989: Ch. 1!3), Habermas (1987: Ch. X), 
and others, there is no “crypto!normativity” here; but there is what we might call 
a certain contingent normativity. The normativity of contingent critique is not 
based upon universal or even “new” generalized normative criteria, but is 
immanent to what is thus being critiqued. As Foucault put it, ‘critique only exists 
in relation with something other than itself’ (Foucault 1996a: 383). Or as Butler 
rephrased this, ‘[c]ritique is always a critique of some instituted practice, 
discourse, episteme, institution’, consequently, ‘it loses its character the moment 
in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a purely 
generalizable practice (Butler 2004: 304, emphases added). Of course, one can 
always apply what one takes to be a universally valid normative framework to 
criticize practice—past or present, since they are universal—if one is willing to 
accept the resultant anachronism. However, one of the things that Foucault’s 
work works towards is precisely the de!naturalization and thus to render 
uncertain certain aspects of the epistemic and technical matrices that we inhabit 
and thus that inhabit us, and this includes the practice of criticism and the 
normative frameworks through which it seeks to judge. Moreover, this is 
anything but at odds with the empirical insights to be gained from Foucault 
critical histories of the present, since such insights result not in normative 
confusions but in an understanding that the norms inhabiting such frameworks 
are themselves historical through and through.  
On this view, critique is not one thing; it is neither universal nor 
generalizable but is itself a historical practice that takes place with the very 
epistemic and technical matrix, or that particular aspect of this matrix, that is thus 
being critiqued. In other words, ‘we will not be able to define [critique] apart 
from the various objects by which it itself is defined’ (Butler 2004: 306). The point 
here is not that critique, and the normative criteria it employs, are culturally and 
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temporally relative. Rather, critique, in being conditional upon what it is a 
critique of, is more complex than a simple relativism would allow; it is 
contingent. To be contingent means that both critique and the normative 
frameworks it employs do not exist independently by themselves but in 
dependence on something else. In other words, there is no normative framework 
independent of what is being questioned, and from which what is being 
questioned can be interrogated. In addition to this, critique, as practiced by 
Foucault, does not do any judging at all. It does not question power in terms of 
good and evil, legitimate or illegitimate, and so forth, but rather in terms of 
existence and the acceptability, in terms of ones willingness to accept the cost, of 
such forms of existence. The task of Foucaultian critique, then, is not to criticize 
the present and judge it in reference to universally valid normative frameworks. 
Rather, it seeks to attempt to render visible the forms of existence that certain 
programmes of power sought or seek to bring into existence, to render 
intelligible the potential costs of such forms of existence, and then to leave it to 
others to work out whether or not they deem these forms of existence, and their 
costs, to be acceptable or not. In other words, not only is there no judgment here, 
there is no legislation either.  
Pace Fraser (1989: 17!34), Foucault clearly describes the contingency—and 
thus the dependent existence—of critique, and of critique as a questioning in 
terms of cost and acceptability, in his 1978 lecture, ‘What is critique?’ (Foucault 
1996b; 2007a: 41!81). In this lecture, Foucault discusses or, in any case, describes, 
the immanent and mutual constitution of the “will to govern” and “the will not 
to be governed like that”, and thus details how both emerge, historically and 
practically, from within and out of the same epistemic and technical grid. What 
Foucault describes in this lecture, then, are a number of historically specific 
modes of the interrelations and correlations of the will to govern and the will not 
to be governed thusly, and thus of the relationality of governmentality and 
critique on the one hand, and of critique and the normative frameworks it 
employs on the other. Firstly, Foucault observes that ‘at a time when the 
governing of men was essentially a spiritual art or an essentially religious 
practice linked to the authority of a church, to the magisterium of Scripture, not 
wanting to be governed in that way was essentially seeking in Scripture a 
relationship other than the one that was linked to the operating function of God’s 
teaching. To not want to be governed was a certain way of refusing, challenging, 
limiting (said as you like) the ecclesiastical magisterium’ (Foucault 1996b: 385, 
emphasis added). Secondly, Foucault notes that ‘not wanting to be governed in 
this way is [also] not to accept these laws because they are unjust, because they 
are antiquated, or because they hide an essential illegitimacy under the more or 
less threatening splendour given by their present!day sovereign. From this point 
of view, critique is thus, in the face of the government and the obedience it demands, to 
oppose universal and indefeasible rights to which every government…will have to 
submit. In short, this is where one finds the problem of natural law’ (ibid., 
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emphasis added). Lastly, he describes how ‘“not wanting to be governed” is, of 
course, not accepting as true what an  authority tells you to be true, or at least it is 
not accepting it as true because an authority tells you that it is true. Rather, it is to 
accept it only if one thinks oneself that the reasons for accepting it are good. And 
this time, critique finds its anchoring point in the problem of certainty in the face of 
authority’ (ibid., emphasis added). 
In the first mode, the critique of ecclesiastical rule is essentially ‘biblical’; in 
the second mode, the critique of natural law is essentially ‘juridical’; and in the 
third mode, the critique of authority takes the form of ‘not accepting as true what 
an authority tells you to be true’ (ibid.). These ‘games of governmentalization 
and critique’ are historically immanent and mutually constitutive. Or, stated 
otherwise, the normative grounds for critique are both immanent to and thus 
contingent upon what is thus being critiqued. These normative grounds do not 
stand outside or above what critique takes as its object, they are not positioned in 
a place free from power and opulent with truth; the will not to be governed 
thusly is formed within the same epistemic and technical configuration as the 
will to govern. Thus, working within the space of “the will not to be governed 
like that” is not to apply universally valid standards of criticism based upon 
notions of universal human rights and an essential human nature, but nor is it to 
practice this form of criticism blindly and without being cognizant of the fact; 
that is, by way of a crypto!normativism (Fraser 1989: Ch. 1!3; Habermas 1987: Ch. 
X). It is to question the formation, articulation, institutionalization, and/or 
instrumentalization/operationalization of certain discourses that concern 
themselves with the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to 
the “good life”. Practising this form of critique is to acknowledge that critique is 
contingent, and that what it is contingent upon is precisely that which it is 
questioning critically (see Butler 2004). This form of critique ties into the notion 
that Foucault did not apply an ‘immutable, systematic, and universally 
applicable method’ (Machado 1992: 17) but, rather, practiced ‘a mode of research 
which, inasmuch as it cannot be fixed into a rigid canon, means that it is able to 
learn from its sources’ (ibid.). Which is to say, it is able to learn from what it is 
researching, questioning, and, consequently, critiquing.  
In addition, it should not be forgotten that all of Foucault’s enquiries began 
life with and/or within a problem in the present; that is to say, in the present!day 
practices contemporaneous with their being questioned, practices that were 
already susceptible to mutability because ‘some of the given!ness of established 
ways of thinking and acting [were] already coming into question’ (Rabinow and 
Rose 2003b: xiii): psychiatry and anti!psychiatry, medicine and the crisis of 
medicine, prison and prison riots, governmentality and neo!liberalism, sexuality 
and identity politics, ethics and a lack of ethics, and so forth. Nevertheless, there 
is more going on here than simply imposing present!day normative criteria, 
anachronistically, upon past events, practices, discourses, and the like. Rather, 
what is to be questioned historically has to be questioned from the perspective of 
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the time and place in which it took place: the reformers of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries have to be read in terms of the practices of torture and 
execution they were criticizing, and not judged by present!day notions of 
inalienable human rights. On the one hand, then, there is the historical play of 
governmentality (the will to govern) and critique (the will not to be governed like 
that); and, on the other hand, there is our critique of governmentality, which is 
related to, though not identical to, the aforementioned form of critique. A central 
question to be posed, vis!à!vis our own critique, is ‘[w]hat is the relation of 
knowledge to power such that our epistemological certainties turn out to support 
a way of structuring the world that forecloses alternative possibilities of 
ordering?’ (Butler 2004: 307). Or, since we are not questioning the present in 
terms of its past but are to pose the question of the future in terms of its present, 
paraphrasing Butler, we might ask, “what are the relations of knowledge (savoir) 
to power (pouvoir) and of power to knowledge such that the ontological and 
epistemological certainties that certain authorities want to bring into existence 
turn out to support ways of environing environments that foreclose alternative 
possible worlds?” Or again, critique might ask “what is this prescribed order of 
things whose very conditions of possibility excludes other possible orders?” In 
other words, Foucaultian critique starts not from universal criteria of judgment 
but from a position aptly summed up by Klee when he stated that ‘whilst we 
may not live in the best of all possible worlds, in its present form, this world is 
surely not the only world possible’ (Klee 1961: 92; cited in Rabinow and Rose 
2003b: xxvii). 
Hence, to do a critique from the stand!point of counter!power and of the 
will not to be governed thusly is neither to employ standard normative 
frameworks for critique nor to offer alternative forms of government. Rather, it is 
to undertake critique in terms of existence, to practice such critique, as a critique 
of the exercising of relations of power, from within or at least in relation to such 
and such a power relation, and to do so by attempting to grasp the techniques 
and knowledges that will allow for that relation to be exercised, the procedures 
to be deployed and employed in the directing of human conduct. As Rose puts 
this, ‘[t]o analyse…power through the analytics of governmentality is…to start 
by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to 
problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and 
techniques’ (Rose 1999: 20). In other words, to question power, by way of the will 
not to be governed thusly, is to question it in the direction of thought and 
rationality. However, as noted above, thought is not cognitive activity but an act 
that posits a subject and an object and a possible relation between them, and 
rationality is not to be questioned on the basis of its deviations into the irrational 
but in terms of its deliberations, calculations, schematizations, and 
conceptualizations. 
Bentham’s plan for the panopticon, for example, was discussed, described, 
and analyzed by Foucault without recourse to Bentham’s biography, psychology, 
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or social context (the “being of “man””); rather, it was interrogated by recourse to 
the broader epistemic and technical matrix—the dispositive—in which it was 
situated and of which it was an expression (see Foucault 1991a: 58). That is to say, 
it was questioned in terms of the domain of a history of thought in which the 
panopticon, and its practices and goals, became thinkable and practicable, 
conceptualizable and actionable. Here, it is not simply a question of the “how?” 
of government but is, rather, a question of the “how?” of governing what there is 
to govern, and of how these came about. On this view, power is a perspective 
concept; it is a way of looking, of rendering visible; it looks at how things are made 
and/or conceived of as being governable and what went into their making, it 
looks at how things are rendered thinkable as governable: ‘[a]n analysis of 
governmentalities…seeks to identify [the] different styles of thought, their 
conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges that they can borrow 
from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out, 
their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing’ (Rose, O"Malley, 
and Valverde 2006: 84). It is to question the formation, conceptualization, and 
elaboration, within politico!technological discourses and programmes of 
government, of the articulation of techniques and discourses about the subject; 
or, stated otherwise, of the articulation of the nature of human nature and the 
political order conducive to the “good life”. 
Questioning the provent present by way of the problematizations it both 
evidences and addresses (i.e. by way of the rejoinders to such problematizations 
that take the form of explicit programmes), might enable us to grasp two things. 
On the one hand, in describing that which they are working against (i.e. the 
specific form of problematization), they disclose that which we are and thus 
render visible that which we are ceasing to be. On the other hand, in prescribing 
that which they aim to bring about, as both a target area of governmental 
intervention and a governable reality to be brought into existence, they disclose 
something concerning where we are going and thus make visible that which we 
are in the process of becoming (see Deleuze 1992b). Either way, they tell us 
something about our present conjuncture, and thus about the will to govern 
inhabiting our contemporary present. Programmes, as rejoinders to specific 
forms of problematization, often name and describe the form of the problem that 
they address and to which they are a response. In doing so, they disclose 
something of the order of thing contemporaneous with them. In addition, as a 
rejoinder to said forms of problematization, they disclose something of the 
ordering of things to come. Of course, things never work out as planned, and so 
it is not possible to speculate on or upon the shape of things to come, but we can 
broach such programmes as being the provenance or as an aspect of the 
provenance of a possible or potential future emergence. In any case, such 
speculation, where this is made, can only be posed as a question and not as an 
affirmation.  
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Such local and regional epistemic and technical matrices, in attempting to 
programme both a target area of governmental intervention and a governable 
reality to be brought into existence, in planning for the conducting of conducts by 
way of the environing of environments (i.e. programming horizons of 
probability; see below), can be questioned in terms of the ontological and 
epistemological certainties they aim to bring about; that is to say, in terms of the 
ways in which they propose to work upon an open field of possibilities so as to 
produce a closed or more or less circumscribed field of probability. Subjecting 
such planned for certitude to critique is to render visible their mechanism as 
forms of constraint that enable, and one of the things they enable are certain 
forms of subjectivity in which the self relates to itself in relation to the 
codifications of conduct that are the telos of a particular programme. This 
relation of self to self, however, contains within itself, precisely in its relation to 
said prescriptions and codifications, not only forms of obedience and obligation, 
but also the very seeds of not wanting to be governed like that. Questioning such 
programmes in terms of the futures they wish to programme into existence, and 
thus in terms of the very forms or types of existence they want to environ or 
architect, opens up the possibility of interrogating them in terms of a reactivation 
of the counter!will of not wanting to be governed thusly, which, in turn, opens 
up the possibility of being able to intervene and thus to transform the possible 
futures we may come to inhabit. Such a critique is not crypto!normative but this 
is not to say that it does not have normative principles. It is just that these 
principles are themselves constituents of, and thus are part and parcel of, the 
same epistemic and technical grid from which the will to govern arrived. This 
form of critique, then, is contingent upon what is being critiqued; and it does not 
judge what it is questioning in terms of wright or wrong, good or bad, legitimate 
or illegitimate, and so forth  but, rather, in terms of existence, dangerousness, and 
cost: given the epistemic and technical matrix that certain authorities want us to 
inhabit, and thus to inhabits us, what are we willing to accept, what are we not 
willing to accept, and what are we not prepared to accept at all at any cost, and 
so forth. 
 
 
 
136 
 
137 
 
II.  CONTROL  
In a society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the 
fabric of existence itself, into the organization of space, time, 
visibility, [and] circuits of communication. 
(Rose, Powers of Freedom). 
Having broached the question of the aim and the method of our Foucaultian 
perspective, as this pertains to posing questions to power as it is exercised to!day 
from the perspective of to!day, in this part of the thesis, I want to broach the 
question of the domain of analysis on the one hand, and how we question this 
domain by way of the aforementioned aim and method on the other. As noted in 
the Introduction to the thesis, for Foucault, “power”, in the substantive sense of 
this term (le pouvoir), “does not exist”; and as I went on to note, this raises the 
question of how one can do an analysis of it. I also noted how, pace Hoy (1986), 
Foucault’s analytics of power does not tell us where to look but is more like “a way 
of approaching things”; which is to say, a way of looking: hence, not where to look 
but how to look or, in any case, one possible way of looking, of rendering visible: ‘if 
power is in reality an open, more!or!less coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill!
coordinated) cluster of relations, then the only problem is to provide oneself with 
a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power’ (Foucault 
1980: 199, emphases added). In this part of the thesis, in posing the apparently 
simple but in point of fact rather complex question “what is power?” we are 
going to look more closely at applying this way of looking. Of course, this 
question—“What is power?”—is somewhat ironic. As Foucault put it in Society 
Must be Defended, ‘because the question: “What is power?” is precisely a 
theoretical question that would provide an answer to everything…the issue is to 
determine what, in their mechanisms, in their effects, [and] in their relations, are 
these different [dispositives] of power that are exerted at different levels of 
society, in different domains, and with such a variety of extensions?’ (Foucault 
2003c: 13, modified). That is to say, posing this question already points us in the 
wrong direction. That is to say, it [i]s misguided’, and this because ‘as a 
discursive strategy [it is] condemned in advance to set the analysis of power on a 
wrong course’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 255; see also Foucault 1980: 87!88, 198!
199; 1982: 785!786). However, in posing this question in this way, it both throws 
into relief the conventions and taken!for!granted assumptions inhabiting 
normative frameworks for questioning concerning power and thus throws into 
relief the very object of such a mode of questioning.  
To ask a “what is…?” question is to ask after being; which is to say, it is to 
move in the direction of (a realist) ontology. But a Foucaultian conceptualization 
of power does not question ontology; it questions technology. In other words, I 
think we have to understand Foucault’s conceptualization of power 
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technologically; that is to say, in terms of ‘the articulation of certain techniques and 
certain kinds of discourse about the subject’ (Foucault 1993: 223; 2007a: 152) as 
these pertain to problematizations and programmes. If we pose the question 
“What is power?” or if we attempt to do an analysis of power, in organizations or 
elsewhere, then we are inevitable led in the direction of an ontology (essence), 
and, perhaps inevitably, to a metaphysics of power. That is to say, we are led to 
search for it (the source of power), to locate it (as a substance), to finding out who 
has it and who does not (as a possession), and to look at what those who have it 
do with it (e.g. Mintzberg 1983). Moreover, we are ultimately led in the direction 
of producing a theory (ontology) of power and a methodology (epistemology) for 
studying it. Needless to say, Foucault would earmark such an approach as being 
indebted to a sovereign and juridical notion of power (and/or an analytic of 
finitude).  
If, on the other hand, we take Foucault’s nominalism seriously and grasp 
“power”, conceptually and analytically, as being nothing more, and nothing less, 
than a name that lends itself to describing “a complex strategic situation in a 
given society”, then another path opens up for us to explore; one in which we do 
not ask what power is or undertake an analysis of it but do analyses in terms of 
power. Now a relation of power is not a social relation, nor is it an economic 
relation; it is a relation inhabiting these and all other forms of human relations 
(sexual, religious, racial, gendered, familial, ethnic, medical, punitive, 
organizational, etc.), and it can be analyzed as such and in those terms. This is 
not to reduce all human relations to relations of power (as happens, for example, 
with “the social”); it is to say that power is an aspect, but one aspect, of all such 
relation. All human relations, then, are inhabited by relations of power, but in the 
vast majority of these relations, there is a certain free!play or to!and!fro of the 
power relation. What we need to analyze are precisely those events in which 
some seek to capitalize on these relations; events in which this fluidity starts to 
solidify or congeal; literally, to establish or institute a fixed or, in any case, a 
more!or!less circumscribed relation of power. It is these rigid or less flexible 
relations that are to be broken down and analyzed in terms of power. 
1 Power  
To make this somewhat clearer, we can say that what Foucault means by “a 
complex strategical situation” is, essentially, a situation in which one or more 
people attempt to govern the conduct of one or more other people: what Foucault 
called ‘strategic games between liberties’ (Foucault 1997: 299). It is not, however, 
‘simply a relationship between “partners”, individual or collective; it is a mode of 
action of some on some others’ (Foucault 2001d: 340, modified, emphasis added). 
Hence, what is at stake here is not a substantive power that has a source, that can 
be possessed, and that can wielded, but a relation of power (a relation between an 
act that acts upon an action and an action that is thus acted upon) on the one 
hand, and an exercising of power (the specific modality of acting upon actions or of 
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actions being acted upon) on the other. Or, stated otherwise—since the above 
formulation make it sound as if “relation” and “exercise” where separate and 
discreet—a relation of power only comes into existence when it is exercised: 
‘[p]ower’, by which Foucault always means relations of power, ‘exists only as 
exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action’ (ibid.). 
Hörnqvist (2010) claims that a distinction needs to be made ‘between power 
as a relation and power as an activity’ (ibid.: 1). He goes on to claim that ‘[t]he 
concept of power is ambiguous as it can refer to both’, and that ‘Foucault 
exclusively studied power as an activity, which was not always kept separate 
from the notion of power as a relation’ (ibid.: 2). As I hope to demonstrate, since 
the exercising of power is an exercising of a relation of power—indeed, it is the 
exercising of that relation—, one cannot study one without the other. Moreover, 
Foucault did not study power as an activity (if what is meant by that is 
something like a sociology of everyday life) but as a rationality (technologies of 
power). Pace Hörnqvist, there is no ambiguity here. Exercising power is 
exercising a relation of power: the exercise of power is what brings into existence 
a relation of power; and a relation of power is what enables the exercise of 
power—in other words, whilst the relation and the exercise are irreducible each 
to the other, they are nonetheless immanent in each other and thus mutually 
constitutive of each other.  
Hence, the principle question to be asked here is not a “what is…x?” 
question so much as it is a “how?” question (Foucault 1978: 97; 2001d: 336; 2003c: 
28!34): how what there is to be governed is, and how it is to be governed. As 
Foucault put this in ‘The Subject and Power’, such “how?” question are posed  
‘not in the sense of “how does [power] manifest itself?” but “how does it exercise 
itself?”’ (Foucault 2001d: 337, modified). If what we are questioning is not how 
does power manifest itself but how does it exercise itself, then what is meant by 
the exercising of power here? If by “manifest itself” we mean “reveals itself”, 
“shows itself”, “displays itself”, “disclose itself”, “makes itself evident”, and so 
on, and if the intelligibility key of the analysis of power is not what is thus 
revealed, disclosed, evidenced, and so forth, then how can we have access to it; in 
other words, how are we to analyse the “how?” of power? Foucault’s answer to 
this question is that ‘[a]ddressing the theme of power through an analysis of 
“how” is…to give oneself as the object of analysis relations of power and not power 
itself’ (Foucault 2001d: 339, modified). In other words, it is not “power” that is 
exercised but an unequal, asymmetrical, or nonegalitarian “relation”, and what is 
to be questioned is the “how?” of exercising that relation. The aim and method of 
an analytics of power, then, is ‘[t]o grasp the material agency of subjugation’; in 
addition, it is to question such agency ‘insofar as it constitutes subjects’ (Foucault 
2003c: 28). And so the kinds of question to be posed in such an analytic are “How 
is that relation to be exercised?” “What knowledge and what techniques are to be 
deployed and/or employed in directing human conduct?” and “How did this 
become so?” Or, stated slightly differently, ‘Who or what is to be 
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governed?…How should they be governed? To what ends should they be 
governed?’ (Rose, O"Malley, and Valverde 2006: 84!85; see also Dean 2010: 33, 37!
50), and so forth.  
In order to clarify this point, we can contrast our Foucaultian conceptual 
analytics of power with Dahl’s (1957) intuitive sociological ‘concept of power’. 
Dahl’s concept of power, like Foucault’s, conceptualizes power as a relation 
between people; but that is where the similarity ends. Dahl conceptualizes the 
power relation as a relation in which ‘A has power over B to the extent that he 
[sic] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (ibid.: 202!203). A 
first differentiation is that in Dahl’s formulation “A has power over B”, in other 
words, power is conceptualized if not exactly substantively then, at a minimum, 
as something that someone can have (i.e. as a possession). In a more Foucaultian 
conceptualization of relations of power, on the other hand, one or more people 
exercise power over others; that is, they do not have power, but occupy a position 
within a nonegalitarian relation. A second, and much more significant, 
differentiation is that in Dahl’s formulation “A gets B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do”. This contrast with a more Foucaultian way of 
conceptualising this relation as a relation in which one or more people attempt to 
govern the conduct of others by working upon an open field of possibilities in 
such a way as to reconfigure it into a closed, semi!closed, or more!or!less 
delimited field of probability; and it attempts to conduct the conduct of other, by 
way of the above, so as to induce in them the conducting of their own conduct. 
Bearing in mind that we are working at the level of formation and 
conceptualization—that is, at the level of what various authorities want to 
happen—and not at the level of actualization, a more Foucaultian way of looking 
at this is that what B would want to do is probably what A wants B to do. Stated 
otherwise, whereas Dahl views the power relation as an imposition (e.g. A 
imposes a form of existence upon B: i.e. if it was not for the imposition of A, B 
would do otherwise), Foucault conceptualizes relations of power not as a relation 
in which one has a form imposed upon one’s existence, but as a relation in which 
one is given the very terms in, by, and through which only certain forms of 
existence will and will not be possible (e.g. Butler 2004); or, rather, in which 
certain forms of existence will be more probable than not. On this view, ‘[p]ower 
is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of 
possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245!246): this is what is meant by a the “setting!out or 
laying!out of probability”.  
What Dahl’s formulation implies is that there are forms of existence which 
grant access to a thing called power (the source of power to be exploited, the 
means at their disposal, the amount of power they have, and the scope of their 
power), and there are forms of existence in which access to power is more 
limited, delimited, or is non!existent. Then, it is simply a question of looking at 
how those who have access to power impose that power upon the existence of 
those who do not: through force or coercion, threat or promise, and so forth. In 
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other words, it is simply a question of analyzing the manifestations of power: 
managers manage, supervisors supervise, leaders lead, and so forth. For Foucault 
and others, by way of contrast, there is no such privileged domain; a relation of 
power comes into existence in its exercise; and that exercise ‘consists in 
“conducting conducts” and in arranging probability’ (Foucault 2001d: 341, 
modified, emphasis added). That is to say, that the relation of power, as a grid of 
intelligibility for doing analyses in terms of power, is conceptualized as a relation 
in which some attempt to conduct the conduct of other by exercising that 
relation, and that the exercising of this relation, the technique that allows for that 
relation to be exercised, takes the form of a laying!out or setting!out of 
probability (à aménager la probabilité). 
Foucault looked at two general modalities of exercising relations of power; 
what we might call an anatamo!politics of the human body and a bio!politics of the 
population (Foucault 1978: 135!159; 2003c: 239!263). However, these should not be 
thought of in terms of the micro and the macro. Rather, any distinction that can be 
drawn between different “levels” are differences in the scale of what is being 
analyzed, and not differences in the form of analysis, which, whatever the level or 
scale (individuals, groups, populations), is still that of a “micro!physics” of power 
(Foucault 2007b: 119n*, 358; 2008a: 185ff.; see also Senellart 2007: 381ff.). Hence, 
pace Jessop (2011), what is ‘scalable’ here, if we can even use such a term, is the 
scale of what is being analyzed, and not the point of view of method of analysis.  
In other words, whether one is analyzing the practices inhabiting a prescriptive 
discourse prescribing how to handle a rifle: demeanour, gate, the sequence of 
movements to be followed, etcetera (Foucault 1977a); or whether one is 
discussing the practices contained, for example, in discourses concerning office 
design and office management and analyzing the possible relations between 
them: Taylorism, Bürolandschaft, cubicle, and so on (see, e.g. Hofbauer 2000); or 
whether one is describing the practices evidenced in a discourse offering advice 
concerning the practices and techniques of governing a population: its salvation, 
its health, its economy, and so forth (Foucault 2007b, 2008a); the point of view of 
method is the same, and this point of view of method is that of a micro!physical 
analysis of the exercising of relations of power; or, more specifically, of the 
thought or rationality inhabiting such practices. This is precisely what is meant 
by “an analytics of power”: not because it is ‘determined by’ the level or ‘the 
sector of the scale’ to be analyzed, but because of the perspective of method: ‘the 
analysis of micro!powers is not a question of scale, and it is not a question of a 
sector, it is a question of a point of view’ (Foucault 2008a: 186). In other words, 
power, government, governmentality, and so forth, are not so much the object of 
enquiry as they are the grid of intelligibility, the mode of rendering visible, of 
said enquiry. 
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2 Government  
It may help here to clarify the terms government and governmentality, without 
delimiting them and thus limiting their application by defining them, by putting 
forward a number of conceptual and analytical differentiations. A first 
clarification can be made, for example, by differentiate government from 
“governance”; a second by differentiating governmentality understood in the 
sense of encapsulating and combining thought, relations, discourses, techniques, 
and rationalities of government and governmentality understood as “mentalities 
of government”, and a third and finally, by differentiating between a narrow and 
broader analytical conceptualization of governmentality. Before going on to 
broach these three differentiation, however, it may prove instructive to look at 
the etymology of the concept. Here, I am not attempting to recover the terms lost 
origin, nor to excavate the words sematic embedding; rather, I want to think 
about the kind of work it does as a concept (see, e.g. Foucault 2007b: Lecture 5, 8 
February 1978), and thus what we can do with it. The verb “to govern” stems 
from the Latin gubern"re (“to steer a vessel, hence to direct, to rule, to govern”) 
which is itself “a nautical borrowing from Greek kybernan: “to steer or pilot a 
ship”, from kybern#t#s “steersman, governor, pilot, or rudder”, “navigator”, 
“helmsmanship” (OED). The Greek kybernan is also the root of the term 
cybernetics, which although often associated with Wiener (1961, 1989) was first 
used in the modern era by Ampère (in 1834, ‘cybernétique’) to denote “art of 
government” (Ampère 1834: 140ff.). Thus, rather than referring to those 
administrative bodies that govern modern nation sates, the sense of government 
employed here has this sense of guiding, steering, piloting, directing, and so 
forth: ‘techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour[: g]overnment 
of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of 
a state, or of oneself’ (Foucault 1997: 81). 
1 – Taking government and “governance” first, we can note a difference 
between the suffixes “!ance” and “!ment” applied to the verb “to govern”. The 
former suffix, the “!ance” in governance, is applied to the verb “to govern” in 
order to form “nouns of action”; the latter, the “!ment” in government, denotes 
either “the result or product of the action of the verb” or “the means or 
instrument of the action” (OED). It is the second sense of the latter—the means or 
instruments of governing—that I intend here in questioning relations of power, 
by way of the concept of governmentality, as these are to be exercised to!day (i.e. 
in the provent present) from the perspective of this to!day in which they are to be 
exercised (i.e. field!work) As we shall see, the first sense of the suffix “!ment” 
relates more to a diagnostics and strategics of the effective than it does to the 
disposing and inclining aspect of the dispositive (these terms will be discussed 
below); that is to say, it relates to analyses of the consequences of 
institutionalizing relations of power and of the instrumentalization of their real 
but unintended effects (i.e. states of domination; see below). In everyday 
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parlance, in their etymological and semantic embedding, and maybe in certain 
academic discourse more generally, the distinction that has just been drawn 
between government and “governance” is, perhaps, of little significance. 
However, conceptually and analytically, in undertaking studies in 
governmentality, we can differentiate between the actual action or manner of 
governing the day!to!day lives of individuals, groups, populations, and the like, 
on the one hand, and a “system by which a thing is to be governed” on the other; 
that is to say, between governance and government.  
Whilst the term governance aims to describe, analyze, and explain the 
realities and actualities of day!to!day governing, and to evaluate such governing 
in terms of good or bad governance, and so forth; government(ality), in focusing 
upon “the means or instrument of the action” by looking at what various 
authorities want(ed) to happen, describes a certain aspect of the real that does not 
always get the attention it deserves. Let us say that, for the sake of analysis, we 
can differentiate between manifestations of power, on the one hand, and the 
“how?” and “what?” of power—in terms of how the latter has been thought, in 
terms of the “how?” of government, and in terms of the “what?” of what there is 
to govern—, on the other (see Foucault 2001d: 337). The concept of 
governmentality conceptualizes “arts of government”; ways of thinking 
government; the deliberations, calculations, and schematizations inhering in 
governmental technologies; and, above all, the thought and governmental 
rationality inhabiting such technologies. The notion of governance, by way of 
contrast, refers to what we might call the concrete and everyday instances of 
governing, the minute!by!minute procedures and actual processes of the whole 
messy business of actually governing people and institutions; it refers not to the 
art of government but to the actuality of actually governing. This differentiation 
is clearly played out in Foucault’s appeal, in Discipline and Punish, to the writings 
of a late eighteenth century British utilitarian philosopher rather than the 
descriptions of a late eighteenth century British philanthropist and prison 
reformer.  
As noted previously (see the discussion on page 10), in writing a history of 
the prison, Foucault turned to Bentham’s detailed architectural plans that sought 
not only to diagram a house of inspection but also to programme certain 
techniques for conducting the conduct of others (Bentham 1843). Howard, by 
way of contrast, undertook what we would now call an ethnographic study of 
prisons, gaols, and hospitals, asylums, lazarettos, and the like, across Britain, 
Ireland, and the rest of Europe (Howard 1780, 1791). Foucault’s turning to 
Bentham was not simply the product of doing historical enquiry, since he could 
just as easily have made use of the historical document produced by Howard (as 
he does, for example, in History of Madness). What I think is taking place here is 
not just the penchant of the historian for documents but is, rather, an effect of a 
specific philosophical question as this pertain to what is to be questioned and the 
“level” at which such analyses are to work. This philosophical question relates to 
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the “being of “man”” first discussed by Foucault in his Introduction to Kant$s 
Anthropology (Foucault 2008b), then in Part II of The Order of Things, and again in 
his later writings in which he describes his project as undertaking two negative 
tasks vis!à!vis the study of forms of experience. The first of these two negative 
tasks was ‘a “nominalist” reduction of philosophical anthropology together with 
the notions it is able to support’; the second negative tasks was ‘a displacement in 
relation to the domain, the concepts, and the methods of the history of societies’ 
(Foucault 1997: 200, modified). Foucault introduced a third but positive task, vis!
à!vis such an analysis, and that was ‘to bring to light the domain where the 
formation, development, and transformation of forms of experience are able to 
take their place’, and this domain was the domain of ‘a history of thought’ (ibid., 
modified). In other words, Bentham set!out an art of government, Howard 
described the actual acts of what we would now call governance. In writing 
Discipline and Punish Foucault turned not Howard but to Bentham, and this 
because what Foucault undertook was not a history of ‘behaviors or ideas, nor 
societies and their “ideologies”’, but a history of ‘the problematizations through 
which being gives itself as that which can and must be thought and the practices 
on the basis of which these problematizations are formed’ (Foucault 1985: 11, 
modified).  
If we are to preserve the specificity of the object of studies in 
governmentality, it is important to maintain this distinction between an analytics 
of the discourses and techniques, the technologies or arts of government, on the 
one hand, and analyses of the practices and practicalities of governance, on the 
other. Conflating government with governance (as happens, for example, in 
Walters 2012), as these have been differentiated and described here, blurs the 
specificity of studies in governmentality, which does not study the “everyday 
practices of governance” but “arts of government”. What we are dealing with 
here is not a sociology of power, a sociology of rule, a sociology of governance, 
and so forth, but a history of thought and rationality, as these pertain to 
exercising relations of power, by way of studies in governmentality (see Foucault, 
Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106ff.; see also Dean 2010: 28ff.; Rose 1999: Ch. 1).  
 2 – This emphasis upon the domain of thought and rationality ties into the 
second point of clarification noted above, in which it is important to make a 
further distinction between two notions of governmentality: governmentality as 
governmental rationality or rationalities of government, and governmentality as 
governmentality or mentalities of government. The contraction of the terms 
“govern(ment)” and “mentality” would seem to derive from Gordon’s (1987), 
perhaps off!the!cuff, remarks to the effect that “governmentality” is ‘a term that 
one might…unpack, in the vocabulary of Lucien Febvre, as “mentality of 
government”’ (ibid.: 297). However, according to Senellart (2007), contrary to the 
interpretation put forward by some German (e.g. Lemke 2001) and Anglo!Saxon  
commentators (e.g. Dean 1999; Rose 1999), ‘the word “governmentality” could 
not result from the contraction of “government” and “mentality”’ (Senellart 2007: 
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399n126). This is because, as Senellart states, “governmentality” derives from 
“governmental” in the same manner as “musicality” derives from “musical” or 
“spatiality” derives from “spatial”, and so on (ibid.). By extension, “mentality”, 
would thus refer to the states or condition of being “mental”; that is, “of or 
pertaining to the mind” or “that which is of the nature of mind or of mental 
action”, and so forth (OED). 
In taking up Senellart’s point, Kessl and Kutscher (2008) note that 
‘[s]emantically “governmentality” denotes the way of governing – like 
“musicalité” (musicality) denotes the form of music and the way of being able to 
make music, or "spatialité" (spatiality) denotes the formation of spaces (ibid.: 23, 
my italics). The Annales School, implicitly invoked by Gordon with his reference 
to Lucien Febvre, undertook social histories covering long!term durations (la 
longue durée) that focused upon the intellectual worldviews of common people; 
that is, their “mentality” (mentalité). Foucault did not do a history of mentalities, 
attitudes, worldviews, and so forth; he was not writing about the wider mind!
sets of past cultures, social groups, or peoples, nor how these mind!set affect 
contemporary worldviews. What he wrote was neither a history of ideas 
(Foucault 1985, 2001c) nor a history of mentalities (Foucault 1972) but a history of 
thought or of systems of thought, a critical history of thought, a materialist history 
of rationality, an archaeology of savoir, and so forth, that questions the materialism 
of the incorporeal (Foucault 1981). It is important here to distinguish between 
thought (pensée), as conceptualized by Foucault, and ideas (idées), mentalities 
(mentalité), world!views (Weltanschauung), and so forth, more generally. Looking 
at mentalities, rather than rationalities, takes us back to analyzing substantives: 
mental character or disposition, outlook, kind or degree of intelligence, and so 
forth, or the material conditions of existence that form or structure consciousness, 
and the like (cf. Dean 2010: 24ff.). That is to say, it takes us back to doing analyses 
of behaviours, ideas, societies, ideologies, and so forth. In other words, 
governmentality has nothing to do with consciousness: pace Dean (2010), I do not 
think that it address ‘how we think about governing’ (ibid.: 24, emphasis added) 
so much as it questions what has been thought vis!à!vis what there is to govern and 
how to govern it (Foucault grappled with this issue in the ‘Forward to the English 
Edition’ of The Order of Things, where he talked about replacing ‘X thought 
that…’ with ‘it was known that…’, see Foucault 2002a: xiv!xv). On this view, if 
governmentality is a neologism compounding two terms, those terms have to be 
government and rationality (government and reason, to govern rationality), and 
not govern and mentality; where the latter term refers to the states or condition of 
being “rational”; that is, “of or pertaining to reason”. Hence, government as this 
pertains not to mental activity but to rational thought. 
 3 – A final clarification can be had by differentiating between a narrow 
sense of government/governmentality and a broader understanding of these 
terms. It is certainly the case the Foucault’s conceptualizations of government 
and of governmentality went from being rather restricted notions to becoming 
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more or less synonymous with an analytics of power per se (see the discussion of 
this shift in Senellart 2007), and it may prove instructive to play upon this 
difference. That is, the difference between governmentality as this pertains to 
questions of political reason and political sovereignty, and governmentality as a 
synonym for an analytics of power more generally. On the one hand, then, 
governmentality can be thought in a narrow sense in which government is 
differentiated from questions of sovereignty, and questions of discipline: in a 
lecture from 1978, the publication of which kick!started studies in 
governmentality (Foucault 2001d: 201!222), Foucault states that ‘in reality one has 
a triangle, sovereignty!discipline!government’ (ibid.: 219). We can mark a 
differentiation between sovereignty, discipline, and government by noting the 
differences between the notions of “determination”, “imposition”, and 
“conduction”. If there is determination then there is no open relation of power; an 
example of this “negative” conceptualization of power would be the deductive 
practices of sovereignty (see, e.g. Foucault 2003a: 48); that is, those juridico!
political practices that say “no” or that “take away” (Foucault 1978: Part Five; 
2003c: lecture from 17th March 1976). If there is not determination but there is 
imposition then there is no relation of government; an example might be the 
reductive practices of discipline; those anatamo!political practices in which 
processes, bodily movements, and the movement of bodies, and so forth, are 
reduced to the bare minimum required—that is to say, to the most efficient 
means (Foucault 1977a: Part Three). If there is neither determination nor 
imposition, however, then we have a relation of government, and discourses and 
practices of governmentality (see Rose 1999, especially Ch. 2). In this third 
differentiation, government is delimited, analytically and conceptually, to those 
actions that act upon the actions of free subjects, and only insofar as they are free 
(Foucault 2001d: 340!342), in order to get such subjects to act upon their own 
actions (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 105!106); it is a conducting of the 
conduct of others inducive of or conducive to the conducting of one’s own 
conduct. On this view, government is neither determining nor imposing; it is 
disposing—it is neither deduct nor reductive; it is inductive and conducive. 
The concept of power, then, captures a number of singular modalities of its 
exercise: sovereign power, disciplinary and/or anatamo!political power, and 
various modes of governmental power. What I am interested in here is a subset 
of this third modality. This third modality can refer to pastoral power (Foucault 
2001d: 298!325, 326!348); to mechanisms of security (Foucault 2007b: first three 
lectures); to bio!political power (Foucault 1978, 2003c, 2008a); to noso!political 
power (Foucault 2001d: 90!105); to liberal or neo!liberal arts of government 
(Foucault 2007b, 2008a), or to advanced liberalism (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 
1996b; Dean 1999; Donzelot 1979a; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 1999); and so forth. 
However, since we are questioning concerning government not historically (i.e. 
archaeologico!genealogically) but from the perspective of the present (i.e. 
architecturally), none of these terms may apply. Whilst, in their different ways, 
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these modalities of exercising relations of power, these different discourses and 
techniques, may be said to form the conditions of possibility of our present, they 
do not describe or depict that present; they merely describe the contingencies that 
have made it possible. What we are to question, in questioning concerning the 
present order of things from within that very order, are relations of government 
that are in!process, or that are in!formation.  
It is here that we broaden out the question of governmentality from its 
narrow focus upon question of political reason and political sovereignty to an 
analytics of power more generally. Since we are posing questions to power in the 
provent present vis!à!vis its problematizations and programmes, we are going to 
take up the question of governmentality both in the more narrow sense of 
governing through induction and/or conduction or through what Rose (1999) 
calls “freedom”, and in the broader sense of an analytics of power more 
generally. In addition, the focus of our modified version of studies in 
governmentality will thus not be sovereignty, discipline, or the various modes of 
governmentality, understood in the narrow sense, but will question the 
exercising of relations of power by way of the concept of control. Since we are 
attempting to describe what is under construction, in!process, or in!formation, 
and the like, the concept of control nominalistically and proximally names the 
object of our enquiry. What it names is not so much a “complex strategical 
situation” but rather, and more specifically, complex tactical sites. Control, here, is 
not a type of power—ideal or otherwise; it is a sub!set of a governmental analytic 
that is delimited to analyzing tactics: the programmatic!technological aspect of 
government (not a diagnostics of technology per se, nor a strategical analysis of 
the instrumentalizations and/or operationalizations of the effects of the 
implementations of technologies and relations of power—see below—in 
particular, but an analytics of specific dispositives, of the technology!
programmes of government).  
The domain to be analysed in terms of the provent present and its 
problematizations, then, is government not governance. Government, here, is 
being understood in the narrow sense which distinguishes it from both sovereign 
and disciplinary power in that it conceptualizes the exercising of a relation of 
power not as an action that acts directly or immediately upon others, nor as an 
action that imposes itself upon the actions of others, but as an action that acts 
upon the actions of others so as to get them to act upon their own actions. This 
narrow sense of government is then to be expanded into a broader 
understanding of government, which is now conceptualized as a more general 
analytics of power. What I think we need to avoid in questioning concerning the 
exercising of contemporary relations of power in this way are predefined and/or 
ready!made models, conceptualizations, analyses, and so forth, of said relations 
and the techniques that allow for their exercise. That is to say, we have to put 
aside all notions of sovereignty, discipline, pastoralism, bio!politics, liberalism 
and its avatars, and so forth; at least in the first instance. At some point, we may 
148 
 
even have to put aside the conceptualization of the exercising of a relation of 
power as a conducting of conducts that acts upon actions. In other words, if we 
want to render visible the specificity of a particular present!day technology of 
government, if we want to render intelligible the kinds of relations, techniques, 
and rationalities specific to it, we need to undertake an analytics of that 
programme, and not impose upon it pre!conceived concepts and their 
conceptualizations.  
As noted at the start of the thesis, we need to be specialized. What this 
means in not that we need to become specialists, if by this term we mean an 
authoritative authority, but that we need to be specialized understood in the 
etymological sense of “special” derived from “species” (from Latin speci"lis 
“particular”, from speci#s “form, kind, sort”, OED). To be specialized, in this 
sense, means that we need to maintain things in the dispersion that is proper to 
them, and thus render visible the specific figurations of the particular technology 
under consideration. Only after having undertaken a detailed description of the 
specific relations, knowledges and techniques, and rationalities evidenced in a 
particular programme of power can we begin to think about how and in what 
ways it may or may not relate to other more historical modalities of exercising 
relations of power. Only when we have rendered visible and thus intelligible the 
specific technology that will allow for a particular relation of government to be 
exercised can we start to think about whether it is merely a repetition of prior 
forms, whether or not it modifies certain aspects of prior configurations of 
government, whether or not it combines certain elements of different regimes of 
government and not others, or whether it lays out something novel and 
innovative, and thus radically new and not seen before. Taking this “unknown” 
on board, and in order to give us an object of enquiry, I am going to call this 
unknown but to be rendered visible and thus intelligible exercising of 
contemporary relations of power “control”.  
3 Control  
The nominal and catachrestic concept of “control” is designed to designate two 
things: Firstly, it signpost the fact that what we are questioning is the 
contemporary; that what we are to do is field!work in, on, and upon the present; 
that we are questioning the present from the perspective of itself; and that what 
we are to investigate is an order of things—discourses, techniques, programmes, 
technologies, and so forth—that is in!process. On this view, it is designed, at least 
in part, to move beyond not only the now sterile, overburdened, overused, and 
overworked notions of “panopticism” and “disciplinary power”, but also such 
concepts as bio!politics, liberalism, welfarism, neo!liberalism, advanced 
liberalism, and so on. That is to say, it is being used to mark a difference from 
other established, institutionalized, and/or instrumentalized forms of exercising 
relations of power. For whilst these terms me be used, adjectively, to name what 
is now passed and/or settled, they ought not be used to name and/or describe 
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what is in!formation. Secondly, and following of from the above, “control” is 
being used to act as a placeholder to be substituted and filled!out by concrete 
empirical enquiry (i.e. the aforementioned field!work). On this view, “control” is, 
by design, an empty concept, because it is a skeletal concept that is to be fleshed!
out by way of field!work in the contemporary. It neither presupposes nor 
preconceives. It does not name or designate a natural object (a referent), nor is it 
an abstraction representing the essential characteristics or traits of a regime of 
practice (ideal type). It is not a model, archetype, or ideal type to be imposed on 
or superimposed upon the present; it is a question to be posed to the present.  
Discipline, for example, proximally and nominalistically names a relation 
of power or, in any case, a certain form of such a relation, because it names the 
techniques—or the modality thereof—in, by, and through which that relation is 
to be exercised. Discipline thus names a relation of power because it names the 
techniques that allow for that relation to be exercised. The concept of control 
performs the same function, but whereas Foucault was able to name and 
differentiate between certain modalities of exercising a power relation—and this 
because he was describing what was, for the most part, over and done with—
because what we are to question are things that are in!formation or in!process, it 
is not possible to give a definitive name to the different techniques we are to 
describe. That is to say, since we are questioning multiple and heterogeneous 
technologies in the dispersion that is proper to them, knowledges and techniques 
that may or may not agglutinate into an overall thematized strategy, I propose 
the term control to provide us with an object of enquiry. Control is thus the object 
of a study in governmentality that is to undertake an analytics of the 
contemporary by way of field!work in the present. Such an enquiry does not take 
as its point of departure pre!conceived notions of discipline, bio!power, or 
liberalism and its avatars. Rather, it seeks to disclose conceptualizations of the 
nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the good life 
inhering in programmes and/or technologies of control by rendering visible the 
discourses and techniques in, by, and through which this nature, that order, and 
thus that form of life are to be realized. 
A precedent for the former type of usage of control can be found in 
Deleuze (Deleuze 1992a, 1992b; see also Rose 1999: Ch. 7); however, I would want 
to separate my use of this term from Deleuze’s notion of “societies of control”, 
which tends towards substantializing control as a state!of!affairs. For example, 
Deleuze state that the ‘socio!technological study of the mechanisms of control, 
grasped at their inception, would have to be categorical and to describe what is 
already in the process of substitution from the disciplinary sites of enclosure’ 
(Deleuze 1992a: 7). Or, as he stated this elsewhere, ‘the disciplines which 
Foucault describes are the history of what we gradually ceasing to be, and our 
present!day reality takes on the form of dispositions of overt and continuous 
control in a way which is very different from recent closed disciplines’ (Deleuze 
1992b: 164). However, whilst Deleuze’s concept of control is useful for marking a 
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distinction between it and prior institutionalized and/or instrumentalized forms 
and types of exercising relations of power, I would want to replace Deleuze’s 
rather abstract and generalizing formulations with concrete empirical detail: 
“What are the specific techniques and knowledges in, by, and through which 
some propose to govern the conduct of others?” Government, here, is not only 
related to those relations of power that aim to govern what we might call the 
marginalized (i.e., the abnormal, the indigent, the indolent etc.); it connotes all 
those micro!practices in which some attempt to get others to conduct themselves 
by being conducive to or inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct in 
particular, delimited, and specified ways.  
As Deleuze himself put it, ‘[t]o untangle [disentangle] the lines of a 
dispositive is, in each case, to draw up a map, a cartography, [it is] to survey 
unknown lands, and this is what [Foucault] calls “field!work” [“work in the 
field”, “work on the ground”]. We must be located on the same lines that not 
only make up a dispositive but traverse it and carry it along, from north to south, 
from east to west, or diagonally’ (Deleuze 2007: 338!339, modified; perhaps 
Deleuze was referring to Foucault 1998: 450). In other words, we not only have to 
grasp such mechanisms of control at their inception, we also have to remain at 
the level of their specificity by undertaking field!work in particular dispositives 
(we shall return to this notion below). What this means is Deleuze’s notion of 
“control” ‘should not be understood sociologically, but in terms of the emergence 
of new possibilities and the complexification of the old’, in which the various 
‘metaphors’ employed by Deleuze ‘function more as hypotheses than 
conclusions’ (Rose 1999: 234!235). Here, I follow Rose when he states that there is 
‘no overarching “post!disciplinary” logic, but rather a multiplication of 
possibilities and strategies deployed around different problematizations in 
different sites and with different objectives’ (ibid.: 240). On this view, then, ‘[w]e 
should not emulate sociologists by seeking to chart the emergence of a “post!
disciplinary” society’ (ibid.). Rather, ‘we should seek to identify the emergence of 
new control strategies and the reconfiguration of old ones’ (ibid.). But whereas 
for Rose such an analysis is ‘genealogical not sociological’ (ibid.: 242), from the 
perspective detailed previously, the analytic being put forward here, whilst not 
being sociological, is archaeological in its method and genealogical in its finalité. 
Nevertheless, and bearing in minds all this specificity, control, as the 
object of study, can be studied by taking up some of the concepts and thematics 
of an analytics of government—not as a historical analytics that  diagnoses and 
strategizes the present, but as an analytics of the contemporary that seeks to 
diagnose and thus to strategize the future. In what follows, in taking up the 
narrow sense of government and poising it as a question in terms of the broader 
understanding of this term, in posing questions to government and 
governmentality as these are laid out in the provent present by way of the 
rejoinders to its problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes, and 
in posing such question from within the order of the present!day order of things, 
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we will now look in a little more detail at the concepts of control (relations of 
power or conducting conducts) and technology (the exercising of relations of 
power—the discourses and techniques that allow for that relation to be 
exercised—or environing environments), and of how to question them, vis!à!vis the 
contemporary, by way of what I will call “the architectonics of control”. 
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III.  ARCHITECTONICS  
[I]n undertaking the internal and architectonic analysis of a 
work (be it a literary text, philosophical system, or scientific 
work)…one has already called back into question the absolute 
character and founding role of the subject.  
(Foucault ‘What is an Author?’). 
I have never been entirely satisfied with the emphasis placed by studies in 
governmentality upon the phrase “the conduct of conduct(s)” (conducting the 
conduct of…, conducting conducts, etc.), and for the following reasons. To me, 
what the expression “the conduct of conducts” expresses is the relational aspects 
of relations of power or governmentalities. That is to say, it names the specific 
form of relation of power, which is not deductive or reductive but conductive of 
the conduct of other in that it acts upon the actions of others so as to induce in 
them the conducting of their own conduct, as this is laid!out or set!out in a 
technical programme. Specifically, it designates ‘a form of activity [i.e. 
“conducting”] aiming to shape, guide or affect [i.e. “to conduct”] the conduct [i.e. 
“the actions”] of some person or persons’ (Gordon 1991: 2). What this phrase is 
emphasizing, or so it seems to me, is the distinction that can be drawn, 
conceptually and analytically, between “strategic games between liberties” 
(freedom or an open field of possibilities) and “states of domination” (that which 
is ordinarily called “power”). Or, to be more specific, in names a relation that sits 
between, and thus is related to, games of power and states of domination. Thus, 
for example, whilst the actions of a king torturing and executing a failed assassin 
might correctly be called a state of domination, the desired effect of this act, 
however, is to act upon the actions of others: the spectators of the spectacle. In 
other words, whilst torture, execution, or other forms of overt violence are 
certainly the means by which a sovereign relation of power is exercised, it is also 
more than this, since the aim of the theatre of spectacular might is to conduct the 
conduct of others by acting upon their actions in such a way as to induce in them 
the conducting of their own conduct. Is this, then, an act of sovereignty or an act 
of government? Likewise, disciplinary power, as exemplified by the panoptic 
principle, is an imposition, but it is an imposing that aims to have its effect by 
being conducive to and inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct. It aims 
to produce its effect through the architecturing of a spatio!temporal grid in which 
those subject to it internalize the constrains of power: ‘[h]e who is subjected to a 
field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of 
power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribed in himself 
the relation of power in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes 
the principle of his own subjection’ (Foucault 1977a: 202!203). In other words, this 
is an exercising of a relation of power in which the exercising of that relation, 
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whilst being an imposition, is also taken up and exercised by the one subjected to 
it. That is to say, the conduct of conducts acts upon the actions of others in such a 
way as to be conducive to and inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct. 
Again, is this a disciplinary relation of power or is it a form of government? In 
other words, the phrase “conducting of conducts” both names and describes the 
relation of power, but it does not disclose the “in such a way” of that relation; that 
is to say, it describe the exercising of that relation, but does not disclose the 
techniques and tactics, the processes and procedures, and so forth, that allows for 
that relation to be exercised. 
What is of interest here, then, is not just these strategic games between 
liberties or these states of domination but also the governmental discourses and 
techniques, the governmental technologies that allow for the conducting of 
conducts. Whilst the starting point of such an analytics, the point of departure of 
the analysis, if you will, is the perspective of power as strategic games between 
liberties, and whilst the aim of such an analytics is to disclose how and in what 
ways these strategic games of power congeal or agglutinate and come to form 
states of domination, thus making possible a diagnostics and hence a 
strategization of the present and of present!day forms of subjectivity, the actual 
analytic itself is of the different means by which a power relation is to be 
exercised and that allow for or enable that relation to be exercised. That is to say, 
what an analytics of power analyses are the governmental technologies to be 
deployed and/or employed in governing others; where the term “technology” 
precisely designates the articulation of discourses and techniques or power!
knowledge. This is because it is in, by, and through an analytics of such 
technologies that we are able to distinguish between one modality of exercising a 
relation of power and another, as well as to describe the possible 
institutionalization of such relations, and the effectivity and instrumentalization 
of said relations conceptualized as states of domination. In other words, one 
analyzes the conducting of conducts not in and of itself but by way of an analytics 
of the techniques and discourses that allow its exercise. Such an analytics 
enquires into the programmatic aspect of a technology of power that seeks to 
work out, plan, set!out, and lay!out, and so forth, a spatio!temporal matrix of 
probability (e.g. Foucault 2001d: 341; ‘à aménager la probabilité’, Foucault 2001b: 
1056); what I will call the architecturing of environments of probability or, more 
succinctly, environing environments. To be more specific still, what we need to 
analyze is not just the discourses and techniques, the epistemic and technical 
matrices, but also the thought and rationality not underlying or grounding these 
techniques but inhabiting them: for example, not just the architectural plan, the 
architecting, or the actual architecture of the panopticon, but what we might call 
its architectonics: the grammar, as it were, of these pro!grammes and dia!grams 
for exercising relations of power. 
Relations of government, technologies of government (thought), and 
rationalities of government or governmentalities (to employ the polysemantic term 
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that encapsulates all of these), are as much acquisitive as they are inventive. In 
questioning concerning the methods of exercising a relation of power or arts of 
government—i.e. the architectonics of control—we have to take into account that 
these are not simply unique inventions, but nor are they merely established 
techniques and knowledges applied to new domains. On the contrary, they are 
just as much re!con!figurations as they are figurations and configurations: they 
take elements from here and there, as well as inventing new methods. Historical 
research has the possibility to map out this “here and there”; non!historical 
research of the contemporary, on the other hand, is delimited to mapping out the 
figurations of knowledge and discourse, techniques and tactics, and so forth, 
evidenced in programmes that have as their goal the environing of environments 
of control; that is, of conducting the conduct of others by technologically 
inducing these others to conduct their own conduct. An analytics of government 
or studies of governmentality, then, ‘must distinguish relations of power 
understood as strategic games between liberties—in which some try to determine 
the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be 
determined or try to determine the conduct of the others—and the states of 
domination, which are what is ordinarily called the power’ (Foucault 1997: 299, 
modified). The ways in which it does this is by way of an analytics of 
technologies of power: ‘between games of power and states of domination, you 
have governmental technologies’ (ibid., modified). And an analytics of these 
technologies ‘is necessary, because it is often through such techniques that states 
of domination are established and maintained’ (ibid.). In a moment, we will look 
a little closer a conceptualizing and analyzing the techniques that allow for the 
exercising of a relation of power; that is, not just the conducing of conduct but 
also the arranging of probability. Before this, however, I first want to specify the 
concept and conceptualizations of technology.  
1 Technology  
The differentiations noted above between government and governance, and 
between thought/rationality and mentality, equally apply to how we 
conceptualize and analyze technology vis!à!vis governmental technologies or 
technologies of power. In other words, since we are taking up and working with 
a concept of technology, conceptualized by Foucault as “the articulation of 
certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”, as these 
pertain to conducting the conduct of others, then technology needs to be thought 
precisely in terms of thought and rationality. Consequently, what I want to do 
here is to broach the question of technology and to discuss how this term is not 
delimited to, and thus limited to describing, concrete material devices, 
mechanisms and machines, instruments and apparatuses, appliances of various 
sorts, and so forth. What I want to put forward is the notion that the term 
technology—understood etymological in terms of tekhn#—refers just as much, if 
not more so, to incorporeal contrivances (in the sense of “to devise, invent, 
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design”, “to excogitate”) as it does concrete material contraptions. Another way 
to conceptualize this is by way of a distinction, often made in studies in 
governmentality, between technologies, programmes, and strategies. This 
distinction, derived from Donzelot (1979b) and developed by Gordon (1980), 
proposes that, in undertaking an analysis not of power but in terms of power, ‘it is 
necessary to keep in mind a basic distinction between three…general orders of 
event: that of certain forms of explicit, rational, reflected discourses; that of 
certain non!discursive social and institutional practices; and that of certain effects 
produced within the social field’ (ibid.: 246; see Rose, O#Malley, and Valverde 
2006: 85ff.).  
Whilst I agree with the general thrust and overall logic of Gordon’s 
‘exegetical fiction’ (Gordon 1980: 242), I think that the terminology, and, more 
specifically, the conceptualization of this terminology, can be re!worked to our 
advantage. Specifically, I think that we need to re!think and re!situate the 
concepts of technology. Whilst Gordon conceptualizes these three general orders 
of events in terms of “programmes” (discourse, the discursive, the conceptual), 
“technology” (the non!discursive, the practical, the institutional), and “strategy” 
(real but unintended effects, instrumentalization), I think it more expedient, vis!
à!vis questioning the present from the perspective of itself, to re!think them in 
terms of programmes (articulations), institutionalizations, and instrumentalizations, 
and to conceptualize technology not as one instance in this chain but as 
encapsulating all three levels or orders of events. The reason for this re!naming, 
re!figuring, and re!conceptualizing is that, in taking up Foucault’s 
conceptualization of technology as the articulation of the epistemic and the 
technical, I do not think that technology explicitly and exclusively denotes or, in 
any case, is delimited to describing the realm of the non!discursive. To 
understand technology as referring to the non!discursive, the practical, the 
institutional, and so forth, is to delimit the concept of technology to material 
devices, apparatuses, contraptions, and the like. Rather, I think that the concept 
of technology encapsulates each of these moments: technology in is 
programmatic aspect, technology in its non!discursive institutional aspect, and 
technology in its strategic or instrumental aspect. Moreover, each of these orders 
or levels of events, vis!à!vis technology thus re!conceptualized, have a form of 
rationality specific to it. In addition, in conceptualizing technology in this way, 
and in conceptualizing the programmatic aspect of technology by way of its 
etymological relation to tekhn# (and thus to epist#m#), will enable us to get at what 
I will later call the architectonic aspect of technologies of power; that is, at what 
Donzelot, following Pasquino, called “theory!programmes” (Donzelot 1979b: 77). 
Architectonics, as the ‘programmatic field’ (ibid.: 78) in which we are to work, 
will be mapped out by way of what I will call an architectural analytics. 
Broaching the question concerning technology in this way, allows us to blur the 
distinction, without erasing it, between thinking and doing, thought and practice, 
the material and the incorporeal, and so on.   
157 
 
Thinking this slightly differently, technology should not be delimited to 
institutional and/or non!discursive practices and programmes to the discursive 
and/or conceptual (Gordon 1980: 252). It seems to me that Foucault’s concept of 
technology, conceptualized as the articulation of certain techniques and certain 
kinds of discourses about the subject, or power!knowledge, is a conceptualization 
that precisely seeks to overcome the antinomies of theory and practice. ‘This style 
of research’, Foucault once noted, ‘avoids all problems of anteriority of theory in 
relation to practice, and vice!versa’, and this because it deals ‘with practices, 
institutions, and theories on the same plane and according to their isomorphisms’ 
(Foucault 1998: 262, modified, emphasis added). Placing this conceptualization of 
orders of events in a somewhat different ordering, we can say that they run from 
their formation (from multiple and heterogeneous techniques and discourses: e.g. 
the plague town, schooling, handwriting, handling a rifle, layout of a factory or 
hospital, etc.), to their articulation in specific technological programmes (e.g. 
treaties and reforms concerning penal imprisonment), to the technological 
institutionalization of such programmes (e.g. the prison; discipline), to their real 
(intended and unintended) effects, and, finally, to the technological 
instrumentalization of these effects. Of course, this should not be thought, 
exclusively, as a linear process; rather, what we have are a number of levels or 
orders of events that run simultaneously; sometime conjointly, sometime 
separately; sometime working in tandem, sometime working in opposition; 
sometime moving at the same pace, sometime at different speeds; and so on, and 
forth. 
An analysis of the disjunct between a programme (e.g. panopticon) and its 
implementation and thus institutionalization is what Foucault terms strategics 
(Foucault 2007a: 65): ‘[t]hese programmes don’t take effect in the institutions in 
an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and 
things never work out as planned’ (Foucault 2001d: 231, emphasis added). This 
disjunct, he goes on to note, ‘is not one between the purity of the ideal and the 
disorderly impurity of the real, but that in fact there are different strategies which 
are mutually opposed, composed and superposed so as to produce permanent 
and solid effects which can perfectly well be understood in terms of their 
rationality, even though they don#t conform to the initial programming: this is 
what gives the resulting [dispositive] its solidity and suppleness’ (ibid.: 232). By 
taking up Gordon’s highly accomplished and sophisticated conceptualization, 
vis!à!vis the discursive, the non!discursive, and the effective, but rethinking these 
terms in a way that avoids differentiating between the conceptual (discursive) 
and the practical (non!discursive), or at least thinks these differently, gives us a 
powerful set of tools to be able to think about and analyze the thought and/or 
rationality inhabiting each level or order of events: the programmatic, the 
institutional, and the instrumental. 
As we shall see in a moment, the term “architectonics” is to be used to 
specifically designates the programmatic aspect of technologies of government; 
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that is, what various authorities want or wanted to happen, their “theory!
programmes”; “control” is to be used as a way to materialize—that is, to render 
visible—the exercising of relations of power without substantializing power. One 
reason for proposing the notion of control has been signposted by Donzelot 
(1979b) who, in asking ‘how is one to exorcise this substantialization of power?’, 
replies, ‘[p]erhaps through abandoning this very term power, the trouble with 
which, one can clearly see, is to contain welded to it the idea of an instrument 
and an agent’ (ibid.: 77). As we shall see in the concluding chapter to this part of 
the thesis, the phrase architectonics of control is being taken up and used precisely 
to put forward a conceptualization of instrument as agent and to analyze such 
instruments—techniques and discourses—as being the agent of transformation. 
The distinction that I draw between technologies and programmes, then, is not 
one of kind or general order of events but of formalization and articulation; the 
latter as being but one aspect of the former in which the former articulates 
‘certain forms of explicit, rational, reflected discourses’, ‘discourses which construct 
programmes for the formation of social reality’, ‘discourses whose object!domains are 
defined simultaneously as a target area of intervention and a functioning totality 
to be brought into existence’ (Gordon 1980: 245, emphasis added). What Gordon 
refers to as technologies—“certain non!discursive social and institutional 
practices”—smacks too much of concrete technological devices, of contraptions 
rather than contrivances; the order of historical events that he refers to by means 
of this term would, I think, be much better captured by the concept of 
institutionalization; that is, the concrete implementation and/or material 
instantiation of certain programmatic technologies, their actual take!up in 
institutional settings; or, stated otherwise, the tactical deployment of the 
“articulation of certain techniques and of certain kinds of discourse about the 
subject”. What would be analyzed here is technology in its institutional aspect. 
Technology, thus understood, traverses the discursive/non!discursive 
divide without erasing it; it cuts across and criss!crosses both the discursive 
(conceptual) and the non!discursive (practical); programmes—architectonics—
are explicitly discursive, although, the distinction is not so important here. The 
implementation of a programmatic technology—its institutionalization—also 
criss!crosses the discursive/non!discursive divide; but, again, the distinction is 
not important here. One of the distinctions to be drawn between the discursive 
and the non!discursive is that the latter term ‘is generally applied to every kind 
of more!or!less constrained, learned behaviour’ (Foucault 1980: 197). That is to 
say, ‘[e]verything which functions in a society as a system of constraint and 
which isn’t an utterance, in short, all the field of the non!discursive social, is an 
institution’ (ibid.: 198). Therefore, the only time in which a strong distinction is to 
be drawn between the discursive and the non!discursive, the only time attention 
needs to be paid to it and in which it needs to be analyzed, is when there is a 
disjunct between a technological programme and its deployment or 
institutionalization, and the employment of such a programme in reality, its 
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instrumentalization; that is to say, when things do not work out as planned 
(Foucault 2001d: 231; 1980: 198; Donzelot 1979b: 77!78; Gordon 1980: 251). It is 
this disjunct between the aim or goal—the teleology—of a technological 
programme and its effects in the real that a strategic analysis of the technological 
instrumentalization of the real comes into force.  
Here, we need to separate out and mark a difference between “strategic 
games between liberties”, which are the point of departure for an analytics of 
power, and a “strategic analyses” or strategics, which questions states of 
domination. Concerning the latter, there is no simple direct causal logic between 
a programme, its institutionalization, its effects in the real, and its reintegration 
into the programme by way of instrumentalization. One of the reasons Foucault 
calls what happens “effects” rather than “products” is because the notion of 
“production” implies the intentions of the producer: initial plan, working upon 
material, the means used, and the end product produced, and so forth. However, 
because “things never work out as planned” we should refer to what actually 
materializes in the deployment and employment of a programme not as it 
product but as its real but unintended or unprogrammed effect. The distinction 
that is being drawn here—between an explicit programme and its real world 
effects—is a distinction between what we can call the dispositive and the effective. 
In addition, it also ties in with the conceptualization of a programme as a response 
to an urgent need, that is, as a specific response to a form of problematization 
(see, e.g. Foucault 1980: 194!196), a response that takes the form of a prescriptive 
scheme or plan draw up prior to its execution. Here, the concept of a programme 
is used in the etymological sense of something “written” beforehand (from 
Greek: pro! “before” + graphein “to write”, OED).  
The French term dispositif has an English equivalent that shares the same 
etymology, if not exactly the same broader meaning, as the French. This term is 
the aforementioned dispositive. Both French and English terms are related to the 
Latin disp%n&re: “to put in order, arrange, distribute” (from dis! “apart” + ponere 
“to put, to place”, OED; see also Agamben 2009; Bussolini 2010; Deleuze 1992b). 
The advantage of using this term to translate the French, as opposed to 
“apparatus”, “device”, “deployment”, “set!up”, “social apparatus”, and so forth 
(see the ‘Translator’s Note’ in Foucault 2006b: xxiii), is that it not only denotes 
“disposition” or “appointment”, it also has connotations relating it to 
“disposing” or “inclining”. On the one hand, this term avoids any hard 
distinction between the conceptual and the practical; on the other hand, and in 
the latter sense of “having the function of directing, controlling, or disposing of 
something”, and thus of “relating to direction, control, or disposal”, it is “often 
opposed to effective, and so nearly = preparatory, conducive, contributory” 
(OED). Situating the programmatic aspect of technology or architectonics within 
the dispositive, rather than the effective, both highlights and signposts the ways 
in which such programmes aim to dispose or incline by being preparatory, 
conducive, or contributory to certain dispositions or inclinations. As an aside 
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here, it is interesting to note that Elden (1998) takes Foucault’s concept of dispositif 
‘to be a translation and utilisation of Heidegger#s Ge!stell’ (ibid.: 5; 2001: 110!111; 
see also Agamben 2009: 12ff., who notes the etymological similarity between the 
German stellen and the Latin ponere). I would rather say that Ge!stell refers to the 
positivity of a dispositivity, to the com!posing of a composite which seeks to dis!pose; 
or, stated otherwise, to the placing together of that which is placed together in 
order to place apart (i.e. set!out, laid!out, or arranged), which is to say, to lay!out 
probability. On this view, Foucault’s use of dispositif would seem to have more in 
common with Heidegger’s notion of Bestand—understood in the sense of 
disposing (see Rojcewicz 2006: 83ff.). 
If the concept of positivity refers to that general space of knowledge (savoir) 
in which different discourses come to pose to the same kinds of objects, speak 
from the same styles of enunciative modalities, employ the same forms of 
concepts, and deploy the same types of strategies (Foucault 1972; 1998: 297!333), 
then the concept of dispositivity, in addition to encapsulating the concept of 
positivity and supplementing the epistemic with the technical (Foucault 1980: 196!
197), also moves to the other side of the equation, as it were, and describes what 
various authorities want or wanted to happen. It is called a dispositive when such 
programmes or governmental technologies refer to the same kinds of governable 
objects, seek to govern from the same styles of governmental modalities, employ 
the same forms of governmental techniques, and deploy the same types of 
governmental strategies. In other words, it captures the notion that the exercising 
of relations of power are not only subject to, but are also exercised through and 
by means of conditions of possibility (Gordon 1980): the French dispositif, in 
addition to denoting “device”, “mechanism”, and so forth, also connotes “plan of 
action”. A strategic analysis or strategics (Foucault 1996b) refers to and analyses 
the unintended consequences of the actual deployment and employment of 
technological programmes. That is to say, it analyses the effectivity of a 
dispositivity; not specifically in terms of their particular and practical every!day 
use (analyzed in terms of governance and by way of interpretive methodologies 
or ethnographies), but in terms of their real but unprogrammed effects in, on, and 
upon the real, and in terms of the disjunct between the institutionalization of a 
technological programme, its effects in the real, and the reintegration of the 
effective back into a programme by way of the instrumentalization of the 
effective real (see Gordon 1980: 250ff.).  
It is important here to re!invoke the distinction, made above, between 
governance and government; strategics is still an analytic of government. As 
Gordon notes, ‘the concepts of strategy, programmes, and technologies of power 
serve to analyze not the perfect correspondence between the orders of discourse, 
practices, and effects’—that is, between what I have called a the programmatic, 
the institutional, and the instrumental—‘but the manner in which they fail to 
correspond and the positive significance that can attach to such discrepancies’ 
(ibid.: 247). But as he goes on to state, this discrepancy should not be broached in 
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terms of ‘the gulf between the intentions of a human agent and the results of their 
actions’ (ibid.) but, rather, in terms of this disjuncts ‘real but unprogrammed 
effects’ (ibid.: 248). Lastly, ‘[w]hereas programmes/technologies of power [and 
their institutional deployment] have essentially to do with the formation of the 
social real, strategic activity [i.e. employment] consists in the instrumentalization 
of the real’ (ibid.: 251). In other words, the former are dispositive, whereas the 
latter are effective. As we shall see, because we are questioning the present from 
the perspective of itself, and since we are thus questioning the exercising of 
contemporary relations of power from the perspective of their programmatic or 
architectonic modality, we are, at least to a certain extent, debarred from 
questioning the effective or strategic aspect of technologies of power. Rather, what 
we can question is how such technologies aim to bring into being certain forms of 
existence by structuring certain forms of reality; that is, their dispositivity. Whilst 
the forgoing conceptualization of the dispositive and the effective does not entirely 
accord with Foucault’s use of these terms, since my aim is not to furnish a 
commentary upon Foucault but to put his work to work by manufacturing our 
own tools, and since we are to apply those tools to the present by working in the 
present, this conceptualization does accord with our working in, on, and upon 
the present as the provent and not the emergent. 
2 The  Exercising  of  Relations  of  Power  
As noted, then, in the governmentality literature, government is invariably 
defined as a “conduct of conduct(s)” (notable examples being: Dean 1999; 
Donzelot 2008; Gordon 1991; Hindess 1997; Lemke 2012; Nadesan 2008; Rose 
1999; Walters 2012). This description of government seems to have been taken up 
from Foucault’s 1978 Collège de France lecture on ‘Governmentality’ (Foucault 
1991b; see also 2007b, 2008a), and propagated by Gordon’s (1991) influential 
introduction to The Foucault Effect: ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’. 
There is, however, another instance in which Foucault conceptualizes the exercise 
of power not only in term of the form of its relation (conducting conduct) but also 
in terms of the forms of techniques that allow for that relation to be exercised 
(what I will call environing environments). In the original French, this sentance 
reads: ‘L’exercice du pouvoir consiste à «conduire des conduites» et à aménager la 
probabilité’ (Foucault 2001b: 1056). The sentence comes from the essay ‘The 
Subject and Power’. Now, there are two things to note about this essay. The first 
is that this essay was written by Foucault to help clarify his work on power to an 
American audience and, in that sense, can be read as something like a definitive 
statement on the subject of power (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: xiii; see also 
Gordon 2001: xii). The second point is that this essay consists of two parts: ‘Why 
Study Power: The Question of the Subject’ and ‘How Is Power Exercised?’ The 
first part of the essay was written by Foucault in English; the second part, 
however, was originally written in French and then translated into English for 
publication in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s (1983) book on Foucault (see Foucault 
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1982: 777n). The sentence just cited comes from the second part of the essay; 
which is to say, it was originally written in French.   
There are two alternative versions of this sentence available in English 
translation: The first reads, ‘[t]he exercise of power consists in guiding the 
possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’ (Foucault 1982: 
789; 1983c: 221). The second reads, ‘[t]he exercise of power is a “conduct of 
conducts” and a management of possibilities’ (Foucault 2001d: 341). As noted, 
the first part of this conceptualization (the ubiquitous “conduct of conduct(s)”, 
“guiding the possibility of conduct”) has been chiefly taken up and developed by 
studies in governmentality. The second part of the sentence (“putting in order the 
possible outcomes”, “managing possibilities”), however, whilst perhaps implicit 
in some studies in governmentality, has tended to be almost universally ignored. 
I have, for example, come across just three instance of its full citation (Dean 2007: 
82; Kelly 2009: 66; Rayner 2007: 106). Yet ever here, the second part of the 
conception has been passed over without further discussion. But it is here, I 
think, that we find Foucault at his most interesting and insightful. 
I translate this sentence as ‘The exercise of power consists in “conducting 
conducts” and in arranging (setting!out, laying!out) probability’. There are three 
things to note here. Firstly, note that in my modified translation that in exercising 
a relation of power that that exercise “consist in” (consiste à) as a practice and not 
“consist of” as a substance. The second point to note is that the term aménager, as 
a transitive verb, has the sense of “to fit out” an office”; “to lay out a park”; “to 
develop or redevelop (renovate) an area”; “to plan or to work out a timetable”; to equip, 
to furnish, and so forth; thus aménager has the sense of arranging things: space, 
time, matter. The third point to note is that in the original French, Foucault does 
not talk about “putting in order the possible outcome” or “managing possibilities”. 
Rather, what is stated there is the “laying!out” or “working!out” of probability. 
Note here that the term probability is singular (probabilité) not plural; this 
signposts it as a technical term, and relates it to inductive reasoning and 
statistical inference. 
Now, to say that something is possible means that it could happen (from 
Latin possibilit"s, from possibilis: “that can be done”, from posse: “be able”; OED). 
It is not to say that it will happen or that it is likely to happen, it just states that it 
is possible or that it is not impossible. By way of contrast, to say that something is 
probable is to say that it is more likely to happen than not; in other words, 
probability is a measure of the likeliness that an event will occur. Bearing in mind 
that etymology is being used here as a way of building nominal concepts, 
etymologically speaking, probability (from Latin prob"bilit"tem) derives from 
probable (from Latin prob"bilis) which has connotations of being “worthy of 
approval”, “pleasing”, “agreeable”, “acceptable”, and so forth (OED). So, as a 
technical term, which is to say as an analytical and conceptual term, probability 
not only denotes “likely to happen” but also connotes “likely to happen in an 
acceptable way”. To “manage possibilities”, then, would be to create the 
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conditions in which something could take place, to make it that it can happen. To 
“set!out, lay!out, or work!out probability”, on the other hand, is to attempt to 
structure things in such a way as to not only increase the likelihood that 
something will in fact take place or that it is likely that it will happen, it is to 
arrange or organize things in such a way as to make it more!or!less certain—in all 
probability—that it will happen, and that it will happen in the planned for way, 
which is to say, in an acceptable way. Hence, “managing possibilities” and 
“arranging probability” connote two very different modes of thought and to 
fundamentally different sets of practices. On this view, and working within the 
framework of the latter, the exercising of a relation of power consists in a practice 
that attempts to conduct the conduct of others by arranging things in such a way 
as to increase the probability that certain prescribed and approved forms of 
conduct will come into being.  
Since this is the only place in which Foucault formulates things in exactly 
this way, I do not think we can read too much into this vis!à!vis Foucault 
scholarship (although Foucault used the term aménager, or various conjugations 
thereof—aménagé, aménagement, aménageait, etc.—, throughout his writings); I do, 
however, think that we can take up this conceptualization and use it as an 
analytic for broaching the question concerning the architectonics of control. 
Here, then, we can conceptualize the exercising of relations of power as 
conducting conducts and setting!out or laying!out probability. Stated otherwise, we 
can say that the architectonic aspect of control names the organization of things 
(reconfiguring the space!time!matter of environments) in order to guide or direct 
the ways in which others conduct themselves, and to do so in such a way that 
certain forms of conduct are more likely to be produced than other inappropriate 
or less appropriate forms of behaviour. In other words, power does not act 
directly and immediately upon bodies (Foucault, 2001b, p. 340); rather, it acts 
upon others indirectly, mediatively, kinetically, synæsthetically, cybernetically, 
and so forth, by way of environments (e.g. the panoptic mechanism). In fact, we 
could say that government is that action that shapes, transforms, or reconfigures 
an open field of possibilities (freedom, in Foucault sense of this term) into a 
delimited, demarcated, or more!or!less circumscribed field of probability; a field in 
which action, thus acted upon, becomes more!or!less probable. Re!figuring this 
conceptualization of power, then, we could say that the exercising of relations of 
power consist in conducting conducts and in environing environments; it is this 
formulation that I shall employ from now on.  
Exercising a relation of power, conceptualized thus, then, is not determinate 
and deductive, as with sovereign and juridico!political power; but nor is it 
imposing and reductive, as in the case of discipline and anatamo!political power; 
rather, it is conducive and inductive; it is, in short, dispositive. Specifically, 
conducting the conduct of others is only possible—and can only be said to 
constitute a relation of control—when those others whose actions are to be acted 
upon or whose conduct is to be conducted are potentially free to act and conduct 
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themselves. An architectonics of control names those prescriptive discourses that 
attempt to dispose or incline by transform an open field of possibilities into a 
closed or more!or!less circumscribed field of probability; that is by architecting or 
environing environments of control.  
Hence, the full characterization of the exercising of relations of power, as 
conceptualized here, is that it consists in “conducting conducts” and it consist in 
“environing environments”: not just governmentality but also environmentality. It 
is this aménagement (and réaménagement), this arrangement or organization (or 
reorganization or reworking), this architecting or environing environments of 
probability, this environmentality of governmentality that the term architectonics 
nominally conceptualizes and catachrestically names. Control is a way of looking 
at human relations in which some attempt to conduct the conduct of others; 
architectonics—or the rationality of environing environments as a means of 
conducting conducts—names the field in which we are to work when doing 
field!work in the contemporary by way of an architectural analytics of control. 
3 Problematizations  and  Programmes  
As Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke (2011a) note, programmes of power, 
government, or control, and so forth, ‘are both descriptive and prescriptive’ (ibid.: 
11, emphasis added). On the one hand, ‘they always presume a reality that they 
describe and problematize’ (ibid.); on the other hand, they conceptualize said 
reality ‘as a target area for intervention and a functioning totality to be brought 
into existence’ (Gordon 1980: 245). That is to say, they both describe what is, and 
prescribe what will be; which is to say, what they want to happen. Now, although 
such discursive and technical programmes are ‘practical rationalit[ies] governed 
by a conscious goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364), they are not to be questioned by way 
of consciousness—neither that of the programmers nor that of those whose 
conduct they intend to programme: ‘relations of power are simultaneously [à la 
fois] intentional and non!subjective’ (Foucault 1978: 94, modified). In other words, 
an analysis of programmes is neither ideology critique nor a critique of 
hegemony. That is to say, it has nothing to do with unmasking the truth, nor with 
deconstructing the sematic embedding of words, nor with uncovering the fixing 
of meaning, nor with unpacking how ideas insidiously insert themselves into 
consciousness. On the one hand, in talking of programmes, the focus of interest is 
not on the so!called programmer—that is, on the biography, psychology, or social 
context, and so forth, of the one who programmes: the programmist, architect, or 
chief builder (see Foucault 1991a: 60!61). On the other hand, such an enquiry 
does not presuppose that human behaviour can actually, definitely, and 
definitively be programmed or even that it is programmable. As Miller and Rose 
(2008) put it, the effects of such programmes are ‘not the “realization” of a 
programmer’s dream’, and this because ‘[t]he “real” always insists in the form of 
resistance to programming; and the programmer’s world is one of constant 
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experiment, invention, failure, critique and adjustment’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 
39).  
Rather, in enquiring into the descriptive, prescriptive, and codifying 
elements of a programme, what we are interested in are their architectonics and 
the ways in which such technologies attempt or, rather, propose to programme 
human conduct by programming, architecting, or environing environments. 
What I am interested in or, rather, what I am proposing we investigate are the 
programmatic elements of such programmings: the different and differential ways 
in which they place together what is placed together in order to be placed apart; 
their savoir, the thought they embody or that inhabits them; the knowledges they 
draw upon or employ; their logical and calculative rationale, vis!à!vis techniques; 
and the like. Here, the term “programme” accords with the sense of the word 
that emerged in the early nineteenth century of “a definite plan or scheme” 
(OED); it describes the codified and prescriptive discursivities, schematics, 
and/or diagrammatics that set!out or lay!out not only what is to follow (i.e. what is 
to be known and what is to be done) but also what is to be brought forth into 
existence (the formation of the real). Principally, since we are questioning human 
relations in terms of power, and since power is being conceptualized as 
government—that is, in terms of strategic relations of power and the tactics that 
enable those relations to be exercised, tactics or techniques that do not act directly 
or immediately upon bodies but act upon actions by way of environing 
environments—what I am interested in are those ‘discourses which construct 
programmes for the formation of a social reality’ (Gordon 1980: 245). For whilst 
we most certainly do not live programmed lives, let alone live in a programmed 
world, we do, nonetheless, ‘live in a world of programmes’ (ibid.). And whilst 
things may not turn out as planned, these dispositional technological 
programmes nevertheless have real!world effects.  
On this view, a relation of power is not A getting B to do something that B 
would otherwise not do; rather, the exercising of a relation of power or, in any 
case, the programmes that set forth such exercise, are “world” making…: ‘[i]f we 
say that all human practices are possible only within relations and subject to 
conditions which are only finitely modifiable at a given point and time, then the 
exercise of [relations of] power can be conceived as the general aspect of practice 
within which these relations and conditions function as a material and a terrain 
of operation’ (ibid.: 246!246, emphasis added). Power is exercised through and by 
means of conditions of possibility to the extent that the exercising of a relation of 
power aims to work upon an open field of possibilities so as to re!configure it 
into a closed, delimited, or, in any case, more or less circumscribed—i.e. 
environed—field of probability: power not only constrains; it enables. Hence, 
what we are questioning when we question concerning architectonics are the 
tactical techniques, the setting!out or laying!out—the aménagement—that works 
open possibilities into pre!defined probability; that is to say, of probable action, 
conduct, deportment, comportment, and so forth .  
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What we have to avoid in analyzing programmes of power by way of field!
work in contemporary architectonics of control are what Gordon calls ‘two 
massive illusions or paralogisms’ (Gordon 1980: 246). The first is the ‘illusion of 
realisation’; the second the ‘illusion of effectivity’ (see the discussion on page 13 
above). One the one hand, we have to beware the pitfalls of conflating 
programmes with the domain of actual techniques; on the other hand, we 
likewise have to beware the supposition that these techniques are actually 
implemented and enforced upon a pre!given real. This is by no means to say that 
programmes are never actually deployed, nor is it to say that they are never 
employed. Rather, it is to acknowledge that ‘things never work out as planned’ 
(Foucault 2001d: 231, emphasis added), and to follow through on the 
implications of this in our analysis. Now, whilst it is possible to account for the 
actual practical and institutional deployment and employment of technologies of 
power and their forms of realization and effectivity genealogically (taken as a 
history of the present), it is not possible to do so—or, in any event, our ability to 
do so is severely limited—when questioning contemporary architectonics of 
control from the perspective of their, and thus of our own, present. This is simply 
because these programmes are, as it were, in!formation or in!process; they are 
what is taking place now, and not something that is more or less and for the most 
part over and done with; they are provent (problematizations) and dispositional 
(programmatic), not “emergent” and “effective”. 
In addition to the above, we also need to recognized that 
programmes/architectonics not only lay!out what is to be done (viz. techniques 
for bringing into being the political order conducive to the “good life”), they also 
set!out what is—to be—known (viz. discourse concerning and the nature of 
“human nature” and thus the very conceptualization of the “good life”): ‘[e]very 
programme…either articulates or presupposes a knowledge of the field of reality 
upon which it is to intervene and/or which it is calculated to bring into being. The 
common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is and must be a power 
which knows the objects upon which it is exercised…[and] the condition that 
programmatic knowledge must satisfy is that it renders reality in the form of an 
object which is programmable’ (Gordon 1980: 248). This is the principle question: 
“How do programmes of control seek to architecture or environ reality?” “How 
do they render matter into a material form that is thought to be programmable 
and thus controllable?” “How is the fabric of the world to be woven not only into 
a material that is governable but also into a materiality that governs?” More 
specifically, “how are these materialities made thinkable in terms of 
government?” “What are the ways of seeing and saying and thinking and doing 
that transform beings into entities, entities which are then taken to be 
programmable and thus governable?” And “how are these ways of rendering 
visible, and so forth, articulated with techniques of control vis!à!vis technologies 
of power?” “What is the relation between something being made thinkable as 
governable/controllable and the articulation of techniques of 
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government/control?” That is to say, “how are they made thinkable in terms of 
government (calculable, accountable, administrable, rationalizable, actionable, 
conductive, inductive, etc.), and thus how are they thought governmentally in 
terms of arts of government?” 
Architecture here not only signposts ‘the art or science of building or 
constructing edifices of any kind for human use’ (OED 2009), it also designates 
the art of constructing such edifices for the use of humans or, at least, for 
directing—i.e. programming—their conduct. “How does environing 
environments seek to programme not only conduct but also the conducting of 
one’s own conduct?” In fact, one could say that it is through constructions for 
human use that such constructions make use of humans, and do so in specific 
sorts of ways. The use of the term “architecture” (and derivations thereof) is 
being used here not only with reference to the kind of analytics that Foucault 
practiced in relation to his analysis of Bentham’s architectural plan for a house of 
inspection—minus, that is, an analysis of its historical emergence—but also to 
maintain a link to that analytic being an archaeology of the domain of technology 
(i.e. the arkh# and the tekhn# of that analysis). In calling the programmatic element 
of technologies of power the architectonics of control, I want to do two things. 
Firstly, in calling programmes or the programmatic aspect of technology 
“architectonics”, I want to draw attention not only to rules of conduct, and so on, 
but also to its programmatic element, to the sense of laying out, of setting things 
out, arranging, and so on, planning, schematizing, systematizing, and so forth: 
organizing. Secondly, in calling the exercising of relations of power “control”, I 
want to emphasise that what we are questioning concerning are contemporary 
programmes of power that are in!process or in!formation; that is to say, that are 
not yet settled, fully realized, established or instituted, or effective and 
instrumentalized. 
An architectural analytics of programmes of power or field!work in the 
architectonics of control is neither ontological nor existential; or, rather, it is only 
either of these to the extent that the reason of programmes is the architecturing of 
the real or the environing of environments or existential contextures. That is to say, 
to the extent that they aim to bring into being not total institutions but 
circumscribed environments, environments that not only constrain but also, and 
through the very act of constraint, environ horizons of possibility that structures 
existential probability; not just conditions of existence but also forms of existence 
that are synergetic, symbiotic, and, more specifically, symbiotrophic with such 
conditions. Thinking this through by paraphrasing Butler’s (2004) statement to 
the effect that “to be governed is not to have a form imposed upon one’s existence, 
but to be given the very terms within which certain forms of existence will be 
more or less probable”, whilst a more ontologically orientated study might 
attempt to look at existence delimited by these terms (perhaps taking the terms for 
granted), an architectural analytics looks at the giving of these terms themselves 
and the forms of existence they imply. 
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But what do we mean, explicitly, by programmes of power or of 
government or, more specifically, by the programmatic/architectonic aspect of 
such programmes? It is questionable that there can be a “government of things” 
in the sense of government used here. Since government is being understood as 
the human conducting of human conduct so as to get humans to conduct 
themselves, it implies not only a question of will but also of reflective practices. 
Since inanimate matter has no will and cannot reflect upon its own actions one 
cannot really govern things in this sense of the term (although see Callon 1986). It 
is also questionable that we can talk of a “government of non!human animals”, 
since although animals have a type of will in that they can be stubborn and resist, 
and so forth, it is questionable to what extent they are able to reflect upon their 
own actions in the way that we humans can (i.e. it is reflexive rather than 
reflective). On this view, Barad (2007), for example, is correct in calling the work 
of Foucault and others—most notably Butler—anthropocentric, but this is not 
quite the put!down she intends. It is anthropocentric in that it is concerned with 
how and in what ways human beings have attempted to understand and to 
govern themselves. This does not mean that such analyses are anthropological 
(philosophical) since the mode of description does not pass through the 
consciousness of human beings, nor does it mean that non!human actants—
sentient or non!sentient, animate or inanimate—are not taken into consideration. 
What it does mean is that what we are questioning is the human understanding 
of human being vis!à!vis the human will to govern human beings. What we are 
concerned with are discourses that concern themselves with and are expressive 
of understandings of the nature of human nature and the political order 
conducive to the good life. What this does not mean is attempting to put forward 
an understanding of what we are, of what the world is, and of what we are in the 
world thus understood. On the contrary, we are concerned with unpacking and 
describing just such understandings, not with producing them. That is to say, 
what we are questioning concern is technology, not ontology, it is technological 
not ontological; or it is only ontological to the extent that it is technological: not 
“what is?” but “what is made and what went into its making?” or “how what is 
came to be”: a historical ontology of ourselves.  
Government here is not only related to those relations of power that aim to 
govern what we might call the marginalized (i.e. the abnormal, the indigent, the 
indolent etc.), nor is it explicitly and exclusively tied to political sovereignty and 
the state (the narrow concept of government); rather, the broader 
conceptualization of government and governmentality employed here connotes 
all those practices in, by, and through which some attempt to get others to 
conduct themselves in particular, delimited, and specified—i.e. in probabilistic—
ways. Programmes, being expressive of discourses concerning the nature of 
human nature and the political order conducive to the good life, cover a broad 
spectrum of practices and knowledges that deal with the government of oneself 
and others. Whilst programmes are discursive, they are not exclusively verbal or 
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textural: they concern any practice—discursive or not—that is dispositional; 
which is to say, that is preparatory or contributory to disposing or inclining, that 
is inducive or conducive, and so on, and so forth. Such discourses may be 
prescriptive texts concerning, for example, a plan for social housing, the design of 
a shopping centre, or the laying!out of an office, as these plans, designs, laying!
outs, and so forth, concern attempts to structure, direct, guide, or lead the actions 
and/or conducts of others.  
But these discourses could just as easily concern the actual building, 
structure, or layout of these and other environments. Such environments not only 
include physical structures, planned or built, but also less tangible structures 
such as systems of classification, accounting, evaluating, promotion, insurance, 
taxation, consumptions, and so on, and so forth. Systems that whilst appearing 
less tangible are nevertheless equally material and practical. What we are 
concerned with here, though, is the thought or rationality—calculative, 
instrumental, technical, etc.—inhabiting these discourses, and not peoples actual 
behaviour (the ways in which we go about our everyday lives when we act, react, 
or interact with and within such environments). What we are concerned with, in 
questioning concerning the architectonics of control, are not the realizations and 
effectivities of such discourses (the emergent), which would require a more 
historically orientated form of enquiry, but rejoinders to problems that take the 
form of explicit programmes (Foucault 2001a: 225, 229ff.). It is these programmes of 
power that the phrase architectonics of control proximally and catachrestically 
names and nominalistically conceptualizes. Genealogy, when it questions both 
provenance and emergence historically, is concerned with the material and 
practical conditions of possibility of thought (provenance) and the material and 
practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made possible (emergence). What 
we are concerned with, in question the exercising of contemporary relations of 
power from the perspective of the provent present, is thought itself; that is, the act 
that posits a subject and an object and the possible relations between them, and 
the rationality (the reasoning and the rationale) inhabiting explicit programmes—
discourses, techniques, tactics, etc.—of control in, by, and through which 
governors (subject) aim to govern (are related to) the governed (object). 
Moreover, because such programmes are both descriptive and prescriptive, they are 
disclosive of certain conceptualizations concerning both what we are (ceasing to 
be) and thus that which we are (in the process of becoming).  
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IV.  AN  ARCHITECTURAL  ANALYTICS  
To be governed is not…to have a form imposed upon one's 
existence, but to be given the [very] terms within which 
existence will and will not be possible. 
(Butler 'What is Critique?') 
The discourses that Foucault analyzed when researching the exercising of 
relations of power were, for the most part, either descriptive or, more specifically, 
prescriptive discourses (see, e.g. Foucault 1985: 12). That is to say, they were 
either descriptions describing what was done or, much more frequently, 
prescriptions and codifications prescribing what was to be done, what could, 
should, or ought to be done, and so on, and codifying what was or what was to 
be known, and so forth, vis!à!vis conducting the conducts of others (Foucault 
2001d: 223!238, passim). Even in describing descriptions of what was actually 
done—i.e. a “hysteric” being subjected to a ten!month routine of twelve hour 
daily baths (Foucault 1973: ix), the torture and execution of a “regicide” (Foucault 
1977a: 3!6), or a “madmen” being subjected to cold showers (Foucault 2007a: 147!
148), etc.—these tend to be analyzed not in terms of the biographies, 
psychologies, or the political, social, and/or economic contexts of the persons 
involved, nor in terms of the meanings that such actors attribute to their actions 
or that can be attributed to their actions, and so forth, but it terms of the specific 
techniques used, the type of knowledge involved or produced, and the particular 
ends sought. These descriptions and/or prescriptions, then, are analyzed in terms 
of the different means by which they, in attempting to conduct the conduct of 
others, arranged, laid!out, or fitted!out environments of probability. That is to 
say, Foucault’s analytic of power—which is not an analysis of power, but analyses 
done in terms of power—deals with prescriptive processes or procedures or, 
perhaps more accurately, with the discourses and techniques embodied in or within 
what Foucault called practices; discursive or not. Such procedures or practices can 
be anything from the aforementioned subjections to the arrangement of beds in a 
hospital to the opening up of a few corpses in pathological anatomy; from the 
layout of a military camp to the correct posture for handwriting or the cellularity 
of monastic life; from practices of examination, judgement, and ranking to an 
architectural plan for a house of inspections; from procedures of confession and 
therapeutics to techniques of self; and so on and so forth.  
The ways in which Foucault analyzes such descriptive and prescriptive 
discourses is by drawing out or disclosing the thought (subject/object) and/or 
rationality (reason) inhabiting such procedures or practices. That is to say, an 
analytic of power deals with the immanent materiality of rationality. That is not to 
say that it views ideas as matter or ideality as materiality. What it implies is two 
things: Firstly, it signpost a form of enquiry that examines the material and 
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practical—i.e. social, economic, political, and so forth—conditions of possibility 
not of consciousness or behaviour but of thought itself. Secondly, it views all 
such ideality, knowledge, thought, rationality, and so on, as inhabiting material 
practices and thus as being embodied in specific materialities (see, e.g. Dean 
1996). What Foucault questions when questioning thought and its rationality is 
not “who was thinking”, “what they thought”, or “how it was possible for them to 
think what they thought”, and so forth (Foucault 1991a: 59). Rather, what is 
questioned is the very fact that there was/is thought, and that thought is a thing 
of this world. More specifically, in questioning thought historically, Foucault asks 
how is it that what was thought was thought and not something else. Thus, for 
example, when Foucault poses the question “who is speaking?” this “who” is not 
being posed in terms of a person’s biography, psychology, and so forth, but it 
terms of the condition to which they are subject, they status they must have, the 
position they must occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a 
legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [connaissance], in order to be 
able to say what they say, to do what they do, and in order to have what they say 
and do accepted (see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459). Posing the question of thought and 
its rationality in this way is to look at both the material and practical conditions 
of possibility of thought and rationality on the one hand, and to look at the 
material and practical conditions that thought and rationality, thus thought and 
rationalized, made or makes possible on the other: ‘I study things like a 
psychiatric asylum, the forms of constraint, exclusion, elimination, 
disqualification, let us say, the reason that is always precisely embodied, embodied in 
the form of a doctor, a medical knowledge, a medical institution, etc., exercised 
on madness, illness, un!reason, etc., what I study is an architecture, a spatial 
disposition, what I study are the disciplinary techniques, the modalities of 
training, the forms of surveillance, still in much too broad terms, but… what are 
the practices that one puts in play in order to govern men, that is, to obtain from them a 
certain way of conducting themselves?’ (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 105, 
emphases added).  
Bookended by this mode of rendering visible, which I have previously 
called genealogical, is an analytic of thought and/or rationality itself. In relation 
to an analytics of power, this latter archaeological mode of enquiry addresses 
itself to an analytics of explicit programmes that are responses or rejoinders to 
specific forms of problematization. Regarding an analytics of programmes of 
power or governmentalities, this archaeology of problematizations examines the 
practices that are to be put into play in order to govern human beings; it studies 
the government of human beings by looking at the government of human being. 
Note here that to govern human being is not to have power over others; it is to 
exercise a relation of power in such a way as to induce in said others certain forms 
of conduct; that is, certain forms of human beings conducting their own conduct. 
In questioning technological programmes of power, such an analytics ask what 
thought (subject/object) inhabits such prescriptions, and how are such 
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prescriptive practices rationalized (reason, rationale, rationality)? Such an 
approach questions thought and rationality not in terms of how they ground or 
undergird such practices, but how they inhabit them: “What thought and reason 
are embodied in a specific “practice” of government? “What is the rationality 
inhabiting a specific “art” of government?” Or simply put: “What is their 
governmentality?” 
In thinking through some questions of method, vis!à!vis rendering visible 
the programmatic aspects of contemporary technologies of power from the 
perspective of the provent present and its forms of problematizations, I have 
called the specific field in which we are to work the architectonics of control. As 
noted, control names the form or modality of the relational aspect of a relation of 
power to be brought into existence (conducting conducts); architectonics names 
the prescriptive or programmatic aspect of technologies of power, the techniques 
that will allow for a relation of power to be brought into existence and thus 
exercised (arranging probability or environing environments). Since I have called 
the domain in which we are to work, analytically, the “architectonics of control”, it 
follows that an analytics thereof can be called an architectural analytics. It is to a 
discussion of this form of analysis that we now turn. 
1 Field!work  in  the  Present  
I have called the field in which we are to work, then, architectonics and the 
analytics of this domain an architectural analytics, and I have do so not only 
because the two elements that make up these terms (architect: from Greek 
arkhitekton) maintains a link to both archaeology (arkhi from arkh#) and technology 
(tekton from tekhn#), but also because the former relates to questions of power 
(arkhein: “to rule”) whilst the latter relates to both fabrication and art (tek!: “to 
weave, to fabricate, to make”; tekton: “builder, carpenter”; tekhn#: “art”) and to 
the theoretical praxis linked to these (OED ; see Heidegger 1977: 12!13; see also 
Sandywell 1996, on tekhn#: 118!119, and arkh#: 142!146). That is to say, the arkhi of 
architectonics relates to conducting conducts and the thought inhabiting such 
positing, whilst the tekton of architectonics relates to environing (i.e. fabricating or 
architecting) environments of probability and the rationality or rationalities 
inhabiting such a practice. In addition, these terms signpost that what we are 
questioning concerning is not just the epistemic nor merely the technical but their 
joint articulation, one upon the other. An architectural analytics of the 
architectonic of control, then, aims to render visible and thus intelligible the arkh# 
and the tekhn# inhering in and/or embodied by programmes of control. These and 
associated terms are being taken up and used so as to both differentiate what we 
are doing from Foucault’s and other’s historical analytics, diagnostic, and 
strategic, but also to maintain a link with and/or connection to such historical 
work.  
In questioning these descriptive, prescriptive, and codifying discourses, 
what we are to question are the different and differential ways in which they 
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conceptualize a domain that is simultaneously a problem space, a target area of 
intervention, and a functioning environmentality to be brought into existence. It 
is the prescriptive and codifying aspect of technologies of government—their 
programmes—, and their aim to build environments (the conditions of existence 
we are to be given) that are both the ends and the means of the governmentalities 
we are to question and that I am calling their architectonics. Environments here 
are not just geometric or geographical spaces to be produced; they are “worlds” 
to be brought into existence. On this view, they are akin to what Heidegger called 
an ‘equipmental contexture’ (Heidegger 1982: 162ff., 293ff., 303ff.), or what we can 
call an existential contexture: they are environments that seek to set!out, lay!out, 
or arrange horizons of probability. The aim of an architectural analytics of the 
architectonic of control, then, is to render visible this contexture and the forms of 
existence it seeks to make probable. Rather than think of architecture as 
pertaining to or denoting the master!builder (the grand architect; i.e. Bentham), I 
would rather think of it in terms of or as connoting the laying!out of techniques 
of control (political order), discourses about the subject (i.e. knowledge of “man” 
and the nature of human nature), and the kinds of worlds they seek to make (the 
“good life”): given a certain knowledge of “man” and of the nature of “his” 
nature, what constitutes the “good life”; given this knowledge and this nature 
and thus this form of life, what constitutes the political order (techniques of 
control) that will be conducive to actualizing that nature and thus realizing that 
life. 
As an analytic, the “method” by which such discourses are to be 
interrogated seeks to breakdown, to dissolve the techniques (pouvoir) and 
knowledges (savoirs) that are both drawn together and that are to be drawn 
together and set apart in the prescriptive building or architecting of such 
environments. The reason for putting things in this way, for employing this kind 
of terminology, is, at least in part, to overcome, by clarification, the kinds of 
reading that read into the work of Foucault, for example, a conflation between 
what certain persons, groups, authorities, institutions, and so forth, want to 
happen and what may actually transpire. In referring to these codifications and 
prescriptions which codify and prescribe what is to be known and what is to be 
done as the architectonics of control, I aim to signpost the fact that these are 
theoreticians schemas, political blueprints, governmental diagrams, and so forth, 
whose aim is not only to govern but to govern how things transpire and to 
increase the likelihood that what will transpire will do so within a certain 
bandwidth of acceptability (see the first lecture in Foucault 2007b). In short, they 
are provent, problematizing, and programmatic; which is to say, they are not yet, 
and may never be, emergent, effective, let alone present or actual.   
In questioning concerning the exercising of a relation of power, it is 
important to remember that this is just one aspects of Foucault’s broader critical 
and effective historical ontology of ourselves. In ‘The Subjects and Power’, for 
instance, Foucault notes that his project, conceptualized as a genealogy of the 
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subject, was to undertake ‘a history of the different modes of subjectivation of 
human being in our culture’ (Foucault 2001d: 326, modified). Foucault goes onto 
note that he looked at ‘three modes of objectivation that transform human beings 
into subjects’ (ibid, modified): the objectification of the subject in the discursive 
practices of the human sciences (Foucault 1970); the objectification/objectivation 
of the subject in the dividing practices of the asylum (Foucault 2006a), the clinic 
(Foucault 1973), and the prison (Foucault 1977a); and the objectivation of the 
subject by themselves in practices of self (Foucault 1985, 1986). In other words, 
Foucault questioned three modes of subjectification and/or subjectivation by 
analyzing three modes of objectification and/or objectivation: knowledge, 
relations of power, and relation to self. Foucault referred to the inter!relationality 
of these three modes of subjectivation as a ‘matrix of experience’ (Foucault 1997: 
204), and suggested that whilst it is possible to analyse each aspect separately, in 
doing so, the other two elements should be constantly borne in mind. In short, an 
effective ontology of ourselves should examine all three relata, though not 
necessarily in equal measure. 
2 The  Archaeological  Four!Fold  
In thinking about how to question the architectonics of control architecturally, I 
want to put forward two sets of correlations. Bearing in mind that the aim of 
Foucault’s project was a genealogy of the subject, that the method was an archaeology 
of knowledge, and that the domain of analysis was technology, by which he meant 
the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject, I 
want to propose the following. Firstly, I want to suggest that there is a certain 
correlation between the different ways in which Foucault questioned knowledge, 
power, and ethics (Foucault 1972, 1978, 1985); secondly, I want to suggest that 
there is a certain correspondence between the ways in which Foucault questioned 
these three domains and the Aristotelian four!fold of obligation (Aristotle 1992) 
and thus the Heideggerian four!fold of technology (Heidegger 1977). In thinking 
these correlations through each other, I then want to see how this can be 
“applied” to doing an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, 
where control is to be questioned from the perspective of to!day. In this section, 
we will look at the correlation between the different ways in which Foucault 
questioned knowledge, power, and ethics; in the concluding section that follows, 
we will then see how this corresponds to the Aristotelian/Heideggerian four!fold 
on the one hand, and how it can be applied in undertaking an analytics of the 
contemporary on the other. 
 Knowledge  
In The Archaeology, in looking back over the work he had previously undertaken 
(i.e. Foucault 2006a; 1973, and; 1970, respectively), Foucault put forward four 
rules of discursive formation. These concern: (1) the formation of objects, which 
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maps out ‘the displacement of boundaries which define the field of possible 
objects’ (Foucault 1991a: 56); (2) the formation of enunciative modalities, which 
details ‘the new position and role occupied by the speaking subject in discourse’ 
(ibid); (3) the formation of concepts, which designates ‘a new mode of functioning 
of language with respect to objects’ (ibid.: 57); and (4) the formation of what 
Foucault called strategies, which illustrates ‘a new form of localization and 
circulation of discourse within society’ (ibid.; for references to The Archaeology, 
see the citations on page 93 above). What these four rules of formation were 
designed to evidence where the material, practical, and discursive conditions of 
possibility—the concrete and historical a priori—for the formation of discursive 
formations; of how a heterogeneous multiplicity, in its dispersion, came to form a 
positivity (savoir), and thus a discursive formation, and therefore the formation of 
certain “sciences”  (connaissance) (for a shorter version of this, see Foucault 1998: 
297!333). The rule of the formation of objects describes the surfaces of emergence, 
the authorities of delimitation, and the grids of specification, which gave a discursive 
formations its objects (Foucault 1972: 40!42). The rule of the formation of 
enunciative modalities looks at the formation of a certain style of speaking; it 
describes who is speaking, the institutional sites from which they speak, and the 
relation of subjects to objects (ibid.: 50!53). The rule of the formation of concepts 
look at how a number of different discourses come to employ the same kinds of 
concepts; it describes their forms of succession, their forms of coexistence, and their 
procedures of intervention (ibid.: 56!59). Lastly, the rule of the formation of 
strategies looks at the construction of a common theme or thematic; it looks at the 
points of diffraction of discourse, at the economy of the discursive constellation, and at 
the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non!
discursive practices (ibid.: 64!68).  
I do not want to go into a detailed discussion here of the labyrinthine 
arguments put forward in The Archaeology (for such an extended discussion, see, 
e.g. Cousins and Hussain 1984; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Gutting 1989; Major!
Poetzl 1983; and especially Webb 2013). What I will say is that what is presented 
in The Archaeology  is neither a theory of method nor a treatise on methodology, 
as such, but is more like a theoretical reflection concerning questions of method: 
as Foucault notes, what is presented there ‘is not an exact description of what can 
be read in [History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic] , or The Order of Things’ 
(Foucault 1972: 16). In addition, and as noted previously, I do not think that what 
was worked out there was an abject failure (e.g. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 79!
100; Han 2002: 38!69) but, following Webb (2013), can be read as being rather 
successful in what it set out to do; and, moreover, that it was this relative success 
that made Foucault’s later moves to genealogy, technology, problematization, 
and the like, possible. The repetition (e.g. Han 2002) of Rabinow and Dreyfus’s 
thinking vis!à!vis the methodological failure of archaeology has meant that it has 
now become common!place, that is to say, obvious and taken!for!granted. This 
argument, for example, was not put forward in a text (Cousins and Hussain 1984) 
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more!or!less contemporaneous with Rabinow and Dreyfus’s book, but which has 
been much less influential in the secondary literature. Rather than frame the 
transition from Foucault’s work of the 1960s to his work of the 1970s and after as 
being one in which it was because archaeology was a methodological failure that 
Foucault had to make the switch to genealogy to one in which it was due to the 
very success of archaeology that made the take up of genealogy possible (Webb 
2005a, 2013). Nealon, for instance, goes as far as to state that The Archaeology itself 
‘is or enacts the transformation from archaeology to genealogy; it does not 
“represent” that transformation’ (Nealon 2008: 98).  
That said, what I am explicitly interested in, here, is the transposition of 
these four archaeological rules of formation to the four rules of questioning 
power presented in the ‘Method’ chapter of The Will to Knowledge, on the one 
hand, and to the four aspects of techniques of self, as these are presented in The 
Use of Pleasure, on the other. Now, I am not suggesting that there is identity or 
isomorphism here. Nor am I suggesting that, in a sense, Foucault always did the 
same thing. Rather, what I am suggesting is that there is a certain correlation or 
correspondence in the form or mode of questioning evidence is these three texts 
and in the four sets of questions each proposed that is open to exploration in 
thinking about how to question the exercising of contemporary relations of 
power, and of how to do this by way of what I have called an architectural 
analytics of the architectonics of control that is, at one and the same time, an 
analytics of the contemporary. 
 Power  
Taking The Will to Knowledge first, in the chapter on ‘Method’, Foucault puts 
forward four rules to follow vis!à!vis questioning the exercising of relations of 
power—in this instance, in questioning the relation of power!knowledge and 
discourses on sexuality. These four rules are as follows: (1) the rule of 
immanence; (2) the rules of continuous variations; (3) the rule of double 
conditioning; and (4) the rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses (Foucault 
1978: 98!101, rule 2 modified).  
1 – In describing the immanent relationality of power to knowledge and 
vice!versa, Foucault states that ‘[i]f sexuality was constituted as a domain of 
knowledge [connaître], it is from the relations of power [relations de pouvoir] that 
have instituted it as a possible object; and, in return, if power [pouvoir] was able 
to take sexuality as a target, it is because techniques of knowledge [savoir] and 
procedures of discourse were capable of investing it’ (ibid.: 98, modified). In 
other words, in describing the formation of objects, we not only look at the 
surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification that 
were the conditions of possibility of its formation, we also look at each and all of 
these as being infused with relations of power. In short, in describing the 
formation of objects, ‘[w]e will start… from what might be called the “local foci 
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[foyers locaux]” of power!knowledge [pouvoir!savoir]’  (ibid., modified; see Spivak 
1996: 149!150). 
2 – Concerning the rules of continuous variations, this concerns not only the 
enunciative modalities of the discursive, but also what we might call the 
governmental modalities of technology. Just as research on the formation of 
enunciative modalities looked at the formation of ‘a certain style, a certain 
constant form of enunciation’ (Foucault 1998: 314) and of ‘the situation that it is 
possible for [the subject] to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups 
of objects’ (Foucault 1972: 52), so an analysis of governmental modalities 
examines ‘the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply 
by the very nature of their process’, and of the ways in which relations of power 
‘are “matrices of transformations”’ (Foucault 1978: 99). Here again, in 
questioning the modalities of power!knowledge, we not only question who is 
speaking but also who or what is acting, the institutional sites from which they 
speak or act or from which they are to speak and act, and the relation of governor 
(subject) to governed (object) and the constant modifications and continual shifts 
in these strategic games between liberties: ‘[t]he condition of possibility of power, 
or, in any case, the point of view that can render intelligible its exercise…is the 
moving base of relations of force that, by their inequality, constantly induce 
states of power’ (ibid.: 93, modified). 
3 – In taking up the rule of double conditioning, vis!à!vis the exercising of a 
relation of power, we look at the mutually constitutive inter!relationality 
between tactics and strategy. Here, rather than enquire into the formation of 
concepts, or in addition to such an enquiry, the task is to question the articulation 
of techniques and the mutually constitutive interrelationality between the 
specific techniques of power and particular strategies of power. As Foucault puts 
it, ‘one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity 
of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work’ 
(ibid.: 100). In questioning these techniques and the strategies that both make 
them possible and that they make possible, we can take up the archaeological 
enquiry into the formation of concepts and rethink this in terms of tactics or 
techniques by questioning their forms of succession, their forms of coexistence, 
and their procedures of intervention.  
4 – Lastly, we turn to the rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses. This 
rule points us in the direction of the articulation, one upon the other, of power 
and knowledge, of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the 
subject, as these are articulated in technologies: ‘it is in discourse that power and 
knowledge are joined together’ (ibid.). But it also describes how the different 
discourses and techniques are thematized into an overall  drift or pattern, of how 
a ‘multiplicity of discursive elements…can come into play in various strategies’ 
(ibid.). Just as with the archaeological questioning of the formation of strategies, 
we can question the points of diffraction of discourse, the economy of the 
discursive constellation, and the function that the discourse under study seeks to 
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carry out in a field of non!discursive practices, that is to say, in institutions. 
Rather than pose these merely in the direction of the epist#m#, they are to be 
posed in the direction of both the epistemic and the technical; which is to say, in 
the direction of technologies of power, the programmes that articulate them, and 
the governmental thematics or strategies that they aim to make possible.  
Obviously, there is no tight seamless fit here between The Archaeology and 
The Will to Knowledge, but I did not intend there to be. Rather than isomorphism 
there are a certain number of correspondences and correlations that suggest that 
these four archaeological questions—vis!à!vis objects, subjective modalities, 
concepts or techniques, and strategies—are pertinent to an architectural analytic 
of the architectonics of control. This case is made stronger when we take into 
consideration the four aspects of techniques of self, as these are detailed in The 
Use of Pleasure, and discussed in ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’ (Foucault 1997: 262!
266). 
 Self  
In Chapter 3 of the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault differentiates 
between three different modes of questioning “morality”: by way of an analysis 
of the ‘prescriptive ensemble [of] a “moral code” (as questioned in his earlier 
studies); by way of an analysis of ‘the real behavior of individuals in relation to 
the rules and values that are recommended to them’ (as would be questioned by 
a more sociologically orientated enquiry); and lastly, by way of analysing ‘the 
manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in 
reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code’ (Foucault 1985: 25!
26). In reference to this latter “ethics!orientated” morality, Foucault details ‘four 
major aspects’ (Foucault 1997: 263) of the relation to self. These concern: (1) the 
determination of the ethical substance; (2) the mode of subjection; (3) the forms of 
“elaboration” of ethical work; and (4) the teleology of the moral subject (Foucault 
1985: 26!28; see also, 1997: 262!265). That is to say, vis!à!vis “ethics!orientated” 
morality, they concern what Foucault called ‘its ontology, its deontology, its 
ascetics, [and] its teleology’ (Foucault 1985: 37). Thinking these through the four 
archaeological rules of formation, whereas the rules presented in The Archaeology 
attempt to describe the formation of objects, concepts, and so forth, the four 
aspects of techniques of self detailed in The Use of Pleasure attempt to describe the 
prescriptive element of the formation of oneself. That is to say, whereas the 
former described how things were formed historically, the latter describes the 
historicity of how things should or are to be formed vis!à!vis oneself. Bearing this 
in mind, let us now look as these four aspects of the techniques of the relation to 
self. 
1 – Ontology, here, questions the determination of the ethical substance by 
looking at ‘the way in which the individual must constitute such or such a part of 
itself as the principle material of its moral conduct’ (Foucault 1985: 26, modified). 
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In questioning the ‘prescriptive texts’ (Foucault 1985: 12) that prescribe how one 
should relate to oneself in terms of the determination of the ethical substance, it 
looks at how such prescriptions task the individual with the following question: 
‘[w]hich is the aspect or the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned 
with moral conduct?’ (Foucault 1997: 263). In short, it looks at how individuals 
are lead or directed to constitute this or that part of themselves or of their 
behaviour as an object both for self!reflection and self!transformation in that it 
determines the material to be worked upon and worked over in the formation of 
oneself as a moral subject. It does not look so much at the formation of objects, 
but at how one should form a certain aspect of oneself as an object of self!
knowledge and self!government. 
2 – Deontology concerns the mode of subjection. It looks at prescriptions 
concerning ‘the way in which the individual establishes its relation to a rule and 
recognizes itself as being related to an obligation to implement it’ (Foucault 1985: 
27, modified). Or, stated otherwise, it questions ‘the way in which people are 
invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations’ (Foucault 1997: 264). What 
we are dealing with here is not so much the formation of enunciative modalities, 
but with how one should form what we might call a certain ethical modality. 
Here, the question is not “who is speaking?” or “from where do they speak?” 
but, rather, “what do I, as an ethical subject of my moral actions, need to be in 
order to be able to speak, to act, and so forth?”. However, it does concern the 
relation of subject to object; only here the object is the subject itself for itself. 
3 – The forms of elaboration of ethical work, or ascetics, enquires into the 
prescriptive element which prescribes the ‘ethical work that one carries out on 
oneself, not only to make one’s behaviour conform to a given rule, but to try to 
transform oneself into the moral subject of one’s conduct’ (Foucault 1985: 27, 
modified). We are not dealing here with the formation of concepts but with the 
elaboration of the techniques one is to employ to transform oneself. That is to say, 
we enquire into the prescriptions that prescribe ‘the means by which we can 
change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects?’ (Foucault 1997: 265). 
Again, these can be broached by looking at their forms of succession, their forms 
of coexistence, and their procedures of intervention. 
4 – Lastly, an analytics of the teleology of the moral subject starts from the 
observation that ‘an action is not only moral in itself and in its singularity, it is 
also [moral] by its insertion and the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct’, and 
so it questions how and in what ways such prescriptions ‘leads the 
individual…to a certain mode of being characteristic of the moral subject’ 
(Foucault 1985: 27!28, modified). In questioning prescriptive texts who object is 
the direction of ones relation to self, the question we are to pose is how these 
texts prescribe ‘the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral 
way?’ (Foucault 1997: 265). Whilst it is probably a stretch to call this strategy, it 
does bear some of the elements of the ways in which Foucault thought about the 
formation of strategies, and specifically the formation of an overall thematic, 
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drift, or pattern within which the moral subject, in its ethical relation to itself, is 
to insert itself within the broader drift or pattern, and of the ways in which ones 
ability to govern others is dependent upon one’s ability to be able to govern 
oneself. In other words, it questions the function that the moral conduct under 
study must carry out in a field of non!discursive practices. 
As with the correlations between The Archaeology and The Will to Knowledge, 
there is no seamless juxtaposition here. But like that correspondence, there are 
clear correlates between the ways in which The Archaeology  poses the four rules 
of discursive formations and the ways in which The Use of Pleasure proposes to 
analyze the relation of self to self by way of the above four aspects of that 
relation. What this demonstrates or, in any case, what it suggests is not that 
Foucault always did the same thing—the difference noted between the three 
four!fold questions posed to knowledge, to power, and the ethics respectively 
shows that this is not the case. Rather, what it highlights is the import of this 
archaeological four!fold to all of Foucault’s critical histories, and thus to his 
studies in governmentality, whether this is a study of the government of other, a 
study of the government of the self, or a study of their combination.  
What is correlative here is not so much the specific questions as a certain 
way or style of posing said questions. Such questioning does not question natural 
objects but looks at their formation; either how they were formed or how they are 
to be formed. Likewise, it does not pose questions to a self!transparent or 
constituent subject but looks at the formation of subject positions or looks at how 
the subject should be formed in relations of power or form itself in relation to 
itself. The third set of questions look at techniques—in the form of concepts, 
tactics, or ascetics—and it questions how they were formed or how they are to be 
deployed vis!à!vis the government of others or formed in governing oneself. The 
last archaeological set of questions looks at how such formations—of objects, 
subject, and techniques—coagulate or agglutinate into an overall pattern as this 
pertains to the formation either of the sciences (e.g. biology, political economy, 
philology), or of a certain modality of power (e.g. discipline, bio!politics, 
liberalism), or a certain mode of being (e.g. the beautiful life, renunciation of 
oneself, realizing one’s true potential). 
Having noted and detailed a certain correlation between the ways in which 
Foucault posed questions to knowledge, to power, and to ethics archaeologically, 
I now want to turn our attention to the ways in which this correlation correlates 
to the Aristotelian four!fold of obligation and, more specifically, how Heidegger 
thought this four!fold in relation to technology. Since I am not concerned with 
influence, intellectual history, or in asking “where did he get this from?”, 
whether Foucault took this archaeological four!fold from Aristotle, Heidegger, 
both, or neither is a moot point here. The reason for posing things in this way, is 
that in taking up the archaeological four!fold and thinking it through the 
question concerning technology might provide a set of questions to be posed to 
the programmatic or architectonic aspect of contemporary technologies of 
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power—in terms of the knowledge!power!ethics matrix—when questioned from 
the perspective of the present itself. Whereas The Archaeology  placed its emphasis 
upon conditions of possibility in the form of formations, Foucault’s analytics of 
power looked at the ways in which the exercising of a relation of power was not 
only subject to, but was to be deployed and exercised  through and by means of 
such conditions. His later work on ethics flipped to the other side, as it were, of 
this formation and looked at how things were to be formed vis!à!vis the relation 
to self. It is this latter way of questioning that I want to focus upon here by 
looking at how things are to be formed, but I want to take this not only in the 
direction of ethics, but also in the direction of the exercising of relations of power 
and of questioning this from within the contemporary order of things. 
In addition, whereas The Archaeology  looked at the four rules of formation 
in relation to the epist#m#, I want to rework them, by way of the four!fold of 
technology and the four aspects of technologies of self, in the direction of the 
tekhn# of technologies of power; that is to say, their programmatic or 
architectonics aspect. Whereas epist#m# is concerned with what we might call 
pure theoretical knowledge—such as that concerning life, labour, and language 
discussed in The Order of Things—tekhn# is more practically orientated. Tekhn#, as 
Foucault understood it, concerns ‘a practical rationality governed by a conscious 
goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364). That is to say, tekhn# is related to doing or practices 
but not in the sense of what is actually done or is actually practiced (building, 
producing, manufacturing, etc.). Rather, tekhn# is related to practices in that it is a 
form of theoretical knowledge that orientates and directs such doings and 
practices: ‘what the Greeks mean by techne is not the application but the 
theoretical knowledge that makes the practical application possible’ (Rojcewicz 
2006: 61!62). As Rojcewicz put it, ‘[t]echne is indeed more practical than episteme, 
but the practical aspect of techne, its practical role, is not manipulation but is 
merely the guiding or ordering of the process of manipulation’ (ibid.: 61). One of 
the problems, as I see it, with the different ways in which Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power has been taken up and used, is that it has been taken 
up and used as an analysis of empeiria—i.e. in term of what was actually done 
(historically), and what is actually being done (contemporaneously); which is to 
say, in terms of manifestations—and not as a description of tekhn#. The field in 
which we are to work—that is, the domain in which we are to do field!work—is a 
certain “stratum” of the real, vis!à!vis ‘knowing and acting’ (Rose 1999: 19), and 
not a physical place or geometrical space. The distinction between the technical 
and the empirical, understood as manifestation, is made clear in the following: 
‘[w]hoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is 
to be brought forth…This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the 
matter of ship or house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and 
from this gathering determines the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in 
tekhn# does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, 
but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as 
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manufacturing, that tekhn# is a bringing!forth (Heidegger 1977: 13, emphasis 
added). In other words, what studies in governmentality practices is a certain 
empiricism vis!à!vis thought and not an analysis of the empirical; what it 
analyzes, by way of example, would be the invention of “the social” (e.g. Donzelot 
1993) and not the social itself. 
It is also interesting to note here that Heidegger signposts a certain 
correlation between epist#m# and tekhn#: ‘[f]rom earliest times until Plato the word 
tekhn# is linked with the word epist#m#. Both words are names for knowing in the 
widest sense’ (ibid.). Thus both terms demonstrate a certain correlation with 
Foucault’s use of the term savoir (see, e.g. Foucault 2007b: 150!151), and thus of 
savoir!pouvoir, and, by extension, savoir!pouvoir!soi (knowledge!power!self). Given 
‘that techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but 
also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts’ (Heidegger 1977: 13, emphasis 
added), this relates tekhn# to thought on the one hand, and hence to rationality on 
the other. That is to say, is relates tekhn# to the theory!programmatic aspect of 
technology, which sets!out or lays!out what is to be done and what is to be 
known and thus is prescriptive of the environing of environments of probability. 
As Foucault put it is ‘Questions of Method’ it concerns ‘programs of conduct that 
have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 
“jurisdiction”) and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 
“veridiction”)’ (Foucault 2001d: 225, see also 230); that is to say, vis!à!vis the 
government of other, it refer to the articulation of power (pouvoir) and knowledge 
(savoir). As noted previously, the term articulate here means not only to express or 
to state, but also to conjoin; hence, technology refers to the joining together of 
power and knowledge: to power!knowledge or pouvoir!savoir—both of which are 
questioned at ‘the level, approximately, of archaeology [le niveau, à peu près, de 
l$archéologie]’ (Foucault 2007a: 61, modified; 1990: 49).  
3 Towards  an  Architectural  Analytics  of  Control  
It has been noted (see, e.g. Dean 1996: 225; Deleuze 1988: 104, 147n26; O#Leary 
2002: 85; Rayner 2007: 122) that the four aspects of technologies of self, detailed 
above, map onto or correlate with Aristotle’s four forms of obligation (Aristotle 
1992: Book II, Ch. 3 & 7) and, by extension, with Heidegger’s discussion of these, 
in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (Heidegger 1977: 3!35; see also 
Rojcewicz 2006), as the four!fold of technology (or, indeed, the four folds 
enfolded in, by, and through technology, see Dean 1996; Deleuze 1988; Rose 
1996c). What has not been noted, however, is the similarity, parallelarity, or 
correspondence between the four aspects of practices of the self, and thus the 
aforementioned four!fold of obligation/technology, and the archaeological four!
fold outlined above. Note here that I do not say equivalence, identity, or 
isomorphism, but correspondence. I use this particular word in the double sense of 
a certain correlation between the abovementioned four!fold ensembles 
(Aristotle’s, Heidegger’s, and Foucault’s: in The Archaeology, in The Will to 
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Knowledge, and in The Use of Pleasure), on the one hand, and thus of the possibility 
of establishing a dialogue or exchange between them, on the other. The reason for 
wanting to approach things in this way—by way of the parallelarity of these 
three four!fold ensembles—is to work out how we might question the domain of 
technology (that is, the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of 
discourse about the subject), as this pertains to questioning  power!knowledge or 
techniques of government and the human sciences, by reconceptualizing an 
archaeology of knowledge and/or of problematizations in the direction of what I 
have called an architectural analytics. In thinking through the aforementioned 
four!folds, I am not so much attempting to synthesize these three positions 
(Aristotle’s, Heidegger’s, Foucault’s) into a forth as I am attempting to advance a 
better, and thus more usable, conceptualization of archaeology (as architectural 
analytics), of the programmatic aspect of technology (as architectonics), and of 
questioning the latter in terms of  power (as control) from the perspective of to!
day.  
As noted, it has been suggested that following the publication of The 
Archaeology, Foucault began to move away from a failed archaeology (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983; Han 2002) and, at the start of the 1970s, took up and 
developed a more robust Nietzschean genealogy. This process is said to have 
resulted in Foucault’s most genealogical text: Discipline and Punish. Certainly, 
genealogy has taken the lion’s share when “applying” Foucault’s “methods”, and 
this has indeed been to the detriment of archaeology. The objective here, 
however, is not to downplay the significance of genealogy but, rather, to 
rehabilitate archaeology. I am much more concerned with the way in which, due 
to the emphasis placed on genealogy, archaeology has been side!lined, 
overlooked, or, more often than not, simply forgotten about. What I want to do 
here, then, is to take up the ugly duckling of Foucault scholarship and to develop 
it—that is, to re!develop it in the form of an architectural analytics—as a way of 
questioning contemporary technologies of power—in the form of an architectonics 
of control—from the perspective of the present.  
Programmes of control are both descriptions regarding what various 
authorities take to be (i.e. what is) and codifications/prescriptions concerning what 
various authorities what to be (i.e. what will be), vis!à!vis the nature of human 
nature and the political order conducive to the “good life”. Unlocking their 
architectonics, by way of an architectural analytics, is merely a question of de!
coding and de!scribing their articulations of these discourses about the subject 
and techniques of transformation and control. As an general orientating 
framework for such enquiry, a framework grounded in genealogies done by 
Foucault (particularly Foucault 2007b, 2008a) and others (e.g. Barry, Osborne, 
and Rose 1996b; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999; 
and especially Rose 1989; 1996a, 1999), it is possible to say that modern 
technologies of power are increasingly exercised not only through techniques of 
determination (sovereignty), imposition (discipline), and/or inducement (bio!
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politics) but also through ever more subtle colonizations of the techniques of self. 
Whilst this is certainly an empirical question—vis!à!vis the specificities and 
details of the knowledges and techniques to be deployed—, let us say that the 
exercising of contemporary relations of power has at its disposal multiple and 
heterogeneous discourses and techniques, and that what we need to analyze is 
not only the re!combinations and reconfigurations of these, and the invention of 
ever new modalities, but also the colonizations by technologies of control of 
techniques of self. 
 The  Epist!m! and  Tekhn! of  Technology  
In his Physics, Aristotle (1992: 28!31, 37!39) present what are often taken to be 
four forms of causation: (1) the causa materialis, (2) the causa formalis, (3) the causa 
efficiens, and (4) the causa finalis. These are sometimes referred to as “the matter”, 
“the form”, “the agent”, and “the end” of causality; what Heidegger called hyle, 
eidos, logos, and telos, respectively (Heidegger 1977: 7!8). In his discussion of the 
Aristotelian four!fold, vis!à!vis technology, Heidegger (1977: 6!12) questions the 
thought that posits these as causes (the Latin causa), and instead suggests that 
they should be read as four ways of being obliged or indebted (the Greek aition). 
Heidegger uses the example of a silver chalice to describe how the produced 
sacrificial vessel is indebted to the matter (silver), the form (chaliceness), the 
agent (deliberation), and the end (sacred rite). Understood in terms of being 
obliged, what a thing is is indebted (1) to the matter (hyle) from which it is 
formed; (2) to the aspect (eidos) of the form it assumes; (3) to the careful 
consideration or thought (logos) which, in drawing hyle, eidos, and telos together, 
brings forth that which is brought forth; and (4) to the kinds of activity (telos) for 
which the finished thing is to be used (ibid.: 6!9). This, for Heidegger, is the 
essence of ancient technology (see Rojcewicz 2006: Part I). To!day, and in relation 
to technical devices and the physical/natural sciences, Heidegger claims that 
matter has been reduced to the raw material upon which form is imposed; that 
form is the instrumentality and disposability (and we might add consumability) 
the we imposed upon matter; that the agent—who, for us, is no longer one 
element amongst four, but is the only genuine causal agent—is reduced to being 
the one who imposes form onto matter; and the end is reduced to a thing being 
both at our disposal (consumable) and disposable (thrown away). This, for 
Heidegger, is the essence of modern technology (see ibid.: Part II): we no longer 
think in terms of obligation but in terms of causality, in which causality as a four!
fold is reduced to one—the agent or efficient cause (a metaphysics of 
subjectivity).  
Heidegger’s narrative, then, charts a historical transformation from an 
active letting or abetting (the four!fold of obligation) to an all!encompassing 
imposition, to the com!posing (Ge!stell) of disposables (Bestand); that is to say, to 
the com!posing or syn!thesizing (Ge!stell) of composites or synthetics (Gestell) 
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whose only existence is as disposables (Bestand), that is, as being both at our 
disposal and disposable. This understanding of Ge!stell and Bestand, which are 
usually translated as “enframing” and “standing!reserve” respectively, is taken 
from Rojcewicz’s discussion of Heidegger’s essay on technology (ibid.: 103–5, 84!
89, respectively). However, in using them, I am not implying that they are the 
correct translation or that they are a better translation, and so forth; but nor am I 
explicitly saying that they are a more usable translation. Rather, I am taking them 
up and using them because they are useful in a different way. In other words, 
understanding Ge!stell as com!posing can and may be used in conjunction with 
an understanding of this term as “en!framing/enframing” (Elden 2001: 78!79) in 
that questioning the drawing together (Ge!stell) of what is drawn together 
(Gestell) also questions the “en!framing” of what is thus enframed: ‘[t]echnologies 
of government, techniques of the self…[, and so on,]…should be analyzed not 
simply as instruments but as part of a frame (a Ge!stell, in Heidegger’s sense) in 
which questions of who we are, of what our being is composed, of what we 
would like to emerge…[, and so forth,]…appear’ (Dean 1996: 226). In addition, 
whereas these terms were, for Heidegger, linked exclusively to the emergence of 
modern technology, to the extent that Foucault can be said to have taken them up 
and used them, they were taken up and used as a tools for questioning different 
technologies in different times and at different places (see Elden 2001). 
More specifically, Foucault’s historical narrative, which runs from sovereign 
power to the emergence of pastoral form of government, disciplinary power, bio!
political power, and so forth, can be said to move in the opposite direction to 
Heidegger’s, in that it maps a historical transformation from an all!encompassing 
imposition (sovereignty and juridico!political power) to something like a directed 
active letting or abetting (neo!liberal governmentality or what Rose calls 
advanced liberalism, see Rose 1996b; see also Miller and Rose 2008: 199!218). 
Stated otherwise, just as Heidegger described the reduction of the four!fold of 
obligation, vis!à!vis modern technology, to a single causality, the so!called 
efficient cause, in which form is actively imposed upon passive matter by a 
creative and responsible agent or subject; Foucault describes a process in which a 
single source of power which imposes itself upon the governed (e.g. the right to 
take life or let live, see Foucault 1978: Part Five) is displaced by multiple and 
heterogeneous elements—elements in which the object and target of power!
knowledge comes more!and!more to be not just a passively constituted element 
of power!knowledge but actively constitutive of government: as Cruikshank 
(1996) puts it, we should not  ‘underestimated the extent to which we are already 
self!governing’  (ibid.: 235). Certainly, Foucault’s historical description is not one 
that narrates the replacement of sovereign power by either anatamo!political or 
bio!political power, but describes the emergence of the latter, and of their 
imbrications with and colonizations of the former (see, e.g. Foucault 2003c: 249). 
Hence, unlike Heidegger’s narrative, it does not take the form of epochal rupture 
and discontinuity but of infiltration and colonization. In addition, we need to be 
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much more specific in drawing out the finer details of what is meant by modern 
technologies of power being something like a directed active letting or abetting; 
which, as we shall see, has correlates to, but is distinguishable from, Heidegger’s 
description of ancient technology. What this suggests is that, pace Rayner (2001, 
2007), Foucault’s historical narrative does not closely follow Heidegger’s. Or, to 
be more specific, what it suggest is that we should avoid imposing such schemas, 
historical, ideal typical, or otherwise, upon the object of our enquiry but should 
let that enquiry itself render visible the specific mechanism of the exercising of 
contemporary relations of power.  
In undertaking an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, 
what is to be questioned are discourses that put forward programmes for the 
formation of a future present. Such discourses and the programmes they 
articulate are to be question in terms of their dispositivity; that is to say, in terms 
of their being disposing and inclining. What is to be questioned when 
questioning such disposing and inclining is the placing together of what is placed 
together in order to be placed apart. Stated otherwise, what is to be questioned is 
the com!posing and en!framing (Ge!stell) of what is composed and enframed 
(Gestell), so as to dispose and incline (conducting conducts and environing 
environments). In other words, what is to be interrogated in not only the drawing 
of things together (Latour 1990) but also the simultaneous setting of things apart 
(the aménagement) vis!à!vis what is thus composed. That is to say, not only 
thought but also rationality; not only com!posing but also dis!posing (not only 
savoir—the pre!ontical—but also connaissance—the merely ontic). As the 
foregoing discussion of the archaeological four!fold signpost, of all the things 
that are posed together and enframed in the composition of a dispositive (in the 
arranging of probability so as to conduct conducts) there are three interrelated 
questions that mark themselves out, and each has four aspects. These questions 
concern knowledge (savoir), relations of power (pouvoir), and relation to self (soi); 
and the four aspects relevant to each concern what I will call the matter, the form, 
the agent, and the end of dispositives of control that articulate programmes of 
conduct and thus disclose their architectonics. Whilst the first question relates to 
the epistemic, that latter pertain to the technical (knowledge!power, knowledge!
self). In practice, what we are actually dealing with is a matrix of experience that 
in articulating certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject 
conjoins knowledge!power!self.  
The four!fold of matter, form, agent, and end roughly correspond to the 
ontology, deontology, ascetics, and teleology of the relation of self to self, as 
discussed above (see Rayner 2007: 122), and thus, by extension, they can be 
mapped onto the four archaeological question posed not only to ethics, but also 
to knowledge and to power. What I want to explore here are what I shall call four 
“probes” of architectural research; they are not specifically concerned with 
obligation, causation, or rules of formation, but with conceptualization, and they 
are being discussed as possible questions to be posed vis!à!vis enquiring 
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concerning the architectonics of control. It is this method of probing that I am 
calling field!work; it questions concerning the matter, the form, the agent, and the 
end of control. The archaeological four!fold, when posed by way of an 
architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, can be posed both in the 
direction of the descriptive element of a programme—the ways in which it 
described what is—and in the direction of the prescriptive element of such 
programmes—the ways in which the prescribe what will be, or what is to be 
known and what is to be done; that is to say, what various authorities want to 
happen. 
 Matter  
The matter refers to the “stuff” out of which something is produced (Aristotle 
1992: 38): ‘that out of which as a constituent a thing comes to be is called a cause; 
for example, the bronze and the silver and their genera would be the cause 
respectively of a statue and a loving!cup’ (Aristotle 1992: 28). Heidegger refers to 
this stuff as ‘hyle’ (Heidegger 1977: 7) and, for him, the statue and loving!cup 
would be indebted or obliged to the bronze and silver from which they are 
respectively made. Matter, then, refers to the material or substance, and so forth, 
from which a thing is fashioned. Translating this into a Foucaultian perspective, 
matter refers to the modes of objectification (i.e. objectification and objectivation), 
that is, it refers to the ontology of the articulation of tekhn# and epist#m# or to the 
different modes by which a certain aspect of human being is made an object of 
knowledge, an object of relations of power, or an object of relations to self. It 
refers to the different and differential ways in which a certain aspect of human 
materiality is made an object of the human sciences on the one hand, and of 
political and/or ethical practices, on the other. And it refers to the ways in which 
a matter of concern (problematization and its objects) becomes a matter of fact 
(discourses that are taken to be true).  
What we are concerned with, here, is not some substantive, self!existent, 
material that pre!exists its shaping into form by an agent; rather, what Foucault’s 
archaeology addresses is the formation of matter in the form of objects. As 
Foucault put this in relation to his study of madness: ‘[t]he unity of the 
discourses on madness is not founded on the existence of the object “madness”, 
or on the constitution of a unique horizon of objectivity; it is the series of rules 
which make possible, during a given period, the appearance of medical 
descriptions (with their object), the appearance of a series of discriminatory and 
repressive [and productive] measures (with their particular object), and the 
appearance of a set of practices codified in prescriptions or medical treatments 
(with their specific objects)’ (Foucault 1998: 313; see also Foucault 1972: 40,  47). 
Note, here, that this presentation describes knowledge, power, and—to the extent 
that prescriptions or medical treatments often involve self!management—ethics. 
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This is clearly expressed by the way in which Foucault talks of the 
determination of the ethical substance. It concerns those practices in which the 
individual is incited or directed to constitute a certain aspects of itself, its actions, 
or its behaviour as the principle material of its moral conduct. As noted, the 
principal question here is what ‘is the aspect or part of myself or my behavior 
which is concerned with moral conduct?’ (Foucault 1997: 263). As Hacking puts it 
in his essay on ‘Self!Improvement’, matter refers to the ‘stuff that you worry 
about if you are a moral agent’ (Hacking 2002: 117, emphasis added): pleasure, 
intentions, desire, and so forth (Rayner 2007: 122). Transposing this to our 
architectural perspective, what we are seeking is not the essence of a thing—its 
inherent properties—taken as referent, but nor is it the space or field of practices 
from which an “object” (a referential) comes to be formed; its condition of 
possibility conceptualized as ‘the common space in which diverse objects stand 
out and are continuously transformed’ (Foucault 1998: 313). Whereas Foucault’s 
archaeology was primarily concerned with describing the formation of objects (of 
knowledge, of intervention), what we are interested in is how the articulation of 
epist#m# and tekhn# works ‘not only subject to, but through and by means of 
conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245!246). That is to say, since our enquiry 
is non!historical, and thus cannot map out the surfaces of emergence from which 
certain delimited and specified objects were formed, what we can question are 
the ways in which discourse or the programmatic aspect of technologies of power 
determines the object that is the target of such conditioning. 
The matter, here, not only concerns matters of fact but also matters of 
concern (see Latour 2004). What we are questioning are the different and 
differential ways in which certain aspects of reality—and invariably we are 
talking about human matter—are carved out and isolated, designated and 
analyzed, and so on, through effective problematizations by thought (matters of 
concern), how this matter is presented as that which matters, and thus as that 
which is to be invested by power (matters of fact). That is to say, through 
processes in which certain aspects of behaviour or conduct, certain maladies of 
the mind or the body, certain propensities or predispositions, or certain abilities 
or capacities, and so forth, are cut out from the fabric of the world as what comes 
to matter: that is, in the double sense, as what matters or comes to be an object of 
concern and what, through that very process, materializes as the object of concern.  
In other words, vis!à!vis the architectonics of control, in questioning what 
Dean (1996) calls the ‘governable substance or material’ (ibid.: 222), it ‘concerns 
what we seek to govern in ourselves and others’ (ibid.) or, stated otherwise, it 
questions how a certain ‘aspect of the other is constituted as the prime material of 
their conduct’ (Owen 1994: 159). Or, since a relation of power is a relation in 
which some conduct the conduct of others so as to obtain from them a certain 
way of conducting themselves, the question should be “What aspect of human 
conduct has been constituted by a technology of power as the principal material 
of/for the conducting of one’s own conduct?” The question to be asked here, then, 
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does not concern an object—i.e. pre!given, ready!made, or fully!formed matter; a 
substantive referent, etc.—, it is to determine what matters; that is, what is the 
concern, what is the object of concern, and thus what is the determination of the 
substance of control. Is this material conceptualized as active or passive; as 
corporeal (the body) or incorporeal (the soul); is it to be determined, imposed 
upon, or is it pregnant with a form that is to be actively let or abetted, albeit in a 
directed way; and so on? Is it an object of knowledge, of governmental 
intervention, or something to be formed by the self in its relation to itself as this 
relation pertains to a relation of power, and so forth? 
As Dean notes, this ‘governable substance is a materiality drenched with 
thought’ (Dean 1996: 222), and so what we are dealing with here is a materialism 
of the incorporeal: ‘[i]t is…not a question of either a pure materiality or a pure 
ideality; it is both and at once’ (ibid.). By way of example, Dean asks us to 
‘consider the mundane practice of dieting’, which is a practice not only 
concerned with governing a materiality: ‘the body and its intake of food’, 
exercise, and the like; it is also associated with a whole body of knowledge 
concerning the chemical makeup of the food we eat, the bio!chemical processes 
of digestion, and the ‘physio!chemical constitution of our bodies’ (ibid.). Another 
example would be an organization attempting to increase efficiency through 
productivity. This not only includes governing a materiality: the “entrepreneurial 
self”; it also includes a whole raft of social and psychological knowledge of the 
workplace (e.g. Rose 1989: Part Two). In questioning the substance of control, 
then, we enquire into the ways in which various authorities ‘seek to act upon a 
materiality rendered governable through a grid of intelligibility and calculation’ 
(Dean 1996: 222), which is to say, through the articulation of certain kind of 
discourse about the subject and certain techniques.   
The series of question that may be asked, vis!à!vis that matter of a 
programme of control, can be re!worked from the forgoing discussion concerning 
the archaeological four!fold as these concern knowledge, power, self. What we 
are to describe here are not the rules of formation but rather the descriptions, 
prescriptions, and codification, as these are articulated and conceptualized,  
concerning the matter of control.  
a) “How and in what ways does the discourse under study describe the 
ways in which an aspect of human being—what we are, what we say, what we 
do—has been problematized as an object to be known, as a target of 
governmental intervention, and/or as an aspect of self!reflection?” “What forms 
of conspicuousness, obstinacy, and/or obtrusiveness have given rise to such a 
problematization, what forms of thought has this problematization given rise to 
(codification), and what forms of rationality are expressed there (prescription)?” 
What we have here is not an object that is identical to itself, but a dispersion, and 
the aim here is to ‘show where these individual differences, which, according to 
the degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes, and types of theory’, have been 
‘designated and analysed’ and accorded the status of an object (Foucault 2002b: 
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45). Such surfaces of appearance, or the space of problematization thus mapped 
out, may be constituted by ‘the family, the immediate social group, the work 
situation, a [particular] community’, or at the level of population, the biological 
existence of the human species, its sexual practices, its criminal behaviour, its 
health and well!being, its economic and social life, and so forth. What we are to 
enquire into here, are the different and differential ways in which, ‘[i]n these 
fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the discontinuities, and the 
thresholds that appear within it, [governmental] discourse finds a way of limiting 
its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object 
– and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable’ (Foucault 
2002b: 46). 
b) Next, we can describe the various authorities that are able to perform 
such a delimitation. These may be constituted by medicine; the law and penal 
law; religious authority; the various “psy!“ sciences; the various “social” sciences; 
economics, management, and accounting; ergonomics and cybernetics; genetics, 
and so forth. That is to say, they concern specific areas of expertise and the 
professions, or those to whom we grant or to which has been granted a certain 
authoritative status. What we are dealing with here are what, in The Will to 
Knowledge, Foucault called the “local foci” of power!knowledge; that is, the 
relations that obtain between governors and governed or between those who aim 
to govern and those who have become the target of government: between patient 
and doctor, prisoner and prison warder, school child and teacher, employee and 
employer, penitent and confessor or the modern equivalent thereof, and so forth. 
In other words, these local foci of power knowledge may be constituted by an 
institution possessing its own rules, by a group of expert individuals constituting 
a profession, by a body of knowledge and practice, or by certain recognized 
authorities, philanthropic individuals, pressure groups, charities, and the like 
(Foucault 2002b: 46). It is such authorities that delimit, name, and establish an 
object of concern as an object of concern; or that transform a matter of concern into a 
matter of fact (Foucault 2002b: 46). 
c) Finally, we must ask “how these various authorities were able to specify, 
or how and in what ways they specified, the objects thus delimited?” “What 
perceptual, moral, and ethical grids of specification were articulated and/or 
conceived?” These are the systems, schemas, diagrams, modes of comprehension, 
grids of intelligibility, styles of thought, and so forth, in, by, and through which 
‘the different “kinds of [object]” are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, 
classified, derived from one another, and designated as object of governmental 
discourse: as objects to be known, as the target of governmental intervention, and 
as the substance of self!reflection (Foucault 2002b: 46). What is specified, 
instituted, determined, here is or can be constituted by the soul; human faculties, 
propensities, capacities, limits; the body; the life and history of individuals, the 
health and well!being of populations, the “flesh”, the body of the child, the 
economy as a transactional reality, and so forth, or they may be constituted by 
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some new matter of concern (e.g. bio!sociality, see Rabinow and Rose 2003a; 
2006; Rose 2001, 2009). 
The series of questions to be ask here, vis!à!vis an architectural analytics of 
the architectonics of control, pertain to the specificity of the strategic games 
between liberties that have given rise to said problematization: what forms of 
conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy have given human being to 
thought, what were the surfaces of emergence from which they arrived (as these 
can be gleaned from the discourse under study by analyzing its descriptions of 
what is); what modes of objectification have been posited, what local centres of 
power!knowledge are involved, what authorities of delimitation were able to 
delimit, name, and establish the object of governmental concern; and how and in 
what ways have these object been made, how has matter come to matter and, 
through that very process, become an object of knowledge, a target of 
governmental intervention, and/or the substance of self!reflection. Such questions 
not only concern the different and differential ways in which an object has been 
problematized as an object to be known, or the conduct of the others has been 
problematized vis!à!vis what various authorities want to happen, but also, and 
perhaps more and more so, they concern the problematization of the conducting 
of one’s own conduct, of the ways in which individuals do, or do not, conduct 
themselves. In other words, this not only concerns how we are indirectly 
constituted by the imperatives of power!knowledge, it also concerns how such 
imperatives direct us to constitute a specific aspect of ourselves as the governable 
substance of our own actions and to form a relation to ourselves vis!à!vis this 
aspect and this substance. That is to say, we have to account for the ways in 
which we are not only passively constituted by knowledge technologies and 
technologies of power but also how we are lead or directed to actively constitute 
ourselves, to know ourselves, and to take care of ourselves, through technologies 
of self. 
 Form  
The form refers to the shape or aspect that matter is to be worked into; for 
Aristotle, form refers to ‘what the thing is’ (Aristotle 1992: 38); or, more 
specifically, form ‘is the account of what the being would be, and its genera’ 
(Aristotle 1992: 28). Heidegger calls the form that matter is to be worked into its 
“aspect” or eidos (Heidegger 1977: 7); it has connotations not only of the outward 
appearance of a finished thing but also, and more specifically, of the idea of the 
form that matter is to be worked into (ibid.: 20). In other words, form is the 
conceptualization of form pre!existing the working of matter into the form thus 
conceived. 
Translating this into a question concerning the architectonics of control, we 
can say that form refers to the modes of subjectification (i.e. subjection and 
subjectivation); it refers to the deontology of the articulation of tekhn# and epist#m#. 
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Form is difficult to unravel because what we are dealing with here is a complex 
of interrelated modes of subjectification. Firstly, it questions how being made 
object of knowledge, target of governmental investment, or aspect of self!
reflection makes subjects; secondly, it question the subjected subjects relations to 
itself vis!à!vis the codification of conduct and its recognizing its relation to a 
mode of obligation; thirdly, it questions the modification of the subject that is to 
know the object, that is to govern the target, and, in doing so, that is to form a 
relation to itself; lastly, it looks at the complex interplay between these modes of 
subjection and modes of subjectivation: governed!governor!self. 
To describe the form that matter is to be worked into, then, is to describe not 
only the conceptualization of this form (the determination of the governable 
substance so as to constitute a ‘governable subject’, Dean 1996: 223), it is also to 
describe the different ways in which the subject is formed by way of its relation 
to certain arrangements of obligation. In describing this obligation, and the 
subjects relation to it, we not only have to describe how the subject is lead to 
recognize their relation to such an obligation, we also have to flip to the other 
side of the equation, as it were, so as to be able to describe the formation and/or 
conceptualization of this form of obligation itself. That is to say, we have to move 
from a description of one form of subjectification (subjection) to a description of 
another form of subjectification (modification); from the formation of the object, 
and thus the subject, to be known to the formation of the subject capable of 
knowing or who knows the object. However, since it is the form that matter is to 
be worked into that we are primarily concerned with questioning here, we can 
analyze form not only in terms of how it has been conceived, but also in terms of 
a relation of power that takes the form of the subject being related to an 
obligation, and thus to a description of how this obligation is conceptualized, 
how it gains it authority, and thus its acceptability, and so forth, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, of how, in recognizing its relation to this obligation, the subject 
is lead or directed to constitute its self!relation. 
As with matter or the form of objects, due to an approach that approaches 
things from the perspective of the present, we cannot look at the formation of 
governmental modalities but have, instead, to look at their mode of articulation 
and conceptualization, of how the form that matter is to be worked into is 
conceived not only in relation to those who are to conduct the conduct of others 
but also in relation to those whose conduct is to be conducted and in relation to 
the conducting of one’s own conduct (the mode of subjection). What we are 
concerned with here is ‘the “mode of obligation”’, that is, ‘with the position we 
take or are given in relation to rules and norms, with why we govern ourselves 
and others in a particular manner’ (Dean 1996: 224). The principle question to be 
asked here, then, is “”What is the form of subjectivity that matter, as object of 
knowledge, target of political intervention or investment, and/or of self!reflection 
and transformation is to be worked into?” “What form is to be imposed upon or, 
more specifically, geared!into matter?” Is it to be subservient, docile, 
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interdependent, or independent? Is it something to be determined (subjected), 
imposed (normalized), or brought!forth (realized and actualized)? 
Taking our cue for the forgoing discussion of the archaeological four!fold as 
this pertains to knowledge!power!self, we can pose the following series of 
questions. 
a) “Who is to be governed?” “Who is spoken about?” “Who is to have their 
actions acted upon?” “Who is to be incited and/or invited to establish a relation 
to themselves in relation to a codification of conduct and to recognise themselves 
as being related to an obligation to implement it?” This series of question can be 
posed both retrospectively in terms of descriptions of forms of subjectivity being 
problematized (dependent, inflexible, inactive, intransigent, etc.) and 
prospectively in terms of prescriptions concerning the types or forms of 
subjectivity to be brought into existence (or, if matter is conceptualized as being 
pregnant with form, to be brought forth, that is, pro!duced: independent, flexible, 
active, etc.). “Who” here does not refer to a psychological entity, but nor does it 
refer to the actual making of people. Rather, it designates the formation of a 
position that the subjected subject may come to occupy. 
The flip!side of this question concerns not only “Who is speaking?” but also 
“Who is to govern?” “Who is to direct the conduct of the other so as to lead them 
to conduct themselves?” As noted above, “who”, here, does not refer to a 
psychological entity, with a biography, and an economic and social context; 
rather ‘[t]he problem is to determine what the subject must be, to what condition 
it is subject, what status it must have, what position it must occupy in the real or 
in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of 
knowledge [connaissance]’ (Foucault 1998: 459, modified). Thus, not an individual 
psychology but a position (Foucault 1991a: 58), a position invested with 
authority, with the right to tell the truth, and with the right to have what is said 
accepted because it is invested with authority and truth: psychiatrist, doctor, 
economist, biologist, philologist, prison warden, psychologist, an expert, subject 
to pedagogic norms, legal conditions, in a position that functions in relation to 
society as a whole. 
b) We can also ask, “What are the institutional sites in which the subjected 
subject is to be governed?” “Are these sites already established or are they 
something that has to be modified or brought into being?” “Are they closed 
institutions or more open networks and relays of related institutional settings?” 
Does governing involve what Millar and Rose call ‘governing at a distance’ 
(Miller and Rose 2008: 18; Rose 1996b: 56; 1999: 111). What we are dealing with 
here is a perceptual field that is at one and the same time a field of intervention, 
and the relation between the seeable and the sayable and the thinkable and 
doable: systems of registration, notation, description, classification, statistics, 
teaching, information, hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, the 
examination, other theoretical domains, other institutions. Again, the other side 
of this question or series of questions concern the institutional sites from which 
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the one that is speaking or who is to govern speaks or are to govern. More 
specifically, it concerns the status and authority granted to those who speak or 
who are to act, and thus the acceptability of what they say or what they propose 
to do. In other words, it concerns those institutional sites ‘from which this 
discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific 
objects and instruments of verification)’ (Foucault 2002b: 56). 
c) A final set of question which it is possible to ask here, concerns not only 
the ways in which ‘[t]he positions of the subject are…defined by the situation 
that it is possible for them to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups 
of objects’ (Foucault 2002b: 57), but also the opposite relation. In other words, in 
involves the strategic games of liberty and the attempts to codify and thus to 
solidify these relations into relations between the governed and government and 
between those who are to govern and those whom they are to be governed. Here, 
‘we must not look for who has the power…(men, adults, parents, doctors) and 
who is deprived of it (women, adolescents, children, patients); nor for who has 
the right to know and who is forced to remain ignorant’; rather, ‘[w]e must 
seek…the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply by 
the very nature of their process’ (Foucault 1978: 99). 
What we are to question here, then, is a ‘mode of subjection [that] signifies 
the relation of the other to a rule and its obligated practical exercise which the 
conducting of conduct requires’ (Owen 1994: 159). Or, more specifically, what we 
are questioning concerning is the mode of conceptualization of the principle 
governing the art of governing; that is to say, how is the object (matter), as object 
of knowledge, as the target of political intervention, and the object of self!
reflection, is conceptualized as a subject (form), and what is the principle 
governing the working of matter into form. On this view, and unlike Husserl, 
Heidegger, and the Frankfurt school, for example, power not only takes the form 
of an objectification (the constitution of matter) but also of a subjectification (the 
working of matter into form): it concerns what Dean calls ‘the governable subject 
(Dean 1996: 223). Here, however, it is not simply a matter of form being imposed 
upon matter; rather, matter—i.e. the human material that is subject to procedures 
of objectification and, simultaneously, of subjectification—has come to be 
conceptualized more and more as being pregnant with a form that is in need of 
realization, actualization, expression, fulfilment, and so forth. That is to say, the 
exercising of contemporary relations of power is less a determining or an 
imposing than it is a gearing!into what are taken to be inherent or characteristic 
human propensities, dispositions, tendencies, capacities, and so on, and so forth. 
Furthermore, it is less a question of imposition because the principle causal agent 
is no sovereign imposing his will, but nor it is a question of imposing a pre!
defined norm onto human matter; rather, it is a question of gearing!into matter in 
which the subject itself is one of the principle agents of transformation 
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 Agent  
The agent concerns the human or non!human, animate or inanimate, sentient or 
non!sentient, living or non!living agency—the environment or conditions of 
possibility that environ horizons of probability, the existential contexture, etc.—
that is to be deployed in order to work matter into form and thus to make human 
beings subjects. That is to say, it deals with ‘the work of government or the 
governing work’ (Dean 1996: 222). For Aristotle, the agent concerns ‘the thing 
which effects the change’ (Aristotle 1992: 38): ‘[t]he primary source of the change 
or the staying unchanged: for example, the man who has deliberated is a cause, 
the father is a cause of the child, and in general that which makes something of 
that which is made, and that which changes something of that which is changed’ 
(Aristotle 1992: p 28!29). Heidegger refers to this as logos (Heidegger 1977: 8), and 
so it refers just as much to the discursive as the non!discursive. Here, it is not a 
question of the one who deliberates or the agent who wields an instrument but 
the whole instrumentarium as agent. The agent, then, has connotations of the 
agency in, by, and through which change or transformation occurs or is to occur. 
When approached in terms of tekhn# it refer not only to that which is employed or 
is to be deployed in order to effect change, but also, and more specifically, to the 
thought, deliberation, calculation,  rationalization (i.e. logos) inhabiting such 
practices. That is to say, it concerns the deliberated practical aspect of “a practical 
rationality governed by a conscious goal”.  
Translating this into our architectural analytics, the agent refer to what we 
can call the modes of elaboration, to the logos of the articulation of tekhn# and 
epist#m#, to the articulation and elaboration of the techniques that are to work 
matter into form, and of the ways in which multiple and heterogeneous 
techniques are com!posed and come to form an overall tactics specific to the 
discourse under study. It does not concern an idea existing in someone’s head—
the silversmith, the sculpture, the architect—but to the agency in, by, and through 
which matter is to be shaped into form. Here, we are not referring to some 
humanist notion of agency, but to the specifics of the techniques (architectures, 
timetables, procedures, movements, feedback mechanisms, etc.), which are to be 
deployed in order to transform matter into form and the knowledge informing 
and informed by these techniques; that is to say, the particular arts of 
government to be deployed in the government of others. Here, it is not a question 
of an agent wielding an instrument, but of instrument as agent; what we are 
concerned with is not an agent—efficient cause—that wields and instrument but 
precisely this instrumentarium conceptualized as the agent of transformation. 
In broaching the question concerning the epist#m# and the tekhn# of 
technologies of power, from the perspective of the present, what is sought is not 
so much ‘[t]he system of the appearance and distribution of enunciative modes’ 
(Foucault 1972: 79). Rather, it is the ‘objectives, the strategies that govern it, and 
the program of political action it proposes’ (Foucault 2007b: 36). That is to say, 
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what we can question are the tactics arrangements and not just statements (or, 
perhaps we can say that what we are dealing with are tactic!statements). Relating 
this to questioning concerning the tekhn# of technologies of power, we can begin 
by observing that what ‘[w]e must seek…[are]…the pattern of modifications 
which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process’, and 
this because ‘[r]elations of power!knowledge are not static forms of distribution, 
they are “matrices of transformation”’ (Foucault 1978: 99). What we should 
question is the thought or rationality inhabiting the tactics of power, ‘that is, the 
techne which are deployed not only to bring the other’s conduct into compliance 
with a certain rule, but to attempt to transform the other into the subjugated 
subject of their behavior’ (Owen 1994: 159). Taking up the thematic of The Birth of 
the Clinic, this involves practices of seeing and saying, and taking up one of the 
thematics of Discipline and Punish, vis!à!vis discipline, it involves procedures of 
intervention such as hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and the 
examination; that is to say, in involves ways of seeing and saying and thinking 
and doing that are, at one and the same time, practices of intervening and 
transforming: it ‘refers to all the means, techniques, rationalities, forms of 
knowledge and expertise that are to be used to accomplish the enfolding of 
authority’ (Dean 1996: 222!223). In describing these techniques and, more 
specifically, of how various disparate techniques come to be com!posed into an 
overall tactical arrangement or tactical field, we can look at: 
a) The forms of succession of the agent that brings about or is to bring about 
the change. What is being asked here are the different and differential ways in 
which various techniques and their tactical combination are problematized, 
descriptively, as being inefficient, ineffective, too costly, outdated or outmoded, 
and, on the other hand, the prescriptive articulation of the techniques to be 
deployed and employed so as to work matter into form. Regarding the latter, we 
can look into the various technical series: the various types of dependence 
between the techniques proposed, and the various schemata through which these 
techniques are to be combined to form a series. These techniques not only 
concern techniques that are to act upon the actions of the other, they also concern 
techniques that lead said other to act upon their own actions. 
b) The forms of coexistence of these techniques with a much broader 
technical field: techniques formulated elsewhere; techniques that relate to 
different domains of objects, different fields of intervention, and different types 
of discourses; techniques which may be discussed, taken up or rejected, 
combined or modified, and so on and so forth. 
c) The forms of intervention refers to the fact that of all the techniques 
detailed and discussed or that are available to a particular programme, only 
some are presented and proposed (to the exclusion of others). And thus what we 
have to be attentive to is that the techniques thus proposed make it possible to 
specify each programme of control, and to differentiate it from others. In 
addition, we also need to describe how the techniques that are proposed are 
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thematized and/or systematized and thus whose unity comes to form a broader 
tactical field of practices. 
In other words, what we are dealing with here are the ways in which 
discourse that put forward programmes for the formation of a future present that 
seek to replace older techniques with new ones, borrow techniques from other 
domains, and combine these techniques into a broader tactical arrangement. Of 
course, we also need to account for the relation between the specific tactical 
configuration (the agent) and the broader strategic imperative (the end) of a 
programme of control, and vice!versa. That is to say, we need to account for the 
double conditioning of the agents by the end and of the ends by the agent. What 
has to be accounted for here is not only the articulation of certain techniques vis!
à!vis the government of others but also their articulation with techniques of self, 
of the different ways in which governmental technologies seek to colonise and 
mobilise certain aspects of technologies of self.  
 End  
The end is primarily concerned with the for!the!sake!of!which; for Aristotle, the end 
is ‘what the thing is for’ (Aristotle 1992: 38): ‘a thing may be a cause as the end. 
That is what something is for, as health might be what a walk is for’ (Aristotle 
1992: 29). Heidegger refers to this as telos (Heidegger 1977: 8). It concerns what 
we can call the overall objective—the conscious goals, as it were—of a specific 
discourse or technology of power; it refers to what we can call the modes of 
thematization, to the telos or teleology of the articulation of tekhn# and epist#m#. It 
denotes not only to the ways in which the matter, the form , and the agent are 
com!posed and thematized into an overall dispositional strategy, but also to the 
ways in which the subject—as subject and object—is to be inserted, or is to comes 
to insert itself, into an overall governmental drift of pattern. Again, Foucault’s 
archaeology was concerned with the formation or determination of what he 
called thematic or strategic choices (Foucault 1972: 79): ‘what permits the 
individualization of a discourse and gives it an independent existence is the 
system of points of choices which it offers from a field of given objects, a form of 
determinant enunciative scale, and from a series of concepts [read techniques] 
defined in their content and use’ (Foucault 1998: 320). Transposing this into an 
architectural way of seeing and saying, then, it is not so much a predefined end 
that predetermines the matter, the form, or the agent, as it is an end that comes 
into being through the thematization of these three rules of formation. That is to 
say, they open up a space or practical field in which multiple and heterogeneous 
practices congeal or coagulate into ‘a common institutional, administrative or 
political drift and pattern’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 85). 
In relation to ethics, the telos, or end, of ethical life corresponds to the mode 
of being that is the goal of ethics. As Rayner notes, ‘for the ancient Greeks, the 
telos of ethics was self!mastery in order to permit the government of self and 
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others’, for the medieval Christians, it was ‘self!purification for the sake of 
immortality’, and for us moderns, it is ‘authenticity, understood in relation to 
scientific or philosophical knowledge of human nature’ (Rayner 2007: 122). For 
Foucault, whilst ‘an action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also 
moral by its insertion and the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct (Foucault 
1985: 27!28, modified). We can reformulate this in relation to questioning 
concerning technologies of power in the following way: the telos of domination 
refers to the kind of being which power!knowledge relations attempt to produce. 
In relation to control, it refer to ‘the telos of government, that is, the aim, end, 
goal or design, the plans into which they fit, the mode of being we hope to create, 
what we hope to produce in others’ (Dean 1996: 224). To adapt Foucault, we 
might say that ‘a subjugated action aims towards its own accomplishment, but 
also aims beyond the latter to the establishing of a subjugated conduct that 
commits the other to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of 
the subjugated subject’ (Owen 1994: 159). Hence, there are two interrelated ways 
of looking at this: on the one hand, there are the thematics of what we might call 
an overall strategy (i.e. panopticism); on the other hand, there is the thematics of 
the kinds of object of knowledge (connaissance) and the kinds of subjects of power 
that are to be produced by way of the aforementioned strategic power!
knowledge formation (i.e. docility). In relation to knowledge (savoir), we can call 
it the formation of thematics; in relation to power, we can call it the formation of 
strategies (in relation to ethics, it is called teleology). It is this thematic aspect that 
such terms as “panopticism” or the phrase “disciplinary society” proximally and 
nominalistically name. The teleology of control, then, refers to how certain modes 
of conduct are to be ‘incorporated in[to] a pattern of activities and knowledge 
leading to a specific matrix of ends, means, mode of being, or, as Max Weber 
would have put it…[into a]…Lebensführung or “conduct of life”’ (Dean 1996: 224; 
see also Gordon 1987). 
Possible questions to as here concern “the points of diffraction of 
programmes”, “the economy of the programmatic constellation,” and the 
“function the programme under study is to carry out in a field of non!discursive 
practices”. 
a) The points of diffraction of programme under study refer to “points of 
incompatibility”: two or more tactical fields may be conceived but which cannot 
work together without ‘manifest contradiction or inconsequence’ (Foucault 
2002b: 73); “points of equivalence”: two or more dissimilar tactical arrangements 
may be conceived which, whilst manifestly not the same, may be used 
interchangeable or as alternatives; and “points of equivalence”: the ways in 
which a coherent system of matter, form, and agent has been derived. 
 b) The economy of the programmatic constellation accounts for how, out 
of all the different possibilities discussed in a particular programme, out of all the 
partial groupings, regional compatibilities, coherent architectures, and so forth, 
that what is proposed is proposed and not something else. It also seeks to situate 
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the programme under study into a broader discursive field to which it belongs or 
may belong. What relations of analogy, opposition, complementarity, 
differentiations, and so forth does the programme being analyzed have with 
other such programmes?  
 c) The function that the programme under study is to carry out in a field of 
non!discursive practices” can be question by drawing attention to what the 
various authorities under discussion want to happen, and how, in drawing 
together the matter, the form, and the agent, they seek to bring into existence not 
only a future present, but also the kinds of subjects that will fit into and occupy 
this present. In short, we need to question the different and differential ways in 
which what is being constituted or, in any case, what is being put forth, is not 
only modes of existence but also a broader existential contexture in which these 
forms of existence are to be inserted, or are to insert themselves, and in which 
they may come to take their place.  
The matter relates to what is to be governed; the form relates to who is to be 
governed; the agent relates to how this who and this what are to be governed; and 
the end relates to the for!the!sake!of!which that the what is to be shaped into the 
who by way of the how. Or, perhaps another way of rendering this is that matter 
relates to that aspect of the self that forms the problem of government, and that 
form refers to the ways in which individuals are to be invited or incited, induced 
or conduced, into forming a relation to themselves in, by, and through this 
materiality as both a matter of concern and a matter of fact. That the agent not 
only refer to the various techniques in, by, and through which the actions of the 
governed are to be acted upon, but also the techniques in, by, and through which 
individuals and invited and incited, and so on, to act upon their own actions, that 
is, to govern themselves, and the different and differential ways in which these 
two types of techniques—of others, of self—compose to form an overall tactics. 
And of the ways in which the matter, the form, and the agent form a composite 
that is to disposes and/or inclines: a dispositive. 
What is being accounted for here is not just the different ways in which 
what is placed together (composed) and, in that very process, is placed apart 
(arranged) vis!à!vis matter, form, and agent, but also the different and 
differential ways in which matter, form, and agent come to be placed together in 
what is placed together and thus placed apart, and, in addition, the ways in 
which this happens vis!à!vis the relation of the discourse under study to both 
other discursive practices and the non!discursive institutional. In other words, 
what has to be accounted for is a whole complex of entangled and enmeshed 
relations, interrelation, and correlations; derivations, dependencies, 
interdependencies; oppositions, obstructions, and contradictions; mutual 
support, co!dependencies, overall thematics: in short, the ways in which matter, 
form, and agent come to form an overall governmental drift or patter. In other 
words, tactics—as composites of specific articulations of discourses and 
techniques—need to be reconstructed in terms of their being com!posed in 
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strategies, that is, as being ‘a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come 
into play in various strategies’ (Foucault 1978: 100). That is to say, we must 
interrogate such discourses both at the level of ‘their tactical productivity (what 
reciprocal effects of power and knowledge [savoir] they ensure)’ and at the level 
of ‘their strategic integration (what conjunctions and what relations of force 
render their utilization necessary in such and such an episode of the diverse 
confrontations that take place)’ (Foucault 1978: 102, modified). 
 
Of course, not all of the questions have to be asked, and these are not the only 
questions it is possible to ask. What we are dealing with is a complex 
entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous relations, and what has to be 
accounted for is the ways in which these relation come to form the objects, the 
subjects, the tactics, and the strategies of a particular programmes of control and 
the architectonics it expresses. Here, we could say that matter and form—or 
object and subject—relate to the arkh# of the architectonics of control, whilst the 
agent and the end relate to the tekhn# of the programmatic aspect of a discourse 
that puts forward a programme for the formation of a future present; it refer to 
the “practical rationality governed by a conscious goal”. These are less like 
questions to be posed directly (“What is the matter of such and such a 
programme?”, “What is the form of this or that architectonics?”, etc.) than they 
are a general way of posing specific kinds of questions that orientate the ways in 
which we are to approach the specific discourse at hand. That is to say, they are a 
particular way of rendering visible, and thus of rendering intelligible, the 
thought and rationality inhabiting a programme of control and the architectonics 
it articulates. On this view, and somewhat like genealogy and archaeology, an 
architectural analytics is not so much a methodology as it is a method. That is to 
say, it is an approach, a way of seeing and saying, of thinking and doing, of 
posing questions and describing the modes of objectifications, the modes of 
subjectification, the modes of elaboration, and the modes of thematization as 
these are articulated in programmes of control.  
In other words, such questions do not form a procedure that must be 
followed, a checklist to be ticked off when completed. They are more like an 
orientating framework that frames the types of questions and the form of these 
types of questions when questioning human relations in term of power. To 
question human relations in terms of power is to question such relations as 
relations of force. Relations of force, here, do not necessarily mean juridical 
relations or relations of war, but relations questioned in terms of government. To 
question such relations in terms of government is to question them in terms of 
the different and differential ways in which some attempt to conduct the conduct 
of others, in which these others resisting such attempts or, in turn, attempting to 
conduct the conduct of those who are attempting to conduct their conduct, and in 
which the latter, in turn, resist such attempts, ad inf'n'tum. A relation of force here 
is not bodies colliding, but action upon an action, and vice!versa. Such a process 
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does not form a “dialectic”, but is more like an on on!going conversation, a dialog, 
which is less like a ‘face!to!face confrontation’ and more like ‘a permanent 
provocation’ (Foucault 2001d: 342, emphasis added); provocation, here, being a 
name that lends itself to the action of provoking, that is, of calling forth (Latin 
pro! “forth” + vocare “to call”, OED). 
I noted how this set of questions is related to the Aristotelian four!fold of 
causality/obligation and, consequently, to the Heideggerian four!fold of 
technology. Taking a pointer from the later, Dean notes how such questioning 
‘begins with the questions raised by human beings about being’ (Dean 1996: 225); 
or, to be more specific, questioning technology form a Foucaultian perspective, it 
looks as the questioning by human beings of human being (Foucault 1985: 6!7, 
11!12). As such, it ‘captures Heidegger#s formative insight that “the question of 
the meaning of Being must be formulated” (Dean 1996; the citation is from 
Heidegger 1962: 24, H. 5). What this signifies is that the meaning of being cannot 
be separated from the form of questioning that questions the meaning of being. 
Consequently, in undertaking an architectural analytics of the architectonics of 
control, what we are to question ‘is not the way identities and selves are formed 
through a naturalistically conceived process of socialization, but the forms of 
interrogation, or questioning, of what we are and do within [the] horizon 
of…specific and…given practices’ (Dean 1996: 225). What this means is that what 
should be questioned is not specifically behaviours or ideas but the 
problematizations of certain kinds of behaviours and/or specific types of ideas or, 
more specifically, the specific form of such a problematization. Forms of 
problematization are to be interrogated by questioning their rejoinders that take 
the form of explicit programmes. And such programmes are analyzed by looking 
at their descriptions of what is and at their prescriptions of what will be. 
In highly schematic form, and taking organizations as our reference point, 
we can say that the material that is to be worked upon and worked over by 
contemporary architectonics of control is taken to be pregnant with form, and 
that the key element here is not so much action as it is interaction; that the form 
that matter is to be worked into is not compliant docility but a certain 
circumscribed creativity (enthusiastic, motivated, entrepreneurial, innovative, 
unconventional, thinking outside the box, etc.) that is to be brought forth and 
keyed!into; that the agent is not reduction (restriction of movement—corporeally, 
spatially, temporally—, training and dressage, normalization through 
surveillance, etc.) but the reconfiguration of environments (spatial, temporal, 
material; corporeal and cognitive; kinetic and kinaesthetic; ergonomic and 
cybernetic, etc.) that are designed (programmed) to be conducive to and inductive 
of free!flowing movement, communication, and exchange: interaction (e.g. 
Bürolandschaft); and that the end sought is efficiency, only this is sought not 
reductively through the removal of all that is surplus to requirements and through 
the imposition of pre!defined and normalized activity but by way of the market 
and productivity.  
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Another way to think about this is to say that the matter conceptualizes the 
nature of human nature, whereas the form conceptualizes the realization and/or 
actualization of said nature. Likewise, the agent conceptualizes the political order 
conducive to the “good life”, whereas the end conceptualizes the good life itself; it 
is the for!the!sake!of!which that matter is to be shaped into form by way of an 
agent. Of course, there is no linear logic or causality here; rather there is what 
Foucault called the immanence of power and knowledge (and ethics), the 
continuous variations of the relations of power, the double conditioning of tactics by 
strategy and of strategy by tactics, and the tactical polyvalence of discourse in the 
formation of a thematized and strategized for!the!sake!of!which. 
These four “probes”, which can be posed retrospectively in terms of 
description and prospectively in terms of prescription, are not meant to be 
formulaic or systemic; they do not detail four questions or sets of questions that 
have to be asked, independently or in conjunction, when undertaking an 
architectural analytics of the architectonics of control. That is to say, they are not 
designed to produce such statements as: “the matter of this technology of power 
is…x”; “the form is…y”; “the techniques used are such and such”; and “the ends 
sought are this or that”, and so forth. Rather, what we are dealing with here is a 
tight entanglement that is difficult to untangle, and so these probes are meant to 
be more like an overall orientating framework, a way of seeing and saying, of 
questioning and critiquing too, in, by, and through which to render visible the 
arkh# and the tekhn# inhering in and/or embodied by a particular programme of 
control and of the potential futures and modes of existence it seeks to bring into 
being. They are designed to help us think about how such a programme 
conceptualizes, descriptively and prescriptively, the material that is to be worked 
upon and worked over in, by, and through a relation of power; the forms of 
subjectivity to be brought into being or to be abetted by way of that relation; the 
specific techniques, and their composition into tactics, in, by, and through which 
matter is to be worked into form or through which the form inhering in matter is 
to be brought forth—that is, which allow for that relation to be exercised; and the 
overall forms of existence and/or modes of being that are the goal of a specific 
technology of power. These are to be question not only in terms of the 
prescriptive and codifying aspects of the architectonics of control but also in the 
ways in which such prescriptions and codifications are a particular response to a 
specific form of problematization, and of the particular form of problematization 
to which they are a rejoinder. 
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PART  FIVE: CONCLUSION  
It is the possibility of control which gives rise to the idea of a 
purpose. But mankind has in reality no purpose, it functions, it 
controls its own functioning, and it continually creates 
justifications for this control. We have to resign ourselves to 
admitting that these are only justifications. 
(Foucault, ‘Who are you, Professor Foucault?’) 
There can be no real sense of concluding here, if by this we mean a summary of 
findings. What has been presented in the above is nothing more than a rough 
draft, the broadly sketched outline of a possible opening. What I set out to do 
was to pose a question, or a series of questions, and to pose it without any 
intention of providing an answer, let alone the answer. Rather, the aim was to 
work through the question, to see which paths it opened up for us to follow, and 
to see how, in posing the question thus, it threw into relief the problem at hand. 
In writing the thesis, I was quite happy to let each part of the study, in working 
through this series of questions from slightly different angles, to do the work it 
set out to do and then to let that work drop into the background, as it were, and 
remain implicit in what followed. What I want to do here, in winding up the 
thesis, is to make these connections explicit in order to specify where we have 
arrived.  
Studies in governmentality practice a certain form of critique that analyzes 
the will to govern from the position of counter!power and the will not to be 
governed like that or thusly. The critical tool, par excellence, of such studies, as 
these have been practiced by Foucault and others, is history. And yet much 
contemporary studies of governmentality pass over the kinds of historical 
practices practiced by Foucault and other for studies of the more recent past and 
the near future or even of the present itself questioned from within the confines 
of its own frontiers. Rather than criticise such non!historical, though not 
ahistorical, studies negatively, in terms of not being faithful to Foucault, or in 
terms of misinterpretation, misappropriation, and misapplications, and so forth, I 
wanted to approach this positively as being expressive of a genuine concern. This 
concern concerns questioning the exercising of contemporary relations of power, 
as they are to be exercised to!day, from the perspective of theirs and thus our 
contemporality; that is to say, in their own terms. And so an object of enquiry 
came into view, designated its frontiers, set out its terrain, and posed itself in the 
form of a question: if, how, and in what ways might we be able take up and use 
the work of Foucault and others in order to be able to carry out field!work in, on, 
and upon the present. This is something of a tall order given that Foucault’s work 
was historical through and through, and that history itself is more than just an 
object of enquiry; it is, in itself, the means of critique. That said, and the statement 
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in The Archaeology concerning it not being possible for us to know our own 
archive aside, there is nothing explicit or implicit in Foucault’s writing, or in 
those of studies in governmentality more generally, the would rule out such a 
question before it had even been posed. The first risk I took, then, was in thinking 
that taking up the work of Foucault and others in this way was at least a 
possibility. 
In working through this question or this series of questions—working 
through mind, and not answering, as such—I wanted to move beyond two 
modes of appropriation. The first is the taking up of Foucault’s historical 
descriptions of certain modalities of exercising relations of power as either being 
depictions of the present or as being something like models and ideal types, 
which can be superimposed upon the present. The second was to forgo the now 
overused trope of the tool!box approach, which was replaced by what I called a 
work!shop approach. Taking these two together, the aim was not to see how we 
could “apply” Foucault’s “method”, as is, but to work out what took place there 
and to see if we could fashion some tools for ourselves for researching the 
environmentality of governmentality in our contemporality. The second risk 
taken, then, was that doing field!work not of the present but in the present would 
require a major re!think that moved beyond a simplistic Foucaultianism and/or a 
mere applicationism. Working out what took place in Foucault’s analytics of 
power and in studies in governmentality more generally, re!thinking these in 
terms of the question at hand, and then fashioning some tools for ourselves, was 
undertaken in three ways. 
This involved, firstly, working out not so much a general thematic as a 
certain philosophical problematic in the work of Foucault. The aim here was not 
to find a central thread that ran through all of Foucault’s work, and which would 
stich them together into a unified and coherent whole (quilting). Rather, it was to 
disclose a certain philosophical ethos that was practiced by Foucault’s in his 
diverse writings, and to do so in such a way as to make it available, and thus 
usable, in broaching the question of the exercising of relations of power in the 
contemporary order of things and to do so from within that very order. What 
was disclosed here was that, in their diversity, Foucault’s researches on madness 
and the asylum; illness and the clinic; life, labour, and language and the human 
sciences; crime and the prison; governing and governmentality; sexuality and 
ethics; and so forth, practiced a certain mode of rendering visible. What was 
rendered visible is that which is visible but not seen. Here it is not that what we 
do not see has been forgotten, has been buried beneath layer of sematic 
embedding, or has been masked by some interested party. Rather, what is 
rendered visible—vis!à!vis what we are, what we say, and what we do—is 
invisible precisely because it is too much on the surface of things: it is what we 
are, what we say, and what we do. That is to say, it is visible but unseen, and so 
the question then becomes “how do we make this visible!invisible visible to 
ourselves?” 
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Rendering visible, conceptualized here as a Foucaultian philosophical 
practice, does not pass through consciousness; either in terms of internal 
structures of consciousness or in terms of the internal structures of the objects 
experienced by consciousness. But to render visible, in this way, is also not to 
undertake an analysis of behaviour, attitudes, mentalities, sensibilities, and the 
like; that is to say, it does not look at the external conditions that structure 
consciousness. On the contrary, what is questioned is thought, and what 
Foucault undertook was a history of thought. Thought, here, is not questioned in 
terms of mental or cognitive activity, and is thus not questioned in terms of who is 
thinking, what they thought, or in terms of the political, economic, and/or social 
context that gave rise to what they thought. Rather, thought is questioned in 
terms of there being thought, of thought as an event, and thus of thought being a 
thing of this world. What is questioned here is that such and such a thing has 
been thought, and that what was thought was thought and not something else. 
That is to say, to render visible is, on the one hand, to enquire into the material 
and practical conditions of possibility of thought and the material and practical 
conditions that thought, thus thought, makes possible, and, on the other hand, to 
undertake an analytics of the thought thus thought. That is to say, it is to practice 
genealogy and archaeology respectively. The second move made, then, was to 
look at genealogy and archaeology as two different modes of rendering visible. 
In making this second move, I took up a certain conceptualization of Foucault’s 
project, which conceptualised it as having the aim of a genealogy of the subject, 
as having an archaeology of knowledge as its method, and of studying the 
domain of technology conceptualized as the articulation of certain techniques 
and certain kinds of discourse concerning the subject. 
In taking genealogy first, I looked at Foucault’s essay on Nietzsche, and 
from this, proposed an analysis of what I called the structure of genealogical 
diagnosis. This structure involves a certain mode of historical enquiry that 
diagnoses the present by looking at its provenance and emergence. Provenance, 
here, names the field of dispersion, of the heterogeneous multiplicity, from which 
a certain emergence arrives; emergence, on the other hand, names the bringing 
forth of a singularity, a singularity that is still present in our present. 
Undertaking a diagnosis of the present in this way, that is, in terms of its 
contingency, enabled Foucault to strategize the present as an open field of 
possibility (we are freer than we think we are). I noted here, that this structure of 
genealogical diagnosis requires a difference, that this difference was the 
difference that to!day introduced with regards to yesterday, and that in 
questioning the present from the perspective of itself this form of enquiry was 
closed off to us. What was required here was a re!thinking of genealogy and of 
inventing a new genealogy for ourselves; or, in any case, of reconfiguring it, 
specific to our concerns. This was done by moving the slide!rule, as it were, to a 
different position and instead of undertaking a history of the present what was 
proposed, following Rose, was a history of the future. However, this was not to 
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be a history of emergent futures but a history of future emergences; that is, a 
history that conceptualises the present as provent. In other words, what was 
proposed was a questioning of our present that conceptualized that present as a 
field of dispersion from which or out of which a future emergence, and thus a 
future present, might arrive. Formulating the aims of the project in this way 
enables us to do two things: Firstly, it enables us to render visible the present not 
by looking at where we arrived from but by looking at where certain authorities 
want to take us. Secondly, it prevents us from speculating about what our future 
will be or, worse, predicting the shape of things to come; that is, it helps us to 
avoid the inherent dangers of futurology. Here, genealogy is neither a method 
nor a methodology but is more like an orientating framework that frames our 
orientation towards the present. 
But how are we to question the present conceptualized as provenance? 
“How are we to interrogate the provent present?” This entailed a move from the 
aim of our project to its method; from a genealogy of the subject to an 
archaeology of knowledge (savoir). What was proposed here was the taking up of 
Foucault’s archaeology, re!thinking it in the direction of an archaeology of 
problematizations, and looking at how questioning the provent present in terms 
of its problematizations and their rejoinders may, indeed, grant us access to our 
own archive (the visible invisible that we are, say, and do), albeit in finite form. 
In thinking through the kinds of analytical work an archaeology of 
problematizations can do, vis!à!vis questioning the present from the perspective 
of itself, by way of a certain aspect of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological 
difference, I conceptualized problematizations as both a break!down in ongoing 
activity and thus as throwing forth or rendering visible the visible!invisible 
inhering in such activity. Conceptualizing and analyzing problematizations in 
this way is one possible way in which to disclose that which we are (no longer) 
and, by way of analyzing the rejoinders to said problematizations that take the 
form of explicit programmes, make visible something of what we are (in the 
process of) becoming. Questioning the provent present by way of an analytics of 
its problems and their rejoinders is thus one possible way of being able to see and 
say what we are to!day and what our present is. Of course, such an approach 
cannot disclose the present in its totality, but is can render visible certain aspects 
of the present in their specificity, thus maintaining the provent present in the 
dispersion that is its own. 
Following this, the exercising of relations of power was re!thought, through 
the specificity of the concept of government and of governmentality, by way of 
the concept of control. The reason for putting forward this concept is that what it 
names in an unknown, which is to say, as something that is to be rendered visible 
by way of empirical enquiry. Or, stated otherwise, it is to give ourselves an object 
of study that does not rely upon preconceptions of what it is we are researching. 
In other words, it is to bracket out certain established and/or instituted modalities 
of exercising a relation of power—such as discipline, bio!politics, liberalism and 
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its avatars, welfarism, and so froth—so as to get at the specificity of the particular 
programme being studied. Following on from this, and in light of the 
problematic laid out there, the programmatic aspect of technologies of power 
was re!thought in terms of an architectonics of control. Reconceptualising 
government not just as conducting conducts but also as laying out or arranging 
probability, the notion of architectonics is designed to disclose the relationality of 
programmes of control by interrogating the specific techniques, tactics, and so 
forth that will allow for that relation to be exercised. Giving ourselves control as 
the object of enquiry and architectonics as the field in which we are to work has 
been worked out in such a way as to be able to render intelligible the arkh# and 
the tekhn# inhering in such programmes and thus as rendering visible the 
exercising of contemporary relation of power by way of field!work in the 
contemporary. 
Taking up the aim, method, and domain worked out thus, I then put 
forward a way of undertaking such an analytics by way of what I called an 
architectural analytics. In working through what I took to be a certain correlation 
between four types of questions Foucault posed to knowledge, to power, and to 
ethics, and noting a certain correspondence between this archaeological four!fold 
and the Aristotelian four!fold of obligation and, more specifically, the 
Heideggerian four!fold of technology, I put forward four question by which to 
undertake an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control. What was 
suggested here is that in questioning relations of power as they are to be 
exercised to!day from the perspective of this to!day, we can question four!forms 
of conceptualization that concern the matter, the form, the agent, and the end of 
the programmatic aspect of a technology of control. What is being proposed here, 
then, is an architectural analytics for doing field!work in the architectonics of 
control. Such field!work enquiries into the matter that constitutes the object and 
target of power; into the conceptualization of forms of subjectivity that matter is 
to be worked into; into the elaboration of the agent (tactics) that is to transform 
the matter thus constituted into the form thus conceived; and into the 
thematization of the overall end, goal, or strategy of control; the for!the!sake!of!
which matter is to be shaped into form by way of said agent. What I think we can 
render visible in this way is the ways in which such programmes of control 
conceptualize the nature of human nature and the form of its realization and/or 
actualization in the establishment of a certain political order conducive to what it 
takes to be the “good life”. 
One of the central thematics of the thesis has been a discussion of the very 
complex causality and anything but straightforward historical logic to Foucault’s 
histories in which he attempts to describe the transformations and mutations 
between formation, articulation, institutionalization, and instrumentalization. 
One of the costs of questioning the present from the perspective of itself is that 
this complexity is lost to us or, in any case, become much more simplified. On a 
more positive note, on the one hand, in attempting to describe the present from 
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the perspective of itself and its possible future emergences, we are freed from 
such a complex causality. On the other hand, since we are questioning the 
present in terms of the possible future emergences and thus potential future 
presents it embodies, this complex causal logic still applies because things never 
work out as planned, and so it is not possible for us to predict or even to 
speculate upon the shape of things to come. Thus whilst this complex causality is 
lost to us in terms of the detail of historical description, it is also what prevents us 
from regressing into futurology. 
Another central thematic of the thesis, perhaps more as a subtext than 
overtly stated, is that what has been presented here occludes the combination of a 
Foucaultian analytics, diagnostics, and strategics, with more interpretivist or 
ethnographic modes of enquiry and their respective research methodologies. This 
has not been put forward from an anti!sociological stance. Rather, it is the effect 
of a perceived incommensurability between the work of Foucault and such 
methodologies. My concern here is that in using the work of Foucault to interpret 
interviews, for example, it is difficult to see how one could separate out the 
thought and rationality inhering in a programme, that is, its architectonics, from 
the opinions, desires, meanings, and beliefs, and so forth, of the interviewee. It is 
also difficult to see how such an approach could be reconciled with Foucault’s 
critique of the analytic of finitude. The problem with ethnographic studies, on the 
other hand, is somewhat different, although not unrelated. Here, the problem 
would be that what is being observed by way of ethnography is not only the 
manifestations of power, but also that the practices being observed may not, and 
quite often will not, conform to the original programme. And this because things 
never work out as planned. But it is also difficult to see how such ethnographies 
could render visible the real but unprogrammed effect and the different ways in 
which they are reintegrated, by way of instrumentalization, back into the original 
programme. My point here is not that such approaches are impossible. Rather, 
and given Foucault’s aversion to interpretation (i.e. passing through the “being of 
“man””), it is both difficult to see how this could be done and, in any case, it is a 
highly problematic enterprise to betroth the work of the former to the methods of 
the latter. 
Analyzing relations of power from the perspective of the present by way of 
an architectural analytics that questions the matter, the form, the agent, and the end 
of an architectonics of control can be seen to be a more effective way of drawing 
out the thought and rationalities evidenced in prescriptive discourses prescribing 
the exercising of those relations than can be demonstrated by the imposition of a 
late eighteenth century political programme upon present!day practices. These 
questions, however, are not formulaic; they are analytical. In drawing attention to 
the four aspects of the exercising of contemporary relations of power, such an 
architectural analytics better captures the “how” or, better still, the thought 
inhabiting this “how” and the rationality it expresses, of such practices than does 
an appeal to and the application of models, archetypes, or ideal types, and the 
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imposition of these upon the present. Let us say, remaining at an all too general 
level, that contemporary technologies of power are ergonomically designed; that 
there is a fit between these technologies and the “minds”, bodies, and activities 
that they seek to direct; that they attempt to gear!into us as our conduct is guided 
by them; that they attempt to conduct our conduct by inducing in us a 
conducting of our own conduct; and that they attempt to do this not through 
determination or imposition but through disposition; that is, by environing 
horizons of probability. The question left for us to work through is how various 
authorities want this to happen.  
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